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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the causes and macroeconomic effects of the budget deficit in Oman
during the period 1986-1990. From 1986 onwards the budget deficit became very high, and national
saving, national investment, economic growth were declining. The Omani economy is an oil based,
small, open economy. Oil exports constitute 87% of total exports. Oil income predominates GDP
(60%) and government revenue (88%). Despite these facts, the oil sector is an enclave sector
exerting its effects on the economy financially through the government budget but not physically
through real economic interactions.
Examining the impact of budget deficit requires that it is carefully measured. The commonly used
measurement methods are the conventional (or the public debt) concept of deficit and many special-
purpose concepts, e.g. the budget balance reflecting the impact on aggregate demand. Although the
conventional concept has some drawbacks such as the inclusion of the inflation effect and the effect
of the previous year's deficit, i.e. interest payments on previous debt, it was found that these effects
in the case of Oman are minimal and do not make a great difference.
The causes found to be responsible for the deficit are divided into two categories: those relating to
the expenditure side of the budget and those relating to the revenue scale. In the first category, two
kinds of causes can be distinguished: general causes which affect whole public spending such as
administrative setbacks and population growth, and particular causes relating to each type of public
spending such as increasing wages and salaries and increasing defence expenditure. On the revenue
side, declining oil prices, higher cost of oil production, small proportion of non-oil revenues and the
depreciation of the dollar are the main causes of the deficit. The fluctuation of oil prices was found to
be responsible for 40-60% of the actual government budget imbalances.
Regarding the macroeconomic effects of deficit, the overall evidence pointed to a negative impact on
national saving, national investment, private consumption, and the balance of payments. The decline
of oil revenue, cutting public investment expenditure and increasing public consumption are the
adverse economic consequences of the deficit that led to the negative macroeconomic effects.
The suggested approach to coping with the deficit is based on three pillars: rationalising public
spending, improving the sources of financing and the diversification of the economy.
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Introduction
Oman started its development programmes in the early 1970s with its economy
almost at a subsistence level. A modern government did not exist. Public services
such as education, health, communications, etc., were almost at zero level.
Agriculture, fisheries, trading, handicrafts were the main sources of income for the
population.
Oil production began in the early 1960s and regular commercial crude oil exports
began on 1 August 1967 at 64 thousand barrels. In 1968 it rose to 244 thousand
barrels. The oil price was extremely low at $1.82/b. In 1971 it increased to
$2.22/b.
The period 1970-1975 was the period of the institutional foundation of the
government. The government structure had been formulated and the basic political,
social and economic directions had been shaped. In 1975 the government began to
fulfil systematic development plans to modernise the economy and to transfer it
from a subsistence economy to a modern one in which the private sector played the
leading role.
With the rise of oil price in 1973 and 1974 to $3.13/b and $11.4/b respectively, the
oil sector began to fuel the economic development. Oil production constituted 69%
of total GDP in 1970. Oil exports were increasingly dominating total exports. In
1975 it formed almost 100%.
The government raised its share in the ownership of the oil producing company
PDO. By 1975 the government share was 60% of the company's capital. Oil
surpluses from exports accrued to the government. Oil revenues increased from RO
45m in 1970 to RO 373m in 1975 and RO 1109.5m in 1980. Government
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expenditure increased from RO 20.6m in 1970 to RO 495.0m in 1975 and RO
949.8m in 1980. The government expenditure was channeled into building public
administration, defence and national security, and to provide social infrastructure
and services such as education, health and structural infrastructure, roads, airports,
sea ports and water resources.
From 1975 to 1995 the government executed four development plans. As will be
shown, remarkable performance has been achieved in public services. The standard
of living of the population has improved tremendously.
During this time the economy became more dependent on oil. The sector of
agriculture and fisheries, which had been the main source of gross domestic
product, had lost its importance. Its participation in total GDP fell from 37% in
1967 to 2.5% in 1985. The economy, on the other hand, became more dependent
on government revenues. The state has been providing all public services. Its total
expenditure recorded 68% of GDP in 1975, 46% in 1980, and 55% in 1985. The
state became the main source of investment. Public investment recorded 77% of
total investment in 1975, 70% in 1980 and 1985. In 1990 and 1995 it was 68.5%
and 60% respectively.
Therefore, the private sector has not been developing properly despite the
government's strategy adopted to create a private sector led economy. Within the
private sector, the reliance on the expatriate labour force was increasing. The
expatriates increased from 74,000 in 1975 to 154,000 in 1980, 313,000 in 1985 and
430,000 in 1993. Their number has been increasing by 10% per annum. The Omani
labour force increased from 135,000 in 1975 to 152,000 in 1980, 192,000 in 1985
and 240,000 in 1993. Their proportion in total labour force has been falling from
64% to 50%, 38% and 35.8% during these years respectively. Their number has
been rising by only 5.6% per annum. Despite the noticeable quantitative
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development of the Omani labour force due to education and vocational training
programmes, this development was not in balance with the needs of the private
sector both quantitatively and qualitatively.
The Omani economy, in short, became increasingly strained by two problems:
heavy reliance on the government and high dependence on the oil sector. In other
words, the development strategy did not succeed to put the country in a private-
sector led economy and self-sustained development. Accordingly, the government
budget has been suffering from semi-chronic deficit. During the period 1972-1995
the government budget has been in deficit except for a few years, namely 1979,
1980 and 1981. The deficit recorded 13% of GDP in 1972, 16% in 1973, 10% in
1974 and 14% in 1975. Not very long after enjoying a surplus of 2.5%, 11.5%,
1.5% of GDP during 1979-81, the deficit occurred again recording 9%, 11%, 10%
in 1982, 1984 and 1985 respectively. However, when the oil price declined to
$13/b in 1986 (compared to $36/b in 1980), the budget deficit went up to 25% of
GDP.
The government applied particular measures to cope with the problem, the first of
which was a tangible cut of its expenditure, especially development expenditure.
Thanks to the measures adopted and the rise of oil prices in 1990 because of the
Gulf Crisis, the government managed to reduce the deficit to 0.3% of GDP. In
1991 the government started to execute the fourth plan. One of the main objectives
of the plan was to achieve a balanced budget by the end of the plan in 1995. In
reality, however, the government expenditure resumed its momentum and a deficit
of 13% of GDP was recorded in 1992. In 1993 and 1994, it was 11% and 10%
respectively. By the end of 1995, the deficit was still at 9% of GDP.
The aim of this thesis is to study the causes of the budget deficit in Oman, and to
analyse its macroeconomic effects on the Omani economy. The objective of this
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thesis is also to examine the policy that was adopted to reduce and to finance the
deficit.
The budget deficit was chosen to be the subject of this thesis for three reasons:
1. To investigate the internal economic and social reasons that lie behind the
intensive intervention of the government in the economic activities and
accordingly its rising expenditure which was increasing during 1970-1995 by
28% per annum on average.
2. To explain the external effects of the world oil market that induced fluctuating
trends on the public finance and the private sector due to the heavy reliance on
one single commodity, the price of which is completely out of government
control. When oil prices jumped to $36/b in 1980, the government budget
gained the highest surplus during the oil boom of 11.5% of GDP, but when
oil prices sank to $13/b in 1986 the government revenue declined by 31% and
the budget recorded the biggest deficit so far of RO 700 million, i.e. 25% of
GDP.
3. To assess the deficit reducing and financing policies which have deep and
long-term macroeconomic effects on the Omani economy. Cutting investment
expenditure has negative effects on social and structural infrastructure.
External borrowing and the withdrawals from the state's General Reserve
Fund to finance the deficit have been using up the oil resources and
accelerating the depletion of the oil wealth.
More attention will be paid to the period 1986-1990 for two reasons: First, this
period has witnessed the worst fiscal situation of the government and accordingly
very difficult conditions for the Omani economy. Oil prices plummeted to $13/b on
average and to $8/b in August 1986. The average price during this period was
$16.3/b whereas the average price during 1981-1985 was $31/b. Oil revenues
declined by 31% in 1986 and were not restored to their 1985 level until 1990.
Introduction	 12
During this period the budget deficit recorded its highest levels. It peaked in 1986 at
25% of GDP, with a 97% rise on the 1985 deficit. The public debt figure jumped
from RO 648.1 million at the end of 1985 to RO 1027.3 million in December 1990,
i.e. it rose by 58.5%. Accordingly, all economic indicators were repressed. In 1986
the GDP went down by 26%. It was restored to its 1985 level only in 1990.
National saving declined by 48% in the same year and national investment went
down by 5.7% and by 37% in 1987.
Second, to examine the economic development strategy of the state that was formed
in 1975. The main objectives and policies of this strategy were to invest the oil
resources in diversified income-generating projects in order to augment, and finally
replace, the ample and depleting oil income, taking into account the unpredictable
changes of the oil world market. The means with which oil resources were sought to
be invested were intended to safeguard the best use of these resources, to give
strength to, and to secure the future progress of, the Omani economy. The strategy
also aimed to balance regional distribution of the fruits of development in order to
maintain the existing geographical balance of the population. It was intended that
the Omani economy would be led by an efficient private sector free from
monopolistic practices. After forming the strategy, a series of development plans
have been implemented in an attempt to achieve the broad outline of these long-term
targets and policies.
The period under study was one link in this series of development plans. Therefore,
it is important to see to what extent these targets have been achieved, to what extent
the above difficult conditions have interrupted the development efforts, and what are
the lessons that can be learnt to reform new development strategies.
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Primary sources and problems of data
Three main sources of data have been used: primary sources, books and articles.
These are all mentioned in the bibliography list. I would like here to focus on the
primary sources and problems thereof.
The primary sources are government documents of previous development plans,
official annual reports, statistical year books, and other government publications. I
have visited several ministries and other government units. From the Ministry of
Finance and Economy I collected the documents of the state general budget of the
previous years, particularly of the period under study. I also collected the financial
accounts of those years. They benefittod the present study a great deal, because they
provided the raw material about the government's finance, i.e. the official figures
about government expenditure and revenue, both projected and actual.
From the Ministry of Development (previously the Development Council), I
collected the documents of development plans and the statistical year books. These
documents contain very important information about the Omani economy both
public and private sectors. They provide statistics about sources and uses of the
gross domestic product, investment expenditure, employment, the population and
the labour force. The Ministry also provided me with some studies and reports
issued by international institutions such as the IMF and the WBDC.
Several visits were made to the Central Bank of Oman. Its annual reports were of
considerable benefit to my work. They cover many topics related to the issues
investigated through different chapters of the thesis such as GDP growth, oil sector
development, money and banking, consumer price index, and international trade.
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Oman Chamber of Commerce and
Industry have published some studies and reports about commerce and
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manufacturing sectors. I have used these resources in my analysis of related
subjects.
The problems I have faced are related to the delay in publication of statistics and
information about the economy when a particular year has finished. Data and
statistics were issued a long time after the end of the period concerned.
Some statistics are contradicted by the statistics of other government publications.
For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries has conducted an
agricultural survey and found that the number of employees in the sector of
agriculture and fisheries in 1993 was 163,000. The number of Omani employees
was 123.9 thousand, i.e. 67% of total agricultural employment. The Ministry of
Development, in contrast, has found, through the general census of the same year,
that the agricultural employment was 62.8 thousand and the Omani employees were
21.4 thousand, i.e. 35% of agricultural employment. These two contradictory
figures about agricultural employment give very discrepant implications regarding
the population reliance on agriculture and fisheries. Bearing in mind the average
family size of 7.4 (according to the census), 58.5% of the population relies on
3.6% of GDP if we take the figures of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
into consideration. However, if we consider the figures announced by the Ministry
of Development, 9.6% of the population relies on 3.6% of GDP. Although this
problem does not fall within the bounds of my thesis, it faced me in the discussion
of the main characteristics of the Omani economy and I have tried to explain it (see
chapter one).
Another problem related to my study is the lack of previous studies about the Omani
economy in general and in fiscal and monetary policy in particular. For example, no
studies have been done on inflation or consumption or government expenditure and
economic growth.
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Literature Survey
While there is substantial literature on budget deficits for developed countries,
particularly for the USA, the material is quite sparse for the developing countries.
In spite of the urgency and the importance that is being attached to this issue, it is
surprising that there has been no systematic study of this area for many of the
developing countries. The investigation of this problem in the oil producing
countries in particular has not received any attention. I have found only a few
articles about budget deficit in the Gulf States, two of which are the most important:
one is about the case of Kuwait and the other is about the United Arab Emirates (I
will comment on them later). The lack of literature about the issue in these countries
can be explained by the fact that the issue is quite recent in these economies.
The literature on the subject consists mostly of discussions of different aspects of
the problem that had been experienced in different countries such as budget deficit
and inflation, budget deficit and national saving, budget deficit and interest rate,
etc. The best examples of this type are two books: Essays in Contemporary
Economic Problems edited by Philip Cagan (1981) and Debt, Deficit and Economic
Peifonnance, edited by Mario Baldassari and others (1993).
The second type of literature is written on one single country's experience during a
particular period of time. The best two examples of this type are Deficit Spending
and the National Income, by Henry H. Vilard (1941) and Deficit Financing and
Economic Development by R.G. Kullcarni. The first book consists of four parts: the
problem of business cycle, the theoretical effects of deficit spending (e.g. the
concept of multiplier), analysis of the public expenditure in the US during the
period 1923-1938, and the conclusion. The second book is divided into two parts:
theoretical foundation and analysis of the Indian finances during 1792-1945 and
1946-1951. The definition foundation includes a definition of deficit financing, and
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the economic significance of balanced and unbalanced budgets. The analysis of the
Indian finances is a discussion of deficit financing in India during the process of
economic development.
The third type of literature are articles and essays published in a wide range of
economic and management periodicals. A variety of topics revolving around the
budget deficit have been addressed. IMF staff papers assumed the lion's share in
this type of literature due to the availability of data on the one hand, and as a part of
the IMF function to investigate the financial problems of developing countries and
advising them to follow its prescriptions on the other.
The other observation is that most of the literature concentrates on the implications
and effects of budget deficit. There has been little attention given to the causes of
the problems. The phenomenon of increasing public spending as a main cause of the
problem has been mostly emphasised. This phenomenon, which started after the
second world war in the industrial countries, and after the movements of
independence in developing countries, has attracted most of the attention of public
finance economists. The backwardness of the taxation system in developing
countries, which is the other main cause of the problem, has received less
consideration in the literature and consequently in practical reforms.
After these general comments, let us now make some critical points on the literature
with special reference to developing countries in general and oil producing countries
in particular.
Since alternative formulations of budget balance can give significantly different
indications, careful discussion on the appropriateness of the use of various concepts
for specified purposes and of the relative merits of different approaches is an
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essential prerequisite for careful investigation of the causes of the budget deficit and
clear analysis of its impacts on the economy.
Bleyer and Cheasty (1991), and Chelliah (1973) have made valuable contributions
to this discussion. Bleyer and Cheasty distinguished between several concepts of
budget deficits. Firstly, they draw a general framework within which the budget
deficit is defined. The comparison between so many concepts of budget balance
made their work quantitative but not qualitative. They did not elaborate sufficiently
on each of those concepts. They did not point out the difficulties and shortcomings
of the application of such concepts in the real world.
Chelliah's work in contrast is more concentrated. He studied three concepts of the
budget balance: the public debt concept, the budget balance reflecting change in net
worth and the budget balance reflecting impact on aggregate demand. He elaborated
more on the latter. He discussed the practical issues encountered in applying this
concept such as the treatment of government lending and government borrowing
regarding their impacts on aggregate demand.
From the point of view of developing countries, most of these concepts of the
budget balance are far from reality because they need an advanced database which
these countries are lacking. On the other hand, the structure of public finance of oil
producing countries is quite different from that of industrialised countries in which
these concepts are more easily applicable. For example, the treatment of oil revenue
as internal revenue is questionable since these revenues are not derived from an
economic activity integrated with the local economy. The extraction of oil revenues
does not affect local economy activities. In my study, oil revenue will be treated as
external revenue. Therefore, the concepts of budget deficit need some modification
to measure government transactions of oil countries properly. That is to say, special
work is needed to fill this gap.
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As for empirical studies on budget deficit in developing countries, William Easterly
and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (1992) and Gupta (1992) conducted complementary
works. They tried to study the problem comprehensively. In other words, these two
works attempted to cover all dimensions - causes, effects and remedies - and not
only confined to one aspect. The first one is a paper of 70 pages summarising the
results of ten case studies of developing countries: Argentina, Chile, Colombia,
Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Thailand and Zimbabwe. The
merit of the study is its comprehensiveness. It controlled the different aspects of the
problem. It investigated the causes of the budget deficit on each country through
analysing the sensitivity of deficits to foreign variables such as export prices and
foreign interest rates, and to domestic macroeconomic variables such as inflation,
real interest rate and real exchange rate. The study also covered the most important
implications of the deficit: inflation, money supply and the private sector response
to public deficit via private consumption and private investment. However, there are
some serious imperfections in this study. It is based on different measures of budget
deficits. For example, in comparing the significance of deficit of the countries
under study it depended on primary deficits which range, due to varying degrees to
data, from the central government to the total consolidated public sector. In
analysing the causes of deficits it adopted the consolidated non-financial public
sector deficit, whereas it examines the consequences of deficit in the light of the
consolidated total (non-financial) plus quasi-fiscal public sector deficits. In addition,
some data of the countries examined covered different years. Thus, the results of
the study cannot be accepted with sufficient confidence.
Gupta's work is a small-sized book of 190 pages. It is a comparative study of 10
Asian countries: India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand. It focuses on the following aspects of
the budget deficits in these countries: their sustainability; their effects on aggregate
demand; the channels through which budget deficits engender these effects; the
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irrelevance of the mode of financing a given budget deficit; and effects on
monetisation, money growth and inflation. The period covered is unified. It extends
from 1961 to 1985. The concept of budget deficit used in this study is also unified.
The difference between Gupta's study and Easterly/Schmidt-Hebbel's study is that
Gupta has applied the same analytical tools on the data of all the countries covered,
whereas Easterly/Schmidt-Hebbel's study is a comparison between the results of
separate studies that might have applied different techniques. Despite these facts,
Gupta has come to many inconclusive results regarding the impact of budget deficits
on aggregate demand, money growth and inflation in his sample of countries.
From the point of view of oil producing countries, Al-Ibrahim (1989) and Al-
Yousef (1993) have contributed with two papers.
Al-Ibrahim focused on the budget deficit in Kuwait during the period 1981-1989.
He suggested the comprehensive balance in which the return of general reserve fund
and the next generation fund should be added to the list of revenues. In this case the
budget would record a surplus but the lack of availability of data makes the
adoption of this concept difficult.
In analysing the causes of the deficit, he attributed the deficit to the increase in
public expenditure and the decline of oil revenues between 1981-1989 by 50%. The
causes of increasing government expenditure are similar to that of Oman because
the structure of both governments and societies are similar. There were two sources
of deficit financing: withdrawal from the general reserve fund and selling treasury
bills (internal borrowing). The same sources are used in Oman. The government in
Kuwait started to use the second option in November 1987 while in Oman it was
first used in January 1990. He criticised the adoption of the first source since it
leads to the erosion of the government assets. The second source was expected to
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attract the Kuwaiti resources invested abroad but it did not succeed. In confronting
the deficit, the writer suggested introducing new taxes and rationalising public
expenditure. In the long-term, however, this solution is not adequate in his opinion
because the problem originally refers to disequilibrium between the structure of
government assets and revenues on the one hand, and the government's long-term
social and political commitments on the other hand.
Al-Yousef studied the budget deficit of the UAE in the decade 1980-1990. The
deficit was caused - as in Kuwait - by the decline of oil revenues and continuous
increase in public expenditure. The writer pointed out that the United Arab Emirates
has financed its deficit by drawing from its general reserves and borrowing
domestically.
For long-term confrontation of the deficit he suggested the devaluation of the local
currency (Dirham) and the diversification of the economy. Through diversified
economy, he suggested imposing some taxes. Taxes would rationalise consumption,
increase the responsibilities of the tax payer, and would provide the government
with financial resources. He predicted that oil prices will not exceed $20/b during
1991-2005 so he placed more importance on rationalising public expenditure.
Neither paper has discussed the effects of budget deficit on the local economies of
Kuwait or United Arab Emirates.
From an Islamic economic perspective, three papers on the subject were submitted
to the Higher Advisory Council for Implementation of the Islamic Shari'ah in
Kuwait, in January 1993.
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The first was written by Mohamed Anas Al-Zarqua, the second by M. Mundher
Quhf, and the third by Refaat Al-Awadhi. They all stressed three points: the
importance of the rationalisation of government expenditure, applying the Islamic
techniques of financing and the prohibition of borrowing with interest. I will
comment on the first paper as an example.
Al-Zarqua first stressed the importance of the Islamic prioritisation of government
expenditure. He then argued that the deficit can be reduced by cutting expenditure
and cancelling some other items of expenditure and by increasing fees on
government services and taxes. He has not said which part of expenditure can be
reduced or abolished. He also did not say how the policy of increasing fees and
taxes can be accepted by the public, and how such a policy can be justified
according to the Islamic law. AI-Zarqua suggested some financing methods through
which the Islamic government can run its projects and public utility units such as
mudarabah, ijarah, musharakah, and murabahah. Such methods are applied
nowadays by Islamic banks with individuals and companies in the private sector, but
their applicability has not been tried in public finance.
Three concluding remarks can be made from the literature survey.
First, budget deficit (particularly its causes) needs more and improved investigation
in developing countries. This observation is more applicable to the case of oil
exporting countries, in which this thesis tried to take a small part.
Second, the availability and quality of data are both crucial factors for a good
diagnosis of the problem of budget deficit on the one hand. On the other hand,
homogenous data and unified measures of the budget deficit are essential for useful
comparative studies. The main source of discrepancies has been the different
coverage of the public sector in the countries compared.
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Third, most of the results of econometric models, due partially to data problems,
are by no means definitive. Thus, where the data may be a source of problems,
diagrammatic and tabular data representations are more useful to draw good
inferences about the causality of the budget deficit, the technique that will be
adopted in this thesis.
The Plan of the Study 
An adequate treatment of the subject under study necessitates addressing many
major issues relating to the budgetary policy and its impact on the Omani economy.
The general objectives and policies of budgeting must be distinguished. The
organisation of the budget and the budgeting techniques have to be explained. A
conceptualisation process of the budget deficit is essential to make the discussion
logical and the arguments clear. The core of the subject consists of three major
topics: the causes of the budget deficit, the macroeconomic effects of the deficit and
the evaluation of the policy adopted by the government to tackle the problem. Three
chapters have to be assigned to cover these three topics. A prerequisite of all these
is a comprehensive review of the Omani economy to understand its structure and its
main characteristics.
To control the discussion of all these aspects and issues the thesis will be organised
in six chapters.
Chapter one is appropriated to review the Omani economy. The Omani economy
can be divided into three main sectors: the oil sector, the non-oil commodity sector
and the service sector. They will be discussed in three sections. Three other topics
will be addressed: the role of the government in the Omani economy, the
demographic characteristics and the foreign trade. The three main sectors of the
economy will be assessed through their contributions in the main macroeconomic
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variables, i.e. gross national product, exports, and employment. Special attention
will be given to the oil sector due to its leading role.
Chapter two discusses the government's budgeting in Oman: objectives, policies and
mechanism. It is divided into three sections. In section one the government as a link
between the oil sector and other sectors is explained. It explains how the rent
received from exports is concentrated in the hands of the state which establishes the
links between the oil sector and the rest of the economy. In section two, the
objectives and policies of budgeting in Oman are distinguished. It is explained in
this section how the objectives and policies of budgeting are deductive from the
main aims of the five-year plan and how these are derived from the long-term
objectives of the development strategy. This step is necessary to understand the
environment in which the budget is working. In section three the organisation of
budgeting is detailed. This section shows the cycle through which the budgeting
process is fulfilled. It also explains the classification of the budget items and
explains the advantages and disadvantages of each type of classification and the
economic and administrative purposes of classifying expenditure and revenue items.
This step is important in recognising the structure of the budget and the main sectors
of expenditure and revenue.
Chapter three examines the techniques of measuring budget deficit. The correct
measurement of the budget deficit is vital for correct diagnosis of economic
problems and accordingly appropriate fiscal policies. This chapter presents the
different definitions of budget deficit and their analytical purposes, and the most
appropriate one for the case of Oman. Therefore, this chapter represents the
conceptualisation section of the study.
Chapter four is devoted to analysing the causes of the budget deficit. It is divided
into two sections. Section one presents a review of the evolution of the budget
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deficit in Oman, from 1970 to 1995. This will be conducted through tracing the gap
between the government revenue and expenditure. This section will make a
comparison between the budget deficit in Oman and other GCC countries, and the
group of developing countries in which Oman falls. Such a comparison is
significant in judging the magnitude of the budget deficit in Oman. After
distinguishing the significance of the budget deficit, section two will analyse the
causes that lie behind the occurrence and contentions of the deficit. This will be
conducted through studying the behaviour of government expenditure and
government revenue. The first subsection diagnoses the causes of the increase of
government expenditure. Two types of causes will be distinguished: general causes
and particular causes related to each type of government expenditure. The second
subsection analyses the factors that govern the government revenue. They are the
structure of government revenue, oil prices, oil production, and the depreciation of
the dollar.
In chapter five, the macroeconomic effects of the budget deficit on the Omani
economy will be examined. The impact of the deficit depends on how they are
financed. The impacts include the impact of deficit on monetary and financial
markets, aggregate demand and the balance of payment. Thus, this chapter will be
divided into four sections. Section one presents a general insight into the mode of
deficit financing. It examines the structure of deficit financing during the past
development plans. It also analyses the direct effects of such financing on the
position of public debt and the balance of foreign assets. Section two analyses the
effects of the budget deficit on money supply and inflation. Section three examines
the consequences of the deficit on aggregate demand. This will be done through the
analysis of the effect of the deficit on private investment, private consumption and
output growth. Section four discusses the impact of the budget deficit on the balance
of payments. Two kinds of impact will be distinguished: the direct effect of the
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budget on the balance of payments and the indirect effect through the exchange rate
mechanism.
After investigating the causes of budget deficit and examining its macroeconomic
consequences on the whole economy, the question that emerges is how has the
government tackled this problem? This will be addressed in chapter six that will
assess the policy by which the financial authority tackled the problem. This
assessment will be organised in three sections. Section one will define a "standard"
by using a set of criteria that make the budget decision prudent. Accordingly
Oman's budget deficit will be examined as to what extent it approached this
standard. Section two will evaluate the fiscal policy in controlling the problem and
how this policy has worked. The fiscal policy adopted two measures: cutting public
expenditure and devaluating the Omani Rial. The first measure will be assessed in
light of its advantages and disadvantages. The second will be evaluated as to what
extent this policy has achieved its goals. Having assessed the official policy against
the problem, section three will present our suggested approach. It consists of three
main elements discussed in three subsections: rationalising public expenditure,
improving the sources and techniques of financing, and diversification of the
economy.
Finally, the concluding remarks provides a summary of the main results found and
main points developed through the discussion of the several aspects of the subject.
The concluding remarks are of three main types: those drawn from the first chapter
which presents the main characteristics of the Omani economy; those deducted from
the core of the thesis (chapters 3, 4 and 5), which address the financial imbalances
and their macroeconomic consequences on the economy; and third, the main points
suggested to tackle the problem.
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The first type of remarks shed light on the main structural difficulties of the Omani
economy and give signals for the strategic reforms required to put the economy in
the correct way ahead.
The second type of conclusions point at the financial difficulties of the government
and focus on the main points of weakness in the financial structure of the
government.
Finally, the main suggested points represent the practical actions that can be taken
to correct the wrong trends within the public finance. They also suggest linking the
financial remedy with the structural reforms represented in the diversification
policy.
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CHAPTER I
STRUCTURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
OMAN! ECONOMY
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of the structure of the Omani
economy. Despite the fact that this thesis is concerned mainly with public finance, the
correlation between this sector and the other sectors in the economy is so strong in
Oman that it cannot be ignored. For example, government expenditure is the major
motive for the growth in output of the other sectors.
The distinctive characteristic of the Omani economy will be presented in six sections:
1. The Oil sector
2. The commodity sector
3. The service sector.
4. The role of the government in the Omani economy
5. Demographic characteristics and the labour force
6. Foreign trade
However as an introduction to the discussion of these six sections, it is important to
present a historical background of the institutional and basic infrastructural foundation,
the growth and the sectoral formation of the Omani economy.
I. Historical Background of the Omani Economy
The official name of the state is the Sultanate of Oman. It occupies most of the south-
eastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula and has a coast-line that extends more than
1700 km from the Straits of Hormuz in the north to the frontier with the Yemeni
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Republic. It is located between latitudes 16 40°N and 26 20°N and longitudes 50'E
and 59 40'E.
The recorded history of Oman began with the appearance of the Arabs in the second
century BC when Arab tribes from Yemen and from the north entered Oman. These
tribes were the origins of the present Omani tribes.
The most important phase in the history of Oman has been the Islamic era. Under
Islam the country has been unified and a new political, legislative and social system
based on Islamic principles has emerged in Oman.
After the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, Oman started to play an important role
in international trade and witnessed an important phase of development during the 17th
Century. In 1649 the Omanis succeeded in eliminating the Portuguese presence in
Oman and East Africa and a new era in the history of Oman and its role in the African
continent began. Oman was able to maintain a strong fleet and emerged as the most
important naval power in the Indian Ocean. It witnessed a long era of boom in trade,
construction and development, and territorial extension. A vast empire was formed
extending from Baluchistan Province (on the south-eastern border of Pakistan), to East
Africa. The empire continued to develop its naval power and in 1749 Ahmed Bin
Sa'id came to power and laid the foundation for the rule of Al Bu Sa'id family.
In the 19th century, the international situation changed and the great powers began to
reinforce their presence in the area, supported by a strong naval presence, consisting of
steam-driven ships.At the same time, the international trade route was changed to the
Suez Canal. A long period of stagnation followed, until 1970 when His Majesty Sultan
Qaboos Bin Sa'id came to power.
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In fact the development of modern Oman only started in this year. Before 1970 Oman
completely lacked the basic requirements of a modern state. There were no
government agencies or ministries in the modern sense. Oman was completely isolated
and hardly affected by the developments that were taking place in other parts of the
world.
H.	 The Institutional and Basic Infrastructural Foundation of the Omani
Economy: 1970-1975 
Before July 1970 there were only three state schools in Oman, employing 30 teachers
who were educating 900 boys at primary level. By the 1973/74 academic year the
number of schools had increased to 110, including six preparatory schools and one
secondary school. There were 1225 teachers and the number of pupils had reached
34,830. Between 1970 and the end of 1973 the number of hospitals in Oman had
increased from 5 to 15, the number of beds provided increased from 276 to 825; the
number of doctors rose from 33 to 122 and the number of nurses and ancillary
personnel from 132 to 375. Public health compounds were being established to deal
with preventative medicine. Low-cost housing was on the government's list of
priorities.
New ports were constructed at Mutrah and at Raysut in Dhofar. The international
airport was completed in September 1972. At the end of 1970 there existed only 10
km of asphalt-surfaced road and 1,800 km of graded roads with maintained natural
surface. By the middle of 1974 these extended from the capital area to the borders
with the United Arab Emirates, a network of roads had been built around Salalah in the
Dhofar region and other asphalt roads had been built. These transport facilities
reduced the cost of Oman's imports.
It is worth noting that about 93% of government investment expenditure in the period
1970-1974 was directed towards projects for the development of economic and social
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infrastructure. Consequently, one may say that the period up to 1975 represents a
stage of building up economic and social infrastructure without which no economic
growth could be achieved.
On 17 November, 1973, the General Development Organisation became the Ministry
of Development. In common with previous planning and development units this
ministry continued to exercise both planning and executive functions. Under its
executive jurisdiction it continued to carry out the activities relating to the economic
sectors for which no separate ministries existed. These were: the Sectors of
Agriculture, Irrigation and Fisheries; Mining and Petroleum; Commerce and
Manufacturing.
At the same time the administrative organisation of the Omani economy was taking
place. The administrative process of the economy has undergone several organisational
changes since 1970.
On November 17, 1974, the Council of Ministries was reshuffled and executive
functions were separated from planning functions as a result of which the Ministry of
Development was dissolved and its executive functions were distributed amongst other
ministries, including two new ministries: the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries,
Petroleum and Minerals, and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The
Development Council (DC) was created on November 17, 1974, to exercise planning
functions. The following are some of the functions specified by this Council:
• To set objectives and a strategy for economic development.
• To discuss and establish an annual development budget.
• To set and approve priorities for development projects (DC, FIDP, pp.9-11)
On 9 February, 1975, the Development Council passed a resolution regarding the aims
and objectives of the Economic Development Policy in Oman which, in fact,
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represented the development strategy of the government. Among these aims and
objectives were the following:
1. Oil reserves are apt to be a privilege of the present Omani generation, but the
wealth derived from it should be invested for the benefit and welfare of both present
and future generations. Therefore, it is important to make the best use of these
limited resources by utilising them in development projects which give strength to
the Omani economy.
2. The basis of the Omani development policy should be to achieve the basic
requirements of a free economy in which an efficient and capable private sector
plays a leading role. The opportunity to participate in the building of this economy
should be open to all nationals of the country on the basis of free participation in a
market without monopolistic practices.
3. It is necessary to effect a wider geographical distribution of investment in order that
the benefits may be shared by different regions to narrow the gap in the standard of
living in different regions.
4. Care should be taken to develop local human resources in order that they might be
able to play a more active role in the national economy. In this respect it is
necessary to extend and develop educational and training programmes.
5. The main objective of economic development is to implement income-generating
projects which add to the national income until additional sources of income have
been tapped to supplement oil revenues and to secure suitable economic prospects
for the future. In this respect agriculture and fisheries were greatly stressed.
6. It is important to encourage domestic trade activities by finding suitable solutions to
the problems of transportation and storage and other obstacles which block the way
to establishing the perfect market. The solutions should aim at increasing
competition and maintaining reasonable prices, particularly with regard to food
items and their availability in all regions.
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7. The resolution also placed great emphasis on other strategic aspects such as: water
resources, the efficiency of government administration, and surveying the country's
natural resources (Ibid, pp.106-109).
Broadly speaking, this resolution laid down the principles of the socio-economic
philosophy. Points 2 and 6 defined the identity of Oman's economic system that
should be applied in the country. It is a free economy in which the private sector plays
a leading role. Policies will be addressed to obtain free market, free competition,
without monopolistic practices.
On 28 June, 1975, the Law of Administrative Organisation of the Government was
issued in the Sultan Decree No. 26/1975. This law was one of the major laws that
built the structure of the government and the characteristic of the administration
system in the country. This law defined the means of organising government
administration and the functions of the different government units. The law also
defined the powers and functions invested in the heads of the administrative units.
To sum up, the period 1970-1975 was a preliminary phase of development which
witnessed intensive efforts to prepare and to develop the country and accelerate it into
the twentieth century.
111. The Growth and Sectoral Formation of the Omani Economy
It could be said that the period from 1970-1975 saw the birth of Omani economy.
From 1976 up to the present day Oman's economy has been systematically developed.
Four development plans have been executed by the government, the fifth is being
implemented. Therefore, it is this period within which Omani economy has been
characterised, and its own identity has been practically created.
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The First Five Year Development Plan (FIDP), 1976-1980, was a preliminary step
towards the Sultanate's entry into a new phase of development within the framework
of integrated plans for economic and social development. The main development
effort in this plan was directed primarily at completing the infrastructure, increasing the
absorptive capacity of the Omani economy and initiating policies of support and
encouragement to the private sector with a view to increasing competition and
completing the components of a free market economy.
The Second Five-Year Development Plan (SDP) (1981-1985) also contributed to the
acceleration of economic development and the stimulation of the private sector to
increase its participation in economic and social activities through direct and indirect
sets of policies.
The inception of the Third Five-Year Development Plan (ThDP) (1986-1990)
coincided with a steep fall in oil prices - which has continued on a downward trend
since the early 'Eighties.
The basic objectives of the fourth plan were to achieve a high rate of growth, to pursue
the policy of diversification of national income, to ensure regional development and to
achieve a balance between total public expenditure and the growth revenue.
The specific peculiarities of the Omani economy, the interaction and the behaviour of
its major sectors was characterised during these four plans.
The Omani economy consists of three major sectors, the oil sector, the service sector
and the non-oil commodity sector. The oil sector includes crude oil and natural gas.
On average it accounted for 55.5% of total GDP during the period 1970-1990. The
commodity sector includes: agriculture, fisheries, industry, electricity and water,
construction, and mining. On average it accounted for 14.5% of total GDP. The
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service sector can be divided into two parts, government services and other services.
It averaged 27.3% of total GDP during the same period. It is the second sector after
the Oil sector and exceeded it in 1986 and 1988, for its contribution in total GDP was
39.7% and 46.1% in these two years respectively whereas the oil sector's contribution
was 37.9% and 40.6% respectively.
Table (1-1) shows the relative importance of these three main sectors during the
previous development plans.
Let us now explain the significance of these three sectors in the economy as a whole
starting with the oil sector.
1.1 The Oil Sector
The oil sector includes crude oil and natural gas. the significance of the oil sector in
the Omani economy can be examined through its share in the main macro-economic
variables, i.e. total GDP, total exports, and employment. It can also be assessed
through its contribution in government revenues. However, it is worth starting with a
presentation of historical and general information about the oil sector.
The exploration for crude oil started in Oman in 1924 and commercial quantities were
discovered in 1964. The actual export of crude oil started in August 1967, when
exported quantities reached 20.9m barrels per year; three years later this increased to
121.3m barrels per year.
Until 1973, Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) was owned by Shell (85%),
Companie Francaise des Petroles (10%) and Partex (5%). In December 1973 the
Government agreed with the three companies to acquire 25% of PDO's capital.
Government participation in the capital of PDO was further increased to 60% in July
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1974. The three companies continue to own, at present, a total of 40% of PDO, of
which 34% is owned by Shell, 4% by the French Company (CFP) and 2% by Partex.
On May 31, 1980, the PDO was finally registered as an Omani company in the
Commercial Register of Oman, with shares of participation in its capital as mentioned
above. It is the country's main producer of oil, accounting for 97% of total oil output
in 1986. The government policies which were applied during the years of the First
Five-Year Development Plan (FIDP) revived the interest of international oil
companies in obtaining concessions and exploring for oil in Oman. During those years
several new concession agreements were concluded with international oil companies.
Due to the continued efforts of new oil field discoveries (17 fields in 1992), Oman's
proven reserves moved up from 2.5 billion barrels in 1982 to 4.74 billion barrels in
1992 then to 5.2 billion barrels in 1995. At the current rate of output, Oman's proven
reserves represent about 17 years (Central Bank of Oman (CBO), Annual Report
1992, 1995).
The production of crude oil rose progressively from 332 thousand barrels per day in
1970 with continuing and intensifying exploration efforts, to 884 thousand barrels per
day in 1995 (see Table 1-4).
With regard to natural gas, all its reserves discovered in Oman were discovered as a
by-product of the exploration for oil. There have been no programmes for the
exploration for gas as a separate activity. It started during the FIDP (1976-1980). All
existing oil concessions granted by the government of Oman to international oil
companies stipulated that any natural gas discovered remains government property and
is not subject to concession agreement.
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Table (1-1): The Relative Im portance of the Main Sectors During the Previous 
Development Plans (%)
Main Sectors 1st Plan
1976-80
2nd Plan
1981-85
3rd Plan
1986-90
4th Plan
1991-95
Oil Sector 61.0 52.0 46.0 38.9
Non-Oil Sectors 39.0 48.0 54.0 61.1
- Commodity sectors 14.8 13.1 14.8 11.5
-Agriculture and fisheries 2.7 2.7 3.6 2.5
-Manufacturing 0.9 2.3 3.9 4.0
-Construction 9.0 7.0 5.0 3.0
-Others 2.2 1.1 2.3 2.0
- Services sectors 24.2 34.9 39.2 49.6
-Government services 12.2 14.9 19.2 25.7
-Other services 12.0 20.0 20.0 23.9
Total GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:
1. DC, SDP, Table (5), p.12.
2. DC, ThDP, Table (7), p.14.
3. DC, The Assessment of ThDP, Table (2-8), p.49.
4. CBO, 1995, Table (1), p.127.
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Table (1-2: Distribution of Labour Force Between the Major Sectors
Sectors Number of workers % of Total
Labour
Force
Omani Non-Omani Total
Oil Sector 3276 1795 5071 0.8
(64.6%) (35.4%) (100.0%)
Commodity sector 37780 204101 241881 36.1
(18.5%) (81.5%) (100.0%)
Service Sector 64210 198789 262999 39.2
(24.4%) (75.6%) (100.0%)
Public Administration and Defence 134714 25610 160324 23.9
(84.0%) (16.0%) (100.0%)
Total 239980 430295 670275 100.0%
Source: DC, SYB, 1994, p.145 and 1995, p.57
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Table (1-3): The Average Growth Rate of the Main Sectors During the Last Four
Development Plans %
Sectors 1st Plan
1976-80
2nd Plan
1981-85
3rd Plan
1986-90
4th Plan
1991-95
Oil Sector 14.0 5.5 7.8 -2.5
Non-Oil Sector 19.6 17.6 2.2 7.7
- Commodity Sectors 16.4 17.9 0.3 9.2
-Agriculture & Fisheries 13.4 12.3 5.6 2.5
-Manufacturing 66.6 38.6 13.2 10.8
-Construction 9.8 15.4 -10.6 2.5
- Services Sector 33.1 17.5 2.8 7.4
-Wholesale & Retail Trade 23.7 15.0 2.6 10.4
-Financial Institutions 25.0 38.0 7.9 4.3
-Transport & Communications 17.6 21.7 6.7 7.7
-Public Administration 24.3 16.7 4.8 4.3
Total GDP 16.3 10.8 4.6 3.4
Sources:
1. DC, SDP, Table (4), p.11.
2. DC, ThDP, Table (6), p.13.
3. DC, FODP, Tables (1.6), (1.4), (1.5), pp.16-23.
4. CBO, 1995, Table (3), p.131.
5. CBO, 1995, Table (1), p.127.
6. MOD, The Main Components of the Fifth Development Plan, Table (3.4),
p.29.
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Table 1-4
Production of Crude Oil
1970-1995
YEAR PRODUCTION
Daily Average
(Th. BBL)
Annual Average
(Mn. BBL)
1970 332 121
1971 294 107
1972 282 103
1973 293 107
1974 290 106
1975 341 125
1976 367 134
1977 340 124
1978 314 115
1979 295 108
1980 283 104
1981 328 120
1982 336 123
1983 389 142
1984 416 152
1985 498 182
1986 560 204
1987 582 212
1988 619 227
1989 641 234
1990 685 250
1991 708 259
1992 742 271
1993 790 284.6
1994 820 295.4	 .
1995 864 311.3
Source:
1. DC, Statistical Year Book (SYB), 1992, Table 1-8, p.198
2. CBO, 1995, Table 3.1, p.29.
Chapter I
	
40
Economic utilisation of natural gas also started during the First Plan, and a number of
plants were constructed for extracting petroleum liquids from associated gas before it
is flared. It is largely utilised by being re-injected into the oil reservoirs to maintain
pressure and sustain oil production. It is also used as fuel to generate power in electric
power stations, desalination plants, the cement factories, Cooper Smelter and other
industrial projects as well as for domestic use. Liquified natural gas (LNG) exports are
expected to begin in the year 2000.
The production of natural gas rose from 93 million cubic feet in 1980 to 187 million in
1990. Oman's proven gas reserves are estimated at 27.5 trillion cubic feet (3 trillion
cubic feet of associated gas and 24.5 trillion cubic feet of non-associated gas) (CBO,
1995, p.30).
Natural gas in Oman whether associated or non-associated, is considered as the
principle source of energy until other alternative sources of energy, such as solar
energy, become economical. Therefore, sufficient quantities of natural gas reserves
should be earmarked for the purpose of meeting the country's energy requirements for
a minimum period of 40 years.
The oil sector is still the single largest segment of the economy. Economic growth in
Oman is strongly influenced, both directly and indirectly, by developments in the
petroleum sector.
During the ThDP the Omani economy came under severe stresses and strains largely
triggered by the collapse of the international oil price, especially during the first three
years. Total GDP declined steeply from RO 3454 million in 1985, to RO 2800 million
in 1986, namely by 18.9%. It exceeded its 1985 level only in the final year of the plan.
The oil sector proportion in total GDP averaged 44.1% with a fall of 7.5 per cent
points from that of the previous plan period.
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In general, despite the continued increase in the absolute value of the oil sector in the
total GDP from RO 72 million in 1970 to RO 2021 million in 1995, the relative
importance of the Oil Sector in total GDP fell from 67% in 1970 to 38.2% in 1995.
It is worth noting that, the oil sector contribution in total GDP is totally in the form of
extracting raw material and exporting it as it is without any manufacturing process. In
other words, there is no industrial integration between the oil sector and other sectors.
The sole exception is the natural gas and the refining process of Oman Refinery
Company. Natural gas has already been mentioned. Oman refinery daily capacity is
limited at 80,000 barrels, to meet the local market demand for petroleum products. Up
to 1995, it refined on average only 7.3% of crude oil produced annually.
The nature of such production means the oil economy is described as a rentier
economy, for rent is "any income not originating from the productive activity of the
unit concerned, the flows and dimensions of which are not directly linked to the
beneficiary's activity, i.e. any income the amount of which is determined for the most
part by decisions the unit concerned cannot control" (Chatelus and Schmotl, 1984,
p.255).
Chart 1-1 illustrates the following peculiarities of the Omani economy that can be
derived from the role of the oil sector.
1. Oil income fluctuates in response to the world market oil price.
2. Total GDP has been influenced by the oil sector. There is almost complete
correlation between them.
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3. In the long term, the non-oil sector is still dependent on the oil sector. It can be
seen from the chart that the progress in the oil sector which started in 1973 and
continued up to 1981 made corresponding progress in the non-oil sector which
continued up to 1985. Similarly, the decline in the oil sector which started from
1981 and deteriorated rapidly between 1985 and 1986, caused an accompanied
recession in the non-oil sector, starting from 1985 and continuing up to 1988.
The next indicator through which the significance of the oil sector in the Omani
economy can be examined is the relationship between oil revenue to total government
revenue.
During the period 1970-1995, oil revenue registered an average of 87.6% of total
government revenue. The highest ratio was in 1970 at 97.8% because oil receipts
were more or less the sole source of government receipts. The lowest ratio was in
1986 at 63.5% because of the sharp decline in the world market prices of oil, which
sank to an average price of $13.5 per barrel that year.
Chart 1-2 illustrates the relationship between the oil revenue and total government
revenue. It can be seen that oil revenue has become the dominant source of
government revenue.
The third ratio that may indicate the importance of the oil sector is the ratio of oil
exports to total exports.
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Chart 1-1 
The Relationship between Oil GDP and Non-oil GDP
1970-1995
RO million
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Non-Oil GDP	 Oil GDP	
	 Total GDP I
Source:
1. DC, SYB, 1992, Table 1-14, p.379
2. DC, FoDP: Table 1.3, p16; Table 1.4, p.19; Table 1.5, p.23
3. CBO, 1995, Table (1), p.127
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Chart 1-2
The Relationship Between Oil Revenue and Total Government Revenue
1970-1995
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Source:
1. DC, FIDP, Table 3, p.7
2. DC, SDP, Table 15, p.21
3. DC, The Assessment of the Economic Performance of the ThDP, Table 2-54,
p.136
4. CBO, 1995, Table (4.1), p.38.
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Throughout the period 1970-1992, oil exports averaged 89.8% of total exports (Table
1-5). The highest ratio registered was 99.8% in 1975 because crude oil was almost the
sole exported product. The lowest ratio was 83.6% in 1992. It can be seen from the
same table that oil exports consist entirely of crude oil. With effect from 1985, small
quantities of refined oil produced by the Oman Refinery Company, started to be
exported, however, it only accounted for 3 percent of total oil exports on average.
The Omani policy regarding oil exports is derived from the classical and new classical
theory of foreign trade and development. According to this theory, foreign trade can
be a stimulus of development. The excess resources are used to produce a surplus of
goods for export, and trade thereby "vents" a surplus productive capacity.
The strategy adopted for development from 1976 onwards by the government
... was in fact very much in line with the new classical theory of trade and
development. By using oil as a leading sector, the government used all its
exports to optimise oil production and reserves and maximise exports of oil by
minimising domestic consumption (Al-Yousef, 1995, p.32).
It is also worth noting that total exports include re-exports. This will be clarified in
more detail later in the analysis of foreign trade. It is obvious that oil exports are the
dominant factor in obtaining the foreign exchange (chart 1-3) and this domination
fluctuates according to oil market conditions. Therefore, it has been seen that the
diversification of the local economy was one of the strategic policies of the
government taken into consideration throughout the Development Council Resolution
on Aims and Objectives of Economic Development.
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Table 1-5 
Oil Exports and Total Exports
1970-1992 RO Million
Year Oil Exports
(RO Million)
Refined Total
Total Exports
(RO Million)
.
0.E/T.E%
Crude
1970 44.4 44.4 44.8 99.1
1971 47.7 47.7 48.1 99.2
1972 49.6 49.6 50.0 99.2
1973 61.3 61.3 61.9 99
1974 - - - -
1975 488.1 488.1 489.2 99.8
1976 543.8 543.8 551.2 98.7
1977 545.9 545.9 559.4 97.6
1978 521.8 521.8 552.0 94.5
1979 745.7 745.7 787.4 94.7
1980 1244.6 1244.6 1294.5 96.1
1981 1526.4 1526.4 1621.8 94.1
1982 1409.6 1409.6 1526.8 92.3
1983 1346.6 1346.6 1467.2 91.8
1984 1401.5 1401.5 1527.5 91.7
1985 1597 60.8 1657.8 1778.1 93.2
1986 981 29.8 1010.8 1122.5 90.0
1987 1928 33.0 1361 1484.9 91.7
1988 1101.7 34.7 1136.4 1291.4 88.0
1989 1346.4 48.8 1395.2 1562.9 89.3
1990 1885.9 54.3 1940.2 2116.4 91.7
1991 1575.1 54.6 1629.7 1873.9 87.0
1992 1745.8 39.3 1785.1 2135.3 83.6
Source:
1. DC, SDP, Table 18 p.24
	 Notes: 0.E = Oil exports
2. DC, SYB, 1992, Table 1-11, p.280
	
T.E = Total exports
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Chart 1-3 
The Relationship Between Oil Exports and Total Exports
1970-1995
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Source:
1. DC, SDP, Table 18, p.24
2. DC, SYB, 1992, Table 1-11, p.280
3. CBO, 1995, Table (6.1), p.91
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The last indicator that may measure the relative importance of the oil sector in the
Omani economy, is its contribution to total employment. Government documents
classify oil sector employment as private sector employment. The number of total
employees in oil companies reached 5071 employees in 1993 (Table 1-2). The number
of expatriate employees in the private sector reached 404685 in 1993. By adding the
number of Omani employees in main private sectors, the total number of employees in
the Private Sector is 509951. Hence, the relative contribution of the oil sector in
private sector employment is 1.2%. If it is to be calculated from total employment:
private and government employment (including quasi-government bodies), then the oil
sector contribution will only be 0.8%. Apart from the fact that 37.7% of oil sector
employees are non-Omanis, this result reflects the low degree of oil sector integration
into the whole economy.
Oman is not an exception to other oil states of the region where
the oil sector exists in an enclave of its own, with few productive linkages to
the rest of the economy. It is of course a source of revenue for the government,
and through government spending the major stimulus of economic activity. The
links with other sectors are at the macro rather than micro level, financial rather
than involving the real economy (Wilson, 1995, p47).
In other words, the direct integration of the oil industry — the vertical and horizontal
linkages — with the other sectors of the economy is minimal. The limited number of
people employed by the oil industry in Oman makes the creation of wealth centralised
around a small fraction of the society. On the other hand, the large extent of
centralisation of the oil industry on foreign technological experience has triggered its
remoteness.
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1.2 The Commodity Sector
This sector consists of agriculture and fisheries, industry, construction and electricity
and water, although the inclusion of the last three sub-sections as commodities is
questionable. Its share in the total output decreased from 14.8% in the FIDP to 11.5%
in the FODP. This decline can be explained by the declining ratio of private investment
to non-oil GDP on the one hand (Chart 1-5). On the other hand it can be attributed to
the increasing participation of services sectors.
In 1993, it employed 36.1% of total labour force (Table 1-2). 44.5% of them were in
the construction sector. Omani employees formed 18.5%.
From Table (1-3), it can be seen that it achieved a high average growth rate during the
FIDP and SDP, but almost stagnated during the ThDP and started to recover during
the FODP.
1.2.1 Agriculture and Fisheries 
The significance of the agriculture and fisheries sector has always been emphasised in
the development and diversification of the Omani economy. Agriculture, fisheries and
trade were the back-bone of the Omani economy before the discovery of oil.
The number of holdings is 95100 which constitute a total area of 106200 hectares.
Only 67% of the total area of holdings is utilised. The number of agriculture holdings is
distributed between the country's regions as follows. Al-Batinah 33%, A'Sharqiya
18%, Al-Janubiya 17%, A'Dalchilya 13%, A'Dahire 9%, Muscat 5%, Al-Wasta 3%
and Musandam 2% (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries). Batinah, which contains
33% of total holdings, is a coastal plain and is the most fertile and inhabited area in the
country. It contains 28% of the total population with a density of 41.8/1cm2 (See table
1-11)
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Chart 1-4
The Relationship Between Non-Oil GDP and Government Expenditure
1970-1995
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The Ratio of Private Sector Investment to Non-Oil GDP
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1. DC, SDP and ThDP
2. DC, The Assessment of Economic Performance of the Third Plan
3. DC, SYB, 1993
4. CBO, 1994, Table (3), p.127.
5. DC, The main components of the Fifth Development Plan, Table (3-5), p.30)
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Table 1-6 shows the distribution of cultivated area and output between three major
products, i.e. vegetables, field crops and fruits in 1993.
As can be seen from this table, about 64% of cultivated area is allocated for fruits
which account for about one fourth of total output of these three crops. Field crops
constitute around one fifth of total cultivated area. Alfalfa occupies 88.6% of the area
cultivated with field crops and accounts for 97.4% of total output of this category.
The area planted with palm trees accounts for 70.5% of total area planted with fruits,
and dates account for 58.8% of total fruit output. These two products together with
lemons are three of the most traditional agricultural products in Oman.
The size of animal wealth in the country in number reached 1405990 in 1993, 60.7% of
which are goats, 17.1% are sheep, 15.2% are cows, 7.0% are camels (Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries).
Regarding fisheries, the country has a great potential for substantial growth as Oman
enjoys 1700 km of ocean coast-line rich with different varieties of fish. Fishing activity
in the country is undertaken by traditional fishermen and one fishing company: Oman
National Fishing Company. The annual local production of fish exceeds local demand
and the surplus is exported to several countries.
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Table 1-6 
The Distribution of Cultivated Area and Output Between Three Major Products,
1993
Product Cultivated Area Output
Hectares % Tons (000)
Vegetables 10459 17.4 183.3 23.4
Field Crops 11460 19% 385.1 49.1
Fruits 37921 63.6 215.9 27.5
Total 60200 100 784.3 100
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
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Concerning agriculture and fisheries' contribution to total GDP, oil has changed the
traditional situation of this sector and its total output to national income has
diminished. Throughout the period 1967-1973, the sector contribution to total GDP
averaged 17%. The higher ratio was at 34.6% in 1967. However during the period of
the FIDP (1976-1980) its contribution declined to 2.7%. During the Second, Third
and Fourth Plans, it recorded an average of 2.7%, 3.6% and 2.5% of total GDP
respectively. It is clear that its relative importance has not recorded any progress
although, in absolute value, it was developing within this period but at a diminishing
rate. During the First, Second and Third Plans, it grew by 13.4%, 12.3% and 5.5%
respectively. During the Fourth Plan it grew by 2.5%. In fact, this sector is suffering
from particular problems which will be discussed later.
With regards to its relative importance in total exports, in 1971 and 1972 agricultural
and fisheries products accounted for 99.8% and 99.7% of non-oil exports and 0.7%
and 0.4% of total exports respectively (Department of Information, Oman, 1972).
During the period 1980-1992 its proportion in non-oil exports and total exports
averaged 56% and 2.7% respectively. Its relative contribution in non-oil exports
started to decrease from 1983 after its peak at 86.5% in 1982. On the other hand its
relative contribution in total exports is obviously marginal. 44% of the sector's
exports is fish.
With respect to employment, this sector employed 163,000 employees in 1993, 76% of
whom were Omanis (Ministry of Agriculture). The sector employment accounted for
23% of total employment. Omani nationals accounted for 45% of total Omani
employment.
The average family size is 7.4 (Oman newspaper, 28 December, 1993). By multiplying
this number with the number of Omani agricultural labour force and adding the non-
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Omani labour force in the sector, the agricultural reliance will be1030 thousand. This
number accounts for 51% of total population. This means that 51% of the population
relies on 3.6% total GDP. These figures are worse if we only consider Omani
labourers and their families and only calculate Omani population. In this case, the
sector reliance will be 58.5% of the population viz, a viz, less than 3.6% of total GDP.
According to the Ministry of Development (MOD), the sector of agriculture and
fisheries employs 62,792 workers, 35% of which are Omanis (MOD, SYB, 1995,
p.5'7). The sector reliance would be 9.6% of total population against 3.6 of total GDP.
In fact the Omani agricultural labour force does not rely entirely on agricultural
income. Some agricultural labourers practise trading activities, some work in
government departments and others have other sources of income. Therefore, the
actual figures may fall between the two ministries' statistics.
This sector encounters some severe problems related to water availability, production
techniques, marketing, and rural/urban migration..
With regards to water availability, the Omani irrigation system. depends entirely on
underground water and about 50-60% of cultivated area is irrigated by the Aflar
system. Oman receives a very low average annual rainfall. It is only 100 mm, 80% of
which evaporates, 5% falls in the sea and only 15% seeps underground (Oman
Newspaper, 28 March, 1994). Rapid expansion in the use of water from underground
water sources for several purposes together with drought has led to a shortage of
water supply in many areas, and to salinity problems near the coast. In the Al-Batinah
area, for instance, the annual rate of underground water charge is 442 cubic metres,
and the annual rate of water consumption for all purposes is 688 cubic metres.
Therefore there is a deficit of 246 cubic metres per annum (Ibid.). As a result of
extravagant use of water on the one hand, and drought on the other, many Falajes have
dried up. Historically, Oman enjoyed the existence of 11,000 Falajes, however, only
3075 Falajes are now in existence (Ministry of Water Resources).
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To overcome this problem, the government has employed three measures. A restraint
on excessive well drilling was enforced. The government, starting from the SDP, has
been executing a maintenance programme for Falajes. To overcome the salinity
problem and conserve or even increase the underground water resources, the
government has been constructing water dams that will stop rain water wastefully
flowing into the sea.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries encourages farmers to use modern irrigation
techniques that economise the use of water.
Regarding production techniques, because agriculture in Oman relies on underground
water, many cultivated lands are scattered in numerous small plots over many areas of
the country, and some of them in rugged locations, depending on the availability of
water. Consequently, the size of farms tends to be small and the potentiality of
applying large scale mechanization is, therefore, limited. Moreover, about 50% of the
cultivated area is under palm trees which is difficult to mechanize.
Equally important, the money available in Oman as a result of oil exports has created
the possibility of importing almost anything from abroad. It has also brought people,
including the rural population, into close contact with a level and sophistication of
material goods which were previously quite unattainable and which were certainly not
achieved locally. The speed of change from poor to rich has given no time to adapt
local produce and local manufacturing techniques to the new demands (Pridharn, 1987)
The government is conducting extensive research to improve the agriculture sector.
There are also many extension centres and nurseries for garden and fruit trees run by
the government.
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With respect to marketing, many farmers have little experience in approaching the
consumption centres properly. Quantities produced of some kinds such as dates,
tomatoes and cucumbers, exceed demand in peak season thus prices decline sharply.
Whereas demand exceeds supply elsewhere. Some agricultural products encounter
fierce competition form imported products such as dates prepared for animal feed
competing with imported barley.
The marketing problem led to the establishment of the Public Authority for Marketing
Agricultural Produce which commenced operation with six distribution centres and
twelve collection centres throughout the country.
This problem still needs to be worked on, e.g. the private sector efforts in setting up
agricultural industry to dispose of the surplus of agricultural products through food
industries.
Many farms are not run economically. They are mainly used for personal enjoyment by
their owners at the weekend, although they consume large quantities of water and
other inputs. Efficient, economic administration for such farms is to be adopted and
cost/benefit analysis is to be applied to run them effectively.
Rural-urban migration is another problem facing the agricultural sector. The sustained
efforts made to modernise and diversify the economy have, over the years, led to the
opening up of several jobs as well as investment opportunities. In response to these
changes, while some have ventured into new fields of business, there have been others
who left the countryside leaving their farms to their families in search of higher paid
jobs in the urban areas.
The government has been seeking to solve this problem through its investment
programme and the provision of basic services, i.e. electricity, communication, health
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services education, etc. One of the strategic objectives in the regional distribution of
the government investment expenditure is to support the existing populated areas and
protect them from mass migration to heavily populated centres. According to the last
agricultural census carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in 1993,
about half of the population is still engaged in agriculture and fisheries. The census
established that the total suitable land for cultivation is two million hectares, only 5.3%
of which is the total area of existing holdings, and then only 67% of the latter is
utilised.
To sum up, there is considerable potential for growth in the agriculture and fisheries
sector and the Sultanate is forecast to be the food basket of the Gulf states, but
because of existing problems, actual growth remains far below its potential. For
instance, land reclamation projects cannot be carried out before ensuring the
availability of a sufficient water supply. Even so, vertical expansion can be achieved
through increased productivity. Some studies indicate that productivity of agricultural
land in the country could be doubled (DC, SDP, p.75).
1.2.2 Industry
The industrial process in the Sultanate was initiated on import substitution basis.
Lately, however, export promotion has gained much prominence. One of the targets
and policies of the government in this sector is to give higher priority to the industrial
projects which employ one or more of the following factors: the use of local raw
materials, the production or processing of food stuffs, the benefit of a relative
advantage in export markets, or the use of a high percentage of local manpower. (ibid,
p.85). Manufacturing in Oman consists of medium and small scale industries, such as
oil refinery, cement factories, edible oil blending plants, detergent manufacturing unit,
certain processing units for food stuffs and plastic products, petroleum gas bottling
plants, paint manufacturing plants, building materials, toiletries, light bulbs, car
Chapter I	 58
batteries, electric wire and cables, and other light to medium size industries which
mainly cater for the local market.
The Oman Refinery Project started to operate in November 1982, with a daily
production of 50,000 barrels. Its capacity was enlarged to 80,000 barrels in 1987.
The interest in this sector was initially limited because market conditions favoured
trading and real-estate activities with a much higher margin of profit. However, with
the trading sector nearly reaching saturation point, local entrepreneurs have
increasingly invested in industries for long-term returns on capital and resources
employed.
Between 1975 and 1990, the end of the ThDP, the number of registered industries
reached 3484 establishments. Their entire invested cost reached RO 381.8 million, and
total production reached RO 401 million. Table 1-7 shows the distribution of
establishments, the total investment cost, and the total production according to
industrial activities.
The average annual industrial output during 1978-1990 was about RO 27 million. Its
relative contribution to total GDP averaged 1.0%, 2.3%, 3.9% and 4.0% during the
previous development plans respectively (Table 1-1).
A report issued by the World Bank attributed the low proportion of industrial output
to total GDP in Oman to many reasons some of which are as follows:
• Current public expenditure/saving policies discriminate against goods production,
while other policies inhibit non-rent seeking investment.
• Sanction monopolistic practices.
• The role of public enterprises limits the investment opportunities open to the private
sector.
• The dominance of small-scale enterprises (The World Bank, 1994, p.79).
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Table 1-7 
Registered Industries
Number of Establishments, Total Investment Cost and Total Production Value
1975-1990
Industrial Activity Numberof
Establishment
Total Investment Production Value
Number RO (000) % RO (000) %
Manufacture of
food and beverages
143 4.1 34331.7 9 26942.9 6.7
Textiles (clothing)
and leather
21 0.6 13935.2 3.7 23448.6 5.8
Wood & wooden
products including
furniture
761 21.8 10247.8 2.7 23627.7 5.9
Paper & paper
products, Printing
and Publishing
35 1.0 8231.8 2.2 9428.5 2.4
Chemicals &
chemical products
47 1.3 74203 19.4 171110.9 42.7
Non-metallic
mineral products
1867 53.6 131177.3 33.4 107669.7 26.8
Basic Metal
Industries
2 .06 89200 23.4 8795 2.2
Fabricated metal
products
602 17.3 20034.3 5.2 29597.9 7.4
Other
Manufacturing
Industry
6 0.2 398.8 0.1 772.5 0.2
Total 3484 100 381759.9 100 401194 100
Source:
CBO, 1990, Tables:15, 17, 19, pp.170, 172, 174
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With respect to exports, petroleum refined products were the first industrial
components in Omani exports. They started to be exported in 1985 forming a
proportion of 3.8% of Omani origin exports (excluding re-exports). From 1988, other
industrial products were exported such as products of chemical and allied industries,
plastics, rubber articles thereof, processed food, textile wearing, non-metallic mineral
products, etc. In general, industrial products contribution to total exports registered
an average of 4.9% between 1988 and 1991.
Finally, the ratio of industrial employment in total employment in 1993 was 8.9%, only
7% of which were Omanis (MOD, SYB, 1995, p.5'7)
1.2.3 Construction 
Construction activity comprises public infrastructure projects and residential and non
residential buildings in the private sector. The main stimulus of the construction sector
in the country is government capital expenditure which is tied to development projects.
Private sector activity in this sector is merely financed by the banking system:
commercial banks and Oman Housing Bank. This sector witnessed a boom during the
Second plan (1981-1985) as its annual growth rate reached 15.4%. During the Third
Plan (1986-1990) it showed a very sharp decline at -10.6% per year on average.
Cuts in government civil expenditure which generally has a high construction
component (e.g. schools, hospitals, roads, etc.) and the high supply of residents and
the decline in rents from the end of 1989 had a direct impact on the level of activity in
the sector.
The sector's significance through its contribution in total GDP was very high during
the period 1970-1975. It came directly after the oil sector at an average 12.6% of
GDP. The highest ratio at 16.5% was in 1971. Its relative contribution during the last
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four plans were 9%, 7%, 5% and 3% respectively. The reasons for this decline during
this period have been mentioned above.
Regarding employment, the construction sector percentage in total employment
reached 16%, 4% of which were Omanis (Ibid). The main characteristic of the
commodity sector is the limited domestic productive capacity of all areas of this sector
compared to the rent producing industry, i.e. oil sector.
1.3 Services Sector
This sector can be divided into many subsections. Some of them are purely
Government Services such as Public Administration, Education, Health Service, Social
Services, Religious, Information and Cultural Services etc., and others are private
services such as the Wholesale and Retail Trade, Business Services, Restaurants and
Hotels, and Real Estate. Transport and Communications, and Financial Services are
"Mixed Services" because the government and the private sector share some of these
activities, e.g. in Financial Services the government shares in the specialised banks, in
Transport and Communications it shares in the capital of the General
Telecommunication Organisation and the Omani Aviation Company.
From Table (1-1), it can be seen that its relative importance exceeds the commodity
sector, it has been growing rapidly and during the FODP overweighted the oil sector.
During the second and third plans, it formed more than one third of total output.
During the FODP it participated by almost one half of total output.
In 1993, the service sector employed 39.2% of total labour force, one fourth of which
are Omanis (Table 1-2).
The phenomenon of a large and expanding service sector at the expense of commodity
sector is a general observation of oil rentier economies.
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These economies are characterised by so-called 'Dutch Disease'. It occurs when a
major increase in domestic spending takes place as a consequence of the large-scale
development of natural resources and an associated large-scale increase in public
services and expenditure. This phenomenon drives up the prices of domestic services
relative to those of domestic tradable goods. The increase of the ratio of the prices of
non-tradable to tradable goods increases the return to capital in the non-tradable
sector, thus inducing an increase in the rate of investment in this sector at the expense
of the traded sector. The exportable part of the agriculture sector is likely to be hurt
most by the oil boom. On the other hand, large foreign exchange receipts from the oil
industry resulted in an overvalued exchange rate that this discourages industrial
exports while encouraging import commodities and local produced services.
In addition "there may also exist a considerable monopoly element in the valuation of
services in rentier countries ... since the external rent is paid to the government, it is
tempting for the government to reward its employees and supporters with regular
salary increases, fringe benefits or lucrative contracts etc" (Mandavy, 1970, p.447).
1.3.1 The Wholesale and Retail Trade
Trade has been a principal economic activity for Oman throughout its history. After
1970, trading activities flourished beyond any level recorded at any time in the past.
Among the targets and policies of the government regarding commerce has been to set
up a free economic system based on market economy with free competition and free
foreign trade policy, and to encourage foreign investment.
The total number of companies registered with the Commercial Register of Oman
increased from 239 companies in 1974 to 28616 companies in 1990. These companies
were characterised by their small size. There were about 11165 companies, i.e. 39%
of the total with a registered capital of less than RO 10,000.
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Individually-owned economic establishments in Oman in 1990, represented a majority
of 87.7% of total establishments. General partnership companies were 7%, limited
partnerships only 2%, limited liability companies 3.1% and joint stock 0.4%.
The number of companies fully owned by Omani nationals reached 42892 at the end of
1990, representing 96.5% of total companies.
The contribution of this sector in total GDP reached an average of 7.5% during the
FIDP, then increased to 11%, 11.7% and 12.4% throughout the last three plans.
Expatriate employment in this sector reached 77.6 thousand employees in 1993, i.e.
18% of total expatriates. The proportion of Omanis was 12.7%. Due to the high
number of expatriate labour force in general and in this sector in particular, Oman's
economy is exposed to a high rate of financial outflow.
According to a paper submitted to the Consultant Council for the State in 1988,
covering the period 1980-1986, (AI-Hinai, Financial Remittances of Expatriate
Labourers and Their Effects on the Omani Economy, 1988), it was found that the
average annual rate of increase of expatriate labour force was 10.2%. The paper also
found that net remittances to outside the country was increasing annually, averaging
RO 267 million within the period covered, at 10.7% of GDP. The ratio of net
remittances to domestic saving was increasing. It averaged 24.7% and its highest level
was in 1986 at 39%. This means that 24.7% of domestic saving was leaking out of the
country in addition to the outflow of foreign companies' profits.
Therefore, the ratio of national saving to total GDP was decreasing annually. It fell
from 37.6% in 1980 to 18.9% in 1986.
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Despite the fact that employment wages were increasing annually during the period
under study, their contribution in generating GDP, i.e. the labour cost/output ratio fell
from 3.84 in 1980 to 1.77 in 1986. The paper stated that this result might indicate that
the productivity of the labour force was going down. Furthermore, the sector of
commerce is subjected to a structural problem known as "veiled trading". This means
that, in many cases of business activity, the Omani sponsor has only the name, but
capital of the firm and its profits belong to the expatriate. The expatriate pays his
sponsor a small portion of his return as a rent or a commission then he transfers all his
profits out of the country. This arrangement is existent in other sectors as well but to a
lesser extent.
Consequently, economic surplus in general and in this sector in particular, is not re-
invested or circulated in the economy, the capacities of enterprise have not been
enlarged, and the entrepreneurial experience of Omani sponsors has not been
developed.
1.3.2 Financial Institution, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services
The Oman Banking System comprises the Central Bank of Oman (CBO), 18
commercial banks, three specialised credit constitutions, money exchange companies,
insurance companies, pension funds, hire purchase and leasing companies, investment
banking institutions and the security market. Among the commercial banks, 7 are
locally incorporated while the other 11 are branches of foreign banks. The domestic
network of commercial bank branches which was 175 at the end of 1985 increased to
275 at the end of 1995 scattered all over the country.
Each of the three specialised credit institutions has an independent legal entity, partially
or wholly-owned by the government, and specialises in extending medium and long-
term loans to development projects. Those institutions are: The Development Bank of
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Oman (DB0), The Oman Housing Bank (OHB), and the Oman Bank for Agriculture
and Fisheries (OBAF).
It can be seen from table 1-8 that the bulk of commercial banks' credit (76%) goes to
personal loans, import financing, construction and trade. The nominal maximum loan
term is 3 years and the maximum on mortgage loans 10 years. Reflecting the small
size of manufacturing and the short-term character of commercial bank lending, credit
to the sector is very limited (only 3.6%).
Most commercial banks were established during the 1970s oil boom. Since 1981,
there has been a moratorium on the establishment of new banks. After the collapse of
oil prices in 1986, some commercial banks encountered difficulties and the authorities
concluded that there were too many small under-capitalised banks. Regarding long-
term credit provided by the specialised banks and Ministry of Commerce and Industry
in 1991, about 50% was directed to the housing sector by the Oman Housing Bank.
The sector's contribution to GDP recorded an average of 8.8%, 9.8% and 2.7% during
the Second, Third and Fourth Plans. Its growth rate fluctuated during these periods.
The highest rate was in 1980 at 62.9%. It averaged 25%, 38%, 7.9% and 4.3% during
the previous development plans.
The ratio of employment in this sector to total employment, Omani and non-Omani,
averaged 3% during the Third Plan period (1986-1990). The average portion of
Omani employees in commercial banks reached 61.4% during the same period.
To sum up, it is obvious that the structure of banking in Oman reflects the basic
peculiarities of the economy as it has developed under the dominant influence of oil
exports and government spending.
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Table 1-8 
Bank Credit by Sectors in December 1993
Sector Amount RO (000) %
Import Trade 213389 18.81
Export Trade 7106 0.63
Wholesale and retail trade 96301 8.49
Mining and quarrying 15681 1.38
Construction 113913 10.04
Manufacture 40242 3.55
Electricity, gas, water 8663 0.76
Transport. & communications 9403 0.83
Financial institutions 18918 1.67
Services 43706 3.85
Government 40843 3.60
Personal loans 440593 38.83
Agriculture & allied activities 5143 0.45
All others 80788 7.12
._Total 1134689 100
Source:
CBO, Quarterly Bulletin, March 1994, Table 10, p.14
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1.4: The Role of the Government in the Omani Economy
The government plays a significant role in the Omani economy. It owns and operates
the bulk of the country's economic and energy resources. It has 60% of the Oil Sector
and all natural gas earnings, all public electricity generating stations (25), 100% of the
General Telecommunications Organisation, 32% of the Omani Aviation Company,
35% of Port Services Corporation, 99% of the Oman Mining Company, 99% of the
Oman Refinery Company, 100% of Al-Bustan Hotel, and 100% of Oman National
Transport Company.
Moreover, it has established many other financing and production projects either
financed by it completely or in association with the private sector such as cement
factories, Oman Flour Mills, the DBO, the OH13 and the OBAF.
It is obvious that the government takes the leading role in utilities, communications,
transportation, financing, energy and tourism, through the establishment of these public
authorities and wholly or partially-owned companies.
The government became so rich because of the fact that oil wealth flows its rents into
the hands of the government, therefore the government is wealthy, not the society, and
because the economy depends approximately on one source of income, namely, oil.
It has also attempted to define and influence the direction and character of private
sector development. The government development plans have had legal force with
respect to activities of the public sector. As was mentioned previously, the
government has been seeking to achieve two long-term major objectives: to lessen the
economy's dependence on oil through the diversification of the economic base and the
development of a strong private sector, and to promote social and regional balance.
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The government's approach to achieve these objectives followed four identifiable
policy tracks:
1. Continued efforts to build institutions and infrastructure.
2. Investment in large-scale projects the capital requirements of which far exceeded
the capacity of the private sector, e.g. telecommunications, desalination plants, the
oil refinery and cement.
3. The development of a system of incentives under which the private sector receives a
variety of input and output subsidies.
4. The adoption of a social policy based on the principal that every citizen has the right
to free education and health services regardless of his income.
However, the size of the government and its economic and social role in the economy
can be measured through its total expenditure. In other words the government
expenditure can be considered as a parameter for the government importance in the
economy. During the past stages of development, government expenditure
represented 53% of GDP on average (see Chart 1-6). It consists of current expenditure
(32.3%), development expenditure (25.6%), defence and national security expenditure
(40%) and contributions and support for the private sector (2.3%).
As can be seen from Table 1-9, the contribution of the government in total capital
formation was on average 71.1% during the previous development stages, compared
to 28.9% for the private sector. On average it accounted for 17.5% of the total GDP.
It comprises the following:
• Capital expenditure on projects for civil ministries and other public
organisations.
• Capital expenditure associated with natural gas expenditure.
• Government share in PDO capital formation.
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Chart 1-6
The Ratio of Government Expenditure to Total GDP
1970-1995 (%)
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Source:
1. DC, SYB, 1992, Table 1-15 p.435, Table 1-14 p.379
2. DC, The Development Plans
3. CBO, Annual Reports
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Table 1-9 
The Uses of GDP between the Government and Private Sector During the
Previous Plans
Government Private Sector
Capital Formation Consumption Capital Formation Consump ion
RO(m) % of
total
% of
GDP
RO(m) % of
total
% of
GDP
RO(m) % of
total
% of
GDP
RO(m) % of
total
% of GDP
70-75 430.6 77.7 23.6 373.4 61.6 29.5 123.5 22.3 6.8 232.8 38.4 3.0
1st Plan 1186.3 70.6 19.3 1409.6 53.6 25.2 494.9 29.4 8.1 12.18 46.4 21.8
2nd Plan 2755.9 70.8 19.2 3853.5 47.3 26.9 1137.5 29.2 7.9 4237.7 52.7 30
3rd Plan 2005.2 68.5 12.5 5319.2 49.3 33.2 920.1 31.5 5.8 5479.6 50.7 34.2
4th Plan 2330 60.0 13.0 6676.2 36.2 26.1 1556 40.0 6.2 11764.3 63.8 40.5
Average 71.1 17.5 49.6 28.2 28.9 7 47.1 25.8
Source:
1. DC, FIDP, Table 2, p.6
2. DC, SDP, Table 31, p.49; Table 6, p.14
3. DC, ThDP, Table 10, p.19; Table 5, p.13
4. DC, FODP, Table 7-1, p.178; Table 1-2, p.24
5. MOD, The Main Components of the Fifth Development Plan, Table (1-4), p.35
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The regional distribution of public capital formation is one of the mainstays of the
development process in Oman. The aims and policies of economic and social
development emphasise the importance of distributing investment among the various
geographic regions of the country. They also stressed the necessity to "support and
develop existing population areas and protect them from mass migration to heavily
populated centres".
This high level of the government expenditure resulted from the vast and rapid
expansion role of the government in operating and managing a wide range of goods
and services units. Purely government services contribution in the total GDP
accounted for 12.2%, 15%, 19% and 25.7% during the previous four development
plans respectively.
This high level of public expenditure makes the State the biggest consumer compared
to the private sector. During the 5 previous stages public consumption accounted for
almost 50% of total consumption (Table 1-9). The State consumed 28.2% of total
GDP, whereas the private sector, on averaged, consumed 25.8%.
The rise in government expenditure during the previous development stages was a
result of the incremental expansion of the range of government services and a result of
increasing public investment as a social and political commitment for the people.
Gradually, total government expenditure became rigidly responsive to changes in the
GDP. Because of the deterioration in oil prices, GDP declined steeply from RO
3453.8 million in 1985 to RO 2800 million in 1986, i.e. by 18.9%, whereas
government expenditure declined by only 3.2%.
Due to the high level of public expenditure, little importance was given to the
generation of adequate levels of public saving. As a consequence, planned public
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saving and investment have been low and public capital flowed primarily into domestic
infrastructure in health, education, communications, electricity and water, with little
left for other investment that would possibly yield future public income. Domestic
investment has been occasionally employed for socio-political reasons as a primary
instrument of job creation and regional development than as a complement to private
sector economic activity. The intensive role of the government in the economy,
through its high capital and current expenditure and through its large public
administration, had precluded the achievement of the objective of free economy with
an efficient and able private sector playing a leading role. It resulted in a decline in
participation of the private sector in some aspects of economic activity, limiting its
interest to certain areas like trade and banking. In its turn, this led to the neglect of
other important primary areas of investment such as manufacturing, agriculture,
fisheries, petroleum, and mining, leaving the financing of these sectors to the
government which contradicts the establishment of a private sector-led economy.
As can be seen from Table 1-10 the biggest portion of private sector investment
spending during the Second and Third Plans went into housing (22%), followed by
trade and contracts (13.7%). Manufacturing received 8.8%, while agriculture and
fisheries received only 2.2% and 0.4% of investment respectively. This picture did not
change throughout the Fourth Plan. The low rate of private investment in goods-
producing activities is not due to the investors so much as to the lack of profitable
investment opportunities.
This trend can be partially explained by the argument that "expected oil wealth tends
to have an adverse impact on private investment; this may reflect the competing nature
of private and government investment expenditures as perceived by private
entrepreneurs. The availability of petroleum resources reduces the private sectors'
propensity to save and its demand for investment" (Vaez-Zadeh, 1989, p.364).
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Table 1-10
Non-oil Private Sector Investments During the Second, Third and Fourth Plans
Relative Importance)
Sector The Second Plan
(1981-1985)
2.2%
The Third Plan
(1986-1990)
2.2%
The Fourth Plan
(1991-1995)
0.7%Agriculture
Fisheries 0.4% 0.7% 0.4%
Industry 8.8% 9.5% 4.6%
Trade and Contract 13.7% 7.6% -
Finance	 and
Banking
2.2% 2.6% -
Transport 1.2% 2.0% -
Tourism - 0.9% -
Housing 21.7% 21.6% 5.6%
Others - - 3.4%
Source;
1. DC, ThDP, Table 11, p.23; Table 12, p.20-23
2. DC, The Assessment of the Economic Performance of the ThDP, Table 2-49, p.108
3. DC, FODP, Table 3-10, p.69
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Another relevant explanation of low rate of private investment and heavy intervention
of the government in Oman, particularly in the first stage of development, is the market
failure to achieve social optimum allocation of resources. "The level of investment
may fall below the social optimum, firstly because private investors ignore external
economics and the supplementary benefits of projects when calculating prospective
returns, and secondly because the element of risk will be higher for a series of unco-
ordinated individual projects than for co-ordinated investment programmes
systematically undertaken with some central direction" (Thirlwell, 1990, quoted in Al-
Yousef, 1995, p.53).
At the same time, the increasing role of the government, the speed with which
government units and organisations were established, and the need to employ qualified
personnel, necessitated regulating an incentive system to increase national participation
in the work force in the government sector. This system has attracted workers to
employment in government departments. Conversely, the system has become an
obstacle in the development of the private sector, because it became unable to provide
corresponding incentives. This has affected the sectoral and occupational distribution
of the labour force. Hence, more basic measures are needed to address the large
public/private sector salary differentials.
To sum up, the government's role needs to be reprioritised and the role of the Private
Sector needs to be expanded. The public infrastructure can appropriately support, but
not supplement private development as an engine of economic growth. The
assumption of a more appropriate role by Oman's public sector would necessitate
withdrawing from ineffective, unnecessary or undesirable activities and confining the
government role to necessary limits. In this direction, the World Bank report suggests
the following actions in setting national priorities:
• More reliance on economic criteria when setting national priorities in the selection
of public investment programmes.
Chapter!
	 75
• Substantially reducing or eliminating government involvement in commercial
activities.
• Reviewing current policies and instruments for promoting industrial diversification
with an aim to using more efficient means.
• Scaling down public expenditures on buildings and other low-return infrastructure
(The World Bank, 1994, p.63).
In fact, the government has started to implement a programme of transferring certain
public operations to the private sector such as billing and collecting for water and
electricity maintenance and cleaning contracts, and operating contracts for water and
power stations and hotels. Further privatisation of infrastructure projects are one of
the features of the new Five-Year Development Plan which came into effect in January
1996. The private sector is invited to invest in 10 new projects, the estimated cost of
which is RO 1008m. They include sewage, electricity, water desalination and power,
roads and Polyolefin projects (Ministry of National Economy, 1996).
In reality, however, the liberalisation process in Oman, like in other Arab Gulf States,
encounters three difficulties:
First, there is the problem of finding enough genuine entrepreneurs (rather than
just merchants or speculators) to take up the developmental challenge after the
completion by the state of the basic infrastructure. Second, the network of
subsidies and protection to an extent undermines the building of an efficient
free enterprise system. Third, it is frequently the case that much of the equity in
privatised companies is taken up by the same families and groups (Nonneman,
1995, pp. 258-289).
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1.5 Demographic Characteristics and the Labour Force
The results of the population census that was carried out by the government in
December 1993 (DC, SYB, 1993) established that Oman's population had reached
2,018,074 inhabitants, of which 1,483,226, i.e. 73% are Omanis. Sex distribution
differs between Omanis and non-Omanis. Amongst Omanis, 50.9% are male and
49.1% female, whereas non-Omanis are 79.1% male and 20.9% female. This means
that the total population, Omani and non-Omani, comprises 58.2% male and 41.8%
female, and this is due to the composition of the non-Omani population.
The age distribution of the Omani population is consistent with that of developing
countries. It is characterised by a population pyramid with a wide base which
decreases gradually. This means a high fertility and birth rate, which results in a rise in
the number of young people among the population. 51.6% of Oman's total population
is under 15 years old. This has led to an increasing dependency on foreign labour in
the last phase of economic development.
This population structure resulted in a decline in the number of people of working age
and proportion of the labour force to the total population. It also meant a rise in the
level of economic dependency (proportion of non-working to employed population) to
3.2 for Omanis which means that each worker supports between three and four
dependents. It is worth noting that the level of economic dependency for the entire
population is 1.3. This is because the level of economic dependency of expatriate
labour is very low.
Regarding the distribution of population among the areas of the country and the
density in each of them, it can be seen from Table 1-11 that the highest density is in
Muscat, at 152.5 per km2, whereas the lowest is in Al-Janubiya at 1.6 per km 2. The
highest portion of the population is in Al-Batinah at 28%, whereas the lowest portion
is in Al-Wusta at 0.8%.
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Table 1-11 
Re ional Distribution and Density of Po ulation in 1993
Region Area % Population % Density (personper
11=2)
Muscat 1.2 27.2 152.5
Al-Janubiya 38.4 9.4 1.6
A'Dakhliliya 25.2 11.4 3.0
Al-Batinah 4.5 28.0 41.8
A'Sharqiya 13.7 12.8 6.3
A'Dahira 16.5 9.0 3.7
Al-Wusta - 0.8 -
Musandam 0.5 1.4 19.2
The Sultanate 100 100 6.7
Source:
DC, SYB, 1993, Table 1-2, p.46
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0 
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(by years)
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Chart (1-7): The Population Pyramid
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.15%
12.72%
8.4%
6.2%
4.41%
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1.96%
75+
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59
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49
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39
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29
20
19
10
9
0.99% 0.99%
1.18%
69
1.50%
60
2.04% 2.37%
3.12% 3.08%
4.45% 4.05%
6.11% 6.61%
13.79% 14.36%
17.48% 17.93%
Source: DC, SYB, 1994, Table (3-2), p.55.
Chapter I
	
79
1.5.1 Labour Market Characteristics 
Firstly, there are three terms that must be distinguished: human resources, manpower,
and labour force. Human resources means total population in the country. Manpower
means the number of people of working age, regardless of aptitude, willingness, or
ability to work. Labour force consists of people economically active and according to
international definition "those able, willing and looking for work". Here, labour force
does not include housewives, students and disabled people. It includes those actually
working, as well as those unemployed and looking for work (DC, FODP, pp.135-136).
According to the census results, Omani manpower, which comprises the number of
people between the ages of 15 and 65, accounted for 45.4% of total population in
1993. This percentage is expected to rise mainly by virtue of changes in the age
structure of the population: the widening base of the population pyramid due to an
increase in the number of young. The labour force represented 40.7% of the
manpower in 1993.
Nevertheless, the rate of crude economic participation which is the ratio of the labour
force to the total population is 18.5% and about 22.5% in 1995. The fact that this
portion is so low is due, on the one hand, to decreased participation of women in the
labour force, and on the other hand, because of the decrease in average age of the
population, to a large proportion of manpower being in the various stages of
education, and therefore outside the labour force.
There are many peculiarities marking the Omani labour force. The most prominent
one has been the increasing labour force in the public as well as in the private sector.
This has been to firlfill the demands of develOpments and the need to implement its
programmes at a time when the number of Omanis entering the labour market has been
limited because of the age structure of the population, the rise in the number of young
people, and those in various stages of education. Due to the lengthy period of
preparation and qualification, there has been a need to fill the gap by using foreign
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labour, the amount of which has increased both in the public and private sectors (this
will be discussed later).
The peculiarities of the Omani labour market can be summarised as follows:
1. The average annual growth rate of foreign labourers exceeded the average annual
growth rate of GDP ( at 1980 prices) during the First, as well as the Second Five-
Year Plans. The former was 15.8%, 15.2%, whereas the latter was 9.7%, 14.8%
during the two periods respectively. However, when the level of GDP fell in the
first years of the Third Plan the growth rate of number of expatriate decreased
faster (2.9% and 0.6% respectively).
2. The ratio of expatriate to total labour force highly exceeded the ratio of the Omani
labour force. The increased rate of economic growth led up to 1985 to a widening
of the labour market and accordingly a greater demand for labour in the country.
However, the local supply of labour was unable to meet this increase because of the
wide base of the population pyramid, which implies a large number of young people
outside the labour force. Therefore, the rate of Omanisation (the rate of Omani
labour force to total labour force) fell from 65% in 1975 to 50% in 1980 and 38%
in 1985 and 35.8% in 1993 (The Fourth Plan and the Census result). The entire
labour force grew between 1975 and 1993 by 238%, equivalent to an annual growth
rate of 10%, whereas Omani labour force increased during the same period by only
103% at annual rate of growth of 5.6%. This disparity in the rates of growth of the
total labour force and the Omani labour force resulted in an increase in the level of
foreign labour at 10.3% per annum and a decline in the rate of Omanisation.
3. The Omani labour force is concentrated in technicians and skilled occupations. It
can be seen from Table 1-12, which shows the occupational distribution of the
labour force, that 48.5% of total Omani workers, who account for 35.8% of the
total labour force, were concentrated in technicians and 70.3% in skilled
occupations in 1993.
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Table (1-12)
Distribution of Labour Force per Vocational and Educational Status
Nationality
Vocational and Educational
Status
Total Labour Force Omani Labour Force
Number
(000)
% Number
(000)
Omanisation
in Each
Group (% of
Groups)
Distribution
of Omani
Labour Force
among
Groups (% of
Total
Omanis)
Specialists (Graduates and
above)
63 9.4 20 31.7 8.3
Technicians (Diploma after
general education)
33 4.9 16 48.5 6.7
Skilled (general education and
training)
158 23.6 111 70.3 46.3
Semi-skilled (drop-outs from
different education systems)
112 16.7 9 8.0 3.8
Other semi-skilled and
unskilled
304 45.4 84 27.6 35.0
Total 670 100 240 35.8 100
Source: MOD, SYB, 1995, Table (4-2), p.58.
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4. Government jobs have special attributes which attract Omani workers to the public
sector, including wages, work conditions, services regulations, retirement benefits,
etc. The absence of similar attributes and conditions in the private sector resulted in
a work performance for the government sector and created tremendous pressure on
government organisations to employ an incremental number of workers even who
are qualified for work in industrial services units in the private sector. On the other
hand, wage scales and conditions in the private sector vary between Omani and
expatriate labour. In general, expatriates accept situations and conditions
unacceptable to Omanis, including low wages and long working hours. The
availability of such cheap alternative labour has led to sluggishness in Omanisation,
especially in some private sector activities.
5. The contribution made by women (Omani and expatriate) in the labour force was
9.7% in 1993. The total number of females in the labour force was around 68,000,
of which 23,500 were Omani. In other words, Omani women accounted for 3.5%
of the total labour force and about 9.8% of the Omani labour force. This can be
attributed to a number of economic and social factors, such as female education and
qualification, and the type and nature of occupations which the labour market
provides and the unsuitability of these occupations for religious reasons. By virtue
of the increase in the education of girls and the expectation that thousands of girls
will complete various stages of education in the next few years, the role of women
in the labour market will continue to increase.
1.6 Foreign Trade 
Oman follows a free foreign trade policy in accordance with existing laws. It continues
to maintain a liberal exchange system and there are no restrictions on payments or
transfers for current or capital transactions. There are virtually no trade restrictions.
Only about a half of imports are taxable. The general tariff applicable to duty goods
was raised from 4 % to 5% in the 1986 budget. Under the broad Unified Economic
Agreement among the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council countries, it was agreed that the
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members would seek to establish a common tariff policy. With this objective in mind,
imports form other GCC countries were not subjected to tariffs.
Oman's economy is an export-oriented economy where foreign trade plays a leading
role and is a driving force for all activities of the community. I mentioned earlier that
oil exports accounted for 88.4% of total exports during the period 1970-1995.
Total exports increased from RO 44.8 million in 1970 to RO 2332 million in 1995
(Table 1-13). It multiplied 52 times during this period. Its average annual growth rate
was 12%. The highest growth rate was in 1980 at 64.4% compared to the 1979 level
because of the increase in oil prices. In 1986 (the first year of the Third Plan) it
decreased by 36% compared to 1985 level because of the sudden drop in oil prices.
Total imports increased from RO 12 million in 1970 to RO 1684 million. It multiplied
140 times throughout this period. The average annual growth rate of imports was
approximately the same as exports at 11.8%. The highest growth rate was 39% also in
1980, whereas, the steepest decline was at 23.6% in 1987 one year after the steepest
decline in exports.
Non-oil exports of Omani origin consist of: fish, dates, limes, livestock, foodstuffs,
beverages, mineral products, plastics and articles thereof, textiles and textile articles,
and base metals. Its average annual growth rate within the Second Plan period (1981-
1985), was 35.7%. Throughout the Third Plan, 1986-1990, it grew at an average
annual rate of 30%. During the Fourth Plan it grew at 21.5% per year on average. The
growth was most pronounced in the export of frozen fish and wheat flour. Moderate
increases were also achieved in the export of traditional items such as dates and dried
limes. However, as can be seen from Table 1-13, it still has a marginal importance in
total exports because its highest proportion to total exports was 7.8% in 1995.
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Table 1-13
Summary of Foreign Trade
1970-1995
Non-oil Exports Omani Origin
Exports to
Total Exports
(%)
Total Exports
RO mn
Total Imports
RO mn
Trade
Balance
RO mn
Year Re-exports Omani
Origin
Exports
1970 0.4 0.9 44.8 12 32.8
1971 0.4 0.8 48.1 40.2 7.9
1972 0.4 0.8 50.0 61.6 -11.6
1973 0.6 1.0 61.9 85.8 -23.9
1974 - - - - - -
1975 1.1 0.2 489.2 264.3 224.9
1976 6.0 1.4 0.3 551.2 250.5 300.7
1977 12.0 1.5 0.3 559.4 302.1 257.3
1978 26.9 3.3 0.6 552.0 327.1 224.8
1979 37 4.7 0.6 787.4 430.5 356.9
1980 45.3 4.6 0.4 1294.5 598.3 696.2
1981 88.9 6.5 0.4 1621.8 790.4 831.4
1982 109.5 7.7 0.5 1526.8 926.6 600.2
1983 110.0 10.6 0.7 1467.2 860.8 606.4
1984 109.3 17.2 1.1 1527.5 949.2 578.3
1985 97.4 22.9 1.3 1778.1 1088.9 689.2
1986 85.1 26.6 2.4 1122.5 916.7 205.8
1987 84.9 39 2.6 1484.9 700.7 784.2
1988 92.1 62 4.8 1291.4 846.4 445.0
1989 101.2 66.5 4.3 1562.9 867.9 695.0
1990 107.4 68.7 3.3 2116.4 1030.9 1085.5
1991 165.1 79.1 4.2 1873.9 1228.1 648.8
1992 253.5 96.7 4.5 2135.3 1449.2 686.1
1993 320 122 5.9 2063 1652 411
1994 359 145 6.8 2131 1543 588
1995 322 182 7.8 2332 1684 648
Source:
1. DC, Development in Oman 1970-1974
2. DC, SDP, Table 17, 18, p. 24
3. DC, SYB, 1992, Table 1-11, p.280
4. CBO, 1995, Table 6.1, p.91
Chapter 1
	
85
Japan continued to be the largest buyer of Oman's oil, importing more than 66% in
1985, while West Europe's share declined significantly. On the other hand, South
Korea, India, Singapore, Taiwan and China continued to increase their share of Omani
crude oil. South Korea became the next largest importer at 31% in 1989.
Total Omani exports and re-exports to the UAE fall short of covering the Omani
imports from it. They covered 55.2%, 64.8%, 73.8%, 44%, 48% and 56% of Omani
imports in 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 respectively and this ratio was
increasing in general. This situation is inconsistent with the Sultanates comparative
geographically advantageous location. The Sultanate overlooks the Arabian Sea and
the Oman Gulf with a coastline of 1700 km all of which is outside the Hormuz Strait.
Government spending and total imports have a strong correlation because government
spending is the prime mover in the Omani economy, especially in the demand for
goods and services.
Machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods and food and livestock,
constitute the main items of recorded imports. These three groups together constitute
more or less 75% of total imports in 1991. According to Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC), consumer goods accounted for the major portion at 42.5%.
Intermediate goods, viz, goods that require further processing constitute 27.5%
whereas capital goods accounted for 28.5% (CBO, 1991, p.99).
The UAE, Japan and the UK have been the three most important sources of imports.
In 1990, the participations of these three countries in Oman's imports were 23.2%,
17% and 11.5% respectively. The bulk of imports from the UAE were in the form of
re-exports and consisted of building materials, clothing, fruit and vegetables,
electronics, etc. Those from Japan were mainly made up of machinery and transport
equipment. Imports from the UK covered a wide range of goods.
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With respect to major regions, Oman's imports in 1990 came from: Western Europe
31.7%, Asia 27.5%, Arab countries 27.3% (of which 99% was from GCC countries),
America 10%, Oceania 2.7%, Eastern Europe 0.5% and Africa 0.4% (DC, SIB,
1992).
Oman's balance of trade has always been in surplus since the development of the oil
sector (except in 1972 and 1973). This surplus had been growing since 1979,
reflecting the trends in oil prices. It reached a peak of RO 788.9 million in 1981, then
leveled at an average of RO 542.5 million. In 1986 it dropped sharply to RO 113
million. Imports compression, together with a recovering in oil earnings, brought a
strong improvement in 1987 at RO 707 million, while the 1990 trade surplus was high
because oil prices and production was prompted by the Gulf crisis.
In spite of the trade surplus, there is a remarkable net outflow on the invisible
transactions which has left the country with a much-reduced current account surplus
since 1982 and a deficit of RO 383 million in 1986 and 129 million in 1988. The large
number of foreign workers in the country has contributed to this phenomenon through
workers' remittances. These remittances alone cut the trade balance surplus by an
average annual rate of 61% during the period 1980-1986 (Al-Hinai, 1988).
Free trade policy, unrestrained transfers, and oil exports have widened the openness of
the Omani economy. One simple measure of openness is to add the value of exports
and imports, then divide the total by the GDP. The economy of increasing ratio could
be described as opening up, and that of decreasing ratio is anti-trade. Chart (1-8)
depicts the openness of the Omani economy. It is obvious that the openness of the
economy has been affected positively with oil production and oil; prices.
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Chart 1-8 
The Openness of the Omani Economy
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Trade balance surplus means that total exports exceed the country's needs of all
goods, but would this be the case without oil exports? Non-oil exports could not
satisfy the country's needs. As has already been pointed out, it comprises a maximum
of only 7.8% of total exports. It accounts for a maximum of 10% of imports. Non-oil
exports means that non-oil output exceeds local consumption in some items.
Therefore, non-oil GDP compared to total imports could be used as an indicator of the
self-sufficiency of the country. Chart 1-9 represents the ratio of non-oil GDP to total
imports during the period 1970-1995. On average, non-oil GDP accounted for
163.9% of total imports. In other words, non-oil output is enough to meet the
country's needs of all commodities by 1.63 times. This indicator, nevertheless, may be
criticised by the fact that the imports of an oil-producing country is effected by the Oil
Sector. Namely, total imports includes equipment, machines, tools and materials
related to the oil industry. On the other hand, the needs of other producing sectors for
some capital and intermediate goods, and the household sector needs for consumer
goods, is motivated by oil receipts. As a result, without oil GDP, the structure and
magnitude of imports would have changed. However, non-oil GDP itself, as has been
indicated earlier, is affected by oil GDP. Thus, the effects of the Oil Sector on both
sides, imports and non-oil GDP, would counteract each other. Accordingly, the ratio
of non-oil GDP/imports could work as an approximate indicator for Oman self-
sufficiency.
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Chart 1-19 
The Ratio of Non-oil GDP/Total Imports 1970-1995
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Conclusion 
The Omani economy is a small economy based on oil production. It consists of three
major sectors: the oil sector, the non-oil commodity sector and the service sector.
Although the relative importance of the oil sector in total GDP has fallen from 67% in
1970 to 38% in 1995, oil production is still dominating the other sectors of the
economy because of its far-reaching effects through government expenditure.
The development strategy is based on oil exports. Oil revenues that accrued to the
government have been channelled to establish the infrastructure projects and to provide
a wide range of public services.
Several development plans that have been executed have transformed the country from
subsistence economy to a modern one.
Despite the leading role of the oil sector, it is described as an enclave sector employing
a low proportion of total labour force (0.8%). The economic effects of the oil sector
on other sectors are financial and macro-level effects through government spending.
There is a weak integration between the oil sector and other sectors.
The non-oil commodity sector has achieved a remarkable growth rate during the last
development plan after a stagnation period during the previous plan.
This sector has been suffering from narrow-base investment, especially in agriculture
and fisheries. It also lacks adequate entrepreneurial skills. Manufacturing is dominated
by small projects of light and medium industries. The small local market and imports
competition are critical difficulties facing industry.
The oil-based economy has adversely affected the agriculture sector. Although in
absolute value agriculture and fishing produce has been increasing enormously, the
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relative importance of the sector declined from 34.6% in 1967 to 2.5% during the last
development plan. Lack of water resources, marketing skills, external competition,
rural-urban migration and slow adaptation of modern production technology are the
main serious problems challenging the sector. The commodity sector is also
characterised by the dominant role of expatriate workers who contribute 81.5% of the
labour force working in the sector compared to 18.5% for Omanis. This means the
nationalisation of production techniques is growing slowly.
Large-scale development of natural resources through high government spending has
created the so-called "Dutch Disease". The result of this phenomenon was a rise in the
prices of domestic services and relative decrease in the process of the tradable goods.
This has encouraged the investment in service activities at the expense of tradable
goods, opening the way to increasing importance of the service sector.
The service sector consists mainly of government services such as education, health
services, communications, and of other service activities practised by the private sector
such as wholesale and financial and business services. Its relative importance as a
source of gross domestic product has been increasing rapidly. Presently it generates
almost one half of the GDP, exceeding the participation of the oil sector. Private
activities within this sector are dominated by expatriate labour force (75%), especially
in the trading sector.
The other main peculiarity of the Omani economy is the major role of the government,
with its total expenditure forming 52% of GDP on average, and its development
expenditure contributing by 71% to total investment spending of the economy. The
positive result of this heavy intervention of the government is the quick and remarkable
modernisation of the country. However, the intensive role of the government has
hindered the progress of the private sector, leaving it with narrow options.
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The next characteristic of the Omani economy is that the population enjoy high fertility
and high birth rate, which makes 51% of the population under 15 years of age. This
has resulted in an increasing need for foreign labour. The ratio of expatriate to total
labour force is 65%. The expatriate labour force has been increasing by 10% whereas
the Omani labour force constitutes 35% and has been increasing by 5.6%.
Finally, the openness of the Omani economy is high since Oman believes in free trade
without restriction on imports and financial transfers. Oil exports form 88% of total
exports. Commodity exports of Omani origins form only 7.8%. While imports provide
Omani consumers with a large variety of consumer goods, they harms the Omani
producers through the competition of equivalent products.
Due to the large number of expatriate workers, the current account balance records a
small surplus and sometimes a large deficit. Its position has been reducing the trade
balance surplus and the gross domestic saving.
I "Mar is the plural of "falaj" which is a method of obtaining water for irrigation by locating a water source
under the earth in the flank of a mountain and making a path from this spring to the area to be watered.
Vertical shafts at intervals of about twenty to fifty yards are sunk along this path, and the bottoms of the shafts
then coimected by a tunnel along which the water flows down a gentle gradient to reach the surface at or near
the area to be watered.
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CHAPTER II
GOVERNMENT BUDGETING IN OMAN: 
OBJECTIVES, POLICIES,AND MECHANISM
In the context of analysing the cost and effects of the budget deficit in Oman, it is
important to know the main objectives which the government budget is required to
achieve. It is also necessary to understand how the mechanism of the budget is
prepared, organised and executed. Moreover, the importance of government finance in
Oman as a rentier state and its role in transforming the oil wealth from the oil sectors
to other sectors of the economy is important to examine. Therefore, this chapter will
be divided into three sections as follows:
Section I: The Government in Oman as a Link between the Oil Sector and Other
Sectors.
Section II: The Objectives and Policies of Budgeting in Oman.
Section III: The Organisation of Budgeting in Oman
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2.1	 The Government as a Link Between Oil Sector and Other Sectors in
the Omani Economy: 
From the overview that has been made on the Omani economy in chapter one, as an oil
rentier economy, certain main characteristics have been distinguished which can be
summarised as follows:
First, the limited domestic productive capacity in areas other than the rent producing
industry.
Second, weak relationship between oil revenues received by the government and the
productive efforts exerted by members of the society. In other words, oil prices are
almost disconnected with the local production cost of oil.
Third, the enclave nature of the oil industry, where its direct integration - the vertical
and the horizontal linkages with other sectors of the economy is minimal. The oil
industry has little direct impact on the course of development in the country since it
engages only a small portion of domestic labour and capital.
Fourth, the above characteristic leads to the conclusion that the creation of wealth is
centred around a small fraction of the society; the rest of the society is only engaged in
the distribution and utilisation of this wealth.
Fifth, the oil industry's major contribution is that it enables the government to embark
on large public expenditure programmes without resorting to taxation. The
government becoming the dominant factor in the economy.
Sixth, expected oil wealth have an adverse impact on private investment, the
availability of petroleum resources reduced the private sectors propensity to save and
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to invest. This indirect influence can be interpreted as the confidence effect of the oil
wealth.
Seventh, high wages in the oil industry and it related services sector increased the
wages in industries competing for labour and thereby raised their costs. High industrial
and service sectors wages also increased the degree of income inequality and widened
the gap between the modern sectors and the low productivity agricultural sector.
Eighth, continued high public spending on services meant that the demand for, and the
prices of factors of production, including urban labour, remained high, reducing the
incentive for those factors to seek employment in goods production.
The government as the recipient of oil rents and the purposes and tools of its role as a
link between the oil sector and other sectors are shaped by these peculiarities of rentier
economy.
In Oman, as in other oil-based economies, the large size of export earnings accruing to
the government relative to the size of the economy give more importance to the
operations of the government than is the case in other developing countries. Because
the oil sector is typically characterised as an enclave sector, the government's operation
serve as the main link between that sector and the rest of the economy. In other words,
in the rentier state, the rent received from the exports is concentrated in the hands of
the state which establishes the links between the rent generating sector and the rest of
the economy through expenditure side of the budget. This enables the state to play a
crucial role in both the diffusion of oil rent among the population and in determining
the economic and social fabric of the society.
Hence, the state is at the centre of the analysis of rentier economies. As one author
has argued: "The oil-exporting rentier economy is seen as a hierarchy of layers of
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rentiers, with the state or the government at the top of the pyramid, acting as the
ultimate support of all other rentiers in the economy" (Beblawi 1987, p.33).
This role of the government as a link - between oil sector and the rest of the economy
is governed by three factors:
1-The weak influence of taxpayers.
2-The weak forward-backward linkages of the oil sector.
3-The strong fiscal linkage through the budget.
2.1.1 The Weak Influence of Taxpayers
The rapid increase in oil rents during the 1970s and early 1980s generated strong
domestic pressure to increase the scope of government services. These offered or
provided attractive channels through which governments could distribute oil income
and raise living standards. On the other hand, the availability of large oil revenues has
meant that there has been little need for regular taxation in Oman like other oil
exporting countries in the region. However, partially because of this limited financial
involvement and support, the population as a whole has little say or representation in
the government. In other words, because taxpayers, as a body are not very important,
they have very little political weight or influence in the conduct of the countries affairs.
(Bideleux 1990, p.10). Rentier states are more concerned with spending revenue than
collecting taxes, and they are relatively free from social and political pressures to spend
money carefully. (Ibid. p12).
2.1.2 The Weak Forward Backward Linkages of Oil Sector
The availability of petroleum resources reduced the private sector's propensity to save
and its demand for investment. As a result, Vaez-Zadeh stated that "the growth
prospects of the economy would depend to a large extent than in other countries, on
the activities of the government" (Vaez-Zadeh 1989, p.347). This finding highlights
the importance of the composition of government expenditure for the growth
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prospects of oil-based economies. Vaez-Zadeh argued" whether oil wealth will act as
a stimulate or a barrier to economic growth in the long run depends on the
government's ability to take a leading role in expanding the productive capacity of the
economy through appropriate incentive schemes for the private sector to help mitigate
the adverse influence of oil wealth on private investment" (Ibid.).
In the same way, to understand the economic implications of the government
intermediary in an oil rentier state, like Oman, an appraisal of the existence, strength,
and reliability of various linkages effects of the petroleum sector is important and
conclusions drawn from studies of other oil exporting developing countries are of
interest.
The first conclusion suggests that the petroleum industry has tended to be relatively
deficient in spread effects associated with production and consumption linkages.
Obviously, the failure of petroleum to create production linkages was a direct result of
the technology used in it, which is high capital and skill intensive (Pearson and Scott,
1970, p.173). Hence, in a developing country like Oman, petroleum industry input
requirements were highly divergent from domestic factor supply. On the other hand,
the failure of the oil industry to raise or generate consumption linkage could be due to
its low labour demand as a result of its technology.
The second conclusion is that fiscal linkage in an export oriented economy are by far
the most important means though which developments in the petroleum sector are
transmitted to the rest of the economy. As Amuzegar has put it, "most studies suggest
that, due to its high capital intensive and enclave nature, the oil industry in almost all
developing countries generates few significant forward or backward linkages. The
most effective means of transmitting the oil sector's growth to the rest of the economy
is through the budget" (Amuzegar 1983, p.20).
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The third conclusion is that the difference between production and consumption
linkages on the one hand and fiscal linkages on the other is vital to the understanding
of the unique problem the sector has in transmitting its growth to the rest of the
economy. Production as well as consumption linkages' success or failure is worked out
through the market mechanism while the success of fiscal linkages depends primarily
on the government's ability and willingness to participate in the income originated in
the petroleum industry (Pearson and Scott 1970, p.173). An assessment of export-led
growth in petroleum economies suggests that Oman was obliged to rely primarily on
fiscal linkage. This means that government finance has to play the leading role in
initiating development.
2.1.3 The Strong Fiscal Linkage Through the Budget
Fiscal linkage was defined as " inter-sectoral effect associated with government
expenditures of incremental revenues collected from expansion of given industries"
(Ibid.).
The Omani government's financial performance has major ramifications for the entire
economy. The financial flow is represented in four different types of expenditures:
Current, defence, development expenditures, and contribution and support to private
sector.
A major financial flow of dispersing oil revenues through expenditure is government
employment. Citizens assumed recruitment in the state apparatus as a legitimate
aspiration. Assuming social obligation to ensure the employment of its citizens, the
government found that the easiest way is to create large bureaucracy to fulfil such an
aspiration. Defence expenditures is directed to strengthen the army and security
departments. With the development expenditure the provision of public goods and
services represent an important tool of redistributing oil rent among the population.
The development and expansion of the infrastructure absorbed a large share of the
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government expenditure of this channel. A sizeable proportion of government revenues
is spent on roads, schools and hospitals. The largest portion of the fourth channel of
government expenditure goes to support private sector through soft loans and
subsidies of rate of interest.
Chart 2-1 shows the main lines of financial linkages between oil sector and other
sectors through government expenditures. From this chart it can be seen that the
government uses oil revenues in five ways:
1. It provides public goods and services; education, health services, defence
and security services, electricity, water and communications etc.
2. It establishes infrastructure projects such as roads, schools, hospitals,
airports, seaports, dams etc.
For executing infrastructure projects and operating public units and
enterprises that supply public goods and services, the government buys
goods and services from the private sector and the external sector (through
imports).
3. The government buys services from the public administration officials. They
use the money to buy goods and services from the government (electricity,
water, fuels, etc.) and from the private sector and the external sector.
4. The government pays subsidies for social, political and economic purposes.
The individuals and the establishments use the money to buy goods and
services from the private sector and the external sector.
5. The government appropriates 15% of its total oil revenues to build general
reserves for future needs. It has been resorting to these reserves to finance its
budget deficit.
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However, to examine the influence of government spending on the economy, the
analysis of government expenditures in national income accounts is of great
importance. The Gross Domestic Product may be looked upon as the aggregate of
expenditures on currently produced output. Government contributes to these
expenditures through its purchases of goods and services. As shown in (Table 2-1)
government purchase of goods and services is a major component of GDP. 56.5% of
total output was purchased by the government in 1986. Looked at from other end,
56.5% of goods and services when received by users are provided almost free of
charge and paid for indirectly through the government budget. Thus, it can be recorded
that over one half of total output is based on budgetary provisions.
In examining how budgetary provision fits into the economic structure, Musgrave
distinguished between three types of government purchases:
1-Purchases of factors and purchases of products.
2-Provision for consumption and provision for investment.
3-Provision to consumers and provision to firms.(Musgrave, 1980, p.161).
The first and second distinctions are related here and can be applied to the Omani
economy national account as follows:
1-Purchase of factors versus purchase of products:
Governmental factor purchase are represented in government wage payments.
Government wage payments amounted to 60.2% of total government consumption
purchase in 1986. The remainder is the purchase of consumption goods and services
from local private firms and from abroad. The government wage bill can be assessed
through its importance in total GDP and through the total wages bill of the economy.
GDP reflects the total of production factor earnings. It may be broken down into
income derived from, or "originated in" the government and the private sector. The
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bulk of income originating in government is in the form of wages and salaries paid by
government, i.e. it is equal to the share of government purchases which are used for
factor rather than product purchases. Table (2-2) shows the volume and relative
importance of government wages and salaries to total wage bill of the economy and
total GDP in three years: 1985, 1986 and 1990. It can be seen that the government
pays about 50% of total wages bill of the economy, and this constitutes about 14.5%
of total GDP.
2-Provision for consumption versus investment:
The second distinction is between consumption and capital formation. Both private and
government component of GDP can be broken down by consumption and gross capital
formation. If structure only are included, the share of government purchases going to
capital formation was about 41.2% of total purchases in 1986 (Table 2-1). But if the
concept of capital formation should be defined broadly so as to include investment in
human resource such as Education and Health, capital expenditure of the government
comes to comprise a much larger share of public purchases. According to this
approach, about 50.2% of total government purchases in 1986, and 38.8 in average
during 1986-1990, was of capital formation type. Capital formation, it appears, is an
important function of the government, a fact to be kept in mind in our later discussion
of fiscal (or budgetary) policy objectives and effects on development and stabilisation.
2.2. The Objectives, and Policies of Budgeting in Oman
The word "budget" originally meant the "Money Bag" or the "Public Purse" ; which
served as a receptacle for revenue and expenditure of the state. In Britain, the term was
used to describe the leather bag in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer carried to
parliament the statement of the government needs and resources (Muller, 1979, p.97).
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Table (2-1): 
The Structure of Government Purchases
and Their Relative Im ortance
Particulars 1986
%
1987
%
1988
%
1989
%
1990
%
1.Gov. Purchases of Total Output 56.5 43.7 44.8 39.2 36.1
2.Gov. Wage Payments to Total Gov.
Consumption Purchases, 60.2 60.5 58.6 60.3 60.2
3.Gov.	 Purchases	 of	 Goods	 and
Services to Consumption Purchases 39.8 39.5 41.4 39.7 39.8
4.Gov. Capital formation of Total Gov.
Purchases 41.2 30.4 27.0 23.0 20.9
5.Gov .	 Capital Formation of Broader
sense to total Gov. Purchases. 50.2 41.2 37.8 34.2 30.6
Sources
1. DC, The assessment of the economic performance of the ThDP, Table 2-11,
2. MEIFE, Final Accounts 1990, Table 9/1 p54, Table 9/2 p.57
Table (2-2)
The Volumes and Relative Importance of Government Wane Bill
Particular 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Government Wages
(RU. million) 477.9 495.8 509.9 535.2 548.7 658.6 669.5
Gov. Wages to Total Wages
of the Economy % 49.7 48.1 54.1 53.3 53.2 54.3 51.8
_Gov. Wages to Total GDP % 11.5 14.8 17.1 18.5 17.0 16.3 17.3
Sources:
1. DC, SYB, 1988, Table 236, p.465.
2. DC, SYB, 1994, Table (10-14), p.430.
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Many definitions of the concept of the budget exist because of different financial,
political, economic and administrative dimensions of the budget. All definitions of the
budget concept revolves around three main elements:
I.	 The budget is a financial statement showing the statistics of the
estimated figures of government receipts and expenditures.
2. It reflects the one-year programme of the economic and social
development plan which may be extended to five years or less. Hence it
is a one-year time-unit of this plan.
3. There is a strong connection and interrelated flow of data between the
planning department and the budgeting department.
The financial law in Oman has defined the budget as "the financial programme of the
plan for the coming financial year to achieve certain objectives in the framework of the
general economic and social development plan according to the general policy of the
state and which is approved annually according to the law" (Royal Decree No. 56/82).
According to this definition the budget has two main uses: a) it forms the basis of the
government's longer-term financial planning of its own economic and social
commitments; b) it is an instrument of the fiscal policy in regulating the level of
aggregate demand and aggregate supply in the economy.
Before clarifying how the budget works in these two uses, the scope of this budget, i.e.
the area which is covered by the government budget, must be defined.
The government administration consists of a number of ministries and government
units, public non-financial authorities, public financial authorities, other state owned
enterprises, and the Central Bank of Oman.
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The financial law in Oman indicates that there is one public budget which covers
central government administrative apparatus, the municipality units and the
administrative departments of all the provinces of the country. At the end of 1991,
there were some 25 domestic public authorities and public companies owned entirely
by the government or jointly with the private sector (Table 2-3).
In 17 of these bodies, government participation is 51% or higher; of these majority-
owned bodies, 14 are owned almost entirely by the government. In six cases, the
government is a minority shareholder. Wholly or partly state owned enterprises are
involved in a wide range of business activities such as banking, refining, mining,
cement, transportation, telecommunications, agriculture, fisheries, hotels, insurances,
etc.
The financial system of these public bodies is regulated by a financial circular issued in
1985. Each is required to keep its own special annual budget, which is annexed to the
general budget.
The link between the general budget and the public bodies budget is represented in the
financial flow that the circular has regulated. If the public body makes a surplus, it
must pay dividends to the state general budget through the Ministry of Finance. If it
shows a deficit it can receive a subsidy or loan from the state general budget. (Financial
Circular No 6/1985). In addition, the public body can use its internal resources or
borrow from domestic or foreign sources to finance its capital expansion (Ibid.). In
other words, the state's general budget includes any capital subscriptions, loans, and
subsidies from the treasury to state enterprises and any dividends, interests and loan
repayments from them to the government, but not their commercial transactions.
Government supervision of public authorities and companies is carried out through
representation on their boards (as members or chairperson) of the officials from the
ministry involved and the Ministry of Finance and Economy.
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Table 2-3
Public Authorities and State Owned Enterprises at the End of 1991 
Authorities	 and
enterprises
Date	 of
establishment
Subscribed capital
(R.O.'000)
% of share owned
by government
Central Bank 1975 175000 100
Telecom 1975 50000 100
Golf Hotel 1974 2000 32.1
Oman Aviation 1981 7000 35
Bank of Agriculture and 1981 19000 99
Fisheries
Oman Cement 1977 41429 99.9
Oman	 Development 1977 1000 54.1
Bank
Oman Fisheries 1989 12500 24
Oman Flour Mills 1975 10500 60
Housing Bank 1976 30000 61
Oman Mining 1978 25000 99
Oman	 National 1977 5000 15
Insurance
Oman	 National 1975 6000 99.9
Transport
Oman Refinery 1983 30000 99
Port Services 1975 4800 35.6
Raysut Cement 1981 8000 20
Marketing	 Agricultural 1985 9807 100
Production
Salalah Hotel 1978 2500 99.9
Al Bustan Hotel 1985 N.A 100
Inshirah Restaurant 1987 N.A. 100
Muscat Intercon Hotel 1987 N.A. 100
Storage and Food RSV 1980 N.A. 100
Rusail Indus. Estate 1983 N.A. 100
Seeb Novotel 1982 N.A. 100
PDO 1980 N.A. N.A.
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In addition to the ordinary ministries and public authorities that seek for profit, there is
another kind of public authority which is administratively independent and does not
seek for profit, such as Majlis Al-Shura and Sultan Qaboos University. They are
included in the state's general budget.
In short, the Omani government has one general budget called the state general budget.
Profit-seeking public authorities and enterprises have their own balance sheets which
must be annexed to the general budget Non-profit-seeking authorities which are not
financially independent are included in the state general budget.
After defining the budget, the objective, policies and the organisation of the budget
must be discussed.
From the above definition of the budget as the "financial programme of the plan for
the coming financial year to achieve certain objectives in the framework of the
development plan and according to the general policy of the state", three main
elements can be abstracted:
1-The budget is the annual financial programme of the plan.
2-The budget seeks to achieve certain objectives.
3-These objectives are deduced from the economic and social development
plan, according to the general policy of the state.
The development plan referred to shall be regarded as a reference guide for the
planning and implementing of government financial and economic policies, without
prejudice to the rules and procedures for approving and issuing government budgets
and procedures followed in the approval of projects in accordance with the Economic
Development Law, 1975. (Royal decree No. 32/1976, concerning the sanctioning of
the Five-Year Plan 1976-1980).
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Therefore, to see how the main objectives of the development plans are reflected in the
budget, the objectives of the development plans must be examined.
The objectives rest on the socio-economic strategy of the state which was declared by
the Development Council in February 1975 (see Chapter I p.5). This strategy consists
of the following main targets:
1. To develop new sources of national income to augment and eventually to
replace oil revenues.
2. To increase the ratio of national investments directed to income generating
projects, particularly in manufacturing, mining, agriculture and fisheries.
3 To distribute national investments among geographical regions which a view to
spreading prosperity and progress to all regions of the sultanate, reducing
differentials in the standard of living between the regions, and assuming a
special priority to the least developed areas.
4. To support the maintenance of existing population centres and communities, to
safeguard those communities from potential emigration to densely populated
urban centres, and to protect the environment.
5. To attach high priority to the development of local human resources.
6. To support commercial activities by removing market deficiencies, particularly
in the areas of transport, communications, storage, and other obstacles to
competitive trading, with a view to enhancing the emergence of competitive
market and to maintaining a reasonable level of prices.
7	 To provide for the creation of a national economy based on private-enterprise
and free from monopolistic practices.
The long-term strategy does not change from one five-year plan to the other.
Naturally, the emphasis and priorities attached to each of these targets do change from
one-five year plan to the other in accordance with the achieved stage of development.
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This strategy put an emphasis on achieving the basic requirements of a free economy
led by an efficient and capable private sector. It stressed the diversification of the
economy by developing the income generating projects specially in the fields of
agriculture, fisheries, industry and mining. It highlighted the importance of human
resources and the effectiveness of the government administration. It paid attention to
the significance of the wider geographical distribution of investment between regions in
order to narrow the gap in the living standards between these regions.
Since 1975, four development plans have been executed. The main aims of these plans
were deduced from the strategy above. Since the focus of this thesis is on the third
plan, the main short-term targets of this plan are highlighted as follows:
1-To achieve an average growth rate of 4% in national income in expected prices.
Economic growth should exceed the population growth rate.
2-To achieve equilibrium between the resources of the state and their uses by applying
suitable and necessary steps which will reduce government expenditure and
redistribute the available resources accordingly.
3- To give priority to the development of natural water resources and to the income
generating projects in such sectors as those of agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing,
mining, and natural gas.
4- To increase the daily crude oil production to 550,000 barrels in 1986 and 1987, and
to 575,000 barrels per day during the next three years (1988-1990).
5- To expand regional development in the field of social services, such as education,
health, vocational training and housing.
6- To fix an amount of RU 1483 million as the total development expenditure for the
civil ministries, of which RU 753 million would be for the on-going projects and
730 for new projects.
7- The plan has allocated RU 120 million to encourage the private sector and to create
a suitable atmosphere for contribution to the development of the country's economic
activities.
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8- To set RO 299m as the ceiling for government borrowing.
9- To give due attention to the completion of the public infrastructure within the
available resources and to attach high priority to sanitary drainage projects, drinking
water services, electricity, means of communication and the establishment of local
markets. (DC, ThDP, pp 48-49).
Subsequent to the issuance of the plan in January 1986 the oil prices started to decline
and during the six months that followed there was an oil price crisis. The price of
Omani oil declined till it reached US $8/barrel in July 1986, whereas the average price
during 1985 was US $27/barrel. Consequently, a decision was taken to devalue the
Omani Rial against the Dollar by 10.2% on 25 January 1986, and to reduce
government expenditure in the plan by 10%, except for those sectors which rendered
services to the public, such as education, health and social affairs.
As a result of these variables, the targets of the short term policies of the plan were
reformulated and they are summarised as follows:
1. To stand against the decline of oil prices.
2. To stabilise the economy and assist the private and government sectors to cope with
the new environment.
3. To limit reduction in the national income in 1986 and to sustain it thereafter, while
attaining modest development in the following years of the plan.
4. To tackle the deficit in the budget of the country which was caused by the decline in
oil prices.
5. To concentrate on increasing value added in the non-oil producing sectors so as to
compensate for the reduction in revenues caused by the fall in oil prices.
The figure-targeted by the plan were broken down into the annual programme (the
budget). Plans provide a conceptual framework and represent a thinking process, but
budgets are operational documents. "It is generally agreed that planning is of two
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types: substantive planning or development planning, and fiscal planning. Development
planning is concerned with the planning of social goals and objectives and the
mobilisation of natural, human and financial resources needed for their achievement.
Fiscal planning, which is one of the tools of substantive planning, consists of planning
the future budget, current and future budget decisions, the implications for financing
and the methods of obtaining the necessary resources and allocating them in
accordance with overall national goals" (Premchand, 1983, p.176).
The previous goals of budgeting fall in those categories — Musgrave has called them
the budget functions — allocation, distribution and stabilisation.
1 Allocation function, i.e. the provision for social goods, or the process by which
total use of resources is divided between private and social goods an by which
the mix of social goods is chosen.
2 Distribution function, that is the adjustment of the distribution of income and
wealth to assure conformance with what society considers a "fair" or "just"
state of distribution.
3 Stabilisation function which means the use of budget policy as means of
maintaining high employment, a reasonable degree of price level stability and an
appropriate rate of economic growth, with allowance for effects on trade and
on the balance of payments. (Musgrave, 1989, p.6-'7).
The question may be raised here: on what budgetary theory the budget policy in Oman
is based? Is it based on Keynesian theory or on the monetarists' theory?
Keynes believed that the government is the only mechanism with the ability to play the
role of stabilisation factor for aggregate demand. If the economy is in recession and
suffers from lack of aggregate demand, the government must apply a certain package
of fiscal and monetary policies and inject the economy with motivating doses so as to
increase the effective aggregate demand. For this purpose, he called for interest rate
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reduction in order to absorb the unemployed workers and to raise the volume of
demand on consumption and investment goods. This policy may lead to a budget
deficit, but according to Keynes, it is not important. In the case of full employment
when the economy is threatened by inflation, the government must apply a certain
package of fiscal and monetary policies in order to absorb the excess demand. He
called for high interest rate, tax increase and government expenditure cuts which
would create a surplus in government budget. In this way Keynes explained that the
point is not to stress the principle of annual balance of the budget, but the long term
balance of the budget which could last the whole business cycle of about ten years.
Keynes provided the theoretical justification for government intervention in economic
activities thus he gave the government budget and public finance as well as the
monetary policy a critical importance on the management of the economy.
Opinion prior to this was that the government should operate a balanced budget policy,
allowing the economy to respond in its own way without government intervention.
This opinion was continued by the New Classical School, who expressed its rejection
of Keynesianism since the beginning of its emergence in 1936. This school believed in a
strict version of economic liberalism.
The "Chicago School", also known as monetarism, which was one of the salient
stream of the New Classical School, had led the attack against Keynesianism and the
principle of government intervention in economic activities. It blamed all the problems
(Crisis) facing the economic system on Keynesianism and its economic policies.
The most important feature of this school which is represented in Milton Friedman's
view is its strong emphasis on money and monetary policy.
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Milton Friedman's and his supporters attributed all economic problems of the system,
such as inflation, unemployment and stagflation, merely to faults in monetary policy
which was aggravated by Keynesian policies of economic intervention. Thus the
central aim of economic policy is to struggle against inflation i.e. to achieve monetary
stability not full employment which was a top priority of Keynesian economic policy.
Monetary stability can only be achieved through a strict monetary policy and the
control of the growth rate of the quantity of money relative to the growth of real
national product. In order to achieve this goal the main sources of excess money
supply has to be checked first. According to Friedman and his supporters, the most
important source is the increase of budget deficit (Ibid.). Therefore the economic
policy should aim for decreasing the ratio of budget deficit to GDP gradually. This will
only be possible through tangible cut in government spending.
Budgetary (fiscal) policy in Oman as a developing country and oil exporting country is
not normally based on Keynesian theory. This theory was designed to address
problems originated in Western industrial countries. Those problems were represented
in a shortage of aggregate demand against aggregate supply, unemployment and
recession.
Monetarism, on the other side, is based on the confining of government intervention in
the economic activity and the reduction of tax and interest rate and focuses on
monetary stabilisation.
However, the problems and characteristics of Oman are different. On the one hand
Oman started its development plans with its economy suffering from lack of basic
economic and social infrastructure, lack of skilled labour and technology, lack of
adequate education and high rate of illiteracy. On the other hand, as has been
mentioned earlier, a large fraction of the value of oil exports consists of state revenue.
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The state revenue is initially sterilised in the form of state owned foreign assets, that
are not matched by income and asset accumulation in non-government sector.
Under these conditions, the collection of oil revenues has no direct effect on the
income of residents. The excess of local expenditures will add to domestic income,
while the growth of money will expand liquidity. The demand for imports will be
stimulated, and the inflationary impact will be partly offset by reduction in the balance
of payments surplus. "Because imports and home goods are not a perfect substitute, as
some economists argue, spending on home goods also will be stimulated and prices
will tend to rise. However, a country with a strong export position resulting from
enclave production suffers less from inflation than other countries do" (Goode, 1984,
pp.278-279).
Oman budgetary policy is aimed to affect both sides of the economy: supply and
demand.
1-Supply Side: 
Policies to augment aggregate supply have played a considerable role in the recent
growth performance. Through the budget the government tried to raise the country's
growth potential by channelling growth investment in the proper direction considered
necessary by the government and to direct and encourage private investment. Through
the budget the government tried to make the proper utilisation of economic resources
because the problem of economic growth requires proper participation between the
private sector and the public sector. In the total available productive resources
government was using the budget to support the private sector to play its role in the
economy.
Its development expenditures in the plan mentioned above represented 23.5% of total
government uses, while the government's share in PDO development expenditures
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represented 28.2% of total development expenditures (DC, ThDP, p.62). The plan has
allocated an amount of R.O. 88m to support the private sector and financial
institutions (specialised banks) (Ibid. p80). The government continued developing the
educational and vocational training centres to meet the country's economic need for
human resources. It stressed the importance of secondary and high level technical
education.
2-Demand side: 
The government development plan tried to regulate purchasing power in accordance
with the over-all pattern specified in the plan. Government expenditures both current
and development, aimed to modify the inequality of income distribution. According to
the plan one of the objectives was to expand the scope of regional development in the
under-developed Wilayats to reduce the gap in the standard of living and to upgrade
the social services, specially in the health and social housing sectors (Ibid. p72). The
government subsidises through the pricing policies some of the public utilities such as
electricity and water. On the other hand, there are no indirect taxes such as sales taxes
or direct taxes on individual income. There are no user charges on health services or
education.
However, on the demand side, the fiscal policy is not directed to increase aggregate
demand and employment. The priority or more stress is on the supply side to
encourage the production of goods and services. Oman, on the one hand is still
characterised by many features of underdeveloped countries: insufficient infrastructure,
limited endowment of skilled labour and a large proportion of the population in
economic sectors where productivity remains low. On the other hand, new problems
have emerged such as budget deficit, balance of payment deficit, wages that rose
beyond labour productivity, inefficient industries, decline of traditional exports, waste,
stagnation in non-oil exports, increasing dependence on imports, and rural migration to
towns and cities.
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Oil revenues help to some extent to remove one constraint on development, the
financial one, but this does not, of itself, remove others, such as lack of managerial,
administrative, and entrepreneurial talent, and of infrastructure. Investment drives on
the ports, for example, did not remove the bottleneck of congestion completely.
In brief, measures to augment aggregate supply involving the easing of key bottlenecks
have a critical but limited role to play in restoring efficiency and effectiveness of the
private sector.
On the demand side, there are still discrepancies in income distribution. The civil
service system is biased towards upper administration officials and against the low-
salary officials. The regional distribution of investment, specially private investment, is
still unfair.
However, the objectives and policies of the budget do not give a broad enough picture
of the importance of the government budget within the area of public finance in Oman.
The organisation of the budget process, i.e. the budget cycle, its classification or
techniques, and its structure demonstrate the significance of the budget in Oman.
These topics will be discussed below starting with the budget cycle.
2.3 The Organisation of Government Budgeting in Oman
In 1970, the government started regulating its financial system in the framework of a
comprehensive organisation encompassing all sectors.
Regarding the financial system of the government, a rough assessment of revenues and
outlays was prepared according to which the first budget was issued. In 1971 a more
accurate assessment of resources, and current and capital spending was prepared. In
1973, in the framework of the process of adapting modern systems for the sake of
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building a modern state, the first financial government account of the 1972 budget was
issued. After a long process of adjustment, the first budget had a scientific basis,
prepared according to modern technical methods of categorisation and classification. It
was issued in 1976.
Three related topics will be discussed here. They are:
• The budget cycle.
• The classification of the budget: the budget techniques.
• The budget structure.
We will now examine these topics in turn:
2.3.1 The Budget Cycle
It is necessary that budgeting is processed through a cycle to enable the government to
secure accountability for its actions. The budget cycle in any government should be
marked by a flow-up and flow-back of decisions with a view to creating a two-way
communication. The budget cycle usually consists of four phases: preparation,
approval, execution and audit. Let us look at these phases in the Oman budgetary
process.
A-Preparation
The financial year of the government in Oman starts on the first of January and finishes
at the end of December. According to the financial system law of the Omani
government, the preparation of the budget takes four steps:
1 A financial circular is issued by the Deputy Prime Minister of Finance and
Economic Affairs in July of each year. This includes the regulations that must be
followed by all the ministries and government departments regarding the
preparation of their budget. It is called The Budget Circular No 1/19.
2 In each ministry or department, a special committee is formed to prepare its draft
budget.
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3 The Ministry of Financial and Economic Affairs has the task of preparing the draft
of the general budget of the sultanate after examining the draft of all ministries and
government units.
4 The Council of Financial Affairs takes charge of the financial discussion of the
draft budget. (Royal Decree No 56/82, articles 10, 12, 13, 15).
It is essential to co-ordinate the efforts of all participants in the budgeting process.
Therefore each unit must know its role and the role of others. This requires a means of
communication before and during the budget process. According to Premchand, "the
budget circular should convey the national goals, state the economic prospect of the
country and reflect the policies proposed". (Premchand, 1983, p.143). It seems that
the financial circular in Oman provides the medium of communication and co-
ordination between several government units, because it "includes the regulations that
must be followed by these units". It states that these units should prepare their draft
budget in the "light of planned targets that they are required to achieve according to
the public policy of the state" (Royal Decree No 56/82). In other words the budget
circular consists of directions that define the budget policy which reflects the interests
that the government assigns to different economic sectors (Abdul-Ghafour 1992, p72).
However, the quality of this co-ordination depends, on one hand, on the extent to
which these regulations are sufficient and clear. On the other hand, it depends on the
ability of the administrative unit to transmit the planned targets to accurate annual
transactions. Furthermore, in the process of budget formulation, spending agencies
work according to the direction of the control agencies, while the control agencies are
responsible for economic and financial policies and the management of the economy.
The acceptance of this relationship has provided the finance authorities with great
power as well as planning influence. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
depends on the participation of other agencies to achieve co-operation and success in
its own operations. Thus the preparation of the general budget draft in the Ministry of
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Finance in Oman involves the "examining of the draft budget of several ministries and
government units and co-ordination must be considered" (Ibid.). Yet, as Premchand
has stated, "different perceptions of how much expenditures can and should be
reduced will lead to the emergence of competitive interests among the central and
spending agencies. Spending agencies believe in the importance of their own
programmes, which may, nevertheless, not be important on a national scale. Thus there
is a possibility of conflict" (Premchand, 1983 p150).
The Omani financial system law has stressed that the draft budget must remain within
the financial bounds of the development projects approved by the plan (Royal Decree
No 56/83).
Revenue estimates are considered here in relation to the formulation of the following
years' estimates. These estimates must be made before passing the expenditures' ceiling
to the spending agencies. Revenues and the level of deficit constitute the policy
variables which define the broad level of expenditures. Special attention should be paid
to the formulation of revenue estimates because they facilitate the consideration of the
expenditures' policy options. This point is of great interest to an oil producing country.
During the second half of the seventies the oil prices were going up. Oil producing
countries found it easy to estimate their revenues. Consequently these countries did not
put strict ceilings on their expenditures. However, in the early eighties when oil prices
started to decline, it was difficult to make an accurate formulation of their revenues.
When oil revenues started to go down, the oil producing countries found it hard to
adjust their expenditures. Moreover, the implementation of the development plans
became uncertain. Oman had designed its third development plan (1986-1990)
according to 1985 oil prices, the average of which was $27 per barrel. However, in
1986 the oil prices sank to $13 /barrel, thus the government was obliged to introduce
significant changes in its plans. Public expenditures were brought down by 10%.
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From the above considerations, it is obvious that the objectives of the government
should be the starting point for the formulation of programmes, policy guidance,
resources constraint and good judgement regarding expenditure programmes.
B-Approval 
This phase depends to a large extent on the political system. Under some political
systems the budget is essentially approved by a legislative body. However, the
executive sometimes play a prominent part in the authorisation of the budget. The
authority of the executives in this phase of the budgetary process varies from country
to country. "These may be full authorisation of the budget by the executives with
formal legislative sanctions, or a limited determination of the budget by the executives
with legislative scrutiny and approval, or there may be advisory budgetary proposals by
the executives subject to legislative initiative and action" (Buck, 1934, p. 87).
In Oman the Deputy Prime Minister for Financial and Economic Affairs submits the
draft budget, for approval by His Majesty the Sultan after the final discussion by the
Council of Financial Affairs. This happens in December each year. His Majesty the
Sultan approves the budget in a royal decree which makes a public financial order to all
public finance officers in the country on how to conduct their spending (Royal Decree
No 56/82).
Although there is a consultative council (Majlis A-Shura) which has the right to discuss
social and economic affairs, it still not authorised to discuss and approve the state
general budget.
C-Execution
Execution of the budget in the government is ideally seen as a co-operative effort
between the participants of several levels of government and the agencies at each level.
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"The initial aim during the implementation of the budget is to guarantee the fulfilment
of the financial and economic aspects of the expenditures" (Premchand, 1983, p.351)
The budgetary and economic tasks are achieved through four major steps:
a) An allocation system under which expenditures are controlled by the release of
funds.
b) Supervision of acquisition of goods and services to ensure value for the money
spent.
c) An accounting system that records government transactions and provides a
framework for the analysis of their implications.
d) A reporting system that permits a periodic appraisal of the actual implementation
of the policies (Ibid, 1983, p.358).
For the estimation of revenues and expenditures in the Oman budgeting process, there
is a set of forms used by all government administrative units covered by the regulation
of the financial law. There are eight forms, four of which are for the estimation of the
four type of revenues, while the other four are for the estimation of the main types of
expenditures.
The financial circulars No. 9/83 and 3/84 concerning the control on government
receipts and expenditures have organised complementary regulations and a set of
documents for recording and accounting, and therefore controlling the government
transactions. However, the problem in such a case is that the routine usually attracts
more attention than the real objectives.
The administrative and budgetary tasks must be integrated; they must be performed
together with a view to securing legal accountability, and the efficient and flexible use
of resources. The agencies are responsible for compiling a review of their own
performance of the budgetary and economic tasks they need to achieve. The purpose
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of the spending agencies' review is to examine the financial trends and assess the
effectiveness of their own administrative policies. The Ministry of Finance and
Economic Affairs submits to the Council of Financial Affairs a monthly report showing
the state's actual spending on each budget item, the balance of the government's
account in local and foreign banks, the balance of receipts and repaid loans and grants,
the balance of standing commitments and others which are necessary to show the fiscal
position of the state (Royal Decree No 56/82). Neither the financial system law nor the
financial circular of expenditures audit has obliged the other government units to make
similar performance reports.
For the implementation of the budget programmes, funds may be made available by
various central agencies for different periods. Some constraints may be placed on the
use of the funds in certain projects, which may entail a prior approval by the central
agencies for the release of funds.
With respect to current expenditure, according to the financial system law, no
government unit may exceed its allocations. Transferring from one item to another is
also not allowed, except for very limited cases.
Regarding development expenditures, exceeding the allocations for a development
project is approved up to a limit of 10% more than the cost projected in the
development plan. Conditions for approval are set out in a contract approved by the
Adjudication Council (Ibid.).
Finally, if the royal decree concerning the approval of the budget has not been issued
before the beginning of the financial year, the financial law permits spending within the
limit of the previous year's appropriations.
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D-Audit
Financial control and audit have been given a large legislative effort in Oman. In 1982,
the financial system law was issued. It assigned to the Deputy Prime Minister the
following responsibilities:
1- The approval of the accounting system to be applied by all public finance officials
in the Sultanate.
2- Devising the most suitable financial records and forms, and generalising and
unifying their application.
3- To ascertain that all public finance officials keep records and forms and that they
register all official transactions at the proper times according to the budget
classification, in order to facilitate the examination and auditing of any of them at
any time. They must also apply the laws, orders and regulations related to the
financial affairs in a correct manner.
4- To verify that taxes and fees are imposed and collected according to orders, laws
and statements.
5- To verify that complete precautionary procedures are undertaken to keep the state
assets, properties and records in safe conditions so as to prevent any fraud, forgery
or embezzlement from financial officials.
6- To verify that all records, tables, and data are provided to the ministry at the
proper time and in a correct form. (Royal Decree No 56/82).
In 1983, the Deputy Prime Minister of Financial and Economic Affairs issued the
financial circular No 9/83 concerning the control on government revenues: oil
revenues, taxes, fees, etc. It emphasised that any receipt must be made according to
legislation. It focused on the co-ordination between the Ministry of Finance and other
government units concerning the definition of fees and the prices of goods and services
provided by these units. It obliged all government units to send their receipts to the
Ministry of Finance each day or at agreed times unless the unit was permitted to open
its own bank account. It prevented all units from spending their receipts on any kind
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of expenditure. According to the circular the Ministry of Finance had to keep complete
records of the projected and actual receipts of all government units and these had to be
classified according to the budget order. (The Financial Circular No 9/83).
In 1984, the Deputy Prime Minister of Financial and Economic Affairs issued the
Financial Circular No. 3/84 concerning the controls on the government's expenditures.
It defined government expenditures as the current, capital, and development
expenditures. It requested the chiefs of other government units to inform the Deputy
Prime Minister and the Diwan of Royal Court about the names of officials authorised
with spending and about the limits of their jurisdiction. Spending commitments had to
be in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations, specially the Contract System
law. These commitments had to be within the limits of the approved appropriations of
the annual budget with respect to current and capital expenditures. Regarding
development expenditure, the commitment had to be within the limit of approved
costs. Government units were obliged to send any payment deed, supporting evidence
and documents showing all details in a manner that facilitated the auditing process.
The Ministry of Finance and Economy audited all deeds before paying to be sure that
all the prevailing laws, regulations, and systems in the sultanate were applied.
After issuing these financial circulars, the Directorate General of Expenditures was
established in the Ministry of Finance and Economy to fulfil the spending control
function of the ministry. The two above mentioned circulars provided a documentary
and logical organised system for after-spending control in government finance.
If this system is to be viewed from the Ministry of Finance's side, it is an external audit.
In other words, other government units consider the Ministry of Finance and Economy
as an external auditor. However, if the Ministry of Finance and all government units
are to be viewed as one body (as they are in reality), that is the executive authority,
then the above auditing system is an internal ante-spending audit system.
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In 1991, the Law of State Financial Audit was issued by the Royal Decree No. 129/91.
It defined the aims of the Secretariat General, which was created by this law, as
follows:
1- Co-operation with the financial departments covered by this law to protect public
properties of the state. The secretariat provides financial audit after spending to
ascertain the soundness of financial transactions and accounting records and the
following of financial laws and systems.
2- The discovery of financial deviations in units covered by this law.
3- Drawing attention to inefficiencies and shortcomings in the applied laws and
financial systems and suggesting of required reforms.
4- The evaluation of the development projects performance, and the confirmation of
efficient utilisation of resources.
The Secretary General is appointed by royal decree. The Secretariat General has its
own budget, included as one item in the budget of Diwan of Royal Court. The Minister
of Diwan of Royal Court oversees the Secretariat General. The law defines the covered
units as follows:
— All units comprising the administration system of the state, independent government
units and departments whose budgets are included in the general state budget
excluding that which has been exempted by royal decrees.
— Public authorities and companies and all units that are wholly owned by the
government or it shares in their capital.
— Private authorities and units in the Sultanate which are subsidised by the
government or public authorities.
According to this law the jurisdiction of the secretariat includes: reviewing both
receipts and spending; reviewing the decisions related to appointing and promoting
government officials and remuneration; following up the implementation of
development plan projects according to their projected costs in relation to the time
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agenda; examining and evaluating the results of the achievements of these projects-
ascertaining that resources have been used effectively; examining the government final
accounts; examining what might be ordered by His Majesty the Sultan to be reviewed.
The Minister of Diwan of the Royal Court, who oversees this secretariat, submits the
special issues from the units concerned to his Majesty the Sultan.
The secretariat must prepare an annual report comprising the following issues:
— The discovery of any contraventions in the units subject to this law and also
opinions concerning the procedures and penalties that have been carried out.
— The secretariat's observation on the government's final accounts.
— The overall evaluation of the development projects.
— All observations related to the question of the efficiency of the financial laws and
systems and of the public finance officials.
— Any other issues emerging through the reviewing process of the past financial year.
(Royal Decree No 91/29).
This law, then, provides the post control which usually aims to promote the
effectiveness of future administrative and financial performance. It includes all the
necessary aims. It covers current, capital and development expenditures and seeks to
evaluate the implementation of development plans and the efficient use of resources.
However there are two points of which hinder the effective financial control of the
Secretariat General of State.
First, in the light of the wide range of its duties, its administration capacity has to be
supported by a number of efficient qualified staff.
Second, taking account of the size of the task that it is required to carry out, according
to its law, it needs more authoritative power as an external auditor. Accordingly, its
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independence needs to be strengthened, that it needs to be connected directly to the
highest political power. Once these two points of reform have been carried out, the
outcome will be one of a valuable feedback on the performance of the public financial
system.
2.3.2 The Classification of the Budget; the Budget Techniques: 
The budget has several functions: allocation, distribution and stabilisation. It is also a
tool of management, a tool of accountability and an instrument of economic policy.
Hence, it must be organised in a manner in which these functions can be secured.
Broadly speaking
growing state intervention in economic and social fields has been the
underlying cause of increasing public budgetary responsibilities. The
diversification of government units, activities and functions in response to
more and more specific purposes has made the classification of the public
budget a matter of increasing importance. This has meant that the public
budget necessarily had to be formulated as a unified and comprehensive
statement comprising public expenditure and public revenue. Particular
attention had to be paid to the method of presenting the budget in a clear
form so as to be intelligible and easy to analyse, especially as economic
planning has come to be involved. This has imposed on the public budget a
mode of formal economic incorporation (Al Sayyid, 1964, p.487).
Budget data and transactions can be divided according to several scientific
classifications, each of which can serve a single purpose or a variety of purposes.
Given the diversity of purposes however, no single classification could have served all
purposes. So as to examine the different types of the classifications of the budget, the
purposes of classifications and scientific classification will be discussed first:
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A-The purposes of budget classification
There are four main purposes of the scientific classification:
I Facilitating programme formulation. The budget account should be arranged in a
manner as to show obviously the programme decisions that have been made.
II Achieving efficiency in the budget execution. A budget classification is required
which provides a means of measuring the degree of efficiency of the execution of
the budget and a comparison of the efficiency of that same programme with
previous one.
III Serving the purposes of accountability. Public activity is undertaken by certain
organisational units. Collecting and spending government revenue is done by
specific officers. Thus it is necessary to classify the budget in a manner that define
these responsibilities accurately.
IV Studying and analysing the economic effects of the many activities undertaken by
the public economy units. (Arabic Organisation for Administrative Studies 1970,
p.20).
B-Scientific classification of the budget
Government intervention in the economic field and its involvement in planning brought
about the development of what is known as budget economic classifications. Budget
statements can be organised by putting all financial transactions which serve a
particular purpose in one group. Therefore, classifying the budget is done according to
its purposes, and its type of services and functions. There are other bases for the
classification of the budget. These consist of a group of practical considerations:
political, administrative, and organisational. According to these bases, classifications
are known as procedural, administrative or institutional, and for particular purposes
there are sectoral and regional classifications of the budget.
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Before presenting how these different types of classifications are applied to the state's
general budget, it is necessary to show the summarised statement of this budget which
is known as schedule No 1 (see table No 2-4).
This table summarises the budget in three main sections:
1 Revenue, which consist of five items: net oil revenues, gas revenues, other current
revenues, capital revenues and capital repayments.
2- Current and capital expenditures, loans and participations.
3- The means of financing, i.e. the way in which the government finances its deficit -
such as through borrowing, withdrawal from SURF and grants or, as is less likely,
utilises the surplus.
Loans, some participations and borrowing are not included in the budget tables, and,
therefore, they do not appear in budget classifications. They belong to Fiscal Stance
*
Accounts. (Al-Sayegh, p14).
2.3.2.1 Traditional classification
This classification is called traditional because it belongs to the state's structural
configuration. The first forms of the budget were classified in this way. Some states
call such a budget 'the administrative budget' or 'the line-item budget'. It can be defined
as "a form of budgeting in which there is a high level of legislative or executive control
over individual objects of expenditures in large organisations" (Lewis 1988, p.'7). Yet
objects of expenditure are fundamental elements in formulating and executing a budget
at the lower level of organisations. Administrative classification, or classification by
organisational units, produces state accounts on the basis of these units. This
classification aims to aggregate expenditures according to their types internally in every
administrative units.
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Table No.(2-4). Schedule No. (1)
State's General Budget For the Financial Year 1988
(Amount In Million of Rial Omani
Particulars Budget	 Estimates
First: Revenue:
1)Net Oil Revenue
2)Natural Gas Revenue
4)0ther Current Revenue (Schedule No.2)
3) Capital Revenue (Schedule No.3)
4)Capital Repayments(Schedule No.3)
1065.3
43.0
202.7
3.9
35.4
6) Total Revenue (1+2+3+4+5) 1350.3
Second: Expenditure and Lending & Participation:
Current Expenditures:
7) Defence & National Security
8) Civil Ministries (Schedule No.4)
9) Interest on Loans
10) Government Share in PDO's Current Expenditure
532.6
533.0
84.0
70.0
11) Total Current Expenditures (7+8+9+10) 1219.6
Capital Expenditures:
12) Project Expenditure for Civil Ministries (Schedule No.4)
13) Exploration of Natural Gas
14) Government Share in PDO's Capital Expenditure
15) Non Project Capital Expenditure for Civil Ministries. (Schedule
No. 4)
245.0
6.3
74.0
12.0
16) Total Capital Expenditure (12+13+14+15) 337.3
Lending & Participation:
17) Industrial Sector
18) Oman Housing Bank
19) Oman Development Bank
20) Oman Bank for Agriculture & Fisheries
21) International Regional and Domestic Establishments
8.0
7.0
2.0
5.0
23.4
22) Total Lending and Participation (17+18+19+20+21) 45.4
23)	 Total	 Expenditures,	 and	 Lending	 &	 Participation
(11+16+22) 1602.3
24) Net Surplus (deficit) (6-23) (252.0)
55.0
3.0
Third: Financing:
25) Net Borrowing
Loans Receivable
Loans Repayable
26) Net Grants
178.0
123.0
Total Financing (25+26) 58.0
Balance Deficit(24-27) (194.0)
Source: Ministry of Finance, The State's General Budget 1988. Page 5
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Incrementation is the main characteristic of this system. The concept of incremental
budgeting is defined by Charles L. Schultze as "The system whereby budget reviews
examine only those items for which increases over the prior year are requested. Unless
a new programme is proposed, there is no examination of basic programme structure
or performance. It does not bring up alternatives. It does not lend itself to the periodic
examination of the objectives of other programmes". (Schultze, 1966, p.79).
From the above account we infer that line-item budgeting focuses on accountability,
control and items of expenditures, not on the quantity of required services. The current
conceptions of accountability are those of political accountability, managerial
accountability and legal accountability. With the adoption of "the executive budget
system" the legislative authorities were compelled to concentrate on funds as a means
of control over state activities.
Line items or administrative or organisational classification has a number of
advantages:
I- It is necessary for the ministries preparing the budget to undertake their tasks
through their internally organised services. It is also a requisite for the budget
approval of the legislative authority and for the determination of the budget. This
classification is characterised by simplicity. It involves preparing estimates for
every organisational unit, determining unit execution responsibilities and following
the changes faced by every organisation unit from year to year.
II- This classification concentrates on the accounting aspects of governmental
transactions. Governmental services need and purchase similar articles, such as
personal services, clothing, publications, repairs and furniture, etc. This
classification helps lay down a unified system of accounts for all state activities.
III- The classification of expenses, on the basis of what the subject necessitates,
creates a unified system of accounts.
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IV- This classification helps to restrict spending in order to control the activities of the
executives and facilitates personal management. In addition, this system is marked
by flexibility since it facilitates the transfer of allocations from the items of one
activity or enterprise to other activities listed in the same programme. (Abdullah,
1991, pp. 103-104).
The budgeting techniques in Oman adopted this system. In October 1987 the financial
circular No. 8/87 was issued concerning the classification of the budget of the
sultanate. According to this circular, the budget was divided into two chapters: the
first, for revenues, and the second for expenditures. Each chapter was divided into
sections, items and subjects in a version compatible with the Government Finance
Statistics (GFS) which was designed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Current non-oil revenues are classified in this way. According to this classification the
volume of non-oil revenues is broken down between ministries and public authorities
according to their annual contributions (see appendix 1).
Current, capital and development expenditures are broken down according to all
several government units (see appendix 2). It is helpful to make a comparison between
the allocations made to these different units. From this system, the financial legislator
has aimed to obtain the following objectives:
1- The achievement of the comprehensiveness principle of the budget, i.e. the budget
includes all government revenues and expenditures, and not to earmark special
revenue for special outlay; unless a special royal decree is issued for certain cases.
2- The distinction between current and development expenditures.
3- Assigning separated items for salaries and wages (Royal Decree No.56/82 article
19).
The Ministry of Defence, the Royal Oman police and other security units, according to
the same decree (article 23) are not included in any type of classification because of
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their special status. The allocations of all security units are presented as one item
without further details.
This kind of classification has some disadvantages:
I- Attention centres on expenses within the limits of specific allocations, while the
link between the expenditure, performance and the real result of this material
process is ignored. There is a high level of legislative control over individual
objects of expenditure in large organisations, hence control is too highly
centralised. In short, the focus in this system is on control and the legality of
expenditures.
II- It does not facilitate the economic analysis of individual transactions within the
government's financial activities. While this classification aids the enforcement of
legal accountability, it does not provide useful information for the purpose of
planning or managing the programmes.
III- Fragmented expenditure in many items makes it impossible to assist the achieved
result.
IV- There is almost no relationship between the expenditure made and the results
obtained.
Furthermore, outputs obtained are nearly nil. Consequently this system does not assist
in linking the budget with the development plan.
2.3.2.2 Functional Classification
Functional classification is the classification of all public expenditures, for example,
according to the public services achieved by the government department. The criterion
here is the type of service (or function) on which the finances are spent. The focus is
basically on the service the government department is to provide. In other words
functional classification comprises all expenses included in the general budget for a
particular purpose without confining them to a particular administration unit. For
example spending on education is considered as one programme regardless of the unit
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that undertakes it. The ministry of health and the ministry of agriculture, for instance,
may provide education in addition to the ministry of education.
The UN Social and Economic Affairs Agency in 1956 and 1961 laid down a model for
functional classification. It divided state functions into four groups as follows:
1- The first group; public services, includes public administration, defence, justice
and security, etc.
2- The second group; collective services, comprises routes, maritime lines, water
provision, public health, etc.
3- The third group; social services, consists of education, health, social security,
housing, etc.
4- The fourth group; economic services, includes agriculture, industries, lending,
transport, communication, etc.
Functional classification has many advantages such as:
1- It permits trends in government expenditures on a special function to be examined
over time and thus helps forecast future expenditures. It also clarifies the functions
and the programmes of the administrations.
2- It involves preparing estimates, following changes up and tightening control which
is simple since items and sub-items are given unified numbers in all ministries, and
establishments.
3- It can be used as a summary as it is effectively an outline of the budget statement.
It thereby facilitates the process of following up spending on various activities or
governmental functions, and of controlling and checking the purpose for which
funds are spent.
4- Thanks to this classification state fiscal activity can be analysed. Changes and
developments can be followed up and changes in the nature of government
programmes can be measured. A study and comparison can then be made of the
areas of public expenditure and the development of its distribution among different
functions and purposes. (Al-Shaihk, 1969, pp. 237-45).
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This classification in Oman is applied to both revenues and expenditure. According to
this classification, government units are divided into twelve functional sectors, each of
which includes a number of ministries and departments. (See appendix.3).
The first sector is that of the General Public Services. It comprises twelve units such as
the Diwan of Royal Court, Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, etc. The second one consists of six units
such as the Ministry of Interior, Border Centres, the Magistrate Court, the Authority
for Settlement of Commercial Disputes, etc.
The third sector is the Health Sector. It has only one unit i.e. the Ministry of Health.
The fourth sector is the Social Security and Welfare Sector. It comprises three units:
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, the Civil Service Council, and subsidies to
house holds and other organisations and establishments.
As regards the development expenditures it is useful to indicate the relative importance
of the above sectors concerning the allocation of resources to social, economic and
public services and to other sectors.
The application of the functional classification for both sides of the budget i.e.
expenditures and revenues, facilitates the comparison between the receipts and
expenditures of each sector and gives the government an indication of the cost and
benefit to each sector.
Unfortunately, this classification has some shortcomings and it seems that some
government units are difficult to classify into a particular group because their spending
programmes serve many purposes. For example the Diwan of Royal Court is included
in three sectors.
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In contrast, there are, some activities served by several units and yet they are not
collected into one sector. The prime example is education as there are many kinds of
education agricultural, industrial, commercial, health, science, etc., all of which are
practised by different ministries. However, functional classification in Oman does not
include these several types in the Education Sector. Some units' activities have no clear
criterion by which to put them into any one of the twelve sectors defined, thus they are
grouped under an additional category named the Other Economic Affairs Sector.
These units include the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Technical Secretariat
for the Development Council, Muscat Securities Market, etc.
Furthermore, the justification for classifying some units is not obvious. For example,
the Council for Civil Service and the Ministry of Civil Service are classified under the
Social Security and Welfare Sector, whereas, logically they should be put under
General Public Services. Another example is the Ministry of Water Resources, which is
classified under the Housing Sector, while the more relevant sector would be the
Agriculture and Fishing Sector. The third example, is the subsidy to the Rusayle
Industrial Estate Authority which has formed its own sector called the Mining,
Manufacturing and Construction Sector. Alternatively, this unit should be joined to the
Other Economic Affairs Sector which includes the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry. Finally, the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Police are not mentioned,
whereas they can be classified under the Public Order and Safety Sector.
Consequently, this type of classification cannot be of benefit in the case of the Oman
budget. For example, the trends in government expenditure are difficult to examine
functionally, because the functions of the government programmes are not properly
classified: An examination of the change and development in government fiscal
activities would not be meaningful. Moreover, a comparison of public expenditures and
their distribution among different functions and purposes would be misleading.
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This classification requires that the sections of the government or public administration
be as small as possible. This in turn entails the distribution of various items of
overheads among the diversity of functions or purposes into which the budget is
divided.
2.3.2.3 Classification by Objects of Expenditures
In this type, the budget is divided into items, each of which is assigned for certain
expenses. It concentrates much interest on government purchases of commodities and
services, which include two main kinds: current expenditure and transferable
expenditure. According to this classification, the public expenditure of every public
economic unit is classified in accordance with the object or services against which
finance will be spent. Hence, public expenditure is firstly classified administratively,
then qualitatively according to the object of expenditure. Different units have outlays
for similar goods and services (wages, costs of energy, etc.). This helps to produce a
unified quantitative classification for all units. Therefore, the idea originated of a
unified accounting system in the diverse units of the public services and sectors.
Accordingly, control over transactions and the detection of errors was made easier.
Thus, the use of the qualitative classification is considered by some economists as
notable progress in the field of public finance. This classification has some merits. Its
simplicity facilitates for the planners their estimation of the needs of spending from
allocations, the auditing of these estimates, and the controlling of expenditure. It makes
possible a unified accounting system, because of the similarities in spending by
government units on similar objects, such as salaries, wages, repairs and consumption
of water and electricity, etc. Finally, it provides the means to make simple comparisons
when all government units at the central and local level agree to follow this
classification. Hence, a comparison can be made between items at the level of several
administrative units (Burkhead, 1967, p128).
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The classification of the state budget in Oman combines classification by object of
expenditures and economic classification as will be explained below.
2.3.2.4 Economic Classification
As the operations of the government increased, both in terms of aggregate spending
and in assuming responsibility for economic development and stability, attention had to
focus on measuring the impact of the government expenditures. An economic
classification of governmental activities has become a very important part of the
materials of fiscal planning in the countries where national governments have much
responsibility for growth and stabilisation of the economy.
Budget economic classifications are diverse and the two most relevant here are:
* The distinction between unilateral and bilateral transactions
* The distinction between Current and capital transactions.
I- The distinction between unilateral and bilateral transactions
The distinction between unilateral and bilateral transactions rests on an analysis of the
nature of government expenditure.
— Sometimes government expenditure is used to purchase commodities and services.
In this case there is a transaction, money passes from the government to other
economic units, and commodities and services pass from these units to the
government. These are called real expenditures and represent real incomes received
by citizens against commodities and services they provide to the government.
— In contrast, there are some unilateral transactions such as transfer of resources from
individuals to the government through all kind of taxes, and the transfer of
resources to individuals in the form of direct transfer (pensions, national debt
interest and payment for social security) or indirect transfer, such as aid for the
peasants.
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According to the distinction between unilateral and bilateral transactions, government
expenditure is divided into two main sections:
The first includes spending on commodities and services, while the second are
transfers. Therefore, economists distinguish between real expenditures and transfers.
These real resources of commodities and services form part of the national output.
Real expenditure means the use of these resources directly by the government. By
contrast, transfers can be distinguished as follows:
— They do not provide proceeds in return for offering current commodities and
services.
— They do not represent a part of the final demand, national expenditure and national
output.
Real expenditure, real income and transfers in the sultanate budget can be distinguished
as follows:
1. Real expenditure and real income of the government.
a Real expenditures are represented in expenditures on goods and services such
as:
1- Salaries, wages, allowances, and other remuneration.
2- Purchase of goods for resale at subsidised prices.
3- Services such as maintenance for building, machinery, etc., Rents for real
estate, and insurance of vehicles.
4- Government services expenses e.g. posts, electricity, water, etc.
b- Real income of the government: is represented in sales of oil, gas, copper,
cement, electricity, water, food stuffs, fisheries, etc., and in returns from ports
and airports services, etc.
2. Transfers: they can be divided into two kinds, transfers from the government and
transfers to the government.
a- Transfers from the government: they can be classified according to many
criteria such as:
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i- Transfers to institutions and transfers to individuals.
ii- Transfers for economic purposes (e.g. Subsidies) and transfers for social
purposes (e.g. Social Securities).
iii-Direct and indirect transfers.
iv-Domestic transfers and external transfers.
In the state's general budget in Oman, transfers from the government are
classified into five categories:
1- Subsidies of financial and non-financial authorities.
2- Transfers to non-profit-seeking authorities and establishment such as clubs.
3- Grants to citizens such as allotment to sheikhs and tribes and grants to
students.
4- Compensations, and
5- External grants.
b- Transfers to the government: These include income tax on companies,
municipality fees on rent, custom duties, interest on bank deposits and lending.
The importance of this kind of economic classification may be summarised in the
following points:
1 Identifying the influence of public expenditure on the national income, and on the
level of consumption, since the rise in real public expenditure affects the increase
in the national income. By contrast, transfers assist the increase in consumption
without increasing the national income except in narrow limits.
By this classification, the effect of public expenditure on the price level can also be
identified.
2- This classification supports the prevailing trend towards several budgets instead of
a unified budget which comprises costs of different natures.
3- The economic planner is assisted in identifying the weakness of public expenditure.
It guide him towards achieving social and economic goals.
4- It facilitates analysis, the study of the budget and identifying its economic and
social effects.
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II- Distinction between current and capital transactions:
The distinction between current and capital transactions is considered most important
in the budget structure as well as being generally useful for economic classification.
Burkhead states that" its significance is most apparent in an underdeveloped country,
where the government is continually seeking ways and means to increase the volume of
domestic capital formation" (Burkhead, 1956, p229). In this case, the measurement of
government capital expenditure will constitute an indication of past fulfilment and
provide a basis for planning the government's role in capital formation. There are
economic considerations that favour the budget structure, showing clearly the current
and capital outlays. Borrowing and its utilisation are clearly identified and information
on actual capital formation is precisely described.
The classification of current and capital transactions (as an economic classification) for
both sides of the state budget in Oman (revenues and expenditures) is combined with a
classification by objects (see Appendix 4). For the development expenditures it is
organised with a sectoral classification which will be discussed later.
1-Current transactions
Current revenues consists of 1-Revenues of natural resources, 2-Tax and fees
revenues, 3- Non-tax revenues (see appendix 5).
Revenues of natural resources are divided into further sub-sections, i.e. oil revenues
and gas revenues, while tax and fees revenues are further divided into many
subsections, such as income tax, payroll tax (company participation in technical
training project), and municipality fees on rents custom duties, etc. Non- tax revenues
comprise several objects e.g. revenue from sale of electricity, airport revenue, ports
revenue, surplus from public authorities, etc.
Current expenditures are divided into six categories: wages and salaries, expenditures
on goods and services, transfers to non-financial authorities and establishments, grants
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and compensation to national households, subsidies to national households, foreign
grants, and contributions to non-financial organisations. Each of these categories is
divided into many objects. (see Appendix 5).
2-Capital transactions
We now come to the capital budget, which has several meanings that vary from
country to country. Generally it indicates, on the revenues side, returns from the sale of
government property, or taxes paid from private capital, as different from income such
as capital levies.
There are two approaches which dominate the capital expenditure budget: a
capital expenditures budget comprising outlays on the acquisition of newly
produced assets that are a part of the nation's gross investment for the period
and a finance budget comprising depreciation allowances and acquisition of
previously produced assets that do not affect the volume of production but that
involve a periodic valuation of government assets which may be real or
financial (Premchand, 1983, p.293).
Financial assets reflect government lending appreciation as well as other financial
assets acquired.
A capital budget, on the expenditure side, may be used to indicates programmes and
projects that are financed by foreign aid. In some developing countries, the capital
budget is employed to denote the plan programmes and investments. Premchand
maintains that "the principal accepted feature of a capital budget is that it primarily
consists of the proceeds of borrowing, which are then used for the acquisition of
assets, leaving the net worth of government unaltered" (Ibid.).
In the field of the capital account, there is a distinction between direct investment
which includes the outlays made by the government for the purchase of new assets,
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while indirect investment which comprises government grants or loans to encourage
private capital formation (Burkhead 1956, p.231). Operationally, the difference
between the two is obvious, since indirect investment puts the control of the new asset
into private hands, while direct investments add control over resources to the
government. (Ibid.).
On the revenue side, the budget system differentiates between capital revenues and
capital repayments; capital revenues are divided into three categories: revenue from
sales and rents from government fixed assets, capital transfers, and grants. Each
category is subdivided into many objects.
Capital repayments are classified into three sections each of which is subdivided into
many items. The three sections are: repayment of loan instalments, sale of investments,
and profits.
On the expenditures side, under capital expenditures the budget system differentiates
between non-project capital expenditures, project expenditures for civil ministries,
exploration of natural gas and the government's share in PDO's capital expenditure.
The last three sections form the development expenditures.
Non-project capital expenditures are classified into many objects such as furniture and
equipment, cars and transport equipment, machines, etc. (see appendix 6).
Development expenditures are classified into sectors, beneficiary units, and projects.
Capital revenues and capital repayments are not matched by capital expenditure in one
budget because they are very little. On the other hand, according to Oman's state's
general budget system "there are no particular resources earmarked for capital
expenditures, i.e. all revenues are unified and allocated to the total expenditure: current
and capital" (Assaigh, p.4).
Chapter 11	 144
However, since oil and gas revenues, and non-oil revenues almost cover current
expenditures of civil ministries and defence expenditures only, development projects
are financed either by loans or by withdrawal from SGRF. Thus government
documents mention sometimes that there is a surplus in current account of the
government and it directed to the development expenditures. For example, in 1990
there was a surplus of R.O. 283m, and it was almost enough to finance development
expenditure of that year (CBO, 1990, p.59).
Economic classification has advantages and disadvantages: On the positive side, the
separation of capital from current transactions, makes the government able to
determine the size of the surplus on the current account, thus national savings are
available for investment. This classification should be able to specify the extent of the
government's capability of developing this surplus. It provides information about the
extent of the government's contribution to the development of the national income and
is a useful tool for economic analysis.
Budget economic classification divides transactions into current and capital accounts.
It thereby makes it possible to differentiate between sources of revenue and
expenditure, such as collected funds and interest on national debts, wages and salaries
of officials, goods and services, and paid transfers. Thus an economic classification is a
useful instrument for identifying direct and indirect effects on financial policy. It is
worth noting that the economic classification is not an alternative to a budget; it
represents an addition to it since it encourages the use of a national budget which
shows the economic results of policies.
The separation of current expenditures' estimates makes it possible to finance each one
in a non-inflationary manner. This separation enables executives to control the
magnitude of current expenditure. Furthermore, the economic classification of the
budget makes it possible to estimate the total extent of the government's transactions,
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or to define the importance of its establishments specified for a certain purpose by
estimating their expenditure and income.
On the negative side, however, if capital spending is defined as spending on tangible
assets with a life span of more than one year, the distinction can introduce a bias
towards investment in physical capital at the expense of current operations and
maintenance. (The World Bank, 1988, p. 108). Such a bias can, in turn, lead to a bias
toward "hard" sectors for which physical capital investment is a small share of the
total spending.
In addition to the problem of bias, an emphasis on the current balance alone may be
misplaced. For macroeconomics' stabilisation the important variables are the overall
budget balance and its means of financing. Furthermore, borrowing may need to be
limited not only for stabilisation but also because public investment may not always
yield long term returns as high as the cost of debt service. Finally, the existence of two
budgets is often institutionalised in two budget-making bodies. For example, in
developing countries ministries of finance often have responsibility for the current
budget, while ministries of planning are in charge of the capital budget. Lack of co-
ordination between the two can lead to serious inefficiencies and biases in the
allocation of overall spending.
2.3.2.5 Sectoral and Regional Classification
The development budget is the tool by which the five-year social and economic
development plan in Oman is carried out. It represents the detailed annual investment
programme of the financial year. In this sense it is considered the tool used for
planning the annual expenditures on development projects.
Financial allocations of the development budget are classified according to several
criteria, some of which have been studied earlier. Sectoral and regional criteria will be
studied here.
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1-Sectoral classification 
According to the nature of the product or service provided by the government units,
they are classified according to different sectors: the Commodity Production Sector,
the Service Production Sector, the Social Service Sector and the Infrastructure Sector.
Each of these sectors consists of many ministries and government units.
Development allocations are classified according to these four sectors. The financial
allocation of each sector is broken down according to either organisational
(institutional) criteria or objective (objects of purchase) criteria. (See appendix 7).
According to the former, there is a sectoral-organisational classification, and,
according to the latter, there is a sectoral-objective classification.
Let us take the Social Service Sector as an example. Financial resources allocated to
this sector - according to the sectoral-organisational classification - are divided
between the following: the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Information, the
Ministry of Justice, Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the General
Organisation for Youth Sports and Cultural Activities, the Ministry of Social Affairs
and Labours, the Ministry of National Heritage and Culture and the Institute of Public
Administration.
According to the sectoral-objective classification the allocations are divided as follows:
Education, Vocational training, Health, Information, Culture and Islamic Affairs,
Community centres and youth centres.
In this type of classification, the projects, their costs and their execution stages are
defined. This classification helps in estimating the total cost of each sector, then, of the
whole plan. It allows the planning authorities to know the required financing for
sectoral investment, thereby enabling the decision makers to take an account of
sectoral balance. Sectoral classification in the framework of financial control over
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investment expenditure helps to achieve efficiency in the allocation of the state's
financial resources.
2- Regional classification
In this case development allocations are classified according to regional criteria. The
sultanate is divided administratively into eight regions. Financial allocations for
development are divided between these eight regions according to demographic, social,
political and economic considerations. It has been mentioned earlier that one of the
strategic objectives of the development plan is to achieve a balance in the growth of
different regions of the country in order to maintain a stabilised distribution of
population.
The regional classification helps the government in designing its regional planning. It
enables the decision makers to estimate the required allocations for the different
sectors and to monitor the development of each of them.
The above discussion was concentrated on Line Item Budgeting, according to which
the state's general budget in Oman is prepared and classified. The advantages and
disadvantages of this technique have been examined. The discussion now will be
addressed to the advanced techniques of budgeting to see their possibilities and
limitations.
2.3.3 The Structure of the Budget in Oman 
The anatomy of the budget is displayed here. In other words, the importance of each
component of revenues and expenditures is considered separately.
2.3.3.1 The Structure of Revenues
In examining the relative importance of revenues, three types of government revenues
can be distinguished: oil and gas revenues, tax and fees revenues, and non-tax
revenues. Oil and gas revenues consist of receipts from PDO in the form of royalties
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and income tax, sale of the government oil shares in PDO and other operating oil
companies, and gas revenues. Tax and fees revenues comprise custom duties,
corporate income tax, training tax (payroll tax) and fees on licences, etc. Non-tax
revenues are represented in electricity and water revenues, postal revenues, airport and
ports revenues, surplus from public authorities, income from government investments,
interest on bank deposits and lending, capital revenues, and miscellaneous. (Table 2-5)
shows the relative importance of these three types of revenues at the end of each of the
four development plans that have been carried out so far. It is obvious that oil revenue
still dominates the government revenues, and its contribution to the total government
revenues ranked between 93.4% in 1980 and 77% in 1995. Both tax and non-tax
revenues have marginal importance. Non-tax revenues are more significant than tax
revenues. They were evaluated at 5% in 1980 rising to 9% in 1985, and 15% in 1995.
50% of non tax revenues, on average, is attributed to the user charge for electricity and
water, airport and ports facilities. Tax revenues have minimal importance. These
constituted 1.3% in 1980, 5% in 1985 then declined to 3.7% in 1990 because of the
weak performance of the economy during the third development plan.
About 40% of tax revenues on average comes from custom duties, while 37% comes
from corporate tax.
Due to high oil revenues, government finance, and the whole economy in general,
became more vulnerable to changes in world oil market prices. In addition, oil revenue
is temporary because oil resources are exhaustible, therefore, the government must
plan to increase the internal, non-oil revenues. Further discussion of this point will be
in chapter six.
2.3.3.2 The Structure of Expenditures
Regarding the government expenditures, four main types of expenditures can be
distinguished: current expenditure of civil ministries, current expenditures of defence
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and national securities, development expenditures, and contributions loans and support
to the private sector.
Current expenditures of civil ministries include those of the government's share of
PDO's current expenditures, interest paid on loans, and capital expenditures of civil
ministries on such items as equipment, furniture, etc. Current expenditures of defence
and national security includes development expenditures of a civil nature. Development
expenditures includes the development expenditure of civil ministries, the government's
share in development expenditures of PDO and gas exploration expenditures.
Constitutions, loans and support to the private sector consist of: 1) direct loans and
contributions to financial investment organisations or loans to national, regional and
international organisations. 2) support to the private sector. Table (2-6) shows the
relative importance of these four types in 1980, 1985, 1990 and in 1995. It is clear that
current expenditures of civil ministries formed around one third of the government's
expenditure between 1980 and 1985. It rose to 45% in 1990, then 47% in 1995.
National Security expenditures constituted about 43% in 1980 and declined to about
39% between 1985 and 1990 then it continued falling, forming 33% in 1995.
Development expenditures constituted 26% in 1980, 27.9% in 1985, but fell to 14.2%
in 1990 because of the decline of oil revenues during the third development plan due to
the collapse of oil prices, then it rose again to about 19% in 1995. Contributions, loans
and support to the private sector tapered off gradually from 2.6% in 1980 to 1.6% in
1985 to 0.7% in 1990.
Chapter II	 150
Table (2-5)
The Structure of Government Revenues (/0)
Particulars 1980
%
1985
%
1990
%
1995
%
Av.
Oil and Gas 93% 85.8% 85.7% 77.4% 85.5%
Tax and fees Rev 1.3 5.1 3.7 6.6 4.2
Custom duties 57% 53.4 21.0 37 42.1
Corporate tax 43% 34.3 48 24.6 37.5
Non tax Rev. 5.3 9A 10.6 14.9 10
Income from Public
Service & Utilities 68.7 42.6 46.1 43.3 50.2
Investments 31 14 13.4 15 18.4
Miscellaneous 0 43.3 40.5 41.3 31.3
100 100 100 100
Sources:	 1.	 CBO, 1986 Table (4.2) p43.
	
2.	 CBO, 1991 Table (4.2) p41.
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Table (2-6)
The Structure of Government Expenditures
Particulars 1980 1985 1990 1995 Av.
Current expenditures of
civil ministries 30.7 31.6 45.3 47.3 38.7
Defence and national securities 42.8 38.9 39.7 33.3 38.7
Development expenditures 26.0 27.9 14.2 18.8 21.7
Constitutions, loans and subsidies 2.6 1.6 0.7 0.6 1.4
100 100 100
Source:	 1) DC, SYB, 1988. Table (222) p.429.
2) CBO, 1990, Table (1-4) p.60.
3) CBO, 1991, Table (4-1) p.40.
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Conclusion: 
This chapter has been assigned for the discussion of government budgeting in Oman:
objectives, policies and mechanism. The discussion has been organised into three
sections. Section one: focused on the government as a link between the oil sector and
other sectors. This section has also been devoted to explaining the importance of
government finance in Oman as a rentier state. Since the oil sector is characterised by
weak backward and forward economic effects on the other sectors of the economy.
The government, as the owner of the oil wealth, has established the links between the
oil sector and other sectors. these links are represented in government expenditure
which have far reaching effects on the economy as a whole.
The second section defined the budget and its scope and discussed its objectives and
policies in Oman. The definition of the budget was a pre-requisite step for further
discussion of related topics. After defining the budget, the objective and the fiscal (or
budgetary) policy was examined, this policy was not based on the principles of
Keynesian theory or the monetarists' perception. The economic structure, and
consequently, the economic and social problems originating in Oman as an oil
exporting country are completely different from those of industrial countries. Fiscal
policy was not directed to raise the aggregate demand or to curb inflation. The
budgetary policy goals were to develop the economic and social infrastructures of the
economy and to improve the standard of living of the people as fundamental goals
towards the achievement of comprehensive development.
The third section illustrated the organisation of budgeting in Oman. The budgeting
process in Oman is similar to other countries and works through four phases:
preparation, legislation, execution, and auditing. All these phases of the Omani
budgeting process fall within the responsibility of the executive authorities. Majlis
Ashura, which is allowed to discuss some economic and social issues is not authorised
to discuss and approve the state's general budget. The external and post-spending audit
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is still inefficient. The budget is classified according to the Line-Item techniques. While
this classification facilitates the enforcement of legal accountability, it does not provide
useful information for planning and programmes management. In this context, other
additional classifications of the budget in Oman were evaluated, some of them have
some advantages for making comparison and economic and political assessment, but
others are ambiguous and misleading such as functional classification.
Finally, the structure of the government budget was analysed, regarding revenues, oil
and gas revenues are still dominating the government's receipts constituting 85.5% of
total revenues. This peculiarity makes the government's financial position very
sensitive to changes in the world oil market. On the expenditure side, current
expenditure of civil ministries and defence expenditure absorb the largest proportion of
government resources.
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CHAPTER III
HOW TO MEASURE THE BUDGET DEFICIT 
Introduction 
The measurement of the fiscal deficit is supposed to provide policy makers with an
indication of the net effects of government budgetary activity on aggregate demand
and on financial markets. It is intended to indicate the magnitude of additional
resources over the ordinary revenue that the government must extract from the private
sector, or from external sources, in order to finance its own operations. In order to
diagnose economic problems and find appropriate fiscal policies with which to address
them, the correct measurement of the public sector's net requirements is vital.
Several concepts of budget deficit are currently in use, and the definition of deficit as
used in a particular context is often not made clear. It is obvious that alternative
formulations of budget balances can give significantly different indications, and there
has been considerable discussion in the literature on the suitability of the use of
various concepts for specified purposes, and on the relative merits of different
approaches. Once the definition of budget deficit has been agreed on, the question
which then arises is this: are there data bases available which can be used in the
context of our definition of budget deficit? When measurement problems have been
resolved, the next question that arises is this: how important are the macro-economic
causes of fiscal deficits, and what role do domestic and foreign shocks play in relation
to fiscal policy changes in the evolution of deficits?
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The main objectives of this chapter are to analyse the major alternative concepts of
budget deficit and to indicate the considerations necessary to select the most
appropriate one for the case of Oman.
3.1 The General Framework of Measurement Techniques
In one sense, the budget is always in balance: revenues equal expenditures. A deficit
or surplus in the budget is arrived at only by designating some items as balancing
items, that is, by excluding them from the side of revenues or expenditures so that an
inequality is created between expenditure and receipts. The size and sign of the budget
balance, therefore, depend on (a) what items are included to make up the budget and,
hence, the expenditure total and (b) what items are excluded from revenues to
calculate the difference between expenditure and included receipts. The variety in
deficit measures is due to different answers to these two questions.
Fiscal deficit measures have to be specified over three dimensions:
1. The deficit has to be defined for a public sector of given coverage.
2. The coverage or size of the public sector and its composition must be
delineated.
3. The time-horizon needed to assess the magnitude of the deficit must be
identified (Blejer and Cheasty, 1991, pp. 1644-45).
Issues falling into these three measurement categories have generated a substantial
literature, thus producing a methodology for assessing the true scope of budgetary
policy. The literature distinguishes between the conventional deficit and many
different measures that been considered operationally applicable as policy tools in
various circumstances. They are special purpose measures that attempt to isolate in
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the annual deficit the magnitudes needed to assess the effects of the deficit on specific
indigenous macro-variables such as domestic demand, inflation, or the balance of
payments.
3.1.1 The Conventional Deficit
The conventional deficit is one of the commonly used concepts of the budget deficit:
"It measures the difference between total government cash outlays, including
interest outlays but excluding amortisation payments on the outstanding stock
of public debt, and total cash receipts, including tax and non-tax revenue and
grants but excluding borrowing proceeds." (Vito Tanzi and others, 1987, p.
714).
Expenditure also includes wages of public employees, spending on goods and fixed
capital formation, transfers and subsidies. Revenue includes user charges, interest on
public assets, transfers, operating surpluses of public companies and sales of public
assets. Expenditure does not include accumulation of financial assets, while revenue
does not include the draw down of cash reserves (The World Bank, 1988, p. 56).
Thus, fiscal deficits reflect the gap to be covered by net government borrowing. Most
countries record some variant of this deficit. Arguably the variant most widely used is
the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR), which measures the government's
use of new financial resources and the net repayments of pre .viously incurred debt.
In the absence of government rules for standardised accounting, the conventional
deficit is not well defined and the deficits of different countries are not directly
comparable. Two main areas of variance are:
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1. The distinction between the items that determine the deficit - income
and outlays, and the items that finance it (drawing "the line").
2. Specification of the time at which the resource use is measured (the
cash versus the accrual deficit) (Blejer and Cheasty, 1991, p. 1646).
3.1.1.1 The Criteria for Drawing the Line
One criterion for distinguishing between revenue/expenditure and financing is the
"government debt criterion" where transactions are thought to affect the deficit and
are therefore classified above the line (i.e. as revenue or expenditure) . This is the
case only if there is no government liability; if there is then these transactions are
considered as positive or negative financing (Ibid). For instance, interest payments on
government debt are part of government expenditure while the repayment of principal
is recorded below the line. The economic underpinning of this distinction is that while
a shift in the level of net public expenditure affects aggregate demand, the repayment
of outstanding debt does not represent new income to asset-holders, and therefore
leaves demand pressures unchanged.
This measure of deficit is also known as the public debt concept of deficit (Chelliah,
1973, p.743). This concept is in accord with the dictionary meaning of deficit
spending, i.e. the spending of funds raised by borrowing. In other words, this deficit
measures total net borrowing by the government sector, adjusted for changes in cash
holdings (Ibid). Since changes in cash holdings as a rule are fairly small, the budget
may be said to be balanced, in terms of this concept, if net borrowing is equal to zero,
or, in other words, if public debt remains unchanged. This measure is therefore
referred to as the public debt concept of deficit (Ibid p. 744). The deficit so defined
Chapter III	 158
is also often referred to as the overall deficit, while the items on the receipt side that
are excluded when this deficit is computed are called the financing items (Ibid)..
Thus, initial debt + the deficit = end of period debt.
As Chelliah remarks,
Since changes in cash balances are usually of minor significance, the overall
deficit for any past year indicates the total of government borrowing; likewise
the overall deficit in the budget estimates may be said to give the total
borrowing needs of the government for the coming year. As such a measure
of the overall deficit is useful for treasury management and is in fact necessary
for proper budget planning. Also, it is of interest to know the extent of the
increase in public debt or in gross liabilities of the government, because any
such increase has complications for debt servicing in the future (Chelliah,
1973, P. 745).
The conventional definition is designed to act as a measure of government
contribution to aggregate demand and, through this, to the external current account
disequilibrium. Under this definition, amortisation payments are not added to other
government outlays in the computation of the deficit because of the implicit
assumption that such payments will not be regarded as income by those in receipt of
them. Therefore one basic assumption is that the behaviour of the bond holders as
consumers will not be changed by amortisation payments (Vito Tanzi, 1987, p. 719).
Prior to 1983, the financial authorities in Oman applied the government debt criterion
to foreign grants, i.e. they classified grants above the line. Since 1983, however,
government documents have put such grants below the line, i.e. the government
considers foreign grants to be a sort of financing (See: CBO, 1987, p. 48).
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Foreign grants place no financial commitment on the shoulders of the government;
according to the government debt criterion, they should be put above the line, i.e.
considered as revenue. By considering them a sort of financing, the budget
department is able to rely on them with greater confidence; this in turn may lead to a
loosening up of the deficit. In the case of Oman, the reason for not considering grants
as revenue may be uncertainty on the part of the budget department: such grants are,
after all, marginal, and the government does not accord them much importance when
estimating its revenue. Therefore I have applied this point of view and unified the
calculation process of deriving the deficit figures for the period prior to 1983.
However, in countries which depend significantly on foreign grants, the classification
of grants below the line can widen the deficit by more than 5 percentage points of
GDP (See Blejer and Cheasty, 1991, p. 1648).
With regard to the treatment of repayment loans, government documents show that in
1974 and 1975 the repayment of loans was included in government expenditure, but
excluded in following years (See: DC, FIDP, 1975, p. 7). Responding to the
economic rationale of excluding loan repayments from government expenditure, and
in order to calculate the deficit homogeneously, I have omitted the debt repayment
figures for those two years from the calculations of government expenditure. The
inclusion of amortisation above the line results in a deficit which corresponds to the
government's gross borrowing requirements rather than to the net increase in its
liabilities.
3.1.1.2 The Cash and Accrual Deficits
The other main conceptual variation among conventional deficit measures is the
choice between cash and accrued accounting:
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At one end of the spectrum is the completely cash deficit, where only
government outlays for which cash has been disbursed during the 365-day
period, and only actual cash revenues received, are included in the budget
balance. At the other end is the completely accrual deficit, which attempts to
capture the actual net resource pre-emption of government - the consequences
of its policy decisions - during the fiscal year, regardless of whether or not
transactions have actually been paid for (Blejer & Cheasty, 1991, p. 1649).
An important example is the depreciation of fixed capital, which is included as an
outlay in the accrual deficit, but which does not show up in the cash deficit.
A deficit calculated on the basis of the 'System of National Accounts' (SNA) would be
an accrual measure, while the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) is
measured on a cash basis.
In practice, different countries' deficit measures lie somewhere in between the
complete cash and the complete accrual models. Even in countries which use a PSBR
(cash) deficit concept, interest payments are usually measured as they accrue rather
than when they are actually paid. Revenues, however, are almost always measured on
a cash or quasi-cash basis, the reason being that tax liabilities may be disputed and, as
a result, a certain percentage never collected.
This means of measuring deficit does have its drawbacks. For example, it does not
take into account the effects of inflation on the budget items. It would seem realistic
to assume that different parts of the budget would respond differently to inflationary
pressures. These reactions, however, often depend on political considerations, union
power, indexation rules for wages and pensions, and so on. For nominal interest
payments as a category of public expenditure, it is now generally recognised that an
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increase in expected inflation almost always brings about a fairly automatic increase in
nominal interest payments.
The growth of interest payments in an inflationary situation is often explained by the
nominal rate of interest, which tends to approximate to the real rate that would have
prevailed in the absence of inflation, plus the expected rate of inflation (Vito Tanzi,
1987, p. 712). Assume, for example, that the debt in question is US$1 million. With
expected price stability and a nominal interest rate of 5%, the income of the individual
(the debtor) and the interest expenditure of the government would be $50,000. With
an expected inflation rate of 10%, the nominal rate of interest would rise to 15%.
Therefore the nominal interest income received by the debtor would increase to
$150,000, with the government's interest expenditure increasing by the same amount.
Thus an increase in the rate of inflation from zero to 10 per cent has the effect of
increasing the government's interest expenditure by 200%. If the debtor is perfectly
rational, he will realise that although his nominal interest income has gone up by
200%, his real income has not changed at all, for the simple reason that two-thirds of
the $150,000 nominal interest income is compensation for the erosion of the real value
of his financial capital. This compensation may be called the 'monetary correction'.
The individual in question will treat this $100,000 in exactly the same way as he
would have treated an amortisation payment of the same amount, since in a real
economic sense - though not in an accounting or legal sense - it is, in fact,
amortisation. His behaviour as a consumer will continue to be determined by the real
value of his permanent income, which presumably has not changed. Thus one should
treat this monetary correction exactly as one would a normal amortisation payment:
Because amortisation payments are not part of the fiscal deficit, the monetary
correction should also not be part of the deficit (Ibid., p. 713).
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The second alternative assumes that the individual does not distinguish at all between
real interest payments and monetary corrections, regardless of how high the expected
rate of inflation may be. He would behave as though his real income had, in fact,
increased from $50,000 to $150,000.
Under this assumption, which is implicit in the conventional way in which the
fiscal deficit is measured, whereas amortisation payments are not considered
income for those who receive them or ordinary expenditure by the government
and are thus not assumed to increase the deficit and to affect aggregate
demand, monetary corrections are treated as income. The conventional
measure of the deficit is thus highly sensitive to the rate of inflation whenever
the size of the domestic debt is significant (Ibid).
In short, as far as inflation is concerned, the conventional deficit treats all nominal
interest as part of the deficit. In other words, it overestimates real public dissaving
because it disregards the inflation erosion of the public debt.
Therefore in the presence of inflation, and provided that the domestic debt is in short-
term instruments, the share of the conventional fiscal deficit relative to GDP becomes
a function of: (i) the rate of inflation; (ii) the size of the domestic public debt; and (iii)
the composition, domestic versus external, of total public debt. For countries with all
their public debt in foreign currencies, their fiscal deficit as a share of GDP will not be
affected by their inflation rate, irrespective of the magnitude of such debt. However,
those countries whose debt is held in the form of floating-interest domestic debt will
carry a fiscal deficit that depends on the rate of inflation and the magnitude of their
public debt.
In the case of Oman, the debt is relatively small, and denominated in foreign currency.
Also the interest rate at which Oman borrows is not indexed to the rate of inflation;
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nor is it particularly high, averaging 7.7 between 1981 and 1991. Therefore interest
payments are not high as an absolute value or as a percentage of GDP (See Table
3-1). Thus conventional deficit in the case of Oman is not a distorted measure.
Another shortcoming of the conventional deficit is that it does not allow for the
Central Bank deficit (or surplus), or the public financial and non-financial deficit.
Thus it fails to measure the public sector saving (or dissaving) and is therefore less
likely to account for its ensuing financial and real implications.
Another shortcoming in the conventional measure of the public deficit stems from the
inter temporal dimension of government transactions:
Deficiencies include the omission of valuation adjustment, the treatment of
asset sales, and of the financial implications of entitlement programmes and
government guarantees (Blejer & Cheasty, 1991, p. 1665).
For example, the conventional deficit includes no provision for valuation changes in
government assets or liabilities, though these could conceivably change the sign of the
budget balance in any fiscal year. Government ability to pay can be affected - in real
terms - by inflation, devaluation, changes in the terms of trade or in relative prices,
and capital gains or losses on the purchasing power implicit in government assets and
liabilities, although none of these effects is captured by a summary of government
transactions during a given fiscal period.
Financial economists have developed some special purpose measures of deficit in
order to get rid of such shortcomings in the conventional concept of defeat.
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Table (3-1) Conventional Primary and 
Current Account Deficits (or Surplus) 
YEAR CONV.DEFICIT PRIMARY
DEFICIT
CURRENT AC.
DEFICIT
RO.M %GDP RO.M %GDP RO.M %GDP
1970 24.8 23.9 - - 31.9 30.8%
1971 4.1 3.3% - 30.0 24.2%
1972 -18.6 -13.4% - 17.3 12.4%
1973 -26.7 -15.9 - - 9.8 5.8%
1974 -58.8 -10.4 - 127.9 22.6%
1975 101..5 -14.1 - - 89.7 12.4%
1976 -94 -10.6 -87.0 -9.9% 193.1 21.8%
1977 -37 -3.9 -27.0 -2.9% 192.0 19.2%
1978 -83 -8.8 -67.0 -7.1% 103.4 10.9%
1979 30 2.3 50.0 3.91% 246.6 19.1%
1980 238.1 11.5 259.2 12.6% 552.6 26.8%
1981 38.4 1.5 53.9 2.2% 433.3 17.4%
1982 -236.5 -9.0 -219.0 -8.4% 265.2 10.1%
1983 -242.3 -8.8 -222.8 -8.1% 247.2 9.9%
1984 -346.8 -11.4 307.5 -10.1% 164.1 5.4%
1985 -355.4 -10.3 -308.3 -8.9% 308.2 8.9%
1986 -699.9 -25.0 -624.0 -22.3% -78.2 -2.8%
1987 -148.9 -5.0 -76
_
-2.5% 241.3 8.0%
1988 -362.4 -12.4 -278.4 -9.5% -49.1 -1.7%
1989 -304.6 -9.4 -210.1 -6.5% -17.8 -0.6%
1990 -11.1 -0.27 81.3 -2.0% 274.9 6.8%
1991 -283 -7.2 -213.6 -5.5% 105.5 2.7%
1992 -578.5 -13.1 -480.0 -10.9% -114.1 -2.6%
1993 -480.7 -10.7 -386.8 -8.6% 0.4 0.01%
1994 -495.5 -10.0 -394.8 -7.9 -271.4 -5.5%
1995 -479.4 -9.1 363.7 -6.9 -127.9 -2.4%
Sources:
1. DC, FIDP, Table (3), p.7.
2. DC, SDP, Table (15), p.21.
3. DC, ThDP, Table (18), p.32.
4. CBO, 1985, Table (4.1), p.38.
5. CBO, 1990, Table (4-1), p.60.
6. CBO, 1995, Table (4.1), p.38.
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3.2 Special-Purpose Deficit Measures
Although the conventional deficit measures exist in competing versions, all versions
have at least one characteristic in common: in calculating the budget balance, they
include, with the same weight, all government transactions. However, policy makers
have, from time to time, calculated alternative measures of the deficit, with the aim of
highlighting the different impacts of various budgetary transactions (investment,
import purchases or debt service) on important macroeconomic variables such as
savings, the balance of payments, and inflation. The main types of special-purpose
deficit that have been fairly widely calculated are:
1. The primary deficit
2. The operational deficit
3. The current account deficit
4. The deficit measuring the contribution of different transactions to aggregate
demand.
5. The domestic deficit
6. The cyclically adjusted deficit
7. The consolidated comprehensive deficit
3.2.1 The Primary Deficit
The primary or non-interest deficit attempts to measure the discretionary budgetary
stance by excluding net interest payments from the budget. In other words, it tries to
remove the effects of previous deficits on the budget.
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The interest paid on debt is a result of past deficits rather than current behaviour. A
measure of the current policy stance may therefore exclude all interest payments,
yielding the primary deficit.
The primary deficit measures how current actions improve or worsen the
public sector's net indebtedness, and it is important for evaluating the
sustainability of government deficit (The World Bank, 1988, p. 56).
Table (3-1) shows the primary deficit in Oman as an absolute value and as a
percentage of GDP. because interest payments of the government are not too high,
there is no significant difference between conventional (or PSBR) deficit and primary
deficit. However, the difference has started to increase since 1986. See also (Chart
3-1)
3.2.2. The Operational Deficit
The operational deficit is defined as the conventional deficit minus the part of the debt
service that compensates debt holders for actual inflation; alternatively, it is equal to
the primary deficit plus the real component of interest payments (Vito Tanzi, 1987, p.
728). Only real interest payments, i.e. that which exceeds the product of the
outstanding debt and the actual inflation rate, are included in the government
expenditures that determine the operational deficit.
The economic rationale of this definition is the assumption that inflation-
induced interest payments are similar in their effects to amortisation payments.
Conventional deficits exclude amortisation payments from deficit calculation
independently of the way in which those payments are financed. The
operational deficit concept excludes only the portion of the debt service that
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compensates for inflation. In other words, sometimes the debt principal is
explicitly indexed to inflation, in which case the indexation inflates the PSBR.
The operational deficit is defined as the PSBR minus the inflation correction
part of interest payments; it is sometimes called the 'inflation corrected deficit'
(The World Bank, 1988, p. 56).
It measures the real government dissaving. If Do is the conventional deficit, D1 is the
primary deficit, D2 is the operational (or inflation adjusted or corrected deficit), then:
Do = D1 + real public debt service + inflation correction
D2 = Do - inflation correction
D2 = DI + real public debt service
The difference can be significant. In 1985 in Brazil the inflation correction component
of the indexed domestic debt was so large that the PSBR was 27.1 per cent of GDP,
while the operational deficit was only 3.5 per cent of GDP (Ibid).
As indicated earlier, in the case of Oman the government debt is not domestic; rather
it is denominated in foreign currencies and as such is not indexed to inflation.
Furthermore, the public debt is not big; consequently the inflation erosion of the
public debt is very small. Therefore there are no good reasons to calculate the
operational deficit in the case of Oman.
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3.2.3 The Net Worth Concept of Deficit (or the Current Account Deficit)
The net worth concept of deficit or, as it is sometimes called, the balance on current
account of the budget, is used to indicate the magnitude of savings generated in the
government sector. The concept of current account balance is also widely used, but it
is not always measured or interpreted correctly. The derivation of the overall deficit
necessitates the division of government receipts into current and capital items; the
derivation of the balance indicating change in net worth requires, in addition, a similar
division on the expenditure side (Chelliah, 1973, p. 746).
The balance on current account or the net worth concept of budget balance is derived
by 'subtracting current expenditure, that is, expenditure not leading to capital
formation or to an increase in financial assets, from current revenues.' (Ibid. p. 775)
In other words, the current deficit is the difference between non-capital revenues and
expenditures. It indicates simply the saving generated in the government sector. This
concept is not so relevant for demand analysis, but it is useful for a long-term
appraisal and for economic planning in developing countries.
It is commonly held that current expenditures should be fully financed by taxes,
whereas, like a private firm, the government could legitimately finance its socially
profitable investment by debt.
According to this view, the deficit on current account provides a measure of
the extent the government strayed from (prudent management) (Ibid).
Musgrave has proposed - with special reference to developing countries - a somewhat
different type of balance on current account which could be said to reflect the
contribution of budget policy to capital formation in the economy. The current
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balance, in this sense, must be defined not to show the actual savings in the
government sector but to reflect the increase in capital formation in the economy
brought about by budget policy (Musgrave, 1980, p. 570). For this purpose, current
expenditure would include all public expenditure that provides for current services in
the nature of consumption. This would be equivalent to the current expenditure
minus recurring expenditure representing capital formation not resulting in the
acquisition of physical assets - such as investment in human capital - minus the portion
of government transfer payments saved by the recipients. Current revenue would
include shares of different taxes and other receipts that could be said to be drawn from
private consumption. In other words, current revenue would represent the fall in
private consumption brought about through the revenue side of the budget, and
current expenditure would represent public consumption (narrowly defined as above)
plus the rise in private consumption arising from government transfer payments.
The difference between the two is to be a measure of the contribution of the
budget to total capital formation in the economy (Ibid).
This measure of deficit is of great importance to the Omani government because it
measures the government current saving that should be allocated to finance, at least,
part of development expenditure.
Current revenue in the Omani government budget is defined by the government
documents as total revenues minus loans and grants (DC, FIDP, p. 17). Current
expenditure includes current expenditure of civil ministries, the government share in
PDO current expenditure, interest payments, and current expenditure of defence and
national security. Defence and national security expenditure usually includes the
development expenditure of civil nature; it should be excluded in order to calculate
the defence current expenditure.
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Table (3-1) shows the current account deficit during the period 1970 - 1995. The
government had been achieving current surplus (or saving) until 1986. From 1986
onwards it has been showing deficit except for 1987, 1990 and 1991. The table gives
the financial authorities an indication of how they must endeavour to control current
expenditures in order to develop a saving that can participate in financing the
development expenditure (or capital formation).
To apply Musgrave's version of current account deficit in the case of Oman, education
and health current expenditure must be omitted from current expenditure, since they
represent capital formation in human resources. However, there are some statistical
difficulties encountered when the Musgrave version is applied. For example, the
portion of government transfer payments saved by the recipients must be deducted
from current expenditure, but there is no way of knowing their magnitudes.
Nevertheless in the case of Oman, it may be supposed that all transfer payment
included in current expenditure will be totally consumed by the recipient, for the
simple reason that they are given to poor individuals or social institutions which do
not seek profit. Another statistical problem is that some educational activities are
carried out not by the Ministry of Education but by other government units such as
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour. There are no data available at present on
expenditures devoted to these activities.
3.2.4	 Budget Balance Reflecting Impact on Aggregate Demand (or
Expansionary Deficit)
Since different elements of government expenditure and revenue generate different net
increases to, and withdrawals from, demand, policy makers have sometimes attempted
to create a deficit measure that assesses the government's contribution to aggregate
demand. For instance, tax-financed transfers such as pensions and unemployment
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benefits merely redistribute purchasing power from one part of the private sector to
another. In terms of their impact on aggregate demand they are similar to negative
taxes rather than to government expenditure on goods and services. Policy makers
have also recognised that the inclusion of transfers in government spending may
overestimate the government's contribution to aggregate demand because their are
lags in how quickly transfers can be spent.
More details about how this measure is calculated and how it can be used to assess
the effects of budget deficit on aggregate demand in the case of Oman will be
addressed in chapter five.
3.2.5 The Domestic Deficit
Since trade and capital flows between the public sector and the external sector vary
enormously from country to country, a given conventional deficit can encompass a
large spectrum of contribution to the domestic economy. For instance, expenditure
on domestic goods that is fully financed by foreign grants increases aggregate demand
with no offsetting withdrawal. Government imports financed by domestic taxes
reduce aggregate demand by the full extent of the import bill - a case where
government expenditure may have contractionary rather than expansionary effects.
Blejer and Cheasty state that "the overall deficit could well be zero in each of the two
examples, though they each imply an opposite domestic impact" (Blejer and Cheasty,
1991, p. 1653). To isolate the effect of government on aggregate demand in an open
economy, 'domestic' and 'foreign' deficits have, in many cases, been calculated
separately.
The domestic deficit is measured by including in the calculation only those
budgetary elements that directly affect the domestic economy. The foreign
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deficit - the impact of the budget on the balance of payments - can be
measured by including only budget transactions directly connected to the
external sector (Ibid).
Transactions affecting the balance of payments include:
i) expenditure on goods, services and transfers abroad
ii) net lending abroad
iii) increases in government balances abroad
iv) current receipts from abroad
v) net borrowing from abroad
vi) sales of physical assets abroad
vii) decreases in government balances abroad.
The subtraction of the last four items from the first total gives the foreign deficit or
the net impacts of the budget on the balance of payments (Chelliah, 1973, p. 770).
Most governments do not present - and probably do no maintain - separate accounts
of domestic and foreign expenditure. Thus a fiscal analyst can at best make only
rough estimates of direct expenditure abroad. This measure will also be used in detail
in the next chapter, where the effect of the budget deficit on domestic demand and on
the balance of payments will be examined.
3.2.6
	 The Cyclical Adjusted Deficit: Removing the Effects of Fluctuations in
Economic Activity on the Budget
One of the most important distinctions in modern public finance is that between
structural and cyclical deficits. The idea is simple. The structural part of the budget is
active determined by discretionary policies such as setting tax rates, social security
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benefits or the size of defence spending. In contrast, the cyclical part of the budget is
determined passively by the state of the business cycle, that is, by the extent to which
national income and output are high or low. In an oil exporting country this refers to
the changes in GDP owing to changes in oil prices.
Economists define structural and cyclical budgets quantitatively as follows:
The actual budget records the actual dollar expenditure, revenues, and deficits
in a given period. The structural budget calculates what government revenues,
expenditures, and deficits would be if the economy were operating at potential
output. The cyclical budget calculates the effect of the business cycle on the
budget - measuring the changes in revenues, expenditures and deficits that
arise because the economy is not operating at potential output but in boom or
recession. The cyclical budget is the difference between the actual budget and
the structural budget (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1992, p.625).
The cyclical adjusted deficit is obtained by removing from the actual deficit the
cyclical and inflation components of public receipts and non-financial public
expenditure. The use of the term 'discretionary' to distinguish the underlying
component of the deficit from the cyclical component implies that the former is within
the government's control, while the latter is not (Bredenkamp, 1988, p. 7).
To construct a cyclically adjusted budget, the essential steps are:
1.- Choosing a reference trend for GNP free from short-run fluctuations.
2.- Determining the responsiveness of each category of receipts and
expenditures to short-run movements in GNP (e.g. cyclical tax
elasticities).
3.- Applying these responses to gaps between trend GNP and actual GNP.
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4.- Adding the expenditures and receipts 'gross-ups' from step 3 to the
actual budget to obtain a cyclically adjusted budget. In other words, in
this process the analysis is directed to diverting public receipts and
expenditures from their cyclical and inflation effects.
The first step is the most important and controversial. All other things being equal,
the higher the level of the reference trend, the smaller the cyclically adjusted deficit.
In the case of Oman — as an oil exporting country — revenues and expenditures are not
determined by changes in GNP. Instead, they are governed by changes in oil prices. In
fact, the opposite is correct, i.e. GNP is governed by oil revenues which, in turn, is
affected by changes in oil prices.
Taking the above caveat into consideration, we can give two examples of how actual,
structural and cyclical budget balances can be distinguished. Oil prices went up from
$20/b in 1979 to $36.8/b in 1980. If the average growth rate of the previous three
years, i.e. 1977, 1978 and 1979, of both government expenditure and revenues have
been used to calculate them, they would have been RU 694.2m and RU 788.6m
respectively in 1980. The budget balance, therefore, would have been RU 94.4m. The
actual figures of these three variables, in contrast, were RU 949.8m, RU 1181.9m and
RO 238.1m respectively (see the table below). Consequently, the cyclical effect on the
budget balance was RU 143.7m. The other extreme example is what happened in
1986 when oil prices dropped from $27/b to $13/b. Potential government expenditure
and revenues would have been RU 2120.2m and RU 1715.8m respectively. The
potential deficit would have been RU 404.4m, whereas the actual deficit was RU
669.9m. The cyclical effect on the budget was RU 265.5m.
In the first example, 60.4% of the actual budget balance was cyclical, i.e. caused by
changes in oil prices, whereas 40% of the budget balance was potential, i.e. due to
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"normal" developments in government finance. In the second example, about 40% of
the deficit was cyclically induced. Accordingly, it can be said that approximately 50%
of the financial disequilibrium is caused by external factors, i.e. oil prices.
However, this cyclical effect has been mitigated by the change in the volume of oil
production. On the other hand, it ought to add up to zero in the long term.
Years Variables Potential B Actual B Cyclical B Cyc/Act %
1980 Expen 694.2 949.8 +255.6 26.9%
Rev 788.6 1181.9 +393.3 33.3%
B. Balance 94.4 +238.1 +143.7 60.4%
1986 Expen 2120.2 1854.0 -266.2 14.4%
Rev 1715.8 1186.9 -528.9 44.6%
B. Balance -404.4 -669.9 -265.5 39.6%
Note: B = Budget
3.2.7 Comprehensive or Consolidated Deficit
Alternative measures for public sector composition stretch from the central
government deficit to consolidated non-financial public sector deficit. The latter
includes, in addition to the central government, local government, social security, and
non-financial public enterprises. Alternative measures even stretch to the consolidated
total public sector deficit, which includes the public sector non-financial deficit, the
Central Bank and, possibly, the public commercial banks deficit ( or surplus).
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While deficit measures based on the widest public sector coverage are the most
accurate measure of fiscal stance and public sector resource transfers, they are often
not readily available or free from controversy. In other words, the public sector
should include the central government, provincial and municipal governments,
decentralized agencies, and state-owned enterprises. Conventional deficit measures
often include only the central government. "This can give a very misleading picture
when other public entities are running large deficits or surpluses." (The World Bank,
1988, p. 56) Even in comprehensive measures the pubic financial intermediaries are
often excluded because of their special role as financing agents. On occasions these
intermediaries, especially the central bank, have run up large losses. "They usually
arise because the central bank assumes the exchange rate or portfolio losses of private
banks, or because the central bank directly engages in subsidised lending" (Ibid).
The deficit of public financial intermediaries has macroeconomic effects similar to the
deficits of other public entities; therefore they should be included in the overall PSBR
(Ibid).
The above discussion raises the issue of government composition and the coverage of
deficit, both of which concern us here. It has already been mentioned in the previous
chapter (p.26) that the definition of government in this study, according to its general
scope, is what may be called the 'general government', which includes public
administration (civil and military), and non-profit agencies, which have no independent
financial identity. In other words, the state general budget does not include financial
and non-financial public entities and the central bank. There are also no local
governments and decentralized agencies in Oman. However, there are particular
financial relationships between the state general budget and the financial and non-
financial entities. These relationships must be distinguished in order to decide whether
the budget deficit here is consolidated or conventional.
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Firstly it should be stated that the budget deficit (or the government budget balance) is
considered to be consolidated if it represents, or shows, the net worth of all public
sector (financial and non-financial) units in addition to the central government. The
net worth is defined as any long-term funds employed in a firm. It takes the form of
shareholders' capital — employed plus long-term loans.
In 1991 there were some 25 financial and non-financial authorities (See Table 2-3),
their total net worth amounted to RO 712.6m (World Bank, 1994, p.99). However,
this figure was not included in the State General Budget of 1991.
On the revenue side of the state general budget there is an item known as the estimate
of public authorities surplus. It includes, inter alia, the central bank. On the
expenditure side there is an item known as the estimate of public authorities subsidy.
The match between the two items does not indicate the net worth of the public
authorities.
Thus the net worth of the public sector is not presented in the state general budget.
Accordingly, the budget deficit discussed in this study is not the consolidated or the
comprehensive deficit. It is a conventional deficit since it does not cover the public
sector as a whole.
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Conclusion 
Different measures of the budget deficit provide policy makers with indications of net
effect the budgetary transactions have on the economy. To function properly they
require the availability of developed databases.
The conventional deficit is one of these measures. It is the definition applied to the
budget deficit in Oman, and accordingly, the measure which is adopted in this study.
The criterion used to calculate this measure in Oman is, with the exception of foreign
grants, is the government debt criterion. According to this criterion, if transactions
caused no liability to the government they are classified above the line, if they do not
then they are considered positive or negative financing and classified below the line.
The conventional deficit measures the total net borrowed by the government,
therefore referred to as the public debt concept of deficit. It has some drawbacks that
motivate financial economists to discover alternative methods or techniques to
measure the budget deficit. They serve different purposes for financial analysis.
One disadvantage of the conventional measure is that it does not take into account the
effects of inflation on the budget items. It also includes the effect of previous years'
deficits through including interest rate in the expenditure. Two alternatives are
provided to solve these shortcomings: the primary deficit and the operational deficit.
The former excludes net interest payments from the budget. The latter removes only
the part of debt service that compensates debt holders for actual inflation. Because
interest payments of the government are not too high, there is no significant difference
between the conventional and the primary deficit.
The public debt is not domestic and it is not indexed to inflation. Furthermore, the
public debt is not large, therefore, the inflation erosion of the public debt is very small.
In short, there is no justification to calculate the operational deficit in the case of
Oman.
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The third alternative measure is the current account deficit. It is derived by subtracting
current expenditure from current revenues. It is an important indicator for the
financial analysis because it measures the government current savings that should be
allocated to finance capital (development) expenditure.
The fourth and fifth techniques are the budget balance reflecting the impact on
aggregate demand, and the domestic deficit. The former is used to assess the
government's contribution to aggregate demand. The latter is used to distinguish the
effect of the budget on domestic demand from that on the balance of payments. They
will be practically employed in our analysis in the next chapter. However, the problem
facing the benefit from these two techniques in particular is that the government does
not maintain separate accounts of domestic and foreign expenditure.
The sixth one is the cyclical adjusted deficit. Its function is to remove the effects of
fluctuation in economic activity on the budget. Because of the swinging behaviour of
oil prices and its fluctuation effects on government finance, this measure is of great
importance for Oman and other oil countries. My estimation of the cyclical effects on
the actual (conventional) deficit is that it varies between 60% and 40%.
Another shortcoming of the conventional deficit is that it does not allow for the public
financial and non-financial deficit. This can give a misleading picture when other
public entities are running large deficits or surpluses. The alternative measure is the
comprehensive or the consolidated deficit. It includes, besides the central government
deficit, local government, social security and financial and non-financial enterprises'
deficits or surpluses. While this measure is the most accurate one of the public fiscal
stance, its calculation and controversial problems are beyond the scope of this study.
It has already been mentioned in the previous chapter that the definition of
government in this study is what may be called the "general government", which
includes public administration (civil and military) and non-profit agencies that have no
independent financial identity.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CAUSES OF THE BUDGET DEFICIT
In this chapter, the causes of the budget deficit in Oman will be analysed. Before
doing that, it is important to trace the evolution of deficit and to compare its
magnitude with that of other countries regionally and internationally. Therefore,
this chapter will be divided into two sections: the evolution of the budget deficit
and regional and international comparison as section 4.1 and the causes of budget
deficit as section 4.2.
4.1 The Evolution of the Budget Deficit and Regional and
International Comparison 
4.1.1 The Evolution of the Budget Deficit
The government budget started to show a deficit in 1972 (Table 3-1) and steadily
grew worse over the next four years. There were two main reasons for this: the
quick development of the basic infrastructure, which had been at almost zero level,
and a steady decline in oil production (Table 4-1) due to the fact that oil
exploration was not intensive. Furthermore, oil prices were almost stagnant (Table
4-2) and the government's financial system and control over expenditure were far
from sound.
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Table (4-1) 
The Annual Growth of Government Expenditures and Revenues
Year Government
Expenditure
ROM
Annual
Growth %
Government
Revenue
ROM
Annual
Growth %
Deficit /
Surplus
ROM
1970 20.6 --- 45.4 --- 24.8
1971 46.0 123.3 50.0 10.1 4.1
1972 71.6 55.7 53.0 6.0 -18.6
1973 91.7 28.7 65.0 22.6 -26.7
1974 362.0 294.8 303.2 366.5 -58.8
1975 489.2 35.1 387.7 27.9 -101.5
1976 581.0 18.8 487.0 25.6 -94
1977 557.0 -4.1 520.0 6.8 -37
1978 586.0 5.2 503.0 -3.3 -83
1979 663.0 13.1 693.0 37.8 30
1980 949.8 43.3 1181.9 71.4 238.1
1981 1223.8 28.9 1262.2 6.3 38.4
1982 1411.9 15.4 1175.4 -6.9 -236.5
1983 1546.9 9.6 1253.9 6.7 -242.3
1984 1760.3 13.8 1340.7 6.9 -346.8
1985 1915.3 8.8 1559.8 16.3 -355.4
1986 1854.0 -3.2 1186.9 -23.9 -699.9
1987 1576.4 -15.0 1460.2 23.0 -148.9
1988 1567.2 -0.6 1204.8 -17.5 -362.4
1989 1665.8 6.3 1370.1 13.7 -304.6
1990 1887.4 13.3 1876.3 37.0 -11.1
1991 1868.1 -1.0 1585.1 -16.3 -283
1992 2258.7 20.9 1680.7 -5.8 -578.5
1993 2197.7 -2.7 1717.0 3.4 -480.4
1994 2252.9 2.5 1757.4 2.4 -495.5
1995 2331.0 3.5 1851.6 5.4 -479.4
Average
1986-90
1710.2 0.2 1419.7 6.5 -305.4
Average
1970-95
1220.6 28.6 1022.0 24.9 -108.4
Source:
1. DC, FIDP, Table (3), p.7.
2. DC, SDP, Table (15), p.21.
3. DC, ThDP, Table (18), p.32.
4. CBO, 1985, Table (4.1), p.38.
5. CBO, 1990, Table (4-1), p.60.
6. CBO, 1995, Table (4.1), p.38
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Table (4-2) 
Oman's Oil Production and Prices
OIL PRODUCTION
Year
Annual (M.B) Daily Th.Barrel Prices
	 $/b
1970 121.3 332 1.82
1971 107.4 293 2.22
1972 102.8 282 2.52
1973 107.0 293 3.13
1974 105.8 290 11.43
1975 124.6 342 11.48
1976 133.8 366 11.66
1977 124.2 340 12.9
1978 114.7 314 13.0
1979 107.7 295 20.05
1980 103.7 283 36.83
1981 119.8 328 36.88
1982 122.6 336 34.3
1983 141.9 389 29.17
1984 152.4 416 27.85
1985 181.9 498 27.07
1986 204.3 560 13.46
1987 212.5 582 17.3
1988 226.6 619 13.52
1989 233.8 640 16.25
1990 250.1 685 20.73
1991 258.5 708 17.44
1992 270.8 740 18.0
1993 284.6 780 15.0
1994 295.4 809 14.80
1995 311.3 865 17.80
Source:
1. Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral, Sultanate of Oman. The assesment of Petroleum Sector
performace. p.10
2. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 1995, p.12.
3. CBO, 1995, Table (3.1), p.29.
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In 1979, 1980 and 1981, the government's budget went into surplus: 1980s surplus
saw a 693.7% increase on the 1979 level. Although the volume of oil production
was still declining, and government expenditure increasing, the sharp rise in oil
prices was more than enough to offset the two negative changes. Unfortunately the
government was unable to increase oil production in order to take advantage of the
higher price of oil. Had oil extraction operations been more intensive, the budget
surplus during this period would have been considerably greater.
From 1982 onwards, the budget balance has turned back to deficit. During the
period 1982-1985, the deficit was bigger in absolute values than that of the period
1972-1978. However, as a percentage of GDP it was smaller. Throughout the
period 1986-1990 (The Third Development Plan) the world oil market price had
been declining sharply. It fell from its highest level of $41/b in 1980 to $13/b in
1986. In this year, oil revenue decreased considerably by 31.5% compared to
1985's level. On the other hand, government expenditure has been increasing on
average by 12.5% annually, i.e. the government agencies have been accustomed to
experiencing increases in spending during the second five-year development plan
(1981-1985). Hence, as it can be seen from chart (4-1), the budget deficit had
been fluctuating, reflecting the oscillation in oil revenues and the excessive increase
in total government expenditures. It reached its peak in 1986 recording 25 percent
of GDP.
The deficit minimisation policy which was adopted by the government (to be
discussed in chapter six) has succeeded to bring the deficit down to about 0.3% of
GDP in 1990. This success can be partially attributed to the sudden increase of oil
prices during the time of the Gulf crisis.
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However, in 1991, the beginning of the fourth development plan, the government
expenditure resumed its high momentum and oil price returned to its falling trend.
Thus the budget deficit started to rise and recorded 13% of GDP in 1992.
Table (4-3) sums up the significance of the accumulating deficit as a percentage of
GDP and total government revenue throughout the previous development plans.
4.1.2 The Regional and International Comparison
A - Regional Comparison
To assess the extent of the budget deficit in Oman, a comparative regional and
international study would be useful. To begin with the regional comparison, the
budget deficit of Oman must be compared to that of the other GCC countries. The
GCC countries are similar in economic, social and political characteristics; they
are all oil producing countries. The oil sector is the leading sector of their
economies, oil exports constitute around 85% of total exports and oil revenues
form about 90% of total government revenues. Accordingly GCC countries are
rentier states with export-oriented economies. They also have a small population
with 50% under the age of 15 years. With the lack of adequate quality and
quantity of skilled labour their economies rely heavily on expatriate labourers who
constitute about 75% of the total population, (e.g. Kuwait and UAE). All of these
countries are monarchies experiencing the very early stages of parliamentary
practice, with the exception, to some extent, of Kuwait.
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Table (4-3)
Oman's Budget Deficit during the previous Development Plans
1970-1975 The First Plan The Second Plan The	 Third The Fourth Plan
1976-1980 1981-1985 Plan	 1986- 1991-1995
1990
The	 Deficit
(absolute value)
-176.7 +148.1 -1266.6 -1452.5 -2316.8
RO.M
% of T.R. 19.6% 5.1% 19.2% 20.5% 28&
% of GDP 9.7% 2.4% 8.8% 9.1% 10%
Note: T.R. = Total Revenue
Source: Table (4-1)
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Oman differs slightly with regard to certain features. Economically its oil
production is much less than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE. For example, the
amount of oil produced in one month in Oman, is produced in 3 days in Saudi
Arabia, in ten days in UAE, and between 10-16 days in Kuwait. Regarding proved
oil reserves in 1994, Oman's oil reserve amounted to 2.0% of that of Saudi Arabia,
5.2% of UAE, 5.3% of Kuwait, but 138% of Qatar. Concerning natural gas
proved reserve in 1994, Oman's reserve equalled 10% of that of Qatar, 12% of
UAE, 14% of Saudi Arabia, and 49% of Kuwait.
Gross domestic product of Oman in 1991 represented 47% of Saudi Arabia's, 22%
of UAE's, 29% of Kuwait's, 83% of Qatar's, and 208% of Bahrain's. If per
capita income in the same year is to be considered, the per capita income of Oman
represented 23% of that of UAE, 19% of Qatar, 40% of Kuwait, 45% of Saudi
Arabia and 71% of Bahrain.
With respect to public finance, total government revenue of Oman in 1981
represented 35% of that of Saudi Arabia, 29% of UAE, 72% of Qatar, 16.5% of
Kuwait, and 264% of Bahrain. Total government expenditure of Oman in the same
year formed 4% of that of Saudi Arabia, 27% of Kuwait, 27% of UAE, 61% of
Qatar, and 356% of Bahrain. However, the Agriculture and Fisheries Sector in
Oman has more potential capability than the other countries to participate in the
total GDP, with the probable exception of Saudi Arabia.
Regarding demographic trends, Omani nationals form 75% of the total population
which is larger than the case of other countries, except Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, the proceeding comparison must take into account that Oman had
started its modernisation process relatively later than all the other GCC countries.
Table (4-4) displays some economic and social indicators of comparison between
Oman and the GCC countries.
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Table (4-4) 
GCC countries, some economic and social indicators
UAE Bahrain Saudi Oman Qatar Kuwait
Population 1 1981 1.10 0.35 9.81 1.03 0.24 1.43
1985 1.35 0.42 11.60 1.24 0.30 1.71
1991 1.91 0.52 15.31 1.55 0.50 1.10
Pop. growth 1982 6.36 5.71 4.49 5.83 8.33 4.9
1985 4.65 2.44 4.22 4.2 7.14 4.24
1991 3.8 4.0 4.15 1.97 4.17 -48.6
Oil Production 2 1984 1280 - 4585 420 355 1230
1990 2280 - 7300 695 435 1265
1994 2490 - 8965 815 450 2085
Oil Res. 3 1994 98.1 - 261.2 534 3.7 96.5
Gas Res. 5 1994 204.6 5.3 185.9 25.13 6 250 52.9
GDP 7 1981 32988.3 3467.6 153902 7210.5 8661.3 25246.8
1985 27081.4 3704.3 86673.8 9999.4 6153.3 21456.8
1991 33621.4 3984.0 112275.8 10236.2 6672.8 14526.9
GDP Growth 1982 -7.2 5.1 -21.3 4.9 -12.1 -14.5
1986 -20.0 -14.0 -15.5 -26.7 -17.9 -17.6
1991 -0.1 2.1 7.3 -9.8 -9.3 7.8
Per Capita income
7
1981 29989 9907 15688 7000 36089 17655
1985 20060 8820 7472 8064 20511 12548
1991 17603 7662 7333 6604 13346 13206
Gov.R. 7 1981 13289.2 1437.8 10879.7 3799.1 5286.5 22975.2
1985 7094.4 1413.3 36304.9 5117 3739 7019
1991 11693.5 1361.2 38655 4838 3298.9 2754.1
Gov.Ex 7 1981 11927.9 915.2 83756.4 3256.5 5322.8 12120.2
1985 8620.4 1323.1 50109.1 5582.8 3420.6 10328.9
1991 13177.9 1421.0 72543.0 4859.0 3128.6 21874.8
Source:
1. Arab Monetary Fund, November 9, 1992. Table 1,2,3,6-7
2. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 1995, p. 2-18
Notes:
1. In millions
2. Daily Thousands Barrel
3. Billion Barrels
4. In 1995 (Ministry of Petroleum - Oman)
5. Trillion cubic feet
6. Oman newspaper, February 6, 1995
7. In millions of U.S. Dollars, at current price.
Chapter IV	 190
Table (4-5) 
The Budget stance of GCC Countries
Million of US Dollars
YEAR UAE BAHRAIN SAUDI OMAN QATAR KUWAIT
1981 1361.3 522.6 25040.6 111.1 -36.3 10855.0
1982 -872.6 224.2 370.5 -684.1 348.1 1966.6
1983 -1448.8 -124.7 -6888.9 -700.1 161.8 2453.1
1984 -810.3 -47.3 -12827.0 -1003.2 90.9 -2482.4
1985 -1526.0 90.2 -13804.2 -1028.1 318.4 -3309.9
1986 -3412.4 -137.0 -16247.0 -1818.4 -83.7 -4461.2
1987 -2740.6 -73.7 -18167.2 -368.9 -1249.7 -2797.9
1988 -2677.3 -215.1 -14300.0 -941.5 -902.2 -3109.7
1989 -1794.0 -154.2 -8929.7 -791.4 -1839.0 -628.3
1990 -2155.8 -276.3 -8829.0 -28.8 -403.0 -5048.1
1991 -1484.4 -59.8 -33888.0 -735.3 +170.3 -19120.7
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, November 9, 1992. Table 8
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If this general comparison has been made, it would have thrown more light on the
comparison between Oman's budget deficit and the budget deficit of these
countries. According to the availability of data, Table (4-5) shows the budget
stance of the GCC countries over the period of 1981-1991. It can be seen that all
these countries because of high oil prices have achieved surpluses in their budgets
in 1981 except for Qatar. Oman and UAE budgets started to witness deficits in
1982. In 1983, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia started to incur a deficit. Kuwait began
to show a deficit in 1984, whereas Qatar started in 1986. In absolute values, the
largest deficit was that of Saudi Arabia, the second was that of Kuwait, the third
was that of UAE. Oman's budget deficit was the fourth.
However the comparison in absolute values may be misleading. Therefore
macroeconomic criteria, such as total GDP, total government revenues, the volume
of oil production, oil reserves, financial reserves, foreign assets, etc., should be
taken into account. Table (4-6) shows a comparison of the budget stance of these
countries as a percentage of GDP. The last column represents the ratio resulting
from the total yearly budget balances of these countries, except Oman, divided by
the sum of their corresponding total GDP.
First of all, these countries' budgets have witnessed surpluses in 1981 (except
Qatar), because of the oil boom. The largest surplus was that of Kuwait (43% of
GDP). The second was that of Saudi Arabia (18.3% of GDP). In 1984, all these
countries witnessed large deficits with the exception of Qatar which continued to
achieve a surplus from 1982. The deficits continued to increase, reaching their
peaks in 1986, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, whose deficit reached its peak
in 1987 at 24.7%, and Qatar in 1989 at 28%. The highest deficit during the mid
eighties was that of Kuwait and Oman at 25%. The deficits of Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia in 1990 and 1991 were due to exceptional circumstances, i.e. the Gulf
crisis. Kuwait incurred a deficit at 73.5% of GDP in 1990, and it increased to
131.6% in 1991. As an average, excluding the exceptional cases of 1990 and 1991
because of the Gulf crisis, the highest deficit was that of Oman and Saudi Arabia at
10% and 10.6% respectively. If the special circumstances are to be included, the
highest average was that of Kuwait at 17%, then that of Saudi Arabia at 12.2%.
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Table (4-6) 
The Government Budget Stance in GCC countries
as a percentage of GDP
YEAR LLAd3 BAHRAIN SAUDI
ARABIA
OWN QATAR KUWAIT 00:
1981 4.1 14.3 16.3 1.5 -0.4 43.0 16.8
1982 -2.9 6.2 0.3 -9.0 4.6 9.1 1.1
1983 -5.2 -3.3 -6.4 -8.8 2.5 11.8 -3.5
1984 -2.9 -1.2 -12.9 -11.4 1.3 -11.4 -10.1
1985 -5.6 -2.4 -15.9 -10.3 5.2 -15.4 -12.8
1986 -15.7 -4.3 -22.19 -25.0 -1.7 -25.2 -20.2
1987 -11.5 -2.3 -24.7 -5.0 -23.0 -12.7 -19.6
1988 -11.3 -6.4 -18.8 -12.4 -14.9 -15.5 -16.4
1989 -10.2 -4.3 -10.8 -9.4 -28.4 -2.7 -10.0
1990 -6.4 -7.1 -8.4 -0.3 -5.5 -37.5 -10.3
1991 -4.4 -1.5 -30.2 -7.2 2.6 -131.6 -31.8
Average
before
1990
-6.8 -0.4 -10.6 -10 -6.1 -2.1 -8.3
Average
after 1991
-6.5 -1.1 -12.2 -8.8 -8.4 -17.1 -10.6
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If the case of Oman in 1986 is to be compared to that of the GCC countries as one
unit (the last column), it can be seen that the deficit of Oman was larger, (25%
versus 20%). The average of Oman's deficit excluding the special circumstances,
was also larger than the average of GCC countries under the same conditions (10%
versus 8%).
B - The International Comparison
Oman, along with countries such as Iraq, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela, is
classified by the World Bank as a middle income country (The World Bank, 1988,
p. xi). Therefore in international terms, Oman's international budget stance will be
compared with that of the middle income countries. Table (4-7) shows the budget
deficit of Oman compared to that of some middle income groups according to the
availability of data, and as percentage of GDP. This group includes Malaysia,
Poland, Thailand and Turkey (Ibid, p.44). It can be seen that the budget deficit of
Oman was larger than that of its group countries, except for 1979, 1981 and 1990.
4.2 The Causes of the Budget Deficit
Growing deficit can simply be attributed to the gap between expenditure growth
and revenue growth. This fact, despite its simplicity, needs an understanding of
the rapid increase of government expenditure and the nature of government
revenue. The behaviour of public spending and revenue before and after the oil
booms in Oman has changed. Public revenue accelerated dramatically during the
boom; public spending also increased. Even as the boom was ending, spending
was maintained or increased (See Chart 4-1). This led to a jump in public deficit.
The behaviour of government expenditure and revenues will be examined here,
starting with expenditure.
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Table (4-7) 
The Budget Stance in Oman and Some Middle Income Countries
as a Percentage of GDP
YEAR OMAN MIDDLE INCOME
COUNTRIES
1979 2.3% -3.0%
1980 11.5 -6.5%
1981 1.5% -8/0%
1982 -9.0 -7.5%
1983 -8.8 -5.8%
1984 -11.4% -5.0%
1985 -10.3% -4.5%
1986 -25.0% -3.3%
1987 -5.0% -2.8%
1988 -12.4% -3.0%
1989 -9.4% -3.4%
1990 -0.3% -3.9%
1991 -7.2% -4.9%
1992 -13.1% -3.1%
1993 -10.7% -6.4%
Source: 1) The World Bank, World Development Report, 1988. Figure 2.1
p.44.
2) IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1996.
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4.2.1 The Behaviour of Government Expenditure
With the emergence of the Omani economy from a long period of stagnation,
government recurrent and investment expenditure has inevitably increased at a high
and rapid rate.
The variation of government expenditure in general is explained by the variation in
the number of employees, the number of pupils, the number of patients, the
quantity of electricity produced, the amount of military equipment purchased, and
the growth in population. These factors refer to different types of government
expenditure which will be discussed later. However there are common factors
which affect government expenditure; these will be discussed first.
It can be seen from Table (4-8) and Table (4-9) that, on average, government
expenditure accounted for 52.3% of GDP, growing by 28.6% over the period
1970-1995. During 1986-90 it grew by 0.8% due to a reduction in development
expenditure. Chart (4-2) compares the government expenditures (as per centages
of GDP) of Oman, the GCC and the developing countries. The higher rate of
government expenditure to GDP in Oman can be attributed to the general and
special causes affecting the different expenditure components.
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Table (4-8) 
The Components of Total Expenditure (% of GDP)
YEAR TOTAL CUFUZEInir DEVE. DEFENCE SUBS Eln1C. HIRAI:CFI
1970 19.9 5.8 2.0 12.0 - - -
1971 37.1 8.0 16.1 13.0 - 1.0 -
1972 51.4 9.9 21.5 20.0 - 1.9 -
1973 54.7 12.0 17.6 25.0 - 1.6 -
1974 63.9 11.6 31.6 20.8 - 1.0 2.2
1975 67.8 9.0 21.7 33.4 - 1.3 2.0
1976 65.7 12.9 22.1 30.8 - 1.4 2.0
1977 58.8 16.1 15.4 25.0 2.3 2.1 1.4
1978 61.9 18.3 13.0 28.0 2.6 2.7 1.7
1979 51.4 14.6 15.0 20.9 0.9 2.1 1.4
1980 46.0 13.1 12.0 19.7 1.2 1.8 1.1
1981 49.1 13.4 12.7 20.9 2.0 2.2 1.6
1982 54.0 17.0 15.1 19.9 1.8 2.9 1.4
1983 56.5 16.1 13.8 24.5 2.1 3.2 1.5
1984 57.8 16.7 15.3 25.7 2.0 3.2 1.8
1985 55.5 17.5 15.5 21.7 0.9 2.9 2.6
1986 66.2 23.1 19.0 23.8 0.3 4.1 2.8
1987 52.5 21.6 10.9 19.4 0.5 3.9 2.1
1988 53.6 23.8 9.1 20.1 0.5 4.0 2.2
1989 51.6 23.9 8.0 18.9 1.1 3.5 2.3
1990 46.6 20.9 6.6 18.3 0.8 3.3 1.8
1991 47.7 21.4 7.0 16.4 0.3 3.5 2.2
1992 51.1 22.4 10.0 17.6 1.1 3.7 2.5
1993 48.9 21.7 10.0 16.4 0.7 3.8 2.6
1994 45.4 20.4 8.9 15.7 0.3 - -
1995 44.1 20.8 8.3 14.7 0.3 - -
1986-90 54.12 22.7 10.7 20.1 0.6 3.8 9.2
1970-95 52.3 16.6 13.8 20.8 1.2 2.7 1.9
Source:
1. DC, SYB, 1988, 1993, 1994.
2. CBO, 1985, 1990, 1995.
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Table (4-9) 
The Growth Rate of Major and Important Types
of Government Expenditure
Year T. Ex. Current Dev. Def. Sub Edu. Health
1970
1971 123.3 62.3 852.4 29.8 - -
1972 55.7 39.4 49.5 73.3 - - -
1973 28.1 46.4 -1.34 50.5 - -
1974 294.8 224.8 505.8 180.2 - 115.4 -
1975 35.1 -0.9 -12.3 104.8 - 67.9 20.5
1976 18.8 75.5 24.4 12.9 35.1 19.7
1977 -4.1 33.2 -25.1 -12.9 - 57.5 -25.0
1978 5.2 13.8 -15.8 11.8 13.6 29.5 20.5
1979 13.1 8.7 57.7 1.5 -52.0 6.2 11.3
1980 43.3 44.3 27.2 51.2 109.2 37.8 31.1
1981 28.9 23.5 28.7 28.3 97.2 43.3 34.9
1982 15.4 32.4 24.5 -0.1 -4.0 40.2 17.6
1983 9.6 -0.7 -4.6 28.7 23.4 15.2 24.5
1984 13.8 15.1 23.3 16.6 2.7 10.2 36.0
1985 8.8 19.5 14.9 -4.8 -49.0 2.8 17.5
1986 -3.2 7.0 -0.2 -10.7 -73.9 16.0 9.0
1987 -15.0 0.1 -38.2 -12.3 93.8 1.2 -19.8
1988 -0.6 7.3 -19.1 1.0 2.6 -0.1 1.9
1989 6.3 11.0 -2.9 1.9 116.4 -1.9 11.5
1990 13.3 9.8 2.8 23.6 -8.4 18.6 2.3
1991 -1.0 -1.0 2.5 -13.3 -57.5 2.3 14.6
1992 20.9 17.9 31.0 20.9 267.9 9.5 27.2
1993 -2.7 -1.31 2.2 -5.3 -31.9 13.4 9.5
1994 2.5 0.1 -2.3 5.6 -55.0 - -
1995 3.5 8.4 -0.7 -0.4 -12.6 - -
1986-90 0.2 7.0 -11.5 0.7 26.1 6.8 1.0
1970-95 28.6 27.8 58.4 23.3 21.2 26.0 13.9
Source: Table (4-8)
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Countries
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Chart (4-2)
Government Expenditure as Percentage of GDP, A Comparison Between
Oman, GCC, and Developing Countries
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Source: 1. Arab Monetary Fund, 9 November 1992, Table 7, p.11; Table 1, p.2..
2. The World Bank, World Development Report, 1988, Table 2.2, p.46; Figure
5.1, p.106.
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4.2.1.1 General causes
1. Population growth
This is reflected in the increasing numbers in need of education, health care,
transportation, electricity and water, etc. Changes in the rate of population growth
generate changes in age distribution, and this trend is reflected in expenditures for
education as well as care for the aged. The baby boom has resulted in a vastly
higher school and college enrolment, thus placing a higher burden on the state. If
the more recent population trends continue, education needs will give way to
demands for housing facilities; as the population moves further up the age scale,
the major fiscal problem forty or fifty years hence will be that of support for the
aged (Musgrave, 1980, p. 154). In addition to these conditions, the need for public
services is influenced by factors such as population mobility, leading to the growth
of new cities and resulting in demands for additional municipal facilities.
Oman began to experience high birth rates and declining infant and child mortality
rates in the mid-1970s. Population growth rate between 1980 and 1989 has been
estimated at 4.7% per year, and between 1989 and 2000 at 3.9% per year (World
Bank, World Development Report (19), p. 189). By 1989 Oman had reached a
crude birth rate of 44 per 1000, a crude death rate of 6 per 1000, and a total
fertility rate of 7.1 (Ibid).
2. Administrative setbacks
The dominant role and pervasive influence of the government not only inhibit the
dynamics of the private sector but place heavy demands on the government's
administrative apparatus that it is not capable of meeting (World Bank, 1994, p.
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60) There are evident weaknesses in the public sector's analytical, administrative
and supervisory capacities that are exacerbated by the extended reach of
government activities. At the same time that the government is attempting to
improve the performance of the entire economy, serious deficiencies hamper its
provision of traditional basic services - notably in health and education - and its
overall financial and economic management (Ibid). In the health sector, for
example, the cost of drugs could be cut by about 20% through improvements in the
procurement system. The cost of medical supplies could be reduced in the same
way. Hospital construction costs are high on a per-bed basis and hospital over-
capacity is estimated at 15 - 20% (World Bank, 1994, p. 68).
The government's monopoly over the supply of electricity, gas, gasoline and water,
together with the lack of competition in the sphere of petroleum exploration and
development, mean that inefficient activities survive without check. The absence
of competition, overstaffing, inefficiency and lack of unit cost controls in health
and education imply poor resources allocation in these areas of traditional
government involvement, as well as the diversion of resources from more
productive activities within the private sector (Ibid., p. 61)
3. Monetary variables
Monetary variables such as inflation and the exchange rate affect public
expenditure to different extents and in different directions.
Inflation exerts a direct effect on government expenditure, forcing increases by
pushing up the cost of goods and services needed by the government. The more
rapid the rate of inflation in the price of inputs or goods purchased by the public
sector, the higher the increase in nominal expenditure.
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Inflation affects different types of government expenditure at different rates.
Current expenditure represented by wages and salaries is not affected by inflation
directly; it increases according to a particular system.
On the other hand, local inflation which is likely to affect wages and salaries is
relatively low, hovering around 3.2% between 1976 and 1985. In 1986 it increased
to 7.1%. Between 1987 and 1989 it did not exceed 2.5%, while in 1990 and 1991
the rate of inflation was recorded at 9% and 5.8% respectively (IMF, 1994, p.
134).
Current expenditure (represented by equipment, furniture, drugs and the like),
defence expenditure (represented by military equipment) and development
expenditure are the main types of expenditure subject to imported inflation.
The rate of inflation is taken into account in estimating the government expenditure
at the beginning of each year.
However, there is a dialectical relationship between the budget deficit and inflation.
The former may lead to the latter if the government has financed the deficit by
printing banknotes. Conversely, inflation results in deficit by driving up the prices
of government-purchased goods. Thus a vicious circle of deficit-inflation ensues.
In the case of Oman, however, the vicious circle of deficit-inflation does not exist
because the government has not yet resorted to this means of financing.
The appreciation or devaluation of any currency against other currencies, the
countries of which the particular country has an exchange trade, affect the prices of
goods imported from, or exported to those countries.
Chapter IV	 202
The depreciation of the currency increases public expenditure - in local money - by
increasing foreign interest payments, and the cost of capital and intermediate goods
demanded by the public sector. The Omani Rial was pegged to the US Dollar from
1973 to 1986 at a rate of 1 RO to 2.8 Dollars. In 1986 the Omani Rial was
devalued to2.6, as just one of the monetary measures designed to cope with the
collapse of oil prices.
The USA is the fourth exporter to Oman: many capital, intermediate and consumer
goods are imported from the USA. After the devaluation of the Omani Rial, the
prices of these goods - in Omani Rials - have increased. Certain amounts of these
goods are acquired by the public sector; therefore the increases have been
embodied through the direct government purchase or through the contractors' bids
offered to execute the public works.
In addition to the offlical devaluation of the Omani Rial in dollar terms in 1986,
the real effective exchange rate has been influenced by the decline in the value of
the US dollar in relation to other currencies in recent years. The Central Bank of
Oman (CBO) reports show that the effective exchange rate index of Omani Rials
was 77.6 in 1984 (as a weighted average). In 1993 it was 127.8. A rise in the
index indicates the increase in the number of units of Omani Rials exchanged for a
composite unit of foreign currencies, thus indicating the extent of depreciation
(CBO, 1986, p. 103; 1993, p. 101). The above two indices indicate that the real
effective exchange rate depreciated by 64.7% between 1984 and 1993. The effect
of the devaluation of the rial on Oman has been mainly to raise the cost of Oman's
imports substantially in terms of the domestic currency, both as a consequence of
the decline in the rial vis-a-vis the dollar, and as a consequence of the decline in
the value of the dollar vis-a-vis other currencies.
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4. Psychological causes
The climate of confidence, prosperity and well-being engendered by oil-wealth has
led to an injudicious use of oil resources. Rising government expenditure in
different groups of countries would not be possible without raising tax rates or
imposing new taxes. These countries have faced difficult options when balancing
their budgets; as a result, more attention has been paid to thrift in spending. In oil-
producing countries, however, government revenues are not based on taxation, the
corollary being that since no hard options are faced when budgets are balanced, the
cautious use of public resources has not been given adequate attention.
4.2.1.2 The Components of Government Expenditures
As mentioned elsewhere there are four types of government expenditure: current
expenditure; development expenditure; defence and national security expenditure;
and participation, loans and support to the private sector. Each of these types has
its own pecularities and special evolutionary causes.
4.2.1.2.1 Current Expenditure
Current expenditure is what the government spends on operating the various
government bodies which provide economic and social services in addition to
government expenditure to cover its share in current expenditure of PDO. It also
includes interest payments on government loans and the purchase of cars and
equipment. Table (4-8) shows that on average it formed 16.6% of GDP up to
1995. Table (4-10) shows that it accounted for 32.3% of total government
expenditure, and 42.4% during the period of study. From Table (4-9) it is clear
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that it has been growing by 27.8% annually; during the period 1986-90 it grew by
7% on average. Table (4-11) displays the significance of current expenditure in
terms of GDP, total expenditure, and oil revenue during the previous development
plans. It consumed over a quarter of oil revenue in the first plan and over one half
in the third. Its annual growth rate exceed the growth rate of GDP and the growth
rate of government revenue. Its high proportion and growth constitute one of the
main causes of growth in government spending and, therefore, government budget
deficit.
In order to discover the main factors which push up this type of expenditure, it has
to be broken down into its main component parts. Table (4-12) explains the
structure of recurrent expenditure. As the table shows, there are three elements:
civil recurrent expenditure; the governmental share in PDO recurrent expenditure;
and interest payments. On average the first element formed 85.7% up to 1995.
The main cause of rising current expenditure is government employment, which
increased by almost a fifth over the five years from 1986 to 1990. This high level
of current expenditure resulted from the vast and very rapid expansion of public
administration, which in turn was due to the incremental role of the government in
operating and managing goods and services units. The administrative system of
state presently consists of about 26 ministries, in addition to a number of general
authorities and the majlis al-shura. As the Sultanate covers a large land area, with
scattered population centres, it is divided into eight provinces, each of which is
sub-divided into a number of walayats (provinical governments). Many ministries
have opened directorates and other law departments in each walayat.
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Table (4-10) 
The Structure of Government Expenditure (% of total expenditure) 
Year Current Dev. Def. Sub. Edu. Health
1970 29.6 10.2 60.2 - - -
1971 21.5 43.5 35.0 - - -
1972 19.3 41.8 39.0 - - -
1973 22.0 32.2 45.8 - 2.8 -
1974 18.1 49.4 32.5 - 1.5 3.4
1975 13.3 32.1 49.3 - 1.9 3.0
1976 19.6 33.6 46.8 - 2.2 3.0
1977 27.3 26.2 42.6 4.0 3.6 2.4
1978 29.5 21.0 45.2 4.3 4.4 2.7
1979 28.4 29.3 40.6 1.8 4.1 2.7
1980 28.6 26.0 42.8 2.6 4.0 2.4
1981 27.4 25.9 42.7 4.0 4.4 2.6
1982 31.4 28.0 36.9 3.4 5.3 2.6
1983 28.5 24.4 43.4 3.8 5.7 3.0
1984 28.8 26.4 44.4 3.4 5.4 3.5
1985 31.6 27.9 38.9 1.6 5.1 3.8
1986 35.0 28.7 35.9 0.4 6.1 4.2
1987 41.1 20.9 37.0 1.0 7.2 4.0
1988 44.4 17.0 37.6 2.1 7.4 4.0
1989 46.4 15.5 36.1 1.7 6.9 4.4
1990 44.9 14.1 39.3 0.7 7.2 3.9
1991 44.9 14.6 34.4 2.2 7.5 4.6
1992 43.8 19.5 34.4 1.5 6.7 4.9
1993 44.4 20.5 33.5 1.5 7.7 5.2
1994 45.0 19.6 34.5 0.7 - -
1995 47.2 18.8 33.3 0.6 - -
1986-90 42.4 19.2 37.2 1.2 7.0 4.1
1970-95 32.3 25.7 40.1 2.3 4.9 3.5
Source: Table (4-8)
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Table (4-11) 
The Significance and Growth Rate of Current, Development and Defence
Dxpenditure During the Previous Development Plans (%) 
The First Plan
1976-1980
The Second
Plan
1981-1985
The Third Plan
1986-1990
The Fourth Plan
1991-1995
% of GDP.
- current exp. 14.7 14.9 17.9 21.3
- devel. exp. 16.2 14.6 11.9 8.8
- defence exp. 25.9 22.6 16.5 16.2
% of Total
- current 26.9 28.9 40.7 45.1
- devel. 27.1 26.5 23.5 18.6
- defence 43.4 41.2 41.0 34
% of Oil  R.
- current 28.8 37.3 56.4 73.0
- devel. 31.6 36.4 37.4 31.6
- defence 50.7 56.7 51.8 54.7
Growth Rate
- current 35.1 18.0 7.0 4.8
- devel. 13.7 17.4 -11.5 6.5
- defence 12.9 13.7 0.7 1.5
Total Rev.
27.7 5.9 6.5 -2.2Growth Rate
GDP Growth
25.2 11.0 2.6 3.4Rate
Source: Previous Tables.
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Table (4-12) 
The Structure of Current Expenditure
YEAR CIVIL RECURRENT PDO INTEREST
RO m % RO m % RO m %
1970 6.1 100 - - - -
1971 9.9 100 - - - -
1972 13.8 100 - - - -
1973 20.2 100 - - - -
1974 59.9 91 5.7 9 - -
1975 54.8 84 10.2 12 - -
1976 95.0 83.4 12 10.5 7 6.1
1977 127 83.6 15 9.9 10 6.3
1978 138 79.8 19 8.7 16 9.2
1979 144 76.6 24 12.8 20 10.6
1980 214.8 79.2 35.3 13 21.1 7.8
1981 272.5 81.3 47 14 15.5 4.6
1982 315.7 71.2 55.7 12.6 17.5 3.9
1983 362.7 71.5 58.7 11.6 19.2 3.8
1984 448.7 74 58.5 9.6 39.2 7.7
1985 478.7 79 63 10.4 47.1 7.8
1986 488.2 75.3 72.3 11.2 75.9 11.7
1987 499.5 77 66.5 10.3 72.9 11.2
1988 535.2 76.9 62.7 9.5 84 12.1
1989 600 77.7 66 8.5 94.5 12.2
1990 660 77.8 75.4 8.9 92.4 10.9
1991 674.1 80.3 76.2 9.1 69.4 8.3
1992 779.8 78.8 82.2 8.3 98.5 10
1993 796.7 81.6 92.4 9.5 100.3 10.3
1994 825.6 81.4 87.7 8.5 100.7 9.9
1995 896.7 81.4 89.6 8.1 115.7 10.5
1986-90 76.9 9.7 11.6
1970-95 85.7 10.3 8.8
Source:
1. DC, FiDP, Table (3), p.7.
2. DC, SDP, Table (15), p.21.
3. DC, ThDp, Table (18), p.32.
4. CBO, 1985, Table (4.1), p.38.
5. CBO, 1990, Table (4-1), p.60.
6. CBO, 1995, Table (4.1), p.38.
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Public service wages and salaries averaged 56.8% of the recurrent budget during
the period 1986 - 1990; the overall wage and salary bill rose at an average rate of
10% a year over the same period. Government civil employment has grown in
recent years at a rate substantially in excess of that of population growth.
Employees of government civil service excluding the quasi-governmental bodies
rose in number from 1750 employees in 1970 to 98,342 employees in 1993 - an
average annual increase of 15%. This number forms 39% of the Omani labour
force and 14% of the total labour force.
Government employment has been viewed by the government partially as a policy
of income distribution. The local labour force, in turn, has been motivated to seek
employment in the government administration by salaries and wages that are higher
than those in the private sector. Employment in government administration is seen
as a secure option for those seeking work; other incentives include social care,
transport, good catering facilities etc. Furthermore, because of the limited capacity
of the private sector to absorb the increasingly large numbers of school, college and
university leavers each year, the government has come under social and political
pressure to employ the newly graduated students.
During the period under study, government employment grew at a rate of 3.9%
annually.
This policy was deemed justified as income distribution policy during the oil boom,
however it has long-term negative effects which were not borne in mind. Such
effects are increasing government expenditure, bureaucratic inertia, and continuous
dependence on the government for employment, consequently creating a weak
private sector.
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Interest payments have been increasing during the period under study. Its
proportion in total current expenditure jumped from 7.8% in 1985 to 11.7% in
1986. It grew by 61% due to the increase of accumulated debt. Interest payments
represent vicious circle of deficit in which the deficit of the previous year increases
the deficit of the next year. During the period under study 28.5% of the deficit on
average is caused by interest payments. In other words, the primary deficit (interest
payments are excluded from expenditure) averaged 71.5% of the conventional
deficit (see Table 3.1).
Part of the high growth of current expenditure has been induced by extravagance in
some items such as furniture and equipment. High prices by which the government
has been purchasing such items was another cause behind the momentum of this
type of expenditure. Private interest and personal relations are blamed for excessive
purchase and higher prices.
4.2,1.2.2 Development expenditure
Development or investment expenditure, or capital formation, is the investment
allocated by the government to establish and equip capital assets in order to fulfil
the requirements of increasing government services and increasing production of
goods. It comprises the following:
- Capital expenditure on projects for civil ministries and other public
organisations.
- Capital expenditure associated with natural gas expenditure.
- Government share in PDO capital formation.
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From Tables (4-8) and (4-10) it can be seen that in the early seventies it constituted
high proportions of both total public expenditure and total GDP. This was
expected because of the country's urgent need for basic infrastructure. It formed
about 13.8% of GDP and 25.7% of total government expenditure on average. It
declined from a high of 49.4% of total government expenditure in 1974 to 14% in
1990. As a percentage of GDP, it dropped from an average of 15% over the
period 1976-1985 to 10.7% over the period 1986-1990 (the period under study).
Between 1970 and 1995 its annual growth has been approximately 58.4%,
however, it was diminishing by 11.5% during the period under study. Its
proportion of total government expenditure has fallen to 19% owing to cuts after
the collapse of the oil revenue.
Although the development expenditure has been regarded as investment in the
promotion of private sector production to replace oil and gas production, it has
declined markedly over the previous development plans as a percentage of both
total public expenditure and total GDP (See Table 4-11).
There are two important forms of distribution for development expenditure or
capital formation: sectorial distribution and regional distribution, each of which is
directed to specific aims. Both will be dealt with here.
According to government planning documents, development expenditure is
classified into four sectors: the goods production sector; the service sector; the
social structure sector; and the infrastructure sector. There are five factors
governing sectoral distribution:
1. Working towards developing new sources of national income alongside
oil revenues, so as to replace them in the future;
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2. Increasing the proportion of investment allocated to income-generating
projects, particularly in manufacturing, mining, agriculture and fisheries;
3. Paying attention to the development of national human resources so that
they may fulfil their role in the Omani economy;
4. Completing the infrastructure;
5. Establishing the components of a free national economy based on the
activities of the private sector and free competition.
(DC, FODP, p.173)
Government development programmes in the infrastructure sector covers roads,
airports, ports, irrigation and water resources, town planning, municipality
services, and government administration. The goods production sector consists of
crude oil, natural gas, mining and quarries, agriculture, fisheries, and
manufacturing. The services sector comprises housing, commerce and tourism,
electricity and water, post and telecommunications, financial and banking
institutions, and transport. The social structure sector consists of education,
vocational training, health, information, culture and religious services, and social
centres.
Table (4-13) shows the sectoral distribution of development expenditure during the
previous development stages. It is clear from the statistics that the lion's share of
government attention has been paid to the infrastructure sector, followed by the
goods production sector and the services sector. The social structure sector, which
includes education and health, comes fourth in the list of government priorities.
Chapter IV	 212
With regard to regional distribution, the regional dimension of development is one
of the mainstays of the development process in Oman. The aims and policies of
economic and social development emphasise the importance of distibuting
investment among the various geographic regions of the country, so that economic
prosperity may spread to all citizens on the largest possible scale, thus diminishing
disparity in the standard of living between the regions, while at the same time
giving priority to less developed areas. Economic and social development policies
also stress the need "to support and develop existing population areas and protect
them from mass migration to heavily populated centres." (Ibid., p. 223). Table
(4-14) shows the regional distribution of development expenditure. Unfortunately,
like sectoral distribution, where social structure was ranked fourth in the list of
priorities, the acutal regional distribution of investment has not met the policy
objectives properly.
Other regions which are inhabited by 60% of total population have got only 33.8%
of total investment of the previous development plans on average. This type of
government expenditure represents capitalist accumulation. It aims at the structural
transformation of the economy. "It is a process whereby the state nurtures or
strengthens the private sector" (Alan Richards and John Waterbury, 1990, p. 214).
It does so in several ways. It provides roads, railways, ports and electrical power
in order to stimulate economic activity in general. Through its basic industries and
mines, it provides raw materials (natural gas, oil) and semi-manufactured goods
(iron, copper, chemicals, synthetic fibres), which feed directly into private
production. However, in the field of manufacturing, the scenario of an early
rentier state like Iran has been repeated in Oman. Government investment in many
industrial fields was competing with or even replacing private enterprise.
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Table (4-13) 
Sectoral Distribution of Government Capital Formation
During the Previous Development Stages
Relative Importance
1970-1975 First Plan Second Plan Third Plan Fourth Plan Average
(1976-1980) (1981-1985) (1986-1990) (1991-1995)
Good
producing
sector
14.2 22.6 23.9 32.6 44 27.5
Services
sector
22.8 16.6 19.5 17.0 20 19.2
Social
structure
sector
10.8 6.2 12.2 12.6 12 10.8
Infrastructur
e sector
42.6 54.2 43.2 36.0 24 40
Other
develop.
expenditure
9.6 0.4 1.2 1.9 - 3.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: 
1. DC, SDP, Table 32, p.51.
2. DC, TDP, Table 42, p.68.
3. DC, The Assessment of the Third Plan, Table 2.49, p.108.
4. MOD, The Main Components of the Fifth Development Plan, Table (4-2), p.38.
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Table (4-14) 
Geographical Distribution of the Government Capital Formation
During the Previous Plans* 
Region The First Plan
(1976-1980)
The	 Second
Plan	 (1981-
1985)
The Third Plan
(1986-1990)
The Fourth Plan
(1991-1995)
%	 of
total
area
%	 of
total
pop.
RO
(m)
% RO
(m)
% RO
(m)
% RO
(m)
Muscat 1.2 30.8 284.5 42.4 956.8 56.1 580.3 48.9 322 13.8
Al-Janubia 38.4 8.7 119.8 17.8 164.7 9.7 113.2 9.5 139 6.0
Other
Regions 59.9 59.1 267 39.8 541.8 31.8 483.4 40.7 530 22.8
Musandam 0.5 1.4 35 2.0 7.7 0.7 29 1.2
Abroad 7.1 0.4 2.4 0.2 1310 56.2
Total 671 100% 1705.4 100% 1187 100% 2330 100%
Source.
1. DC, FODP, Table 8.1, p.225; Table 8.4, p.237; Table 8.9, p.240.
2. MOD, The Main Components of the Fifth Development Plan, Table (4-3), p.3.
* Excluding Government share in PDO's development expenditure and natural gas
exploration and capital expenditure of defence and national security.
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In fact the sluggish growth of the private sector with regard to industrial activity in
general is due to the so-called 'confidence effect' of oil wealth. As Vaez-Zadeh
has stated, "The confidence effect.. .adversely influences private saving and
investment, and it imparts more significance to the pattern of government
expenditure.. .in the oil-producing countries compared with other developing
countries" (Vaez-Zadeh, 1989, p. 378). He argues that "the growth prospects of
the economy would depend on the ability of the government, which is the recipient
of oil revenues, to embark on adequately productive projects that compensate for
the adverse effect of expected oil wealth" (Ibid).
Under this effect, Oman, like other render states, has launched, in addition to
infrastructure and social structure programmes, mining and manufacture projects
(copper, cement) and even insurance and hotels, etc. Some of the latter projects
have been economically unsuccessful, representing a leakage of scarce resources
without good return.
During the last three years of the period under study the transfers to financial SOB
have contributed by 23.4% of the budget deficit on average. The transfers take the
form of subsidised interests not lending and equity injections. The first part is
acceptable because it protects low-income borrowers from higher interest rates,
however the other part must be reduced.
In addition, public works in Oman are executed at high costs. A study prepared by
the Secretariat General of GCC countries in the mid-Eighties reveals that electricity
prices in Oman, for example, are much higher than in other countries, despite the
fact that they are subsidised. Strict application of adjudication law and
administrative reform are required to bring investment costs down.
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In this context it is important to evaluate expenditure on education and health as
one of the main components of government expenditure to examine its performance
and effects on the government budget.
Expenditure on education and health:
Oman has put a great emphasis on education and health. Expenditure on education
represented 2.8% of GDP between 1970 and 1993. As a percentage of total
government expenditure it reached about 5% and 7% during the period under study
(Table 4-10). It had an annual growth rate of 26% (Table 4-9). Because of the
high population growth and the scattered distribution of population, the need for
education has been increasing. Education in Oman is free of charge; furthermore,
the government encourages students financially in certain types of education. The
goverment's emphasis on education has meant that education achieved high levels
in quantity terms during the previous development plans. It has been widely
diversified. There are general education schools and technical and training
institutes. With regard to technical education, there are commercial, industrial and
agricultural schools; a number of intermediate vocational training colleges; health,
banking and public adminstration institutes; the Industrial Technical College of
Oman; and, at the top of the educational hierarchy, the Sultan Qaboos University.
There is also an increasing number of scholarships for higher education abroad.
Government capital expenditure is employed in this field in constructing and
equipping general education schools at several levels, the intermediate specialized
colleges and institutes, in the establishment of administrative buildings for regional
departments, and in the construction of Sultan Qaboos University, at a total cost of
RO 55 million. The number of public general education schools increased from 3
in 1970 to 779 in 1990. The number of pupils in state schools increased from 909
to 355, 986.
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Regarding health expenditure, Tables (4-8) and (4-10) show that it represents about
2% of GDP and 3.5% of total government spending (and 4% throughout the period
under study). It has been growing by about 14% annually on average. These
figures represent the expenditure of the Ministry of Health alone; there are other
ministries or agencies which offer health services.
Remarkable progress was achieved during the implementation of the previous
plans. All government health services are free of charge. Government investment
in this field has been directed to the construction of new hospitals, health units,
clinics and maternity centres in various regions. The number of government
hospitals increased from 1 in 1970 to 47 in 1990; the number of clinics from 9 to
90; the number of beds from 12 to 3421.
In 1990, Oman had 1,060 persons per doctor and 2,810 persons per nurse
compared with the average of 3,410 persons per doctor and 3,940 persons
per nurse for countries ranked in the medium human development countries
- into which Oman falls (UNDP, 1994, p.152, quoted in Al-Yousef, 1995,
p.93).
At the top of the medical services are the Royal Hospital, the Hospital of the
Sultan's Royal Forces, and the Sultan Qaboos University Hospital, which alone
was built at a cost of RO 50 million. Accordingly health conditions have improved
significantly in some health indicators. For example, UNICEF's 1994 report stated
that "Oman had achieved 97 per cent rate of immunization against measles -
against a goal of 90 per cent to be achieved by the year 2000" (Ibid) (see also
Section 4.2.1.1 - Population growth). Table (4-15) compares Oman with other
Middle Eastern and developing countries; Oman's advanced position in terms of
expenditure figures is clear.
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Table (4-15) 
Government Expenditure on Education and Health (As Percentage of GDP) 
A Comparison Between Oman and Middle East and Developing Countries
OMAN MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Education: 1985-87 3.6 3.7 3.6
1988-90 3.6 3.2 3.3
Health:	 1985-87 2.5 1.9 1.7
1988-90 2.1 1.6 1.6
Source: 1. World Economic Outlook, World Bank, May 1992, p. 76.
2. The previous tables (for Oman).
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Educational expenditure at the general government level typically represents
4.5% to 7% of GDP in industrial countries. In developing countries,
education expenditure ranges from 2.5% to 7.5% of GDP (Ke-Young Chu
and Richard Hemming, 1991, p. 107).
Expenditure on education may have a large element of consumption, but its
character as an investment in human capital is especially important. One special
feature of an educational investment is its long gestation period. The expansion of
the primary school system does not yield its returns until after 6 to 8 years; a
graduate of medicine represents an investment of perhaps 20 or more years of
formal education. The long gestation period required for education to pay off and
the limited opportunities to borrow against prospective human capital imply that
education costs are usually entirely or substantially subsidized (Ibid).
Education also offers wide-ranging external benefits to society. By
improving the quality of the work force, education increases the rate of
return on other investments and promotes growth; education provides the
scope for greater specialization of labour and can facilitate more outward
looking economic development; and education is viewed by many
governments as a means of promoting national identity, loyalty, and
generally more social patterns of behaviour (Ibid., pp. 107-108).
From an economic standpoint, adequate health care improves human capital by
strengthening an individual's capacity. Unfortunately, expenditure figures do not
necessarily measure the standard of education or health service. Basic education in
Oman, i.e. elementary, primary and secondary, has been declining in quality.
Because of the increasing numbers of pupils, schools have been operated in two
shifts. This means that the length of lessons has been shortened. The number of
students per teacher has increased, resulting in bigger classes. Despite this,
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however, the growth of education expenditure during the period under study has
been reduced. Table (4-9) shows that education expenditure grew by only 6.8% on
average during the period under study compared with 26% during the period up to
1993. Health spending grew by only 1% compared with 14%. The rationalization
of health spending may be required because hospitals have been run at high costs.
4.2.1.2.3 Defence and National Security Expenditure
Oman's defence and national security expenditures have been among the highest in
the world, representing 22% of GDP on average. It constituted 40% of total
government spending. It was 60% and 50% in 1970 and 1975 respecitively. Since
then it has grown at a rate of 23.3% a year on average up to 1995. However,
during the period under study this rate of growth had slowed to 0.7% a year. Its
significance in total government expenditure has declined slightly to 37.2%; as a
percentage of GDP it decreased to 20% (Tables (4-8), (4-9) and (4.10)).
Table (4-11) shows the evolution of this type of government expenditure
throughout the previous development plans. It has been absorbing more than 50%
of oil revenues. Table (4-16) shows a comparison between Oman and some other
Middle F2stern countries regarding the per capita spending on military purposes.
Defence and national security expenditure consumes the equivalent of 78% of all
civilian recurrent expenditure combined; more than three times the expenditure on
education; and seven times the expenditure on health (The World Bank, 1994, p.
66). This report has pointed out that "the sheer scale of such spending means that
any economies that might be achieved could have a far greater impact on the
government's financial position than those achievable anywhere else" (Ibid).
Military spending as a share of GNP is highest in the Middle East and North
Africa, where it accounted for 11 to 14% between 1974 and 1985:
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Table (4-16) 
Per Capita Military Expenditures 	 $) 
A Comparison Between Oman and Some Middle Eastern Countries
EGYPT IRAN IRAQ KUWAIT OMAN S.ARABIA SYRIA
1975 163 268 107 n.a. n.a. 1,153 96
1978 40 280 159 848 852 1,259 125
1979 42 270 213 769 906 1,796 244
1980 53 117 227 769 1,245 2,525 254
1981 49 113 n.a. 936 1,785 3,014 268
1982 56 329 568 n.a. 1,808 2,780 286
1985 85 297 858 1,051 1,739 1,527 339
1987 67 70 592 683 1,270 1,375 339
1988 61 52 433 703 1,073 1,103 133
1989 59 83 n.a. 673 926 995 183
1990 47 73 251 5,816 885 2,386 183
1991 63 77 n.a. 3,907 744 3,343 235
1992 60 n.a. n.a. 5,000 943 1,371 n.a.
Source; Military Balance, 1982/1983, p.124
1983/1984, p.126
1984/1985, p.141
1985/1986, p.171
1987/1988, p.218
1989/1990, p.209
1991/1992, p.213
1992/1993, p.219
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The goals of military spending are non-economic ones - primarily defence
against external threats and internal instability. However, some have also
justified military spending by claiming it can contribute to economic
development. A controversial 1973 study...found that higher spending was
positively associated with economic growth (The World Bank, 1988, p.
107).
It is argued that military spending can have positive spin-off effects such as
fostering technological innovation, training personnel who later move into civilian
jobs, providing employment opportunities, building domestic institutions,
stimulating a country's tax effort, and promoting more intensive use of existing
resources.
Military industries can be a focus of industrialization activity. In recent years,
several developing countries have developed arms export industries of their own.
These positive effects appear to be more than offset by the long-term
negative impact of military spending, however. Research in the past
decade, although not conclusive, points to a negative relation between
military expenditure and economic growth.. .The most basic criterion is the
high opportunity cost of military spending, that is, the diversion of scarce
resources from more productive civilian uses.. .A 1982 study of sixty-nine
developing countries indicated that growth of military spending during the
1950s and 1960s significantly reduced overall investment, agriculture
production, and economic growth. Other studies have found negative
relations between military spending and spending on social development
(including education and health) and between military spending and savings
(Ibid).
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Nowadays, defence spending often has a high import content. In developing
countries as a whole, arms imports represent about 5% of the total imports.
Payment for such imports can add considerably to the balance of payments
problems and to the debt burden (Ibid). Arms imports of Oman averaged 4.4% of
total imports between 1987 and 1990 (UNDP, 1993, quoted in Wilson, 1995,
p.190).
Chart (4-3) makes a comparison between military spending in Oman, the Middle
East, North Africa and middle-income countries during the period 1974-1984.
4.2.1.2.4 Participation. Loans and Support to the Private Sector
This consists of two components: (i) direct loans and contributions to financal
investment organisations or loans to national, regional and international
organisations and authorities; and (ii) support to the private sector. The latter
combines various types: direct support through soft loans to the industrial sector
and indirect support for productive sectors through subsidised rates of interest on
loans granted by specialized banks. Direct government support is channelled
through several ministries. Traditional fishermen, for instance, are given support
through the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in the form of modern boats,
motors, nets and other equipment. The government usually bears part of the cost
of this equipment, while the remaining part would be in the form of an interest-free
loan.
This new type of direct government support was introduced for the first time in the
Sultanate by the Second Plan. The total sum allocated for this type of support was
RO 135 million, of which RO 16 million was in the form of grants and 119
million in the form of interest-free loans repayable over 20 years, including a five-
year period of grace. The grant portion of the programme is allocated for the
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support of small enterprises whose capital assets do not exceed RO 100,000. It is
limited to enterprises which are located outside the area of the capital so as to
encourage regional development.
Indirect support is represented in allocations for the creation and financing of the
three specialised banks mentioned above. It is represented in allocations used for
increasing the capital of these banks; in providing government loans to them; or for
subsidising the interest rate charged by their clients. These banks are authorized to
borrow from the government and/or other sources, and the government is
authorized to guarantee this borrowing up to four times the bank's paid-up capital
and general reserves. The government also guarantees the DBO paid-up capital
and a minimum return of 5% on its equity.
The need to fuiance persistent gaps between the state owned enterprises
(SOE) saving and investment has added greatly to the public deficits and
public indebtedness in developing countries. Direct budgetary subsidies to
SOEs have substantially increased central government deficits (World Bank,
1988, p.10).
During the last three years of the period under study, the transfers to the financial
SOE have contributed by 23.4% of the budget deficit on average. Subsidising the
interest rate is acceptable because it protects low-income borrowers from higher
interest rates, however, the other parts must be reduced.
Total amounts allocated for this type of government expenditure during the
previous Plans were RO 89 million, 266.7 million, 170.8 million, and 129 million
respectively. This type of government spending averaged 1.2% of GDP, 2.3% of
the total government spending, with a growth rate of 21.2%. During the period
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under study it averaged 0.6% of GDP, 1.2% of total government spending, and
exhibited a growth rate of 26%.
Some writers have argued that when administrative prices are held below costs or
enterprises are unable to compete in contested markets, the ready availability of
budgetary resources prevents them from going bankrupt. While budget support can
be justified by reference to those compelling non-economical objectives that
prevent otherwise efficient enterprises from malcing a profit, it often compensates
for inefficiency (Hemming, 1991, p. 78).
The above mentioned report on the Sultanate prepared by the World Bank has
valued the cost of the financial subsidies at approximately 11% of industrial value
added (The World Bank, 1994, pp. 80-81). In the 1980s, the GCC Secretariat
commissioned a study of industrial incentives in the GCC member states. This
study pointed out that the Sultanate has the lowest level of subsidisation among the
GCC countries (GCC Secretariat General, 1983, p.63). Successive IMF missions
have reached similar conclusions. Inclusion of the full costs of those elements of
incentive system, i.e. economic input and output support, in the 11% above, would
undoubtedly raise the real cost of private sector support substantially.
In fact pressures are mounting for higher subsidies to counter the effects of heavy
subsidisation by neighbouring states and to minimise its impacts on the
competitiveness of Omani products in these markets as well as in Oman itself.
However, the World Bank has inferred that, while contributing to some extent to
the growth of manufacturing, subsidisation in Oman has not been successful in
achieving substantial economic diversification. The hidden fact, however, is that
this type of government expenditure has been driven by the pressure of interest
groups.
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4.2.2 The Behaviour of Government Revenue
Along with government expenditure, budget deficit is affected by the evolution of
government revenue, in the previous chapter it was found that changes in
government revenues were responsible for 60% of the budget balance in some
years and for 40% in others. Thus the analysis of the structure and movements of
government revenue and the internal and external factors that influence them are of
great importance. Government revenue constituted 46% of GDP up to 1993
compared with 55.2% for total expenditure. Throughout the period under study it
formed 44.2% compared to 54% for expenditure. It had been growing at a rate of
27.2% on average compared with 31% for expenditure. During the period under
study it grew at a rate of 6.5% on average compared with 0.8% for expenditure
(Table 4-1).
Total expenditure has been greater than total revenues for most of the time, i.e.
there has been a gap between the two sides since 1972. This gap has been seen to
widen at times and to narrow at others. Whenever the gap was widening, the
reason was either that expenditure was rising more quickly than total revenue, or
that revenue was declining faster (for example, the period 1982 - 1986), see Table
(4-1).
Government revenues are governed by three factors: oil prices; the volume of oil
production; and non-oil revenues, a factor which refers to the structure of the
government's total revenues. The depreciation of the dollar has a negative effect on
government revenues.
In this section I intend to discuss these three factors, beginning with the structure of
government revenues.
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4.2.2.1 The Structure of Government Revenue
As can be seen from Tables (4-17), (4-18), (4-19), oil revenue dominates the
government receipts. It constitutes 88% of total government revenues on average.
It forms 45% of total GDP and has been growing by 25% on average. However,
during the period under study its proportion of total revenues decreased to 82%,
representing 44% of total GDP and exhibiting a growth rate of 6.5%. Non-oil
revenues account for no more than 12% of total revenues. Tax revenue is quite
small, comprising 4% of total receipts; it covers custom duty and corporate income
tax. The latter component represents less than 50% of tax revenue. Although it
has been growing faster than oil revenue (Table 4-18), it has been fluctuating, thus
mirroring the case of oil revenue, which in turn reflects the instability of oil prices.
Non-tax revenue is greater than tax revenue, representing 8% of total receipts. It
consists of user charges on electricity and water, other government services, and
interests. It has been growing faster than tax revenue. Because the economic
performance of the country depends, to a large extent, on government expenditure,
which in turn depends on oil revenue, it can be seen that the trends of all types of
non-oil revenue reflect the trend of oil revenue (Table 4-18).
The marginal importance of tax revenue has resulted in the weak role of fiscal
policy, which has concentrated on the expenditure side of the budget as an
adjustment tool. In other words the income redistribution power of fiscal policy is
weak. On the other hand, the marginal role of taxes has abolished the tax payer as
a controller of public spending policy.
In normal economies, public revenues are derived from local economic activities
through the procedures of fiscal policies. In other words, economic activities such
as manufacturing, trading services, tourism etc. are normally the sources of public
revenue. However, in the case of Oman as an oil-rentier state, 88% of public
revenues are independent of the economic activities outside the oil sector.
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Table (4-17) 
The Structure of Government Revenues (% of Total Revenues) 
Year Oil Revenue Non-oil revenue Tax, fees Non-tax
1970 97.8 2.2
1971	 _ 95.8 4.2 2.8 1.6
- 1972 93.6 6.4 4.0 5.3
1973 94.3 5.7
.
3.8 1.8
1974 96.1 3.9 0.9 2.9
1975 96.2 6.6 0.7 3.1
1976 93.4 7.3 1.9 .4.7
1977 92.7 8.9 2.0 5.3
1978 91.1 8.4 2.1 6.8
1979 91.6 6.6 1.8 6.6
1980 93.4 6.6 1.3 5.3
1981 90.6 9.4 2.0 7.4
1982 91.6 8.4 2.6 5.8
1983 86.5 10.0 3.6 6.4
1984 82.5 13.0 5.9 7.1
1985 85.4 13.9 5.7 8.1
1986 78.6 21.4 7.1 14.3
1987 81.0 19.0 4.7 14.3
1988 82.6 17.4 5.9 10.7
1989 82.4 17.6 4.7 11.0
1990 84.7 15.3 3.7 10.5
1991 82.1 17.9 5.2 12.3
1992 80.6 19.4 5.6 13.4
1993 79.0 24.1 5.6 14.2
1994 77.6 22.4 6.1 14.8
1995 77.4 22.6 6.6 14.9
1986-90 81.9 18.1 5.2 12.2
1970-95 87.6 12.3 3.9 8.3
Source: Table (4-18)
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Table (4-18) 
The Components of Government Revenues (as % of GDP)
Total Revenue Oil Revenue Non-oil Tax Non-tax
1970 43.8 42.9 1.0
1971 40.3 38.6 1.8 1.1 0.6
1972 38.1 35.6 3.5 1.5 2.0
1973 38.8 36.6 2.2 1.5 0.7
1974 53.5 51.5 2.1 0.5 1.8
1975 53.7 51.7 2.0 0.4 1.7
1976 55.1 51.5 3.6 1.0 2.6
1977 54.9 50.9 4.0 1.1 2.9
1978 53/1 48.4 4.8 1.1 3.6
1979 53.7 49.2 4.5 1.0 3.5
1980 57.6 53.8 3.8 0.7 3.1
1981 50.7 45.7 4.7 1.0 3.7
1982 45.0 41.2 3.8 1.7 2.6
1983 45.8 41.2 4.6 1.7 2.9
1984 44.0 38.3 5.7 2.6 3.1
1985 45.2 38.9 6.3 2.6 3.7
1986 42.4 33.3 9.1 3.0 6.1
1987 48.6 39.4 9.3 2.3 7.0
1988 41.2 34.0 7.2 2.4 4.4
1989 42.4 35.0 7.4 2.0 4.7
1990 46.3 39.2 7.1 1.7 4.8
1991 40.1 32.9 7.5 2.1 4.9
1992 37.6 30.3 7.7 2.1 5.0
1993 38.2 30.2 9.2 2.2 5.4
1994 35.4 27.5 7.9 2.2 5.2
1995 35.0 28.9 7.9 2.3 5.2
1986-90 44.2 36.2 8.0 2.3 5.4
1970-95 45.4 40.2 5.3 1.7 3.6
Source:
1. DC, FIDP, Table (3), P.7.
2. DC, SDP, Table (15), P.21.
3. DC, ThDP, Table (18), p.32.
4. CBO, 1985, Table (4.1), p•38.
5. CBO, 1990, Table (4-1), p.60.
6. CBO, 1995, Table (4.1), p.38.
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Table (4-19) 
Annual Growth of Different Types of Government Revenues
Year Total Rev. Oil Rev. Non-oil Tax, fees Non-tax
1970
1971 10.1 7.9 120.0
1972 6.0 3.6 122.7 50.0 250.0
1973 22.6 -16.7 -24.5 19.1 -57.1
1974 366.5 605.8 216.2 12.0 641.7
1975 27.9 28.0 24.8 -7.1 34.8
r
1976 25.6 22.0 119.2 250.0 90.8
1977 6.8 6.0 18.8 15.4 20.1
1978 -3.3 -5.0 -7.9 1.0 25.1
1979 37.8 38.7 65.7 18.9 32.0
1980 71.4 74.7 35.2 19.8 39.4
1981 6.3 3.1 50.8 64.9 47.4
1982 -6.9 -5.9 -16.6 22.5 -27.0
1983 6.7 4.8 27.2 49.5 17.2
1984 6.9 3.4 38.9 72.8 19.6
1985 16.3 15.2 24.1 13.7 32.6
1986 -23.9 -30.6 17.5 -5.8 34.1
1987 23.0 26.7 9.5 -18.3 23.3
1988 -17.5 -15.8 -24.6 2.6 -38.2
1989 13.7 13.5 14.7 -9.0 16.4
1990 37.0 40.6 19.7 6.4 30.4
1991 -16.3 -18.8 -2.5 18.3 -1.2
1992 5.8 3.8 14.7 14.9 14.8
1993 3.4 -2.7 28.6 3.9 9.4
1994 1.9 0.2 8.3 11.4 5.4
1995 5.4 5.1 6.3 14.0 6.5
1986-90 6.5 6.9 12.2 -4.8 13.2
1970-95 25.4 32.4 36.4 26.8 53.2
Source: Previous tables.
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This situation, namely one in which public revenues are easy to extract and are not
dependent on the growth of non-oil activities or on changes in tax rates, has made
the expansion process of public expenditure an easy one. On the one hand, this
ease has increased the Omani society's demand for public services; on the other
hand, the dependence of public expenditure on oil revenue as a source of financing
has made the fiscal position of the government extremely vulnerable to changes in
the world oil markets, which, of course, are out of control. This leads us to the
question of oil prices.
4.2.2.2 Oil Prices
Foreign shocks are a source of fiscal instability in developing countries such as
Oman. Commodity exporters face an inherent instability from fluctuating export
prices. Oman, as a developing country, relies on one commodity export as its
major source of foreign exchange, i.e. oil. Cyclical swings in oil prices have had a
great effect on both external and fiscal accounts. There is almost a negative
relationship between oil price and the budget balance. When the oil price goes up
the budget shows a surplus or the deficit goes down and when the oil price goes
down the opposite happens to the budget balance. Chart 4.4 depicts this
relationship. The price increases of the late seventies and the later unexpected
collapse created fiscal crises in many countries.
With hindsight it is clear that resources generated by the 'booms'.. .were
managed in a way that left countries vulnerable to the coming collapse
(World Bank, 1988, p. 71).
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The price at which Oman's oil output could be sold rose precipitously in 1973. It
jumped again in the late 1970s, almost tripling between 1978 and 1981, when it
reached US$ 36.88 a barrel.
In 1982 the international oil prices started to decline. Hence, the total oil revenues
fell by 9.4% in comparison with 1981 revenues, despite a 2.3% increase in oil
production. Oil prices continued to fall during the last three years of the SDP
(1981-85). The Sultanate tried to stabilise oil revenues by increasing oil production
to compensate for the fall in prices. Despite this measure, oil revenues in the
Sultanate did not reach the 1981 level until 1985, when it exceeded the 1981 level
by 12.6%, despite the fact that oil production in 1985 exceeded the 1981 level by
51.8%.
To assess the effect of oil prices on oil revenues, three elements must be discussed:
Oman's oil pricing policy; the general factors affecting the world oil market prices
during the 1980s; and the direct causes of the 1986-89 oil crises.
A. Oman's oil pricing policy
From the time of the first commercial oil exports made by Oman in 1967 until the
end of 1970, oil prices had been stable at a level of $1.82 a barrel. Oman has
never been a member of OPEC or OAPEC, although it has benefitted from the
existence of OPEC price markets in setting its own oil prices. From the beginning,
Sudan Qaboos never considered joining OPEC; he wished to keep Omani oil policy
under his own control, thus avoiding any unnecessary risks (Skeet, 1988, p. 102).
As a smaller oil producer, Oman needed to preserve greater freedom of
manoeuvre. Oman benefitted - albeit passively - from OPEC's role in the
international oil market during the 1970s. During the 1980s, however, Oman
changed its oil policy and became the main mediator between OPEC and non-
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OPEC oil producers, particularly from 1986 onwards. There were two reasons for
this change: Oman's membership of the GCC, established in 1981; and the
persistent decline in international oil prices from 1982 onwards. Since Oman's
economy was heavily dependent on oil, the Omani government's initial priority
was to obtain the highest possible price for its oil. In practice, however, Omani oil
prices were fairly comparable with OPEC oil prices during the 1960s and 1970s,
and Oman had little control over oil prices. Oman was a 'price-taker' rather than a
'price-setter'.
Oman's oil sector in the early 1970s was still under the control of the foreign oil
companies, as were the oil sectors of most oil-exporting countries at that time.
However, Oman was putting relatively little pressure on the oil companies for
'national' control of the oil sector (Al-Ghilani, 1994, p. 96).
During the early 1970s the most difficult problems for the government were the
decline of Oman's oil production and the rebellion of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf in Dhofar. Only later was it able to turn
it's attention to other matters, including economic and social development.
The Shell Oil Company, which dominated PDO, found itself in a very
favourable position in Oman at that time. It was able to pursue its own
interests and maximise the level of oil production at a fair price of $1.82 a
barrel during the 1960s (Ibid., p.97).
It only gradually increased that price as growing pressure for higher oil prices and
greater 'national' control of oil sectors emerged in other oil-exporting countries.
From 1975 onwards, Oman began to give a higher priority to improving the
performance of the oil sector by employing new secondary and enhanced recovery
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techniques and promoting more extensive exploration for oil (Hughes, 1987, p.
169).
The international oil market was relatively stable from 1975 to 1978. During these
years the price of Omani oil increased by only 4 per cent, from $12.55 to $13.07
per barrel. In this period of relative calm on the oil market, Oman inaugurated its
first five-year development plan (1976-1980):
The plan increased government involvement in the oil sector and in the
economy as a whole (Ibid., p. 101).
Oman became increasingly dependent on oil as its main resource, with oil revenues
representing about 90% of the government total revenues. Political events in Iran
at the end of 1978 and the Iran-Iraq war, which began in September 1980, led to a
second 'oil shock', causing spot market oil prices to increase rapidly to almost $40
per barrel in 1980. Oman, as a non-OPEC oil-producer, sold most of its oil on the
spot market. The average Omani oil prices .
 increased by 192% between 1976 and
1980. The highest ever price for Omani oil was obtained in January 1980, when it
fetched $41.33 a barrel (Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals).
Omani crude oil pricing underwent major changes during the 1980s. From 1982
'contract' prices replaced official prices until the end of 1984. In January 1985
Omani oil pricing shifted from the 'contract' to the 'spot price' system. The price
paid by Oman's customers was to be adjusted at the end of each month to the
average level of spot market prices during the month. On 1 February 1987, the
spot price was replaced by an official contract price. The price (determined in
relation to the OPEC reference-price of $18 per barrel) was set at $17.63.
However, this contract price system had to be abandoned in December 1987; since
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then, oil export prices have been based on monthly spot market-related assessments
(Al-Ghailani, 1994, p. 140).
From 1981 onwards, Oman decided actively to support the OPEC oil policy of
stablising oil prices on the market. Omani membership of the GCC increased GCC
OPEC members' confidence and strength, owing to Omani influence on non-OPEC
oil-producers. The first GCC oil ministers' meeting was held on 14 October 1982
(Skeet, 1988, p. 189). From then onwards, Oman encouraged non-OPEC oil
producers to stand shoulder to shoulder with OPEC on oil matters and in 1988 it
took the initiative in organising a meeting of non-OPEC oil producers in support of
OPEC (Skeet, 1992, p. 103).
B. General factors affecting the world oil market during the 1980s
The role of OPEC in the international oil market had been gradually declining since
the beginning of 1980. The price increase in December 1980 marked the end of a
golden era for OPEC. Members agreed to increase their official oil price to $36
per barrel for reference marker crude, and they also decided to set the maximum
price for OPEC crudes at a level of US$41 per barrel (OPEC, 1990, p. 192).
Demand for OPEC oil began to decline from 64.5 mb/d in 1979 to 60.3 mb/d in
1981, which amounted to a 6.5% decrease in world consumption in 1981 (Table 4-
20). Oil consumption in the USA continued to decline from 17.9 mb/d in 1979 to
14.8 mb/d in 1982. It fell by 17.3% in 1982 alone. This decline of demand on oil
was a long-term responsiveness to changes in oil prices.
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Table (4-20) 
World Oil Production and Consumption 1970-1990 (mb/d)
Year Consumption Opec Production Non-Opec Production*
1970 79 23.4 16.7
1971 96.3 25.3 16.8
1972 - 27.1 18.9
1973 96.3 31.0 18.7
1974 93.8 30.7 18.7
1975 91.8 27.2 19.2
1976 97.7 30.7 19.9
1977 100.6 31.3 20.8
1978 103.2 29.8 -
1979 64.5 - -
1980 62.1 26.88 18.36
1981 60.3 22.60 18.84
1982 58.4 18.99 20.09
1983 58.1 16.99 20.88
1984 59.1 16.35 22.20
1985 59.1 15.45 23.05
1986 60.8 18.33 22.63
1987 61.8 17.32 22.56
1988 63.6 19.68 22.75
1989 64.7 21.34 22.29
1990 65.2 23.26 22.55
* Excluding the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China
Source: 1. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 1990, p.8. Autumn 1990, 311.
2. Opec Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1990, Table 13, p. 15. 1980, p. xxvii and 1992, p. 15.
3. BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry, 1980, p. 21.
Chapter IV	 239
In the short run the demand for oil is inelastic with respect to price, with
little response even to the large price rises. In the long term, if the price
rises are maintained the demand response will be much more elastic, partly
as a result of fuel and energy consumption savings but also as a
consequence of the substitution of other sources of energy for oil (Wilson,
1995, p.124).
Moreover, non-OPEC oil production increased from 17.7 mb/d in 1979 to 20.09
mb/d in 1982 (OPEC Review, Spring 1988, p. 14).
The period from 1981 to 1984 was of the greatest importance in the history of
OPEC. All the OPEC members needed to increase their oil prices in order to
finance their development programmes - conceived during the period of high oil
prices - as their expenditures had sharply increased. Moreoever, Iraq and Iran
were at war, and so they particularly needed to increase their oil production prices
and revenues. The weakening of the OPEC countries' position on the international
oil market between 1980 and 1984 can be seen clearly in the gradual decrease in
their share of world oil output (Table 4-20). Overall, the OPEC share of world oil
production fell from 55.7% in 1974 to 30.3 % in 1984 (OPEC, ASB 1992, P. 15).
During this period there was a lack of cooperation and coordination among the
OPEC members (Mohd, 1990, p. 18). A price war began both within OPEC and
between OPEC and non-OPEC oil producers. This stimulated the sale of oil
through the offering of discounts and long-term supply contracts which
'improperly' allowed consumers extra time to pay (Ghanem, 1988, p. 170).
During this period, OPEC members should have displayed stronger solidarity in
order to stablize oil prices, but trust among OPEC members was lacking because
political pressures and the various disputes among OPEC members were stronger
than the desire to reach agreement on prices (Skeet, 1988, p. 183).
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Chart (4-5) demonstrates how oil prices have been influenced by the wars of the
Middle East as one of the general factors affecting the world oil market.
C. Direct Causes of the 1986-8 Oil Crises
The new OPEC quota system imposed in 1984, with an overall ceiling of 16 mb/d,
put Saudi Arabia under great pressure in its role as the main price defender within
OPEC. By the middle of 1985 it was clear that demand for OPEC oil was
declining relentlessly (OPEC Review, Spring 1988, p. 9) and that the Saudi
position as the swing producer on the oil market was no longer tenable. By August
1985, Saudi oil production had fallen to 2.3 mb/d, compared with around 10 mb/d
in 1981. In November 1985, Saudi Arabia suddenly decided to boost its
production to a maximum of nearly 6 mb/d by the summer of 1986 (FT, Feb 3,
1987, p.15). Like other OPEC members, Saudia Arabia had embarked on
ambitious expenditure and development programmes which it had been forced to
trim significantly in 1984 (Saudi Arabia Ministry of Planning, 1987, pp. 2-4). It
decided to abandon the position of swing supplier. The spot price for Brent Crude
declined from $26.5 per barrel in January 1986 to $16.70 in March and $10.30 in
April. In May it recovered slightly to $13.65, but by August the price had
collapsed to around $8 per barrel (Skeet, 1988, p. 218).
The world economy recovered significantly between 1986 and 1989, causing world
oil consumption to increase by 1.6% per annum, from 60.8 mb/d in 1986 to 64.7
mb/d in 1989 (Table 4-20), whereas it had fallen from 1980 to 1985. Falling oil
prices and a plentiful supply of oil from both OPEC and non-OPEC oil-producers
encouraged the oil-importing countries to use more oil. OPEC production
increased from 19.6 mb/d in 1986 to 23.2 mb/d in 1989, while the non-OPEC
share of world oil production declined slightly. By 1989, international oil prices
had recovered slightly. In 1989 the main OPEC target was to gain $18 per barrel
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for its oil (reference crude), with an output ceiling of 17.3 mb/d. However, the
price remained withing the range of $15 - 18 per barrel until the beginning of
1989, when it temporarily exceeded $20 (Petroleum Economist, April 1991, pp.
9-10). The Iranian economy had been very adversely affected by the oil price
collapse of 1986. Thus in July 1988 Iran informed the UN of its acceptance of a
ceasefire; by 20 August the war was over. After the war, the significant recovery
of Iraqi and Iranian oil exports temporarily depressed international oil prices. On
the spot market, oil prices fell from an average of $17.10 per barrel in 1987 to
$14.99 per barrel in 1988. In 1989, nevertheless, the continuing world economic
upswing increased world oil consumption and lifted international oil prices to about
$20 per barrel. The $15-18 per barrel price range was enough to encourage some
OPEC and non-OPEC oil producers to increase their oil output and by late 1989
OPEC production had reached 24 mb/d, causing an oil glut in the winter of
1989/90 (Ibid). The incipient oil glut became apparent on the oil market from the
end of 1989 and it forced oil prices down to about $16 per barrel in the winter of
1989/90.
4.2.2.3 Oil Production
The other factor affecting government oil revenue is the volume of oil production.
When oil prices go down, making oil revenue far less than what is needed to meet
spending programmes, the government increases the volume of oil production, and
vice-versa.
The volume of oil production is governed by the quantity of oil, i.e .proven
reserves and production cost and the earnings needed to cover government needs,
government partners repayments, and partners' profit. The intital discoveries in
the late 60s established proven oil reserves of about 1.8 billion barrels. These were
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maintained until 1972 and then began to decline as extraction rose to exceed 100
million barrels a year. Reserves expanded rapidly to the 4 billion barrel level as
new discoveries were made over the period 1979 to 1984. Since then they have
grown more slowly than the annual rate of extraction, which rose very sharply over
the period 1983-86.
The proven reserve at the end of 1995 stood at 5.2 billion barrels. Table (4-21)
shows the development of oil reserves and production. Oman's oil production is
ample compared with that of OPEC or non-OPEC countries. Up to 1976 it
fluctuated; throughout the 1976-80 period, oil production was on the decline.
After that the production rate was positive but in a fluctuating mood owing to
available quantity and world oil market prices.
Because of the geophysical nature of the oil fields and the long transportation
distances involved, the cost of oil production in Oman is relatively high. The costs
of supply and service contracts form the greatest portion of capital and operating
costs (Ministry of Petroleum, 1995, p. 16). It can be inferred from the Ministry's
report that these costs are very high (See pp. 15, 16, 28 and 32). The Ministry of
Petroleum is trying to slow down the production cost for all working companies so
that it compares with regional and international standards (Ibid., p. 32).
Production unit costs in PDO are equal to operating costs + 60% of capital costs
+ 40% of total capital repayed instalments spent by foreign partners during the last
five years (depreciation) + 40% of the costs of dry holes provision dug during the
same year + 40% of the costs of gas holes works + net recompense, all divided by
total quantity produced.
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Table (4-21) 
Development of Oman's Oil Production: 
Prices and Proved Reserves
Oil Price Production (Daily) Oman
Year $ Growth Opec Non-Opec Oman Growth An. Pr. Prov. Res
1970 1.82 23.4	 (1) 16.7	 (2) 332	 (i) - 121.3 (4) 1.741 °)
1971 2.22 22.0 25.3 16.8 293 -11.7 107.4 1.670
1972 2.52 13.5 27.1 18.9 282 -3.8 102.8 1.810
1973 3.13 24.2 31.0 18.7 293 3.9 107.0 1.698
1974 11.43 265.2 30.7 18.7 290 -1.0 105.8 1.489
1975 11.48 0.4 27.2 19.2 342 17.9 124.6 1.329
1976 11.66 1.6 30.7 19.9 366 7.0 133.8 1.278
1977 12.9 10.6 31.3 20.8 340 -7.1 124.2 1.414
1978 13.0 0.8 29.8 - 314 -7.6 114.7 1.535
1979 20.05 54.2 - - 295 -6.0 107.7 2.480
1980 36.83 83.7 26.88 18.36 283 -4.1 103.7 2.493
1981 36.88 0.1 22.60 18.84 328 15.9 119.8 2.908
1982 34.3 -7.0 18.99 20.09 336 2.4 122.6 2.991
1983 29.17 -15.0 16.99 20.88 389 15.7 141.9 3.500
1984 27.85 -4.5 16.35 22.20 416 6.9 152.4 3.852
1985 27.07 -2.8 15.45 23.05 498 19.7 181.9 4.026
1986 13.46 -50.3 18.33 22.63 560 12.5 204.3 3.972
1987 17.3 28.5 17.32 22.56 582 3.9 212.0 4.088
1988 13.52 -21.8 19.68 22.75 619 6.3 226.6 4.119
1989 16.25 20.2 21.34 22.29 640 3.4 233.8 4.269
1990 20.73 27.6 23.26 22.55 685 7.0 250.1 4.361
1991 17.44 -15.9 23.0 42.1 708 3.4 258.5 4.471
1992 18.0 3.2 24.1 41.5 740 4.5 270.8 4.748
1993 15.0 -16.7 24.7 41.1 780 5.4 284.6 4.970
1994 14.8 -1.3 24.9 41.6 809 4.7 295.4 5.138
1995 17.8 20.2 25.3 42.9 864 6.8 311.3 5.2
1 & 2) m.b.	 3) thousand b. 4) annual m.b. 5) billion b.
Source: For Oman - The Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals and CBO, 1995, Table (3.1), p.29.
For Opec and non-Opec - Table (4-20) and OPEC Bulletin, January 1996, p.38.
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Total expenditure of PDO has been increasing by 14% from 1980 to 1985 (CBO,
1985, P. 31). In 1986 total expenditure rose by 45.4% from RO 279.1 m to RO
405.8 m. The increase was due mostly to the construction and acquisition of assest
in respect of the pipeline project completed in that year, and to a lesser extent by
an escalation in operating expenses (CBO, 1986, p. 37). Rising expenditures,
coupled with the larger depreciation which enabled a complete write-off of capital
outlays in five years, have pushed unit production costs to high levels (Ibid). The
cost reached US$5.73 /bbl in 1982.
The increasing expenditure of PDO's operations resulted in a rising level of
government participation in this expenditure. As can be seen from Table (4-22),
government participation in PDO expenditure has been rising at 21% on average
against 10% increase in government shares in oil revenues produced by PDO
(Columns 2 and 3). If government participation in PDO expenditures has to be
abstracted from government shares in revenue, Column 4 will result, representing
net government revenue from PDO production. The last column represents the net
government revenue as a percentage of total PDO revenue. It ranged from 55% in
1974 to 25.5% in 1993. It averaged 37.7% and 31.6% in the period under study.
The result is that the 60% of PDO revenues which go to the government has
diminished to about 38% because of the expenditures paid by the government.
The final result is that although Oman's oil production is ample, it has been
adversely affected by high production costs, leaving the net government revenue
very low.
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Table (4-22) 
The Government Receipts and Expenditure in PDO's Production. 
PDO Production Government
Receipts (60%)
Growth
Govt.	 Exp.	 in
PDO $m
Growth
Net Govt.
Receipts
% of
PDO
Produc.
m/b $m
1970 121.3 220.8 132.5 - - -
1971 107.4 238.4 143.04 - - - - -
1972 103.1 259.8 155.9 - - - - -
1973 107.0 334.9 200.9 - - - - -
1974 105.9 1210.4 726.2 - 59.7 - 666.5 55.1
1975 124.6 1430.4 858.2 18 76.6 28 781.6 54.6
1976 133.8 1560.1 954.1 11 75.4 -2 878.7 56.3
1977 124.1 1600.9 960.5 1 178.8 137 781.7 48.8
1978 114.7 1613.3 968.0 1 260.4 46 707.6 43.9
1979 107.7 2159.4 1295.6 34 377.0 45 918.6 42.5
1980 103.3 3804.5 2282.7 76 495.5 31 1787.2 47.0
1981 - - - - - - - -
1982 118.4 4061.1 2436.7 7 670.9 1756.8 43.3
1983 137.4 4008.0 2404.8 -1 706.5 3.9 1698.3 42.4
1984 149.1 4152.4 2491.4 4 707.8 0.2 1783.6 43.0
1985 178.5 4832.0 2899.2 16 728.5 2.9 2170.7 44.9
1986 201.2 2708.2 1624.9 -44 1146.7 57 477.5 17.6
1987 208.4 3605.3 2163.2 33 929.3 -19 1233.9 34.2
1988 220.0 2974.4 1784.6 -18 803.5 -13 981.1 33.2
1989 224.9 3575.0 2145.0 20 886.0 -10 1259.0 35.2
1990 238.1 4935.8 2961.5 38 1112.2 25.5 1849.3 37.5
1991 242.6 4230.9 2538.5 -14 1208.2 8.6 1330.3 31.4
1992 253.4 4561.2 2736.7 8 1286.3 6.5 1450.4 31.8
1993 267.5 4012.5 2407.5 -12 1385.7 7.7 1021.8 25.5
1970-93 9.8 20.9 40.4
1986-90 5.8 8 31.5
Source: Column 3 - Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals, 1995, p. 24.
Column 1 - DC, SYB, 1993, p. 202.
CBO, 1986, p. 27.
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4.2.2.4 The Depreciation of the Dollar
The Omani Rial is pegged to the dollar. The dollar has been depreciating against
major currencies which dominate the Oman imports. The effect of depreciation of
the dollar has weakened Oman's terms of trade by reducing export price index and
raising import price index. Its overall terms of trade index declined from 134.6 in
1974 (1987 = 100) to 86.8 in 1992 (World Bank, World Tables, 1989, p.510).
Thus, the purchasing power of oil has been declining with the exception of the first
half of 1980s. According to the World Bank, the purchasing power of Oman's oil
rose from 50.6 during the late 1970s to 91 during the first half of the 1980s then
declined again to 60.5 during the second half. This figure represents the oil price
index divided by import price index (World Bank, 1994, p.53).
By the 1990s the oil-exporting countries of the Middle Fast were more or
less back where they were before the oil price shocks of 1973-4. The dollar
in which oil prices are denominated, had itself depreciated against the
German Deutchesmark and Japanese Yen, the currencies in which a
substantial part of the civilian imports into the Middle Fast are
denominated. In terms of purchasing power ... the economies of the Middle
East which are oil-dependent appear to have experienced a continuous
deterioration, with the two brief exceptions of the oil price shocks (Wilson,
1995, p.136).
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Conclusion
Careful diagnosis of the causes of the budget deficit is of great importance because
it provides policy makers with clear information that helps them to form the
financial policy properly.
The government budget started to show a deficit in 1972. There are two reasons for
the budget deficit during the early 1970s: an urgent building of basic infrastructure
and the steady decline of oil production. Although the volume of oil production
was still declining and government expenditure was rising in 1979 and 1980, the
budget achieved a surplus in these two years, and in 1981, because the sharp
increase in oil price was more than enough to offset the two negative changes.
From 1982 onwards, the budget has been in deficit. It peaked in 1986 at 25% of
GDP because of the 31.5% decline in oil revenues due to the collapse of oil prices,
despite the harsh measures taken by the government to reduce the deficit. The oil
surpluses of 1979, 1980 and 1981 caused the government agencies to become
accustomed to experiencing successive increases in their spending.
Thanks to the increase of oil price in 1990 because of the Gulf crisis, in addition to
the deficit minimisation policy, the deficit declined to 0.3% of GDP in this year.
However, in 1991, the government expenditure resumed its high momentum and
the oil price returned to its falling trend. Thus the budget deficit started to rise and
it went up to 13% of GDP in 1992.
In comparison with other GCC countries, the budget deficit of Oman and Kuwait
were the highest in 1986 (25% vis-a-vis -22.2% in Saudi Arabia, 15.7% in UAE,
4.3% in Bahrain and 1.7% in Qatar). However, Oman's budget deficit in this year
compared to the GCC as one unit was larger (25% against 20%). On average,
excluding the exceptional cases of the Gulf crisis in 1990 and 1991, the highest
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deficit was that of Oman and Saudi Arabia at 10% and 10.6% of GDP
respectively.
In comparison with other middle income developing countries, the category in
which Oman falls and during the period 1979-1993, Oman's deficit was larger
except for 1979, 1980 and 1981.
The growing deficit is simply explained by the gap between expenditure growth
and revenue growth. Total expenditure has been greater than that of revenues for
most of this time. This gap has been seen to widen at times and be narrow at
others. Therefore the causes underlying the deficit are the factors affecting the
behaviour of public expenditure and revenues. Public expenditure growth rate
averaged 28.6% during the period 1970-1995, against 24.9% for total revenues.
Total public expenditure has been rising because of general causes that exert their
influences on all types of expenditure. On the other hand, each type of public
expenditure has been induced by particular factors. The general causes that pushed
up successive increases in expenditure are population growth, administration
setbacks, inflation, exchange rate depreciation, and psychological causes
represented in the climate of confidence and prosperity engendered by oil-wealth,
which led to an injudicious use of oil resources.
Different types of public expenditure have different circumstances.
Current expenditure, which accounted for 32.3% of total expenditure up to 1995
and 42.4% during the period under study, has been growing by 27.8% and 7%
during those two periods. The main causes of rising current expenditure are
government employment, interest payments and intensive purchase of equipment,
cars and furniture at higher prices. Wages and salaries averaged 56.8% of recurrent
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expenditure during the period under study and were rising by 10% per annum. The
interest payments jumped from 7.8% of current expenditure in 1985 to 11.7% in
1986. During the period under study it grew by 61% per annum.
Development expenditure formed one fourth of that of spending up to 1995 and
19% during the focused period. It was growing by 58% on average. It is the most
important type of public spending. It plays a short-term and long-term economic
and social role in the economy. It provides the social and structural infrastructure,
i.e. education, health, communication, and agricultural and industrial income
generating projects. It also represents a tool of the sectoral and regional distribution
of the oil wealth.
The increasing needs of the country for schools, hospitals, roads, electricity,
telephones, dams, etc. is the main cause of the increase of this spending. However,
there is an avoidable increase which is represented in the high costs at which public
works have been executed. During the period under study, development
expenditure was the sacrifice of fiscal adjustment. It was slashed by 11.5% per
annum.
Defence and national security expenditure in Oman is one of the highest in the
world. It formed 60% of total government spending in 1970 and 50% in 1975. Up
to 1995 it constituted 40% on average. It has been absorbing more than 50% of oil
revenues. 41% of military spending during the period under study on average is on
military salaries.
Changes in public revenues are the other factors affecting the budget deficit.
Changes in public revenues are caused by their structure, oil prices, oil production,
and the depreciation of the dollar.
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Oil revenues dominate the government receipts. It constitutes 88% of total public
revenues on average. It has been growing by 25% per annum on average. During
the period under study it declined to 82% of total revenues and grew by 6.5%.
Accordingly, total revenues have been very vulnerable to changes in oil prices. It
was found in the previous chapter that changes in total revenues, due to swinging
trends of oil prices, are responsible for 40% to 60% of the actual deficit. The
structure of public revenues implies that 88% of government revenue is not derived
from local economic activities. This situation has made the expansion process of
public expenditure an easy one. On the other hand, this ease has increased the
Omani society's demand for public services.
The volume of oil production has been playing a stabilising role. When oil prices
go down, making oil revenue far less than is needed to meet spending programmes,
the government increases the volume of oil production, and vice versa.
Finally, the effect of the depreciation of the dollar has weakened Oman's terms of
trade by reducing the export price index and raising the import price index. Thus,
the purchasing power of oil has been declining except for the first half of the
1980s. The purchasing power of Oman's oil rose from 50.6 during the late 1970s
to 91 during the first half of the 1980s, then declining again to 60.5 during the
second half.
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CHAPTER V
THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE 
BUDGET DEFICIT 
Introduction
The budget balance has generally been used as an important summary measure of the
impact of the budget on the economy. However, no macro-economic issue has
generated more controversy in economic literature than the impact of government
deficit and debt upon the economy. The consequence of deficits depends on how they
are financed. The macro-economic implications of deficits includes their impact on
monetary and financial markets, aggregate demand, and external disequilibrium.
Accordingly this chapter will consist of five sections and will be organised as follows:
In the first section, a general analysis of the means of deficit financing in Oman will be
conducted, and their direct effects and consequences on the economy will be
examined.
In the second section, the effects of the deficit on money supply will be analysed.
In the third section, the discussion will be addressed to assess the effects of the deficits
on aggregate demand, i.e. investments and consumption.
Finally, in section four, the study will focus on the consequences of the deficit on the
balance of payments.
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5.1 The Means of Deficit Financing in Oman and Their Direct
Consequences 
The consequences of deficits depends on how they are financed. To a first
approximation, each major type of financing corresponds to macro-economic
implications, if used excessively. Domestic borrowing from the Central Bank to
finance the deficit often leads to inflation; domestic borrowing from commercial banks
leads to credit squeeze and crowding out of private investment and consumption;
external borrowing leads to a current account deficit and real exchange rate
appreciation.
Casual observation of the ways in which recent deficits have been financed in a sample
of 64 developing countries indicates that the first source used was often external debt.
The sample includes countries from Latin America such as Bolivia and the Dominican
Republic, and from Asia such as Indonesia and Malaysia, and from the Arab world
such as Jordan and Tunisia (see Vito Tanzi, 1985, pp.69-71).
Resorting firstly to external debt because:
This was readily available to countries with a small total foreign debt that were
just entering a process of fiscal deterioration. And at least at the beginning, this
source had low political and economic costs (Ibid.)
This observation is applied to Oman because it could easily obtain additional resources
through external borrowing. Partially, Oman financed the deficit via the withdrawal
from its reserves funds, and therefore, external borrowing did not cause political
problems.
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Governments started to depend on other sources of financing only after they had
exhausted foreign sources of financing that ranged from grants to commercial credits.
Foreign reserves seem to have been the next financing source used. In fact countries
often borrowed to maintain or even to increase their levels of resources. The next
sources turned to were domestic non-bank credit, domestic arrears and inflationary
finance.
First, we will take a bird's eye view of the general features of the means of deficit
financing in Oman. Then we will turn to a worm's eye view of different types of deficit
financing to see their economic and political implications. Table (5-1) shows the
means of deficit financing that has been implemented.
To start with inflationary finance, it has not been used in order to avoid the harmful
effects on the economy. Commercial credits have not been resorted to, and the
government has been a net creditor to the commercial banks. Domestic arrears may
have been used, but only in very limited cases and for a short time. Regarding foreign
arrears, the government has a very good reputation in financial circles because it
refunds its matured debt in time. Its financial record as a borrowing country is clean.
Two main sources of financing have been implemented: foreign borrowing and
withdrawal from the State General Reserve Fund (SGRF). Foreign grants have been
occasionally used especially during the early years. Development bonds have been
introduced very recently. From Table (5-1) it can be seen that foreign borrowing was
excessively used to finance the deficit at the early development stages (1970-1985).
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Table (5-1) 
Means of Deficit financing During the Previous Development Plans
(R0m) and Percentage of Total
Period Deficit Financing
VI
Debt B.
wr
SGRF
B.
Total Net Borrowing Draw. SGRF Net Grants
1970-75 222 229CI) 149 65% - - 80 35% - -
1976-80 215 241 26 10.8% - - 215 89.2% 70.0 250
1981-85 1266 1284 478 37. 2% 628 48.8% 179 13.9% 648.1 1181
1986-90 1526.9 1539.9 123 8.9% 1414 90.9% 2.6 0.2% 1027.3 1230.2
1991-95 2354.9 2354.9 -44 0.0% 823.2 35.3% 21 0.9%i 1501 -
Notes:
1. B = Balance (at the end of the period)
2. The total means of financing is slightly higher than total deficit and the
difference forms the change in Government Accounts.
3. 16% of the deficit was financed by development bonds, 47.8% was
financed by change in Government Accounts.
Source:
1. MOFE Internal Report (unpublished) p.11
2. DC, The Assessment of the Third Plan Economic Performance,
1992 p16-17
3. The World Bank, Sultanate of Oman, Report No. 12199-0M,
1994 p.18.
4. CBO, 1995, Table (4.1), p.38.
5. MOD, The Main Components of the Fifth Development Plan,
Table (2-1), p.18.
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Higher proportions of borrowing and grants in the structure of deficit financing in the
first stage were attributed to the absence of other sources and to the strong and
friendly relationships with other countries.
During the first plan the highest participation of grants relates to the military aid that
was given to the government during the war in the south of the country. At any rate,
the total deficit during this plan was relatively low at RO 215m which explains the
higher oil return achieved by the government in the last two years due to rising oil
prices.
The structure of deficit financing during the second plan reflects the relatively high
deficit recorded by the budget. Despite significant participation by newly-created
SGRF - by almost half the magnitude of total financing - the government had to rely
heavily on borrowing (37%) and to a lesser extent on grants (14%).
With the deficit climbing to almost RO 1527m, and in spite of the total foreign
borrowing receipts standing at RO 929m (Table 5-2), the contribution of net
borrowing in deficit financing stood at only about 9%. The interpretation is this:
receipts from new borrowing have been allocated to repay the previous borrowing.
The total borrowing receipts was RO 929m, but the total amortisation was RO 1225m.
The difference came from SGRF which bore the heaviest burden of the deficit
financing, i.e. 91%. The foreign grants contribution in the deficit financing almost
vanished (0.2%) because total grants paid by Oman nearly approached total grants
received.
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Table (5-21
Indebtedness and SGRF Balances (R0m)
Year
Indebtedness SGRF
Receipt Amortisation(I) Balance (2) Drawing Net
Addition
Balance
1980 66 65 70 - - 250
1981 89 54 120 - 380 700
1982 70 47 180 40 250 830
1983 192 50 320 80 100 950
1984 195 81 470 145 50 1000
1985 125 99 648.1 300 190 1181
1986 298 158 940 526.3 100 1283.9
1987 123 248 887.8 198.4 - 1285.1
1988 219 231 959.9 274.6 100 1193.1
1989 232 292 994.5 254.9 - 1192.0
1990 57 296 1027.3 160 50 1230.2
1991 227 142 973 50 n.a. n.a.
1992 106 129 1088 149.2 n.a. n.a.
1993 137 163 1165 292.0 n.a. n.a.
1994 254 144 1311 221.0 n.a. n.a.
1995 118 110 1501 111.0 n.a. n.a.
1986-90(3) 929 1225 1027.3 1414.2 1230.2
1980-95 2508 2309 1501.0 2802.4 - -
Notes
1. Including interest payments
2. The Debt balance is not exactly the difference between receipt and the
amortisation because the loan prescribed is not totally drawn and the
outstanding dept is not totally amortised.
3. Total/Balance.
n.a.: not available
Sources
1. CBO, 1985, Table 6.9, p.100.
2. CBO, 1990, Table 5.6, p.127.
3. CBO, 1994, Table 6.8, p. 95.
4. DC, The Assessment of the Third Plan Economic Performance, 1992, Table
1.4, p.16.
5. The World Bank, sultanate of Oman, Report no. 12199, p.19.
6. MOD, The Main Structure of the Fifth Plan, 1996, Table 2.1, p.18.
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From 1991 the government began to borrow from domestic sources using treasury bills
and development bonds. These were seen as a means of both contending with the
financing of the deficit and of absorbing excess domestic liquidity. They contributed by
16% in the deficit financing.
The main two sources of deficit financing, namely foreign borrowing and withdrawal
from SGRF have direct and indirect effects on the economy. The direct effect is
represented in the increase in the country's indebtedness and exhaustion of its foreign
assets. The indirect effects work through money supply, aggregate demand, and
balance of payments, which will be discussed later. Only the direct effects will be
addressed here.
5.1.1 Indebtedness 
Oman, like many middle income countries, developed debt problems because of
excessive fiscal expansion and overvalued currencies, which made the economy
vulnerable to the rise in global interest rates and the falling export prices after 1981.
The continuation of borrowing as illustrated in Table (5-1) has led to increasing debt.
During the period under study the indebtedness rose from RO 648m in 1985 to RO
1027m in 1990. In 1995, it reached RO 1500m. The debt balance as a percentage of
GDP has been increasing (Chart 5-1).
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5.1.2 The Exhaustion of Foreign Assets
The approach of financing budget deficit by drawing down the foreign assets has been
taken by some oil exporting countries that accumulated large foreign assets when the
price of oil rose sharply in the 1970s. Oman accumulated publicly-owned foreign
assets. They are in the form of foreign exchange owned by the central bank; foreign
deposits owned by the State General Reserve Fund and foreign assets belonging to the
Ministry of Finance including shares in foreign companies. The foreign assets
accumulated when export earnings were high allowed Oman to maintain a higher
deficit (and a higher level of consumption) when economic conditions were not so
good. This option obviously reduced the need for forms of financing that lead to
inflation, directly increase foreign debt, or that crowd out the private sector.
The SGRF was established in 1980, the income of which has been specified on the
basis of 15% of each net payment of revenue from oil. The establishment of this fund
has been regarded as a prudent policy. Because of the emergence of the series of
budgetary deficit after 1981, the government allocation of gross oil revenues has been
shrinking rapidly (Table 5-2). The withdrawal was increasing substantially throughout
the period under study, forming a total of RO 1414m. Thanks to strong earning on the
fund assets over this period its final balance has not been falling quickly.
Whether on economic ground a country should meet it's financial needs by
using it's foreign assets or borrowing abroad is an open question. If the
country can use real foreign assets (if it can liquidate, say, foreign property
holdings) then the question is whether the marginal cost of foreign borrowing is
less than the earning foregone if the assets are liquidated. In each situation the
answer will be different and will need to be assessed on it's merits (Vito Tanzi,
1989, p. 77).
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5.2 The Effect of the Budget Balance on Money Supply
In the oil exporting countries, fiscal policy is the primary determinant of domestic
liquidity and aggregate domestic demand. "It must be the primary instrument of
demand management for oil exporting countries ... there exists a close relationship
between domestic budget deficits, domestic liquidity expansion and inflation" (Morgan
1979, p.57). Budget Deficits are expansionary because they are often financed in a
way that adds to the stock of money.
So as to analyse the effect of the budget balance on the money supply in Oman which
has witnessed, as have other oil exporting countries, a noticeable volume of external
receipts and payments through the government's budget, the domestic budget balance
provides a better measure than the overall budget balance.
The domestic budget balance has been defined in Chapter Three as "government
domestic revenue — government domestic expenditure".
Concentrating on the domestic, rather than overall budget balance is due to its direct
implications for the analysis of monetary policy. More precisely:
the concept of domestic budget balance highlights the role of the budget in the
determination of domestic liquidity more accurately. Ordinarily, an overall
budget surplus implies a contractionary effect on domestic liquidity. This result
does not necessarily hold in the case of oil exporting countries. In these
countries a government may incur large budget surpluses and yet have an
expansionary impact on domestic liquidity. This follows from the fact that the
government relies predominantly on oil exports to meet its expenditures rather
than through taxing the private sector. It is the domestic budget balance that
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determines whether the government plays an expansionary or contractionary
role in domestic liquidity creation (Kalmoor 1988, p.59).
Money supply may be defined for our purposes as consisting of: a) Currency notes and
coins with the public and b) Demand deposits held by the public This is because a
narrow definition of money supply is more suitable in the case of developing countries.
It is obvious that the direct (positive) impact of the budget on the money supply will be
equal to the excess of government payments to the non-bank private sector over the
receipts from that sector. That is, it is equal to:
(domestic expenditure on goods and services + transfers to the domestic non-
bank private sector + domestic net lending) - domestic tax and non-tax
revenues including depreciation but excluding profits from the central bank +
sale of physical assets within the country + net domestic borrowing from the
non-bank private sector (Chelliah 1973, p.774).
Alternatively, domestic expenditure can be calculated by subtracting the external
expenditure from total expenditure. Domestic revenue is total revenue minus oil
revenue, i.e. oil revenue is to be considered external revenue because, as has been
mentioned in chapters one and two, oil revenues are generated outside the domestic
economic activities. The excess of domestic expenditure over domestic revenues has to
be financed through:
— borrowing from the banking system;
— drawing down of the domestic cash balance;
— profits received from the central bank net of interest payments to the
banking system;
— the sale of foreign exchange by the government to the banking system =
(the excess of foreign receipts including drawing down of the government
to foreign assets over foreign expenditure) (Ibid.)
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These three sources all represent three channels through which foreign assets flow to
the country and are then transferred to local currency partially or totally then affecting
the supply of money. The impact of the budget balance on money supply, therefore,
must be judged in light of the domestic not the overall deficit.
Table (5-4) shows that increasing overall deficit particularly since 1982, indicates that
external balance (surplus) was not enough to cover the domestic deficit leading the
government to restore to external financing represented in borrowing and drawing
from SGRF. Domestic financing has been short term and temporary and represented in
borrowing from the banking system.
With respect to the relationship between budget deficit and domestic liquidity or
money supply, government borrowing from the banking system has a positive
relationship with liquidity. However, this effect is countered by a negative relationship
between money supply and government deposits. Domestic liquidity is positively
affected by the increase of government foreign assets as a consequence of inflow of
foreign exchange from foreign borrowing and external budget surplus. The supply of
money, M, can be multiplicitively related through the money multiplier, m, to the stock
of monetary base, H.
Mt = mt Ht
An increase in the fiscal deficit is thus assumed to result in an increase in the money
supply through the monetary base. In other words, the effect of budget deficits on the
growth of money supply is a two-step sequential process, namely from deficit to the
monetary base and from the monetary base to the money supply. This would be true to
the extent that government deficits were financed by borrowing from the central bank
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or using cash balances held with the central bank, by borrowing abroad, or by
borrowing from commercial banks with the banks immediately replenishing reserves by
recourse to the central bank. The money supply equation can be written as:
Mt = mt (G- Rt + Et)
where mt is money multiplier
(Gt - Rt) is budget deficit
Et = A 0 At + Ht -1
A 0 A is changes in international reserves and changes in claims on private
sector.
Table (5-3) depicts the change in money supply owing to changes in budget
operations. From this table it can be seen that the domestic deficit growth rate and the
growth rate of money supply (M1) have a positive relationship but sometimes with a
one year lag, i.e. M1 has been increasing one year later. This can be economically
justified by the fact that government expenditure does not ensue its monetary effect in
the same year of spending. For example, the high rate of increase (or decline) in the
domestic deficit in 1980, 1984, 1987, 1988 has been associated by corresponding
increase (or decline) in M 1 one year later. However, this correlation has been disturbed
in some years. For example, in 1982 domestic deficit increased by 31% whereas M 1 did
not increase in 1983. In 1993 domestic deficit declined by 10% (from an increase of
22% in the previous year), whereas M 1 did not decline in 1994.
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Table 5-3
Budget Deficit and Inflation
Date Domestic Deficit Government
Borrowing(I) and
Deposits
Inflation
ROm Growth % GDP ROm
net
Growth m1
Growth
CPI
Growth
1976 -285.7 - 32.2 +68.5 - 42.4 -
1977 -292.0 2.2 30.8 -7.1 -89.6 10.3 -
1978 -316.6 8.3 33.4 +27.3 +284.5 4.2 -
1979 -336.6 6.4 26.1 -63.9 +134.1 5.5 -
1980 -482.2 43.4 23.4 -147.1 +130.2 28.5 51.3
1981 -584.3 21.0 23.5 -194.9 +32.5 36.2 3.2
1982 -763.8 30.7 29.2 -189.6 -2.7 11.5 -15.9
1983 -789.0 3.3 28.8 -279.3 +47.3 11.9 -9.6
1984 -885.3 12.2 29.1 -347.2 +24.3 7.1 -4.7
1985 -961.1 8.6 27.8 -259.1 -25.4 12.3 -0.3
1986 -930.5 -3.2 33.2 -60.0 -76.8 -5.2 -21.7
1987 -785.5 -15.6 26.2 -114.9 +91.5 7.8 11.4
1988 -855.1 8.9 29.2 -52.9 -54.0 -6.7 -7.9
1989 -910.9 6.5 28.2 -149.0 +181.7 10.3 -23.3
1990 -997.7 9.5 24.6 -268.9 +80.5 13.4 10.1
1991 -999.5 0.2 25.5 -326.4 +21.4 3.4 -0.6
1992 -1212.1 21.8 28.8 -164.0 -49.8 7.0 -1.5
1993 -1091.7 -10.3 24.3 -12.4 -92.4 4.3 5.9
1994 -1052.9 -3.6 21.2 +31.2 +151.6 4.6 7.9
1995 -1097.3 4.2 20.7 -0.4 -101.3 -0.4 -1.3
Average 1986-1990 1.2 28.0 -129.1 44.6 3.9 -6.3
Average 1976-1995 8.1 27.2 -125.5 36.2 10.4 0.2
Note:
(1)From Domestic Banking System
Source:
Money Growth: CBO Reports, Development Plans.
Inflation: CB0 Reports and IMF, Government Finance Statistic
Year Book, Vol. X[II, 1989, p.449
The World Bank, Sultanate of Oman, Report no. 12199-0M,
1994, p.48.
Other sources such as World Development Report 1990 and
World Economic and Financial Surveys give different figures for
inflation.
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This disturbance can be attributed to the effect of net claims on government to the
banking system on domestic liquidity (columns 4 and 5). M 1 did not increase in 1983
because the net negative balance of borrowing and depositing increased sharply by
47%. In other words, the government's high deposits in the banking system in 1983
has mitigated the growth of money supply. In 1994, M 1 did not decline because the
negative balance has converted to positive, i.e. government borrowing exceeded its
deposits.
Generally speaking, expanding domestic budget deficit has been associated with
monetary expansion. During the period 1980-1985 the domestic deficit growth rate
averaged almost 20% and M 1 growth rate averaged 18%. During the period under
study (1986-1990), the domestic deficit grew by 1.2% against 2.9% for M 1 . During the
whole period, i.e. 1976-1995, the former averaged 8% and the latter averaged 10%.
The monetary expenditure has been induced by external borrowing and by the drawing
of the cash balances of the government to finance the deficit.
5.2.1 Budget Deficit and Inflation 
Some economic perceptions hold that government budget deficits are inflationary
because they stimulate aggregate demand (the Keynesian view), or because they lead
to higher money growth rates (the monetarist view) either as a result of direct
monetisation or following the attempts of the central bank to prevent increases in
interest rate. Inflation can be measured either by money growth rate or CPI
(consumption price index) growth rate. The budget deficit in Oman has not been
inflationary through the demand-pull channel as will be explained in the next section.
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The CPI measure of inflation as shown in Table (5-3) has been -6.3 during the period
under review.
With respect to the monetarist view - that budget deficit induces high money growth -
the analysis rests on the way in which the deficit is financed and the level of interest
rate. Inflation is caused by governments with no alternative source of deficit financing
resorting to money creation at a higher rate than the growth in money demand.
Excessive reliance on money creation is particularly risky if the inflation itself worsens
the deficits, because expenditure keeps pace with rising prices while revenues do not.
This means that still more money creation becomes necessary - further worsening the
inflationary spiral. In such circumstances, money growth becomes much higher than
the rate of real output growth. Consequently, the share of one unit of output from the
quantity of money increases. Fortunately, Oman has not resorted to this type of deficit
financing.
Monetisation or financing the budget deficit through sales of short-term government
debt, namely treasury bills, to the banking system lead to monetary expansion and
raises interest rate. The purchase of treasury bills by banks adds to their reserves and
thus to their capacity to create money. Oman has not been using this source of
financing during the period under study (1986-1990) and never before. It started using
it in 1991. Consequently, the interest rate has not risen in accordance with rising
deficit. The Central Bank of Oman defined a ceiling on Omani Rial deposits and
lending in 1982. It was 9.5% and 11.5% respectively. In February, 1986 the Central
Bank lowered these two ceilings from 9.5% to 8.5% on non-government deposits, and
from 11.5% to 10.5% for loans. This action was taken in accordance with falling
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international rates of interest coupled with the need to encourage the private sector in
particular against the expected decline in government expenditure. Stable interest rates
in Oman are also due to integration of world capital markets through which Oman
partially finances its budget deficit at current world long-term interest rates. As some
economists put it:
The size of the domestic economy is a determining factor: in a small country
with open capital markets, an increase in the public borrowing requirements
should not affect national interest rates as far as this is financed by net capital
inflow from abroad (Nunes-Correla and Stemitsiotis 1993, p.7).
In spite of all these positive consequences, Table (5-3) gives us two contradictory
results. As far as money growth is concerned, it is obvious that the budget deficit has
led to inflation. However, CPI indicates that there has been no inflation because the
growth rate of CPI was 4% throughout the period 1980-1985, and -6.3% during the
period under study (1986-1990), and only 0.2% during the whole period (1976-1995).
In fact, the relationship between budget deficits and money growth represent indirect
effects of budget deficit on inflation (Gupta, 1992, p.111). It is, therefore, inadequate
to explain inflationary behaviour (Ibid., p.137).
CPI on the other hand, may give a misleading picture about inflation because "the
coverage of price indices in the Middle East countries is often restricted, making their
usefulness open to question" (Wilson, 1995, p.31).
There are also distribution issues that arise when deflating GNP.
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Price indices in the Middle East are based on urban rather than rural prices. As
a result the impact of inflation on agriculture and the countryside may be over
or under estimated (Ibid).
The last observation of the price index is applied totally to Oman because it is
calculated about the capital area only i.e. Muscat.
At any rate, inflation in Oman is mostly imported inflation, and therefore the budget
deficit has been causing inflation through the real and effective exchange rate
mechanism.
5.3 Budget Deficit and Aggregate Demand
Chapter III presented a brief summary of several definitions of budget balance, one of
which was the budget balance reflecting the impact on aggregate demand. We will
now elaborate more on this sort of budget balance and then look at how the aggregate
demand has been affected by the budget deficit.
5.3.1 The Budget Balance Reflecting the Impact on Aggregate Demand
A stimulus to aggregate demand generally leads to an increase in the demand both for
domestically produced goods and services and for imports. That is, an impact on
aggregate demand is reducible to an impact on gross national product (GNP) and on
the balance of payments.
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Theoretically, a budget balance that reflect the impact on aggregate demand
may be computed by subtracting the sum of receipts that either reduce
purchasing power or add to real resources available for spending from total
expenditure (all of which would lead to an increase in either GNP or the
demand for imports) (Chelliah 1973, p.751).
A positive budget balance would denote net expansionary stimulus. In reality,
however, it is not easy to make strict statements about the impact of certain types of
receipts and expenditure on private demand, because the results depend, inter alia, on
institutional arrangements and monetary policy.
The influences of budgetary transactions involving foreign receipts or expenditure
differ according to the types of receipts and expenditure that are combined in given
transactions:
Four different combinations can be envisaged (assuming that the receipt and
expenditure are equal in each case):
1. Foreign receipts, such as grants from abroad - combined with foreign
expenditure - net impact is neutral with respect to both GNP and the
balance of payments.
2. Foreign receipts combined with domestic expenditure - an expansionary
impact on GNP but a countervailing favourable impact on the balance of
payments.
3. Domestic receipts other than borrowing combined with foreign expenditure
- a contractionary impact on GNP but an adverse impact on the balance of
payments.
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4. Domestic borrowing combined with foreign expenditure - a nil impact on
GNP but an adverse impact on the balance of payments (Ibid.:752).
In the context of the use of this definition of budget balance, an expansionary impact is
defined in terms of an increase in the demand for domestic goods and of the impact on
the balance of payments. Given this definition, the net impact of budgetary
transactions can only be obtained by combining the effects on GNP and on the balance
of payments. Thus, not only (a) but also (b) combined with (c ) are examples of
neutral impact, while (d) is a case of expansionary impact. Since expenditure abroad is
added to domestic expenditure in computing this definition of budget balance, foreign
receipts, all of which have a favourable impact on the balance of payments, need to be
placed "above the line" in the derivation of the expansionary deficit.
In calculating the expansionary deficit in this way, two items of government
transactions must be examined: domestic lending and domestic borrowing.
a)	 Domestic Lending
Domestic lending has been included in expenditure (placed above the line). This
procedure implies the assumption that government lending, or net acquisition of
financial assets by the government, increases aggregate demand in the same way as any
other expenditure.
Two different questions seem to be at issue here. First, does financial investment
create less demand than an equivalent amount of direct investment by the government?
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Second, do not the effects of borrowing neutralise the effects of lending, i.e. is there
any justification for treating lending to and borrowing from the same sector
asymmetrically? The answer of these two questions will take us out of the scope of
this study, and the domestic lending item in Oman's budget is small, forming only
0.35% of total expenditure during the period 1986-1990 on average.
b)	 Domestic Borrowing
In our definition of expansionary deficit (given earlier) all domestic borrowing has been
included in the deficit with the implicit assumption that there is no act of borrowing
which has a negative impact on demand. It is, of course, granted that such an
assumption is not exactly equally valid for all types of borrowing. The distinction
should be made between borrowing that reduces purchasing power in the hands of the
public and that which does not. There are three major types of borrowing: borrowing
from the central bank, borrowing from commercial banks, and borrowing from the
non-bank private sector. The first and the last two types are not existent in the Omani
government budget.
Government borrowing from the commercial banks will have no impact on aggregate
demand if the banks have excess reserves, and so domestic expenditure financed by
such borrowing will have a direct expansionary effect. In other words, since the
commercial banks have excess reserves, their lending to the government will not
necessitate them to reduce their credit to the private sector. Therefore, government
domestic spending will have an expansionary effect on aggregate demand. If the
commercial banks do not have excess reserves when the government offers them its
Chapter V	 274
bonds, they can lend to the government only by curtailing credit to the private sector.
This would exert a contemporary pressure off-setting the expansionary effect of the
additional government expenditure. Commercial banks in Oman do not lack enough .
reserves. Therefore, their credit to the private sector has not been curtailed by making
credit available to the government. This point will be elaborated upon later.
The use of the previous simple budget balance as a measure of the impact of budget
policy on demand is based on a number of simplifying assumptions. Some of the
limitations of the use of this measure arise from those assumptions.
First, there is the implicit assumption either that foreign transactions are not
significant or that it is not necessary to distinguish between the impact of the
budget on GNP and on the balance of payments. Second, it is obvious that the
simple budget balance approach is based on an implicit model in which all items
of expenditure and receipts that are included to compute the balance have equal
(and one-to-one) impact on aggregate demand, negative and positive,
respectively, and that those items included in the deficit have no direct impact
on demand (Ibid. p.76'7-768).
Different types of lending and borrowing tend to have an unequal impact on demand.
This is also true of various forms of taxation and different kinds of expenditure. For
example, the impact of expenditure on goods and services on GNP plus imports is
equal to the amount of expenditure itself, whereas the impact of transfer payments is
reduced by the savings leakage. On the revenue side, the negative influence of a dollar
of a given tax on consumption demand depends on the marginal propensity to consume
of the taxpayer; the influence will rarely be equal to the amount of the tax.
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From all these circumstances it is obvious that a balanced budget may exert a positive
or negative impact on domestic demand and accordingly an equal increase in revenues
and expenditure generally cannot be considered to be "neutral" in its impact. In order
to get a more satisfactory measure of the impact of the budget, the weighted budget
balance is suggested.
This balance is derived by assigning a specific weight to each budgetary item
and then summing up the items multiplied by their respective weights. The
weight assigned to each item would be designed to reflect it's impact on GNP
or on demand for domestic goods and services, as to both magnitude and sign
(Ibid).
For example, if expenditure on imports and saving are the only leakages to be taken
into account for the personal income tax, the weight for this tax would be -(1-m)c,
where m is the marginal propensity to import of the income-tax payers and c is their
marginal propensity to consume. A budget item multiplied by its weight may also be
called the first round effect of that item, since its total effect can be obtained by
multiplying this product and the general multiplier. A relatively simple way of
assigning weights to different budget items would be to use a basic analytical
framework for deciding what leakages should be allowed for and then giving them
numerical value derived from existing estimates of the relevant propensities.
Because of the lack of specific statistics in the case of Oman that can be utilised to
derive such estimates and indicators, it is difficult to obtain available weighted budget
balance. However, in the absence of a general weighting system it 'may be desirable to
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work out a limited "weighting" exercise designed to show separately the impact on
GNP and on the balance of payments.' According to Chelliah this can be worked out
by the separation of the total budget balance into domestic and foreign
components in such a way that the former will reflect the direct impact on
demand for domestic goods and the latter the direct impact on the balance of
payments (Ibid., p.769).
5.3.1.1 Domestic Balance or the Budget Balance Reflecting the Impact on GNP
The government budget affects national economy through both revenues that are
drawn from the private sector and the expenditure on the purchase of goods and
services from the private sector. The domestic balance of the budget is the measure
that is used to evaluate the effect of the government budget on the national economy
(GNP).
The domestic balance is very important because it indicates to what extent the
government transactions influence the national economic activities. In other words, is
government expenditure completely directed to motivating the national economy or is
it spent mostly on goods and services produced outside the country, consequently
having no strong impact on GNP?
The domestic balance is measured by including in the calculation only those budgetary
elements that directly affect the domestic economy. More precisely, this balance
equals the total expenditure on domestic goods and services, minus the sum of
domestic current revenues.
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In the case of Oman:
Domestic Budget Balance = Non-oil Revenue - Domestic Expenditure.
Oil revenue is considered non-domestic because its collection does not affect the
income of the private sector. In other words, it is a renter receipts obtained from an
enclave sector (oil sector).
Regarding expenditure, the government accounts do not distinguish between domestic
expenditure and foreign expenditure but this distinction can be roughly estimated. As
analysed in chapter four, there are four types of government expenditure: current
expenditure, development expenditure, defence expenditure, and lending, subsidy and
participation.
From the current expenditure two items must be subtracted: the transfer of the
expatriate civil workers of the government and the costs of Omani embassies abroad.
With respect to the first item, the number of workers is given, and average salary is
estimated for these workers and a proportion of the average salary that is transferred
must also be estimated (e.g. 70%). Multiplying the three previous steps gives the total
transfer made by the expatriate civil workers of the government. Regarding the costs
of Omani embassies abroad, there are about 40 Omani embassies currently operating
world-wide; an estimated average of 15 employees in each one. Government spending
on embassies abroad includes:
1. salaries for Omanis that are spent abroad and the salaries of foreign officers
2. the rent of the embassy buildings
3. furniture, maintenance, fuel and communication
4. transport equipment
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From development expenditure, the costs of imported capital and intermediate goods,
foreign employees' and contractors' transfers must be subtracted. Large government
contracts involved in building hospitals, schools, dams, airports, ports, roads, etc. are
mainly fulfilled by foreign companies. These companies employ expatriate workers
and import their needs of capital goods and equipment from abroad because they are
not mainly available from domestic production. My estimation is that nearly 35% of
development expenditure has been appropriated to imports, 15% to contractors'
profits, and 10% to labour wages. Therefore, 50% of development expenditure has
been leaking outside.
With respect to defence expenditure three items must be estimated: weapons and
equipment, capital and intermediate goods for military engineering establishments
(because defence expenditure includes development expenditure) and the transfers of
senior military experts. My estimation is that about 25% of defence expenditure went
to weapons and equipment, 20% to capital and intermediate goods, and 5% to senior
military experts transfers. Thus, 50% of military expenditure has also been flowing
outside.
Regarding lending, subsidy and participation, about 60% of it is spent abroad as
participation in regional and international organisations (See Ministry of Finance, Final
Accounts 1990, p.56). Thus this proportion must be deducted from this type of
government expenditure.
After making these deductions and estimating foreign expenditures, the domestic
budget balance can be computed according to the above equation. This balance is
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displayed in table (5-4) compared to foreign and overall budget balance. It simply
represents the net government expenditure that has been injected into the domestic
economy, and it measures the impact of government budget on the domestic demands
on domestically produced goods and services. This table illustrates that only 63% of
government expenditure during 1976-1993 and 67% during the period under study has
been received by the local economy. In other words, there has been a considerable
leakage of government expenditure flowing abroad and it should be totally reflected in
import and transfer statistics. Accordingly, if import and transfer figures are correct,
i.e. all imports and transfers are completely recorded, then the gross national product
(GNP) of the previous years was correct. However, if this is not the case - which is
quite likely - then GNP has been overvalued.
5.3.1.2 Foreign Balance or the Budget Balance Measuring the Impact on the
Balance of Payments
The equation which represents the domestic budget balance excludes the impact of the
budget on the balance of payments.
An approximate measure of the direct (adverse) impact of budgetary operations on the
balance of payments may be said to equal:
expenditure on goods, services, and transfers abroad
+ not lending abroad
+ increase in government balance abroad (if any)
- current receipts from abroad
- net borrowing from abroad
- sale of physical assets abroad
- decrease in government balance abroad (if any)
(Chelliah 1973, p.770)
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In other words, whereas domestic deficit is measured by including in the calculation
only those budgeting elements that directly affect the domestic economy, the foreign
deficit - the impact of the budget on the balance of payments - can be measured by
including only budget transactions that directly connect to the external sector.
As has already been mentioned the Omani government (and most governments) does
not present separate accounts of domestic and foreign expenditure. Hence, a fiscal
analyst can at best make only rough estimates of direct expenditure abroad. However,
it is much easier to obtain a separation of the two components of receipts. In other
words, it is arbitrary to exclude from the domestic component all expenditure directly
incurred abroad, because there is an import content of domestic expenditure that
should be added to expenditure abroad. This arbitrariness is one of the limitations to
the measures of impact on GNP and the balance of payments. The second limitation is
that these two measures give an indication of only the direct impact of the budget on
GNP and the balance of payments (Ibid. p.770-771). However, Oman's foreign
budget balance can be derived by subtracting domestic expenditure from total
expenditure to get foreign expenditure. Foreign revenues are oil revenues.
Foreign balance = foreign revenue - foreign expenditure.
Since, overall budget balance = domestic balance + foreign balance
then, foreign balance = overall budget balance - domestic balance
As can be seen from table (5-4), whereas domestic balance is in minus foreign balance
is in plus.
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Table (5-4) 
Domestic Expenditure, Domestic, Forel2n and Overall Bud2et Balance (R0m)
Year Domestic Expenditure Domestic
Balance
Foreign
Balance
Overall
Balance
ROM % of T.E.
1976 317.7 54.7 -285.7 191.7 -94.0
1977 330.0 59.2 -292.0 255.0 -37.0
1978 351.3 59.9 -316.3 223.3 -93.0
1979 394.6 59.5 -336.6 366.6 +30.0
1980 531.1 59.1 -482.7 720.8 +238.1
1981 702.5 57.4 -584.3 622.7 +38.4
1982 862.4 61.1 -763.8 527.3 -236.5
1983 914.4 59.1 -789.0 496.0 -293.0
1984 1059,5 60.2 -885.3 465.9 -419.4
1985 1177.2 61.5 -961.1 605.6 -355.5
1986 1184.5 63.9 -930.5 263.4 -667.1
1987 1063.6 67.5 -785.5 669.3 -116.2
1988 1064.9 67.9 -855.1 492.7 -362.4
1989 1151.5 69.1 -910.9 615.2 -295.7
1990 1285.7 68.1 -997.7 986.6 -11.1
1991 1280.4 68.5 -999.5 701.8 -297.7
1992 1539.2 68.1 -1217.1 619.4 -597.7
1993 1505.8 68.5 -1091.7 611.0 -480.7
1994 1419.9 63.0 -1052.9 531.0 -521.9
1095 1496.2 64.2 -1097.3 598.5 -498.8
Source:
1. DC, FIDP, Table (15), p.21.
2. DC, ThDP, Table (18), p.33.
3. CBO, 1985, Table (4.1), p.38.
4. CBO, 1990, Table (4-1), p.60.
5. CBO, 1995, Table (4.1), p.38.
Chapter V	 283
5.3.1.3 The Effect of Budget Deficit on Domestic Demand for Domestic Output
Domestic demand for domestically produced output is the private and public
expenditure (consumption and investment) spent on domestically produced goods and
services. However, in the absence of statistics which differentiate between what is
spent domestically and abroad, the above four components of total domestic demand
for domestic output cannot be computed separately. Instead, total domestic demand
can be calculated aggregately. This can be done as follows:
Total domestic demand for domestic output =
+ Total consumption (private and public)
+Total investment (private and public)
- imports
- factor income payments
Exports are not added because they represent external demand on domestically
produced product. Table (5-5) expresses a comparison between domestic budget
balance and domestic demand. The best criterion by which they can be assessed is the
gross national product because it excludes imports and factor income transfers. It
seems that there is a strong relationship between domestic budget balance and the
domestic demand on domestic output. This relationship is understood because the
latter is motivated by the former. This motivation is direct on public demand
(investment and consumption), however, it is indirect on private demand.
The domestic balance affects public demand directly because, by definition, domestic
expenditure of the government goes to purchase domestically produced investment and
consumption goods and services. While the motivation of the domestic balance is
indirect on private demand because domestic expenditure of the government either for
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consumption or investment purposes goes into the hands of people: contractors,
consumers etc., then they use the money in investment and consumption activities.
The last column of the table also demonstrates the weak sectoral integration within the
national economy since only 42% of gross national product is purchased domestically.
58% represents the foreign trade component of the gross national product.
The macroeconomic effects of deficits are to a large extent determined by the direct
response of private spending - consumption and investment - to changes in the deficit
and in its components. Because we are dealing here with domestic demand then the
private spending, both investment and consumption, must be confined to domestically
produced products. However, due to the lack of statistics the examination will be on
their existing figures which include spending on imported goods and services.
William Easterly and Glous Schmidt Hebbel found that fiscal adjustment during the
1980s was often done in a way that was costly for private sector investment. In their
10-country sample (all developing countries) private investment declined sharply from
an average of 13% of GDP in 1981 to a trough of 9% of GDP in 1986 (Easterly and
Schmidt-Hebleck 1992, p.49). Public investment declined also as it was the vehicle of
choice for fiscal adjustment. In contrast, consumption, both public and private was
relatively insulated from the adjustment. In particular, the sharp increase in public
consumption in the 1970s - which has much to do with subsequent fiscal crises - was
not reversed in the adjustment of the 1980s (Ibid.). We will now look at the case of
Oman, starting with private investment.
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Table (5-5) 
Domestic Demand Compared with
Domestic Budget Balance
Year
GNP Domestic Budget Balance Domestic Demand
ROm G.E. ROm G.E. GNP % ROm G.R GNP %
1976 647.8 - -285.7 - 44.1 148.7 - 23%
1977 745.3 15.1 -292.0 2.2 39.2 216.4 45.5 29
1978 766.8 2.9 -316.0 8.3 41.2 240.7 11.2 31.4
1979 1016.9 32.6 -336.6 6.4 33.1 275.9 14.6 27.1
1980 1740.5 71.2 -482.7 43.4 27.7 641.7 132.6 36.9
1981 2129.5 22.3 -584.3 21 27.4 717.5 11.8 33.7
1982 2239.6 5.2 -763.8 30.7 34.1 895.6 24.8 40.0
1983 2304.9 2.9 -789.0 3.3 34.2 1030.9 15.1 44.7
1984 2574.7 11.7 -885.3 12.2 34.4 1213.7 17.7 47.1
1985 3054.8 18.6 -961.1 8.6 31.5 1345.8 10.9 44.1
1986 2464.4 -19.3 -930.5 -3.2 37.8 1379.4 2.5 56.0
1987 2721.6 10.4 -785.5 -15.6 28.9 1247.6 -9.6 45.8
1988 2517.9 -7.5 -855.1 8.91 34.0 1323.9 6.1 52.6
1989 2826.6 12.3 -910.9 6.5 32.2 1361.6 2.8 48.2
1990 3633.7 28.6 -997.7 9.5 27.5 1696.7 24.6 46.7
1991 3494.4 -3.8 -999.5 0.2 28.6 1847.4 8.9 52.9
1992 3843.4 10.0 -1217.1 21.8 31.7 1922.8 4.1 50.0
1993 3877.2 0.9 -1091.7 -10.3 28.2 1839.5 -4.3 47.4
1994 4202.3 8.4 -1052.9 -3.6 25.1 2249.3 22.5 53.5
1995 4488.2 6.8 -1097.3 4.2 24.4 2346.2 4.3 52.3
Average
1986-90
4.9 1.2 32.1 5.3 49.9
Average
1976-95
12.1 8.1 32.3 18.2 43.3
Source: 1. DC. 4th DP. Table 1.3, p.16; Table 1.4, p.1; Table 1.5, p.23.
2. CBO, 1994, Table 1, p.125.
3. CBO, Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, June, 1996, Table (29)
p.37, Table (30) p.38
4. CBO, 1995, Table (6.1), p.91.
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5.3.1.3.1 The Effect of Budget Deficit on Private Investment
The relative importance of private investment during the period 1976-1995 has been
32% compared to 68% for public investment. This low participation can be explained
by the lack of experience of the private sector. It can also be explained by the lack of
opportunities opened for the private sector. In other words the public sector has been
a strong competitor with the private sector even in commercial fields like insurance and
tourism. This experience of the private sector in Oman is almost in line with the cases
of other developing countries. For example, William Easterly and Klaus Schmidt-
Hebbel, who carried out a study on ten developing countries such as Chile, Morocco,
Thailand, and Pakistan, stated that:
Public capital could be a close substitute for private capital and drive down the
private rate of return. Public investment in steel plants is an obvious example.
Governments also invest in activities where the private sector would not invest,
like infrastructure, which has large fixed costs and for which it is sometimes
difficult to charge user fees. The net effect on private investment will be more
positive the lower the substitutability of public for private capital (Ibid. p53-54).
In addition, foreign competition and the limitation of local markets are also blamed for
the weakness of the private sector. Table (5-6) shows that, during the focused period
when the budget deficit reached its peak, private investment was declining. In 1987 it
went down by 33.2%. Its growth rate averaged 1.2% during this period compared to
12% throughout the total period (1976-1995).
Public investment decreased even more sharply. It plummeted from RO 651.9 million
in 1986 to RO 399.7 million in 1987, i.e. by 38.7%. Its annual growth during the
examined period was negative at -13.8% on average. As has been mentioned earlier
the government cut public investment in order to cope with the problem of climbing
deficit.
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Table (5-6)
Private and Public Investment: 
Relative Importance and Annual Growth Rate
Year
Private Investment Public
Investment
Oil Non-oil Total
R.L G.R. GDP
%
RL G.R. RL G.R. GDP
0/0
G.R. R.L
1976 26.7 - 5.0 73.3 - 18.8 - 6.8 - 81.2
1977 26.7 34.2 6.3 73.3 33.9 20.0 33.9 8.5 -11.8 80.0
1978 36.3 52.3 6.1 63.8 -2.2 32.3 12.4 9.6 -17.3 67.7
1979 53.2 63.2 3.7 46.8 -18.4 31.8 11.1 7.8 14.2 68.2
1980 45.7 35.9 2.9 54.3 27.7 34.3 58.3 7.7 40.9 65.7
1981 50.7 34.7 3.8 49.3 58.3 33.2 21.3 7.8 27.4 66.8
1982 56.1 28.1 3.8 43.9 3.1 31.8 15.8 8.6 23.8 68.2
1983 47.3 -22.2 4.0 52.7 10.5 28.1 -7.8 7.6 9.9 71.9
'	 1984 50.6 34.5 4.2 49.4 18.3 28.5 25.9 8.6 23.1 71.5
' 48.9 -6.7 3.7 51.1 -0.4 26.4 -3.6 7.3 7.5 73.6
i6 53.7 7.6 4.1 46.3 -11.1 27.4 -1.9 8.8 -7.1 72.6
1987 49.5 -38.4 2.6 50.5 -27.2 29.2 -33.8 5.5 -38.7 70.8
1988 53.6 3.7 2.5 46.4 -11.9 30.9 -4.2 5.4 -11.6 69.1
1989 51.9 -6.5 2.3 48.1 0.1 34.3 -3.4 4.7 -17.4 65.8
1990 53.2 48.7 2.6 46.8 41.1 41.7 45.0 5.5 5.6 58.3
1991 50.3 7.5 3.2 49.7 20.7 38.0 13.7 6.4 33.1 62.0
1992 47.1 -3.9 3.1 52.9 8.7 34.0 2.7 5.8 22.3 66.0
1993 47.7 21.2 3.6 52.3 18.9 38.4 19.6 6.9 -1.4 61.6
1994 - - - - - 34.7 -17.1 -2.8 65.3
1995 34.5 - - 65.5 - 46.0 60.0 7.7 0.0 54.0 1
1986-
90
52.4 3.0 2.9 47.6 -1.8 32.7 1.2 6.0 -13.8 67.3
1976-
93
46.5 17.3 3.8 53.5 10.0 32.0 13.0 7.2 5.3 68
Notes: R.I. - Relative Importance, G.R. - Growth Rate
Source:
DC, ThDP, Table (6), p.13; Table (8), p.16
DC, The Assessment of the ThDP, Table (2-12), p.56
MOD, The Main Components of the Fifth Development Plan, Table (3-5),
p.30.
DC, 1994, Table (3), p.127.
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However, the decrease of private sector investment has to be examined more carefully.
There must be a distinction between oil and non-oil private investment. Oil investment
is done by foreign partners of oil companies whereas non-oil investment is executed by
local companies in manufacturing, mining, commerce, agriculture, etc. The proportion
of oil investment to total private investment averaged 47.3% during 1976-1993 and
52.4% during the period under study. The contribution of non-oil investment averaged
53.5% and 47.6% throughout the two periods respectively. Its relative importance in
general, has been falling until 1990, while the oil investment has been rising. The
growth rate of oil investment averaged 17.3% while the non-oil averaged 10%. The
former, in general, was increasing, whereas the latter was decreasing. During the
period under study, the average growth rate of the oil investment was 3% while that of
the non-oil was -1.8%. The normal effect of crowding out, when the government
resorts to financial system credit to finance its budget deficit, is that the interest rate
increases and accordingly private investment declines. In other words, if there is
domestic financial repression with preferential access at the public sector to domestic
credit, the deficit would crowd out private investment through financial markets. A
study which attempted to examine the role the real interest rate plays in private
investment in Oman has found that
In no attempt was the interest rate or private credit significant. The conclusion
emerging from this is that: the costs of funds in the private money market does
not play much of a part in the private sector's decision to invest (Kalmoor
1987, p.47).
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There is no lack of loanable funds that can be used by the private sector. Commercial
banks have had surplus liquidity since the early years of the oil boom. It can be seen
from Chart (5-2) that the commercial banks' total deposits has been higher than their
credit to the private sector. Moreover there are three specialised banks which provide
soft long-term credit to the private sector in the fields of agriculture, industry and
housing. Then, the decline of private sector investment during the period of large
budget deficit cannot be explained by a crowding out effect. The decline in total
private investment during this period can be attributed mainly to the decline of non-oil
investment, the causes of which have been indicated at the beginning of this sub-
section. The decline of oil investment can be interpreted by the falling of the rate of
return of oil companies because of the collapse of oil prices.
The main cause behind the falling total investment (private and public) is diminishing
national saving. National saving is equal to domestic saving minus net factor income.
Domestic saving is computed by subtracting total final consumption (public and
private) from gross domestic product (GDP). National saving can be considered as a
measure for financial resources generated through national economic activity, that can
be invested by residents. Due to higher total consumption caused mainly by high
public consumption (and large deficit) the domestic saving is low. National saving has
been worsening by large workers' and contractors' transfers out of the country. Table
(5-7) shows domestic and national saving and total investment as a ratio of GDP and
their growth rates. Chart (5-3) depicts the relationship between total investment and
national saving.
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Chart (5-2): Commercial Banks' Deposits and their credit for the private sector
as a percentage of GDP
Source:
1. DC, SDP, Table (20), p.26.
2. CBO, 1985, Table 5-8, p.67.
3. CBO, 1990, Table 5-6, p.87.
4. CBO, 1994, Table 5-7, p.61.
5. CBO, 1995, Table (5-7), p.61.
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Table (5-7): Domestic and National Saving
Domestic
saving
National
saving
Total
National
Investmen
t
% of GDP Growth
Rate
% of GDP Growth
Rate
% of GDP Growth
Rate
1976 52.2 - 33.5 - 36.3 -
1977 45.6 -6.4 31.9 -3.8 32.8 -3.2
1978 38.5 -15.7 26.8 -16.2 29.7 -9.6
1979 46.3 +64.1 35.7 +82.1 24.7 13.2
1980 47.9 +69.4 37.6 +87.2 22.6 46.4
1981 49.9 +14.7 40.5 +13.9 23.4 25.3
1982 42.2 -12.1 33.1 -18.2 27.0 21.1
1983 42.3 +13.4 31.4 +7.2 26.9 4.3
1984 42.7 +12.3 31.2 +10.4 30.0 23.9
1985 40.2 +6.9 28.7 +4.3 27.6 4.4
1986 30.0 -38.8 18.4 -48.0 32.0 -5.7
1987 39.0 +36.2 29.2 +70.4 18.8 -37.2
1988 27.0 -31.8 13.1 -56.5 17.5 -9.4
1989 30.0 +22.8 17.5 +48.2 13.7 -13.1
1990 35.2 +46.9 24.8 +77.7 12.5 14.2
1991 26.5 -27.2 15.7 -38.9 16.7 29.1
1992 27.4 +16.8 14.4 +3.8 17.7 19.5
1993 24.2 -12.9 10.1 -31.0 18.7 7.6
1994 24.0 10.1 8.6 -4.8 15.7 -7.2
1995 23.7 5.1 8.6 6.1 15.0 1.7
Average
1986-1990
32.2 7.1 20.6 18.4 18.9 -10.2
Average
1976-1993
36.8 9.1 24.5 10.2 23.0 6.6
Source:
1. DC, The Assessment of the Third Plan, Table (2-13), p.75.
2. CBO, 1994, Table (4), p.128.
3. DC, Statistical Yearbook, 1986, Table 247, p.462.
4. CBO, Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, June 1996, Table (30), p.38, Table
(29), p.37.
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Chart (5-3): 
Total national investment and total national saving as a percentage of GDP
Source:	 Table (5-7).
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During the oil boom (1979-1985) domestic saving averaged 44.5% of GDP compared
to 34% for national saving. The former was growing by 27.6% per annum on average,
while the latter was growing by 26.7%. However, during the period of higher deficit
(1986-1990) domestic saving proportion of GDP fell to 31.6% and national saving
proportion declined to 20.6%. The former growth rate plummeted to 7% and the latter
to 18%. It has been indicated in chapter one that the transfers of the expatriate workers
were blamed for 60% of the difference between domestic saving and national saving.
With respect to total investment, it averaged 26% of GDP during the first period and
grew by 20%. During the second period, it averaged 19% of GDP and declined by
10% on average. From table (5-7) and chart (5-3), it can be seen that total investment
was rising or falling one year lag after national saving which means that national saving
was the main factor affecting total investment.
5.3.1.3.2 The Effects of Budget Deficit on Private Consumption
The real interest rate determines how consumers schedule their consumption over time,
assuming they have access to credit. The effect of the interest rate on today's
consumption levels is theoretically ambiguous due to the offsetting, substitution,
income and wealth effects. An increase in interest rates causes consumers to substitute
consumption tomorrow for consumption today, but it also induces consumers to feel
richer and thus to spend more both today and tomorrow. The effect of the real interest
rate on consumption would also be low or zero when borrowing constraints are
pervasive. Does public saving or the deficit affect private consumption directly? Table
(5-8) shows the development and the relative importance of private consumption
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compared to public consumption during the period 1976-1995. To know the
behaviour of private consumption in relation of budgetary transactions, the factors that
affect it must be identified and the budget policy during the period under study must be
recalled.
Real consumption can be considered as a fimction of real income and prices. Public
consumption consists of total civil recurrent expenditure and total general reserves
allocated to meet the probable increase in government consumption plus expenditure
on defence and national security (DC, FLDP, p.58). Consumption is affected positively
by income and the excess demand for money, but negatively by prices. However, the
relationship with real interest rate is somewhat different. Reflecting the fluctuation in
oil income and accordingly non-oil income, both annual growth rate and the proportion
to GDP were dwindling for both public and private consumption (Table (5-8). During
the period 1986-1990, private consumption fell sharply. Its average annual growth
rate dropped from 20.2% during 1976-1995 to only 0.3%. This can be explained by
the decline of non-oil income, which in turn reflects the decline in oil income on one
hand. On the other hand it was adversely affected by the increase in import prices due
to the devaluation of the local currency. However, the ratio of both private and public
consumption to GDP during the period exceeded the general average. This is because
GDP declined faster than the two types of consumption.
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Table 5-8 
Private and Public Consumption: 
Relative Importance and Annual Growth Rate
Year Total
Consum
ption
Private Consumption Public Consumption
G.R. % GDPRI. G.R. % GDP R.L
1976 361.1 32.6 - 14.3 67.4 - 29.5
1977 426.9 47.8 73.4 23.3 52.2 -8.4 25.3
1978 521.0 52.0 32.9 30.3 48.0 12.1 28.0
1979 592.1 52.1 13.9 26.3 47.9 13.4 24.2
1980 1078.0 39.5 86.9 28.0 60.5 76.1 24.2
1981 1247.0 47.4 2.4 23.7 52.6 31.5 26.4
1982 1509.9 52.6 34.6 30.4 47.4 9.0 27.4
1983 1582.0 50.7 0.9 29.6 49.3 9.0 28.5
1984 1746.5 53.7 17.0 31.4 46.3 3.6 26.5
1985 2063.7 54.5 19.9 32.6 45.5 16.1 27.2
1986 1949.0 52.3 -9.4 36.4 47.7 -1.0 33.2
1987 1843.3 50.4 -8.9 31.0 49.6 -1.7 30.4
1988 2135.8 55.2 26.9 40.3 44.8 4.6 32.7
1989 2260.4 56.8 8.9 39.8 43.2 2.1 24.6
1990 2625.5 41.2 -15.9 26.7 58.8 58.4 38.1
1991 2880.0 51.6 37.5 37.9 48.4 -9.7 35.6
1992 3210.2 46.0 -0.7 33.4 54.0 24.4 39.2
1993 3314.6 60.9 36.9 46.2 39.1 -25.4 29.6
1994 3775.3 62.2 16.2 47.2 37.8 10.4 28.8
1995 4035.2 63.8 9.7 48.7 36.2 2.3 27.6
Average
1986-'90
51.2 0.3 34.8 48.8 12.5 31.8
Average
1976-'95
51.2 20.2 32.9 48.8 12.0 29.5
Notes: R.I - relative importance of total
G.R. - annual growth rate
Source:
1. DC, SDP, Table (6), p.14; Table (7), p.15
2. DC, ThDP, Table (5), (6), p.13
3. DC, the Assessment of the ThDP, Table (2-12), p.56
4. CBO, 1985, Table (5), p.119
5. CBO, 1994, Table (3), p.127
6. CBO, Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, June 1996, Table (29), p.37.
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5.3.1.4 The Impact of the Budget Deficit on Output Growth
I would like now to investigate whether an increase in the government's fiscal deficit
stimulates economic activity. The presumption created by fifty years of Keynesian
macroeconomics is that it does. However, a much older classical tradition suggests
that it does not. According to this older view, any increase in the economic activity of
the government sector will be offset by a reduction of private sector activity. The
classical prediction is that in the long run overall economic activity will fall because
public sector resource use is likely to be less efficient than in the private sector. It is
important to distinguish between the impact of deficits on output of the government
sector and the output of the rest of the economy. Output in the private sector can be
measured by its market value. The output of the government sector is not typically
marketed however, so its imputed value is taken to be the value of the resources it uses
up. If the government hires another worker, the output of the government section is
assumed to rise by the earnings of the extra worker, even if he does nothing.
This difference in the way output is measured in the public and private sectors
is important because it biases tests in favour of the result that deficits increase
output. The government has only to hire more people and its output goes up
accordingly. The interesting question is, however, what happens to output in
the rest of the economy? (Chrystal & Dowd, 1987, p.17).
Unfortunately, this distinction cannot be made directly in our case. The official
statistics do not present separate output composition between the government and
private sectors because both of them are mixed in many fields of production. Rather
the distinction is made between the oil sector and the non-oil sector. Within the non-
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oil sector one can distinguish between pure government sectors and mixed sectors, or
between goods producing sectors and services producing sectors. Let us turn first to
the non-oil sector.
5.3.1.4.1 The Impact of the Budget Deficit on the Non-oil Output Growth
In the non-oil sector there are pure government sub-sectors such as Public
Administration and Defence, Transport and Communications, and Electricity and
Water. They have the highest relative importance in the composition of the non-oil
output. They accounted for 12%, 15%, 19% and 25.7% of non-oil output in previous
development plans on average (Table 5-9). They make a direct and almost one to one
relationship between government expenditure and output. The other sub-sectors are
mixed sectors such as commerce, manufacturing, agriculture and fisheries which
depend mainly on private sector investment. It can be seen that agriculture and
fisheries and manufacturing, i.e. the non-oil goods produce have the lowest proportion
in the non-oil output. They constituted 4%, 5%, 8% and 6.5% during the previous
plans. Other services which include commerce, ownership of dwellings, financial and
business services, make up 20% of non-oil output. If these service sectors are added
to pure government services they will account for 26%, 36%, 41% and 49.7% of non-
oil output during the four development plans respectively. Due to the highest relative
importance of government services in non-oil output, the growth rate of this sector
would relate mostly to the government expenditure growth.
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Public expenditure is only the cost of providing these goods and services. Thus
a 10% increase in nominal expenditure does not translate into a similar increase
in the volume of goods and services provided by the public sector (Hemming
1991, p.36)
From table (5-10) it can be seen that non-oil output has been growing even faster than
government nominal expenditure. The average growth rate of the former was 12%
during 1976-1995 compared to 7.9% for the latter. In the period on which we are
focusing these two rates were 3.8% and 0.8% respectively. This means that non-oil
output is highly swollen. Expenditure has to be deflated by the relevant price index
which should in turn reflect the price indices for the various components of
expenditure.
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Table 5-9
The Structure of Out put (GDP)
During Previous Plans 
Main Sectors 1st Plan 2nd Plan 3rd Plan 4th Plan
Oil
Non-oil:
of which
- Govt. services(1)
- Agriculture and
manufacturing
-Constriction
61% 52% 46% 38.9%
39% 48% 54% 61.1%
12% 15% 19% 25.7%
4% 5% 8% 6.5%
9% 7% 5% 3.0%
- Other services(2) 12% 20% 20% 24.0%
Total 100 100 100 100
Notes:
• Includes Public Administration and Defence, Electricity and
Water, and Transport and Communications
• Includes trade, ownership of dwellings, banking and other
services
Sources:
• DC, SDP, p.12
DC, ThDP, p.15
DC, the Assessment of the ThDP, p.49
CBO, 1995, Table (1), p.127.
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In general, these will differ from indices corresponding to private sector output.
Richard Hemming states that "the usual argument being that the price of public sector
output rises faster than that of private sector and output" (Ibid). While wage costs are
higher, productivity growth is slower in the public sector, reflecting the low level of
competition, the inefficiency of complex bureaucracies
After making this precaution, the discussion now will turn to the question of how non-
oil output growth has been affected by the budget deficit.
The budget deficit has been influencing non-oil output growth indirectly through two
tracks:
1. The 'leakage' represented in transfers and imports.
2. Lost opportunity cost related to rising debt service.
1. The Leakage Represented in Imports and Foreign Government Expenditure
It was found earlier in this section that the impact of budget deficit on domestic
demand must be examined in the light of domestic budget balance not the overall
budget balance. This is because of the large proportion of government spending that
has been flowing out of the country through transfers and imports. This leakage was
reflected in low domestic and national saving. It also resulted in low domestic demand
for domestic output compared to total consumption and investment as a proportion of
gross national product (see Table 5-5). In other words there has been a 'leakage' from
total demand (or total purchasing power) to outside the economy, off-setting the effect
of government expenditures multiplier. This depression in turn can stand as a reason to
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the "deflation" that has been indicated by the negative change in the consumer price
index starting from 1982 (see Table 5-3).
2. Lost Opportunity Cost Represented in Debt Service Spending
Debt service is a direct consequence of budget deficit. The increasing foreign public
debt lead to increasing debt service expenditure. If those funds had not been spent in
this way, they might have been invested in schools, roads, electricity, water, etc.
Non-oil output might have increased, especially if we take into consideration the
volume of the debt service compared to public investment. From 1976 to 1993 debt
service represented 41% of public investment on average. It climbed to 69% during
1986-1990. In 1989 it peaked at 100%. Therefore, the following statement by
Samuelson and Nordhaus can be applied completely to Oman's case:
An increase in external debt lowers national income and raises the fraction of
national output that has to be set aside for serving the external debt ... taking all
the effects together, output and consumption will grow more slowly than they
would had there been no large government debt and deficit (Samuelson and
Nordhaus 1992, p.635).
So the two factors above have been slowing down the non-oil output growth. Table
(5-10) shows that its annual growth rate has been falling since 1982 with the exception
of a few years. In the first two years of the period under study its growth rate was
negative. The average annual growth rate during that period was 3.8%. According to
the official estimation, of course, this decline was mirroring the decline of oil revenue,
yet this growth rate has been overestimated.
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Table (5-10): 
The Growth Rate of GDP, GNP, Oil and Non-oil GDP and Government
Expenditure
Year GDP GNP T.G. Ex. Oil output Non-oil
output
-1976 - - - -
1977 7.1 15.1 -4.1 2.9 13.4
1978 0.0 2.9 5.2 -7.5 10.0
1979 36.2 32.6 13.1 45.8 25.6
1980 60.0 71.2 43.3 78.0 33.0
1981 20.7 22.3 28.2 15.2 34.8
1982 4.9 5.2 15.4 -3.6 16.9
1983 4.8 2.9 9.6 -3.0 13.7
1984 11.2 11.7 13.8 4.6 17.4
1985 13.4 18.6 8.8 13.6 11.3
1986 -26.7 -19.3 -3.2 -35.1 -2.4
1987 6.5 10.4 -15.0 32.0 -7.3
1988 -2.6 -7.5 -0.6 -15.4 8.4
1989 10.4 12.3 0.3 23.1 2.3
1990 25.4 28.6 13.3 36.1 18.0
1991 -2.8 -3.8 -1.0 -16.7 7.6
1992 12.8 10.0 20.9 13.1 12.2
1993 1.7 0.9 -2.7 -10.7 6.1
1994 3.4 8.4 0.5 1.8 4.9
1995 6.5 6.8 3.5 11.4 4.1
Average
1986-1990
2.6 4.9 0.8 8.1 3.8
Average
1976-1993
10.2 12.1 7.9 9.7 12.1
Notes: T.G. Ex.: Total government expenditure
Source: Previous tables.
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5.3.1.4.2 The Impact of the Budget Deficit on Oil Output Growth
Oil output is dominated by two factors: world oil market prices and the volume of
production. The two factors go upwards together and sometimes they go downwards.
Very often the government moves the volume of production upwards in order to offset
the effect of falling prices. The rapid rise in Oman's oil output from 1978-81 reflected
primarily the strong increase in prices over that period. From 1983, when the oil prices
started to fall gradually, the government started to increase the volume of production
so as to minimise the ensuing budget deficit. However, starting in 1986, when budget
deficit was triggered by the sharp and sudden falling of oil prices, the magnitude of oil
production was excessively increased. Notwithstanding this increase the value of
output was depressed over 1986-89 as a consequence of the particularly low oil prices
over the period. It is obvious then that the budget deficit has been forcing the
government to raise the volume of oil production but the adverse effect of oil prices
has been offsetting the growth of oil output. Sometimes oil prices increase
unexpectedly making the deficit fluctuate. Table (5-10) shows the dwindling oil output
growth. This makes the reliability of oil output growth as a measure of economic
growth questionable. Rodney Wilson has made the case well, when he says that:
Oil production distorts gross national product figures and for the
Arabian peninsula states in particular much of the change reflects oil
price decreases on production swings. It is often asserted that for
OPEC countries per capita income is a totally misleading indicator
of the level of economic development as the high figures merely
reflect oil productions not successful advance through economic
diversification (Wilson 1995, p.28).
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In this way, budget deficit has a negative long-term effect on proven oil reserves. Oil
is an almost depleted energy resource. By the existent extracting rate, which is now at
800,000 b/d the total proven reserve (5bb) will be depleted in as little as 17 years.
5.4 The Effect of Bud2et Deficit on Balance of Payments
Changes in fiscal policy affect the balance of payments in various ways. At the
aggregate level, changes in the size of the budget as well as the extent of the surplus or
deficit will affect aggregate income and prices. These will lead to changes in imports
and exports through income and price effects. At the micro level, the types of taxes
and expenditure in the budget will have effects on imports, exports and capital flows.
In an oil exporting country with a limited home production base, there is likely to be a
close relationship between foreign fiscal balance and balance of payments
developments. Government oil revenues are the principle source of foreign exchange,
and a large proportion of government expenditure consists of payments for imports
and for other external transactions. Also, government injection of oil revenues into the
domestic income stream via its domestic expenditure is reflected in private sector
imports, given a limited home production base and a reasonably open economy.
An adequate analysis of exactly how budget deficit has been affecting the balance of
payments requires an insight into the structure of the balance of payments. There are
four main components of the balance of payments (Table 5-11). They are: trade
balance, current account balance, capital account balance and overall balance. Trade
balance is the merchandise account that shows the balance of exports and imports. It
has always been in surplus and the oil exports is the major export item forming 85% of
total exports. The current account balance represents the result of two accounts:
trade account, and services and private transfers. The latter consists of the non-factor
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Table (5-11) 
Balance of Payments (in ROm)
1985 1986 1987
1. Trade Balance 555 113 707
Exports and re-exports (f.o.b.) 1717 1093 1463
Oil Exports 1597 981 1339
Other exports 23 27 39
Re-exports 97 85 85
Imports (c.i.f.) -1162 -980 -756
Recorded (custom) -1089 -917 -701
Unrecorded -73 -63 -55
2. Services and Private Transfers -534 -513 -393
Travel -18 -18 -18
Port Dues 5 5 5
Profit remittances -184 -182 -138
PDO foreign partners -35 -65 -65
Contractors, Commercial banks, Others -149 -117 -73
Official interest (net) 69 145 119
Receipts 114 221 192
Payments -45 -76 -73
Commercial banks' interest receipts (net) 11 7 8
Other services (net) -104 -147 -99
Workers' Remittances (net) -312 -323 -270
Inward Remittances 15 15 15
Outward Remittances -327 -338 -285
Other Private Transfers (net) -1 0 0
3. Current Account Balance 21 -400 314
4. Official Capital 110 211 -64
Grants 60 0 3
Loans (net) 73 216 -52
Receipts 125 298 123
Amortisation -52 -82 -175
Other official capital (net)1/ -23 -5 -15
5. Oil Sector Capital (net) 31 110 5
Direct Investment 52 51 12
PDO foreign partners 5 22 -18
Other companies 47 29 30
Oil exports credit (net) -21 59 -7
6. Commercial banks' Capital (net) 3 2 1
7. Capital Account Balances (4+5+6) 144 323 -58
8. Total Current and Capital accounts (3+7) 165 -77 256
9. SDR ALLOCATION 0 0 0
10. Errors and Omission (2) -166 -218 -184
11. Overall Balance -1 -295 72
12. Change in reserves and net foreign assets 1 295 -72
Central Bank* -35 136 -92
Government -37 93 48
Changes in holdings 3/ -230 -157 -19
Valuation change 4/ 193 250 67
Commercial banks 73 66* -28
Source: Central Bank of Oman, Annual Report 1989, p.114
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service e.g. shipment of merchandise, remittances of contractors, banks, and workers.
Workers' remittances is the largest item affecting the current account after the trade
balance. The current account balance showed a deficit in 1975, 1976, then a surplus
from 1977 onwards up to 1985. In 1986 it witnessed a significant deficit and since
then it has been swinging between deficit and surplus. The capital account balance
consists of three main sections: official capital, oil sector capital and commercial banks'
capital. The capital account is mainly affected by movements of official capital, i.e.
government loans. The overall balance, which shows the final result of the balance of
payments, concludes the net balance of the main three previous balances, i.e. trade
balance, current account balance and capital account balance. Overall balance showed
a deficit in 1975-1976. From 1977 onwards it showed a surplus. Since 1985 it has
been fluctuating. At the end of the balance of payments there is a financing statement
which is the exact opposite of the overall balance. It represents the means of financing
the deficit or using the surplus of the balance of payments. When the balance of
payments shows a deficit it means drawing down on foreign assets of the banking
system and/or the government. Conversely, when the overall balance shows a surplus
it means inflow of foreign assets has gone into the accounts of banking system and/or
the government. The means of deficit financing consist of all or some or one of the
following resources:
•
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Since deficit financing by drawing down the foreign government reserve makes no
obligation on the government to repay the funds, this sort of financing does not occur
in the balance of payments. However, when the overall balance shows a deficit, a
drawing down of government reserves abroad would occur as a sort of financing
beside negative or (positive) change in the central bank or commercial bank's foreign
assets. When there is a surplus in overall balance, it means that there is an
accumulation of foreign exchange on the government accounts.
All these reactions can be considered as direct effect on the balance of payments
whereas the exchange rate mechanism (which is influenced by budgetary transactions)
has an effect on import prices and thereafter on the volumes of imports. This will
affect the foreign expenditure (FE) in equation (2) and thereby the foreign surplus
(FS). It will also affect non-oil exports influencing the trade balance. These types of
transactions form the indirect effect on the balance of payments.
5.4.1 The Direct Effect of the Budget on the Balance of Payments
The analysis will be stressed here on the public capital outflow as a budgetary
transaction stemming from budget deficit. The analysis will interpret how the public
outflow affects the trade balance and the overall balance of the balance of payments.
Table (5-12) illustrates how the surplus of the trade balance has been declining and
becoming a small surplus (or even a deficit) in the overall balance. The table also
shows the main causes of this decline which is the debt service. The trade balance fell
by 105% in 1985 and the debt service contributed 17% of this decline. In 1986 it fell
by 138.2% with the debt service contributing 43%. In 1991 it dropped by 61% and
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the debt service contributed 58%. During the period under study the average
contribution of debt service in trade balance cut was 42.3%.
Obviously the budget deficit - through the debt service - has adversely affected the
balance of payments. The debt service has been cutting the foreign exchange earning
of the country accomplished by the trade balance and even eroding the foreign
reserves in overall-deficit-years.
As indicated earlier in this section, when the result of the overall balance is positive
there will be an accumulation of foreign exchange i.e. an increase in foreign reserves
from outside the country. In contrast, when the result is negative there will be a cut in
previously accumulated reserves outside the country. In this case, the government
finances the deficit in the overall balance by resorting to foreign reserves which are
invested in foreign banks and establishments. From Table 5-12 it can be seen that
average decline of the foreign reserves of the government and the Central Bank during
1986-1990 amounted to 83% of overall deficit. The remainder was the decline in
commercial banks' foreign assets.
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Table (5-12) 
The Direct Effect of the Budget Deficit
on the Balance of Payments 
Year Trade
Balance
Overall
Balance
Decrease in Trade
Balance
Debt Service Drawing of
Foreign Reserves
ROm ROm ROm % ROm % of
dec.
ROm % of
O.D.
1985 555 -29 -584 105.2 99.1 17 -44 151.7
1986 113 -295 -408 361.0 157.7 38.7 -199 66.6
1987 707 72 635 89.8 248.1 39.1 +44 61.0
1988 385 -147 -532 138.2 230.7 43.4 -180 122.4
1989 646 138 508 78.6 291.8 57.4 109 79.0
1990 1042 147 895 85.9 296.2 33.1 128 87.1
1991 594 230 364 61.3 211.6 58.1 209 90.9
1992 636 49 587 92.3 227.7 38.8 114 232.7
1993 411 -335 -746 181.5 262.3 35.2 -407 61.8
1994 588 -249 -837 142.3 244.7 29.2 -253 101.6
1995 648 -190 -838 129.3 225.7 26.9 -166 87.4
Average
'86-'90
578.6 -17 219.6 150.7 244.9 42.3 -19.6 83.2
Average
'85-'95
575 -55.4 -86.9 133.2 226.9 37.8 -55.9 103.8
Notes:
O.D. = Overall Deficit
Source:
• CBO, 1990, Table (6-5), p.127
• CBO, 1994, Table (6-8), p.95
. CBO, 1995, Table (6.8) p.103, Table (4.1) p.38
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5.4.2 Indirect Effect of the Budget Deficit on the Balance of Payments 
This sort of effect works through the monetary policy tools such as the exchange rate
and interest rate. The effect of the exchange rate on the balance of payments can be
divided into two types: the effect of devaluation and the effect of the real exchange
rate. The effect of devaluation was a discretionary policy taken by the government to
cope with collapse of oil price and accordingly with the budget deficit. This effect will
be discussed in the next chapter which will address the evaluation of the deficit -
reducing policy. The effect of the real exchange rate is the appreciation or
depreciation induced implicitly by the budget deficit. Hence the discussion here will be
confined to this.
The Omani Rial was pegged to the U.S. dollar in fixed exchange rate at RO 0.345 =
one dollar up to January 1986. It was then changed to RO 0.385 = one dollar. This is
called the nominal or the official exchange rate. The real exchange rate is the:
exchange rate of a currency expressed in constant price terms to make
allowances for the effects of inflation. For example, where a country
experiences a higher rate of domestic inflation than its trade competitors, then
its exports will become more expensive than those of competitors' exports and
its imports cheaper than domestic product unless its exchange rate depreciates
to offset fully the inflation differential (Pass & Lowes, p.461).
When a major increase in domestic spending takes place as a consequence of the large-
scale development of a natural resource and an associated large-scale increase in
public revenues and expenditure, this is known as the 'Dutch disease'. This drives up
the prices of domestic services relative to those of domestic tradable goods, i.e. it
produces an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
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The result is that tradable goods production becomes less profitable than the
production of domestic services. Rising domestic demand also raises the cost
of domestic labour and capital. This further reduces the profitability of
domestic production of tradables. Countries, such as Oman, experiencing a
resource boom thus typically experience a gradual decline in tradable goods
vis-à-vis services production as factors of production are re-deployed in
response to the fundamental changes in relative prices and costs (The World
Bank, 1994, p.iv).
Oman witnessed three episodes of real exchange rate; depreciation in 1978-1979,
appreciation during 1980-1985, then depreciation throughout the period 1986-1991
reflecting the oil cycle. The first two years (1987-1989) witnessed relatively poorer
terms of trade and lower purchasing power for oil compared to the middle period
(1980-1985), characterised by an improvement in both indicators. Real exchange rate
appreciation inhibited the growth of the non-oil traded goods sectors. The share of
agriculture and fisheries does seem to have responded to both real exchange rate
depreciation and appreciation. The share of the sector in total GDP declined by 16%
between the first and second periods as the real exchange rate appreciated by more
than 60%. On the other hand, in response to real exchange rate depreciation in the last
period its share grew by 35%. However, it remains rather small and despite the real
depreciation in the last period, did not rise above the level reached in the first period
(Ibid., p.5).
It can be inferred then, that the balance of payments was adversely influenced by the
appreciation of the real exchange rate because the price of Omani non-oil exports
could not compete with its trade partners. This also made it cheaper for the country to
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import from abroad narrowing the trade balance surplus. This is also correct even
during the period of real exchange rate depreciation (1989-1991) since the growth rate
of the non-oil exports was 8.5% compared to 13.4% for imports. As a consequence,
the share of net exports (the trade balance) to GDP dropped from 20.7% over 1976-
1985 to 17% over 1986-1990 (Chart 5-5).
To sum up, the internal (or the fiscal) disequilibrium, i.e. the budget deficit has been
shifted to an external disequilibrium, i.e. the deficit of the current account balance and
the overall balance of the balance of payments. This shift was taking place through the
outflow of the official capital as a direct effect of the deficit and through the real
exchange rate mechanism as an indirect effect. Chart (5-6) depicts this relationship.
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Conclusion 
This chapter addressed the examination of the macroeconomic effects of the budget
deficit on the Omani economy. The consequences of deficits depend on how they are
financed.
During the period 1981-1985, the deficit totalled RO 1266 million. 48.8% of the deficit
was financed by withdrawals from the SGRF, 37.2% by external borrowing, and 14%
by foreign grants. During the period under study, the total deficit was RO 1526.9
million. It was financed by withdrawal from SGRF (91%) and external borrowing
(9%). The first direct effect of increasing deficit was the rise of accumulated debt. The
indebtedness balance rose from R0648 million in 1985 to R01027 million in 1990,
then to R01501 million in 1995. As a percentage of GDP it peaked in 1986 at 33%.
The other direct effect of the deficit was the exhaustion of the government foreign
assets. The withdrawal from the SGRF totalled RO 1414 million during the period
under study. During 1991-1995 the total withdrawal was RO 823 million.
The indirect macroeconomic impacts of the deficit were on money supply and inflation,
the aggregate demand and the balance of payments. Regarding the analysis of the
impacts on money supply, the concept of domestic deficit was adopted. It was defined
as government domestic revenue - government domestic expenditure. The study has
found that there is a positive relationship between the domestic deficit and money
supply with one or two years lag, which means that the budget deficit has an
expansionary effect on money supply. The monetary expansion has been induced by
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the external borrowing and the drawing from the cash balances of the government.
However, this monetary expansion was not an adequate evidence that the budget
deficit has an inflationary effect, because the consumer price index (CPI) has not been
indicating inflation in general. This result is supported by the fact that the government
has not resorted to inflationary means of deficit financing such as the borrowing from
the central bank or excessive reliance on selling treasury bills.
To examine the effect of the budget deficit on aggregate demand, the budget balance
was separated into domestic and foreign components. The former reflects the direct
impact on demand for domestic goods and the latter reflects the direct impact on the
balance of payment. Domestic budget balance was calculated as non-oil revenues -
domestic expenditure. Due to the absence of classifying statistics of government
expenditure to domestic and foreign items, the study has resorted to rough estimation.
The consequence of the budget deficit on domestic demand for domestic goods was
examined through the impact on private investment and private consumption. The
growth rate of private investment declined during the examined period. It averaged
only 1.2%. Private investment was not falling due to the so-called crowding out effect,
because the government was not competing with the private sector for commercial
bank's credit. The commercial banks have been in surplus financial resources. Non-oil
private investment was declining because of structural setbacks such as lack of
opportunities and lack of experience. Oil investment was falling because of falling oil
prices. Other main reasons for falling total investment was falling national saving. The
latter was falling because of large expatriates' and contractors' remittances and large
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public consumption and higher deficit. The macroeconomic consequence of the budget
deficit on investment, then, was through the lack of saving both public and private.
The fluctuating behaviour of both private and public consumption during the period
under study was explained by the swinging trend of oil income and accordingly non-oil
income.
The output growth was another aspect of the macroeconomic impacts of the budget
deficit on aggregate demand. Due to higher relative importance of government services
in the non-oil output its growth rate is explained mostly by the growth rate of
government expenditure. The budget deficit has been adversely affecting non-oil
output indirectly through two factors: first, through the leakage represented in
transfers and imports and second, through the lost opportunity cost related to rising
debt service. Oil output is governed by oil prices and the volume -of production. The
budget deficit has been forcing the government to raise the oil production to offset — at
least partially — the adverse effect of oil prices.
Finally, the balance of payments has been affected by the budget deficit directly and
indirectly. The direct effect has been represented in the decline of the foreign exchange
earning of the country due to increasing debt service. The indirect effect worked
through the exchange rate mechanism. The balance of payments was adversely
influenced by the appreciation of the real exchange rate because the prices of Oman's
non-oil exports could not compete with its trade partners. This also made it cheaper
for the country to import from abroad, reducing the trade balance surplus.
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CHAPTER VI
ASSESSMENT OF THE DEFICIT-REDUCING
POLICY
Introduction
Having identified the causes of the budget deficit, and having investigated the macro-
economic effects of the deficit, we will now evaluate the policy by which the financial
authority has tackled the deficit. In order to do so we will address three topics in three
sections, as follows:
• Section I: The criteria of prudent deficit and how close is Oman's actual deficit to
it.
• Section II: The government's fiscal policy in confronting the problem and how this
policy has worked.
• Section III: Suggested alternatives to this policy.
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6.1 The Criteria of Prudent Deficit and Oman's Actual Deficit
One of the most important aspects of fiscal policy is the management of the public
sector's deficit. Deficits in themselves may not automatically imply macro-economic
problems. If the use of public resources is sufficiently productive, future income can
be generated to cover the cost of any debts incurred. Deficits can be absorbed by
countries with high rates of domestic private saving and well-developed capital
markets. Thus a relatively high deficit need not cause problems in an efficient, high-
saving economy, whereas in a low-saving, highly distorted one, even a small deficit
might be destabilising.
A prudent fiscal policy can therefore be defined as one that maintains the public
deficit at a level that is consistent with other macro-economic objectives:
controlling inflation, promoting private investment and maintaining external
creditworthiness (World Bank, 1988, p.55).
To do this, financing must be broken down into its components. A good starting place
is the rule stating that the sum of all investment in the economy must be equal to the
savings available both from Omani residents and other foreigners.
PI + PrI = PS + Prs + FS
where:
PI = Public Investment
Pr! = Private Investment
PS = Public Saving
PrS = Private Saving
FS = Foreign Saving
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Chart (6-1) 
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Foreign saving is the excess of foreigners' income from the domestic economy over
their spending in it. This is equal to the current account deficit in the balance of
payments.
Public saving is the excess of public current revenues over current spending and the
public deficit can therefore be defined as public investment minus public saving.
Public deficit must be balanced by a domestic private sector that saves more than it
invests and/or by an external current account deficit.
PI - PS = PrS - PrI + FS
This can be changed to:
PD = PSR + CAD
where:
PD = Public Deficit
PSR = Private Surplus
CAD = Current Account Deficit
The prudence of the public deficit depends on the level of private saving, the
desired level of private investment, and the desired current account deficit
(World Bank 1988, p.58).
It was found in Chapter Five that private investment represents a small proportion of
GDP and is continuing to fall (see Table 5-6). It can be seen from Chart (6-1) that
private saving has been dwindling. Current account deficit of the Balance of Payment
is assessed in Chart (6-2). It was improving until 1981 when it reached it's peak at
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17% of GDP and then began to fall sharply due to foreign workers' transfers. In 1986
it saw a deficit at 14% of GDP. In 1987 and 1980 it recovered again, registering a
surplus at 10% and 12% respectively, but since then it has been deteriorating. Thus,
it's positive position is generally not sustained.
The amount of foreign lending determines whether or not public deficit is consistent
with other macro-economic goals. The external creditworthiness is one criteria
adopted in this issue:
External creditworthiness is sometimes defined as maintaining an acceptable
ratio of gross external debt to exports. This is because exports determine the
ability to serve debt, a permanently increased debt-export ratio could impair
creditworthiness (Ibid.).
This suggests that public external debt should grow at the same rate as exports over
the long run.
Table (6-1) and Chart (6-3) tell us that the debt/export ratio has risen quickly. It
peaked in 1986 at almost 84% which meant that 84% of exports had to be
appropriated to serve the indebtedness balance. During the period under study this
ratio averaged 66%. Indebtedness has grown faster than exports. Throughout 1980-
1995 its growth rate was more than five times that of exports. It is obvious then,
according to the creditworthiness criteria, that the position is unacceptable.
Commodity booms during the early eighties caused excessive spending, which led to
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Table (6-1) 
Creditworthiness Indicators
Year Debt/Export
%
Export
Growth
%
Debt Growth
%
ForeignReserve/
Imports
%
1980 5.4 - - -
1981 7.4 25.3 71 33.6
1982 11.8 -5.9 50 33.6
1983 21.8 -3.9 77.8 31.6
1984 30.8 4.1 46.9 33.9
1985 36.4 16.4 37.9 34.8
1986 83.7 -36.9 45.0 40.6
1987 59.8 32.3 -5.6 77.0
1988 74.3 -13.0 8.1 47.9
1989 63.6 21.0 3.6 60.0
1990 48.5 35.4 3.3 62.4
1991 51.9 -11.5 -5.3 52.1
1992 50.9 13.9 11.8 42.9
1993 56.5 -3.4 7.1 -
1994 61.5 3.3 12.5 -
1995 64.4 9.4 14.5 -
1986-90 66.0 7.8 10.9 57.6
1980-95 45.3 5.7 27 45.9
Source:
1. Table (1-16).
2. Table (5-2).
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rapid borrowing and the accumulation of debts. Countries that depend on commodity
exports face a particularly difficult fiscal environment. Their safest strategy is to treat
commodity revenue as inherently volatile. Mistakenly treating a temporary boom in
revenue as permanent is costly in the long-term because it can take years to cut
spending and reverse the accumulation of debts incurred during the boom. By
contrast, erring on the side of caution and treating a permanent boom as temporary can
easily be put right later. Boom revenue can then be used to accumulate external assets
or repay debt, thus avoiding the risk of inflation and an appreciating exchange rate.
This policy, which has been firmly rooted in the Keynsian theory of substitutionary
finance, has been misused by countries that depend on commodity exports such as
Oman. Chapra pointed out this misuse when he stated that:
The Keynesian concept of compensatory financing has been unduly exploited
and deficits incurred during recessions have not been offset by surpluses in
boom periods (Chapra, 1985, p.136).
If access to voluntary foreign lending has already been interrupted because of excessive
borrowing in the past, then it makes sense to aim for a lower debt/export ratio,
implying that the growth of debt should be held below the growth of exports. The
usual objective in managing foreign exchange reserves is to maintain an adequate ratio
of reserves to imports of goods and services. Deficits can be prudently financed by
running down reserves only to the extent that reserves remain above this target. Table
(6-1) illustrates that foreign reserves have covered 45.9% of imports on average.
During the examined period the reserves covered 57.6% of imports.
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The above criteria are used to judge what level of fiscal deficit is prudent. Higher
growth in exports, real demand for money, and overall financial savings means a higher
deficit can be financed without violating the objectives of external creditworthiness,
low inflation, or reasonable interest rates.
In general, faster economic growth brings bigger deficits within the bounds of
prudence, because it usually implies faster growth of exports and demand for
money. In a slowly growing economy with low financial savings and stagnant
exports, the prudent fiscal deficit is likely to be low (World Bank, 1988, p.59).
The assessment of these elements in the previous chapter and in preceding pages
indicates low prudent position.
Let us now examine which elements of fiscal and monetary policies have been applied
to reduce the deficit.
6.2 Assessment of Deficit-Reducing Policy
The Third Development Plan which covers the period under study has been based on
$23.65/b for oil. At that time - December 1985 - the actual price in the world market
was $27.35/b. After the approval of the plan, oil prices started to fall dramatically. In
July 1986 the price plummeted to $8.20/b. It averaged about $13/b in 1986, which
was about half the 1985 price. Accordingly, the government adopted strong measures
to cope with the new situation. For the purpose of our study the following two
measures are most relevant:
1. Cutting public expenditure by 10%;
2. Devaluating the Omani Rial against the US dollar by 10.2% (See CBO, 1986, p.6).
Chapter VI	 332
In addition to the above two big decisions, the volume of oil production was raised by
12.4% in 1986. The growth rate averaged 6.6% during 1986-1990.
Despite the precautions being taken, the budget deficit amounted to RO 700 million at
the end of 1986, i.e. 96.9% higher than 1985's level. The deficit was financed mainly
by withdrawal from SGRF as was indicated earlier.
We will now take a closer look at the first two measures mentioned above and the far-
reaching effects they had, i.e. cutting public expenditure and the devaluation of the
Omani Rial.
6.2.1. Cuttin2 Public Expenditure by 10% 
While the reduction envisaged in total spending was in the region of 10%, actual
expenditure figures for 1986 showed that a 3.2% reduction on 1985's level was
actually achieved and in 1987 it dropped by 15%. The average reduction during the
period 1985-1988 was 18.2%. The government was able to bring down the growth
rate of total expenditure from 30% during 1970-1993 to less than 1% on average over
the examined period. In 1991, total expenditure was still 2.5% less than in 1985. The
rate of reduction has varied between different types of government expenditure. The
sharpest cut was in development expenditure which was slashed by 11.5% annually.
Next was that of defence and national security, the growth rate of which has been
brought down from 25% to 0.7%. The third highest cut was in current expenditure the
growth rate of which dropped from almost 30% to 7%. The cut in subsidies was
minimal at only 2% from 28% to 26%. Other areas where there were reductions
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included education where the expenditure growth rate was reduced from 26% to
6.8%, and the health service whose growth rate was reduced from 13% to 1%.
The alternative of reduction was not chosen on economic grounds. There should be a
distinction between areas where there is waste, prodigality and unnecessary spending
and areas where government spending is essential. The Omani economy still suffers
from key bottlenecks such as port congestion, few roads (some with low capacity),
limited skilled labour and lack of vocational training. Public spending plays a critical
role in development. Through spending, governments presume and promote national
identity, supply infrastructure for development, influence both the course of economic
growth and the distribution of its benefits and provide social services to meet the basic
needs of the population. It is useful here to quote Al-Yousef, from his book Oil and
the Transformation of Oman, who was aware of the Omani economy:
The economic and cultural development of a country requires the efficient and
steadily expanding provision of a whole host of non-revenue-yielding services -
education, health communication systems, and so on (Al-Yousef, 1995, p.'73).
It is unwise to stop development projects such as schools, hospitals, roads, and
electricity, as they represent the future wealth of the economy. The country's network
of highways, transit system, power plants and schools all represent enormous wealth-
producing assets. Lessening capital formation had led to diminishing private
investment, lower growth of non-oil output, and finally almost stagnation.
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6.2.2 Devaluatinz the Omani Rial
Three objectives were targeted from devaluation:
i. Raising government oil revenues in local currency.
ii. Improving the position of the balance of payments by reducing imports.
iii. Reducing the demand on foreign exchange especially by expatriates working inside
the country.
The success of the devaluation policy depends on the extent to which the above three
goals have been achieved. The following discussion will examine the costs and
benefits corresponding to each of these three goals.
6.2.2.1 Raising Government Oil Revenue in Local Currency
Since the government sells its oil in dollars and the Omani Rial is pegged to the dollar,
devaluation of the Omani Rial against the dollar would bring more money to the
government in local currency, thus mitigating the adverse impact of falling oil prices.
The increase in oil revenue through devaluation in 1986 has been calculated at RO
109.7 million according to the volume of oil production (see chapter four).
Nevertheless, the devaluation process has other adverse impacts on government
finance through expenditure on imported goods and services, debt services and the
balance of foreign debt evaluated in local currency. In that year (1986) the
government's foreign expenditure was estimated at RO 669.5 million (see chapter
five). With the increase in imports prices i.e. imported inflation by 18.1% (CBO, 1985,
p.6) in addition to the increase due to devaluation by 10%, the total increase in imports
in that year was RO 133.3 million. Table (6-2) gives the total increase in government
foreign imports (approximated by its foreign expenditure) caused by devaluation.
Chapter VI	 335
From 1986 to 1990, the total increase in imports was RO 264.3 million. From 1986 -
1993 this item totalled RO 316.7 million.
Annual amortisation instalments increased by 10% every year when paid in Omani
Rials. Supposing that annual amortisation of public debt has been paid in Omani Rials
i.e. there was a conversion of currency from local to US dollars, then every instalment
increased by 10% because of devaluation. Table (6-2) gives the total increase in
amortisation instalments from 1986-1990 and from 1986 to 1993 caused by the
devaluation. If this extra payment is added to the increase in government foreign
spending the result will be that at the end of 1990 the government received RO 582.8
million through oil revenue but it paid out RO 344.8 million. At the end of the day the
government had saved only RO 238 million.
6.2.2.2 Improving the Position of the Balance of Payments
The effect of devaluation on the balance of payments can be traced through the three
main accounts: a) the trade balance, b) the current account balance, and c) the capital
account balance.
a) The effect of devaluation on trade balance
The ordinary aim of devaluation is to increase exports (because the products of the
country become cheaper for foreigners) and to reduce imports (because foreign
products become expensive to the people whose currency is devaluated). Omani
exports are of three types, oil exports, non- oil exports and re-exports.
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Table (6-2) 
The Effect of Devaluation on Government Finance
Year Oil Revenue Foreign
Expenditure
Change in
Import
Prices %
Increase in
Govt.Imports
ROm
Amortis-
ation
ROm
1985 1343.7 738.1 -0.2 -147.6
1986 932.9 669.5 18.1 121.2 82
1987 1182.1 512.8 11.5 59.0 175
1988 995.0 502.3 9.7 48.7 147
1989 1129.5 514.3 -0.7 -3.6 197
1990 1588.3 601.7 2.5 15.0 204
1991 1289.5 587.7 2.9 27.0 142
1992 1338.9 719.5 5.5 39.6 129
1993 1302.9 691.9 -1.3 -9.0 163
1994 1364 833 4.6 38.3 144
1995 1433.3 834.8 4.4 36.7 110
Total
1986-90
5827.8 240.31 805
DE +582.8 -264.3 -80.5
Total
1986-95
125556.4 362.9 1493.9
DE +1255.6 -399.2 -149.3
Notes:
DE - Devaluation Effect
(1) Increase in imports due to imported inflation only
Source:
1. Previous Table
2. 030 Annual Reports, Different Issues
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Oil exports are sold in dollars so devaluation does not affect them. Devaluation raised
the value of oil exports in terms of Omani Rials. As has been found above, the total
increase during 1986-1990 was RO 582.8 million. Unfortunately, oil exports have
been dwindling (see Table 6-3), due to the fluctuation of oil prices. The losses caused
by the collapse of oil prices were too great to be offset by the devaluation gains.
Non-oil exports of Omani origin rose during the period at higher rate especially in
1987-1998. Their average annual growth rate from 1986 to 1990 was 26.3%. The
increase was mainly in copper, fish, and live animals. Whether this rise was motivated
by devaluation or not is a questionable because the growth rate declined sharply to 6%
and 3% in 1989 and 1990 (see Table 6-3).
It is generally thought that the devaluation policy in the Middle East could not raise the
volume of non-oil exports because the foreign demand for these exports is not
sensitive to price change. Rodney Wilson explained this point when he said:
The responsiveness of foreign buyers to exchange rate falls has been
disappointing. The price elasticity of demand for Middle Eastern non-oil
exports appears to be rather low. Most Middle Eastern exports are dollar -
denominated, so export prices do not fall with domestic currency depreciation
(Wilson, 1995, pp 154-155)
By and large, non-oil exports are of marginal importance in total exports since they
formed an average of only 3.5% of total exports during the period. Their total
absolute value during the period was RO 263 million.
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Re-exports declined in 1986 and 1987 by 12.6% and 0.2% respectively. After 1987
they started to recover gradually and recorded a sharp rise in 1991 at 53.7%.
Movements of both non-oil exports and re-exports have been influenced by the
disturbance taking place within the oil sector.
On the other side of the trade balance, the target was to raise the cost of imports in
terms of local currency in order to improve the situation of this balance. From Table
(6-3) it can be noted that imports declined in 1986, 1987 and 1988. However the
decline should be explained carefully. First, they have been declining with a one year
lag compared to oil exports which indicate the dependence of imports to oil revenues.
For example, imports fell by 15.8% in 1986 following the decline of oil exports in 1985
and in 1986 by 13.6% and 38.5% respectively. In 1988 it rose by almost 21% as a
reaction to the increase in oil exports in 1987 by 36.5%. This correlation can be
explained through the effect of government spending which adversely affected the
overall economic activity, particularly the construction and trade sections.
Second, because of the depreciation of the dollar against the other major currencies
such as the Yen and the Deutschmark, import prices have been rising. According to
CBO reports they rose by 18.1%, 14.4% and 6.2% in 1986, 1987 and 1988
respectively on a year by year basis (CBO, 1990, p.41). Therefore, another part of the
decline can be attributed to the depreciation of the dollar.
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Table (6-3) 
The Effect of the Devaluation on Trade Balance
Year
Exports ROm
Imports
ROmOil GR. Non-oil GR R. Ex. GR.
1985 1597 -13.6 22.9 33.1 97.4 -11.2 1088.9 14.7
1986 981 -38.5 26.6 17.0 85.1 -12.6 916.7 -15.8
1987 1339 36.5 39.0 44.0 84.9 -0.2 700.7 -23.6
1988 1130 -15.6 62.0 61.5 92.1 8.5 846.4 20.8
1989 1388 22.8 66.5 6.0 101.2 9.7 867.9 2.5
1990 1934 39.3 68.7 3.0 107.4 6.1 1030.9 18.8
1991 1629 -15.8 79.1 15.1 165.1 53.7 1228.1 19.1
1992 1786 9.6 96.7 22.3 253.5 53.5 1449.2 18.0
1993 1621 -9.2 122.0 26.2 320.0 26.2 1652.0 14.0
1994 1627 0.4 145.0 18.9 359.0 12.2 1543.0 -6.6
1995 1828 12.4 182.0 25.5 322.0 -10.3 1684.0 9.1
Average 1986-90 8.9 26.3 10.4 0.5
Average 1985-95 2.6 24.8 12.3 6.5
Notes:
GR: Growth Rate
R.Ex: Re-exports
Source:
1. CBO, 1988, Table (6.1) p.104
2. CBO, 1990, Table (6.1) p.104
3. CBO, 1990, Table (6.1) p.85
4. CBO, 1995, Table (6.1) p.91
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Third, the devaluation of the Omani Rial caused an additional increase in import prices.
The above changes in import prices would be 31%, 19.5% and 10.6% respectively
(CBO, 1986, p.6). The fall in imports caused by devaluation, therefore could have
come through this increase. Consequently, the devaluation increased import prices but
did not make a tangible reduction in the volume of imports.
To sum up, devaluation has not made noticeable positive change to the trade balance
since the financial saving it has formed in oil exports has been cancelled out by price
increases in imports.
b) The Effect of Devaluation on the Current Account Balance
The main items in this account are profit remittances of oil companies, contractors,
foreign banks and others, official interests, workers remittances and other services.
Profits remittances tapered off between 1986 and 1990. From 1991 they started to
rise again (Table 6-4). Oil companies' profits have been adversely affected by the
collapse of oil prices. Contractors' profits fell because of the cut in government
expenditure. Foreign banks' profits declined due to a slump in banking activities
mirroring the overall recession in the economy. Devaluation may have encouraged
them to reinvest their profits in Oman in order to raise more profit so as to compensate
their losses in dollars, or on the other hand it could have induced them to transfer their
money to avoid the decline of it's purchasing power. Registering profits in the balance
of payments in Omani Rials makes them greater by 10% compared to 1985's level.
Table (6-4) shows that they totalled RO 749 million at the end of the period under
study, RO 74.9 million of which was the effect of devaluation.
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A small item of inflow was the local commercial banks' income from outside (not
mentioned in the table). This item amounted to RO 55 million and the positive
devaluation effect was RO 5.5 million. Therefore, the net negative effect of
devaluation on profit item was RO 69.4 million
The item of official interest consists of receipts as a return on government foreign
assets on the one hand and payments on its foreign debt on the other. Both have
increased by 10% because of devaluation but due to the greater weight of the receipt
side, the current account balance has been gaining from devaluation. Unfortunately,
the positive net official interest fell during the period because of increasing interest
payments. At the end of the period the current account balance saved RO 31.2 million
from this item.
Net workers' remittances increased by 3.5% in 1986 despite a 9.8% decrease in their
numbers (CBO, 1990, p.127). In 1987, the remittances dropped by 16% which could
be explained by the 12.8% fall in the number of workers in that year. After that this
type of outflow witnessed a fluctuating growth. In 1991, it went up by 35.5%
reflecting an increase in workers' numbers by 27% in the previous year. The increase
in remittances in 1986 can be attributed to three factors:
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Table (6-4)
The Effect of Devaluation on 
Current Account Balance and Capital Account Balance
Year Profit R.
(net)
Official
Interest
(net)
Workers R.
(net)
Other
Services
(net)
Official
Capital (net)
ROm
OSC.
(net)
ROm
1985 -184 67 -312 -112 73 31
1986 -174 145 -323 -147 216 110
1987 -159 119 -270 -91 -52 5
1988 -136 4 -293 -93 72 47
1989 -131 14 -304 -106 35 18
1990 -149 30 -325 -146 -147 -27
1991 -156 59 -335 -218 85 126
1992 -205 29 -454 -184 40 18
1993 -196 33 -532 -158 -81 66
1994 -195 16 -592 -165 162 0
1995 -171 9 -669 -177 -51 1
Total
1996-90
749 312 1515 583 124 153
DE 74.9 +31.2 -151.5 -58.3 +12.4 +15.3
Total
1986-95
1672 458 4097 1485 330 363
DE 167.2 45.8 -409.7 -148.5 33.0 36.3
Notes:
R: Remittances,
OSC: Oil Sector Capital
D.E.: Devaluation Effect
Sources:
1. CBO, 1990 Table (6.5) p.127
2. CBO, 1994 Table (6.8) p.95
3. CBO, 1995 Table (6.8) p.103
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1. The number of workers increased in the two previous years by 14.5% and 3.8%.
2. Their consumption in Oman may have decreased so as to compensate the cut in
their remittances in terms of foreign currency, bearing in mind that government
departments and the media had been discussing the Omanisation policy which
could motivate the workers to increase their savings quickly.
3. 10% of the increase - in terms of Omani Rials - is due to devaluation. In other
words, if each worker tried to transfer the same amount of dollars after
devaluation, the figure would be 10% higher in terms of local currency compared
to 1985's level.
The total amount transferred by workers during the period under study was RO 1515
million, 10% of which, i.e. RO 151.5 million, was the devaluation effect.
Other services, such as insurance and freight are paid in foreign currency. They rose
by 10% due to devaluation. They totalled RO 583 million in 1990 and the devaluation
effect was RO 58.3 million. The collective result of the devaluation effect on the
current account balance (the first four columns) was that: the positive effect totalled
RO 31.2 million whereas the negative effect totalled RO 279.2 million. Thus the net
effect was negative at RO 248.5 million. However it must be borne in mind that the
negative effect through profits and workers' transfers is monetary, not real, since they
are paid in local currency. If the real effect were to be taken into account, the final
result would be negative at RO 96.5 million.
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c) The Effect of Devaluation on Capital Balance
The main items in the capital balance are the official capital and oil sector capital. The
official capital consists of loans and grants.
Starting with loans, the effect of devaluation depends on whether the new loan is
converted to local currency, or is used to repay the old one directly. In this case
devaluation has no real effect on the capital account. The effect would be only
monetary, i.e. translating the figures of loans from dollar to Omani Rial. If there is a
conversion, however, from foreign to local currency and vice versa, there will be a real
effect of devaluation on the capital account, i.e. it would show real change in both
directions. In this case the final effect of devaluation would depend on the net of
receipts and amortisation of loans. Table (6-4) illustrates that the total net capital
receipt was RO 124 million during the period under study. If government loans were
fully converted to local currency, the devaluation effect on capital account would be
RO 12.4 million. The gain has been diminishing since 1986 because amortisation has
generally been higher than receipts i.e. the net receipt has been tapering off. Regarding
grants, devaluation has had a positive effect because they have been advanced in
foreign currency and then transferred to local currency. Unfortunately, total grants
received during the period under study were too small at RO 3 million and the
devaluation effect was RO 0.3 million (not shown in the table).
Oil sector capital transactions consist of direct investment by PDO and other oil
companies and oil exports' credit. The final effect of devaluation rests on the balance
or the net of these two elements. The question is raised here as to whether this type of
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capital is received in the form of equipment or in cash. If it is in cash, then an increase
of 10% has been gained thereby improving the capital account balance compared to
1985. Table (6-4) demonstrates that this sort of capital inflow, like official capital, has
been diminishing except for 1986 and 1991. By the end of the period under study it
totalled RO 153 million, the effect of the devaluation of which was RO 15.3 million.
The total effect of devaluation on the capital account balance was RO 27.7 million.
However a precaution should be put in mind that devaluation might provoke capital
flight because savers could have anticipated more devaluation. Capital flight is much
easier under unlimited currency convertibility. If it is wanted to be hidden and not
appear in the capital account, there are several tricks to transfer it indirectly in order
for it to be hidden and not appear in the capital account, such as raising import prices
by agreement between importers and exporters.
Taking all the above into consideration, devaluation did not improve the position of the
balance of payment. The positive effect has been cancelled out by negative effects on
the same account or on other accounts. The positive effect on the capital account of
RO 27.7 million was offset by the negative effect on the current account of RO 96.5
million and the final result is negative at RO 68.8 million. The financial increase of oil
exports on the trade balance was counteracted by increases in imports prices.
6.2.2.3 Reducing the demand on foreign exchange, especially by expatriate
workers inside the country
Foreign exchange is demanded by importers, foreign contractors, foreign investors in
oil companies, foreign bankers, foreign workers, travellers and the government to
serve its debt. The behaviour of importers, as indicated by imports movements has
been governed by government expenditure which is affected by oil exports. The
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demand of the next three categories on foreign exchange, which is represented in profit
remittances as has been indicated above, has declined for particular reasons (see p.19).
Workers demand has been increasing except in 1987 which was explained by the
decline in the number of workers themselves. Travellers have not changed their
behaviour. As is shown in CB0 reports, no change took place in spending on travel
(CBO, 1990, p.127). The government demand for foreign exchange increased because
of the rising debt services. Therefore, devaluation has not reduced the demand on
foreign exchange.
However, within the domestic economy, the government has benefited from
devaluation through using it as an inflation tax. As the wages of government officials
were fixed and consumer prices were rising, purchasing power was falling. Devaluation
played a role as a tool for redistributing resources.
It is a potent tool in countries where the government owns the primary export
commodity and where wage earners are not in a position to adjust their non-oil
income in line with the rate of inflation. For in such countries the government
gain is two-fold. It gains from inflation tax and from the redistribution of
resources away from wage-earners as a consequence of inflation (Kalmoor,
1987, p.170).
6.3 What Should be Done?
A more comprehensive approach is necessary in dealing with the problem of the
budget deficit, with a thorough investigation of all causes lying behind the emergence
and continuance of the problem. The cause of this problem, as has been revealed in
Chapter Four, has two sources. The first is related to expenditure, each type of which
has three parts, necessary, unnecessary (misallocation) and waste (inefficient
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spending). The part of the deficit that is attributed to expenditure has emerged from
unnecessary expenditure and waste. All types of expenditure need to be re-prioritised
in order to eliminate all sorts of prodigality. Effectiveness and efficiency should be
secured in the necessary types of spending so as to avoid all kinds of waste. The
second part of the deficit relates to the revenue side of the budget. This can be broken
down into two factors. One is external and is represented in oil prices, which are not
controlled by the government. The volatility of oil prices exposes the fiscal position of
the government and general situation of the economy to serious uncertainty and
instability. The second factor is internal and is represented in non-oil revenues. The
developing of permanent and stable income generating from the domestic economy
will eliminate the second part of the deficit on the one hand and will improve the fiscal
position of the government and immunise the overall economy against external shocks
on the other. Accordingly, this section will address the following issues in three sub-
sections.
1. Rationalising Public Expenditure
2. Improving the Sources and Techniques of Financing
3. Diversification of the Economy
6.3.1. Rationalisine Public Expenditure
The government plays an essential role in allocating resources - in influencing what is
produced, how it is produced, who receives the benefits and who pays. It does so both
directly and indirectly. For instance, directly it provides defence and social
infrastructures, supplies power and telephone services and produces industrial and
agricultural goods. The government has created state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to
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carry out some of these functions. Indirectly it influences the production and
allocation of privately-produced goods through subsidies, taxes and a wide range of
regulatory tools. Therefore, setting up a clear priority for public spending is a crucial
pre-requisite for the government's economic policy. Improving public administration
and financial control and the rational use of available resources are necessary for the
government to perform it's above functions efficiently:
6.3.1.1. Reprioritization of public spending
This process rests on some fundamental steps including
• considering both the benefits and costs of government involvement
• recognising the institutional and political constraints that are likely to be
encountered in implementing a particular policy.
• searching for ways to ensure that the public sector operates efficiently within
those constraints.
According to the World Bank a pragmatic approach to public policy analysis might
begin by:
Ranking areas of economic activity according to the extent to which
government intervention is desirable. Plausible criteria for ranking
would be the scope for government to promote efficiency growth,
poverty alleviation and stabilisation (World Bank, 1988, p.52).
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Promoting efficiency, boosting growth, alleviating poverty and securing stabilisation
are vital goals of the Omani economy and the government is responsible for their
achievement. Economic, political and social activities through which the government
can obtain such goals are of different levels.
First the government has certain core areas of responsibility. Public goods that only the
public sector can effectively provide include defence, diplomacy, macro-economic
management and a legal and institutional system that defines and enforces the roles of
justice, property and commerce.
Second, the government needs to help provide social, physical, and information
infrastructure: education, health, transport networks, public utilities, technological
development and environmental protection. Market failures are common in these areas
and many of the goods required to meet basic needs are found here. Elsewhere the
case for the government involvement is weaker on economic grounds and the costs of
intervention threatens to outweigh the benefits. For example, in agriculture, industry
and mining, although some support may be needed, the government is not well enough
equipped to play a major role.
Where exactly the line should be drawn between government involvement and the
private sector responsibility depends in principle on careful evaluation of the costs and
benefits of government intervention. Where the system for collecting revenue allows
additional resources to be raised with little distortion of private sector activity, greater
government involvement may be appropriate, e.g. gas producing, marketing, and
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distributing. Shifting public resources from low to high-priority areas can significantly
improve the effectiveness of the public sector.
6.3.1.2. Ensuring the Efficiency of Public Administration and Financial Control
The government faces the need to trim expenditure and to improve its allocation. The
technical and institutional problems involved in planning, budgeting, implementing and
monitoring expenditure are great.
Poor accountability of decentralised agencies and poor fiscal relations among the
different parts of the government have often contributed to an ineffective mobilisation
and use of public resources. The government's administrative capabilities are an
important constraint on its ability to design and implement high-quality expenditure
and revenue programs. Improving the quality of administration is an essential part of
improving the quality of the government. Particular reforms should be taken covering
the following three areas:
1. Reducing the Bureaucracy of Government Administration
The government apparatus has been expanding since 1970. The number of ministries
has increased to 23, each of which has a number of directorate generals which are
divided into directorates each of which is in turn sub-divided into a number of sections.
Each section is recruited by several officials and clerks. There is also a number of
independent institutions which are financially covered by the state general budget such
as Sultan Qaboos University.
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There are some unnecessary directorates and sub-directorates in some ministries.
Procedures are numerous, complicated and time-consuming. In order to simplify
these procedures and enable government administration to be carried out efficiently
two steps need to be taken:
I. The number of government administration units can be minimised. During the
first half of the eighties there were some government units with a large number
of experts taking high salaries. The financial burden of these units caused the
government to reconsider and transfer their duties to other ministries. The
same thing could be done now for similar cases.
II. A comprehensive training program should be devised to promote the efficiency
of middle and low level government administrators. The programme should
consist of four steps. First, a full survey should be conducted of the
qualifications, skills, training experiences and ages of all government officers.
Second, job specification should be provided for all occupations of government
units and the skills and qualifications required for each job should be defined.
Third, government manpower should be redistributed among these
occupations, according to their skills and experience. Fourth, training
programmes should be implemented for those who need particular skills and
certain knowledge.
2. Supporting the Confidence of the Financial Control System
Tremendous legislative effort has been made covering expenditure, revenues, internal
and external control ante- and post- audit, but it's implementation has been executed in
a routine and logical manner. The Secretary General, which was created in 1991 to be
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responsible for the overall post audit over public finance, should be equipped with
experts and well-trained staff. Its authoritative power should be strengthened through
giving it independence from any ordinary government department and connecting it
with the highest political power.
3. Reforming the Adjudication Law
Many times in the past, the government contracts have been taken through personal
relations and at higher prices. This was one of the main causes of the increase in public
expenditure. Therefore, the adjudication law should be reformed so as to safeguard the
lowest and optimal bids for government contracts and secure the strict application of
the law.
6.3.1.3. Rational Use of the Available Resources for Various Purposes 
The emphasis has to be on the careful evaluation of government expenditure and the
elimination of as much fat as possible. Every effort should be made to increase
efficiency in government spending and reduce waste and extravagance. As the World
Bank has correctly emphasised:
Over the longer term the challenge for developing countries is to use their
limited resources efficiently and more equitably. Every government faces this
challenge: whatever the political objectives, the goal is to find the most cost-
effective means of achieving them. Evidence abounds of how much can be
gained from greater efficiency... And in most countries, the consequences of
these inefficiencies are felt most by those who have least - the poor (World
Bank, 1983, p.126).
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The proceeds from oil and gas should be regarded as capital rather than income.
Resources should be allocated carefully between the main four use types, i.e. defence,
recurrent expenditure, development expenditure, and subsidies. From a technical point
of view the increase of the relative share of either category would reduce the resources
available for the other purposes and thus their rates of growth and activity would be
affected accordingly. Therefore a long-term and concrete decision should be taken in
this regard to ensure reasonable allocation of government resources between the main
four categories. Within each type of expenditure important changes should be made.
a) Current expenditure
Since 1986 its relative importance to total expenditure has outweighed that of defence
expenditure. It began to be so with respect to development expenditure very early i.e.
in 1980 (see Table 4-10). Its share stands now at 44.5% of total expenditure. It
consumes about 56% of oil revenue. Its annual growth rate outweighs both total
revenue and GDP i.e. 7% vis a vis 6.5% and 2.6% respectively (see Table 4-11).
Reducing current spending is important for creating a surplus in the current account of
the budget. The surplus should be transferred to the capital account of the budget.
Tangible reductions should be made in the following areas.
• Cutting furniture appropriations, especially in high level offices of government
administration. There has been a great deal of extravagance in this area.
• Cutting the rental of private buildings and abolishing some of them. In many
cases government units have rented private buildings despite the fact that some
of their public buildings are empty. This source of waste has been and still is
brought about by interest groups.
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• Rationalisation of the purchase of cars, equipment, tools, clothes, etc. The
need of government units for such items has been overestimated. On top of
that, they have been sold to the government at very high prices. Careful
evaluation of the costs and benefits of such things should be implemented. For
example many government units have been equipped with computer systems.
Few of them have been used efficiently. In some cases there have been changes
from one system to another with all previous machines being cancelled. Such
expenditure has been induced by private interests.
• Savings in the health service could also be achieved through better use of
hospitals, a reduction in the cost of hospital construction, the elimination of
redundant staff and competitive procurement of drugs and medical supplies.
b) Development Expenditure
This type of expenditure has been drastically cut during the period under scrutiny. It
was the sacrifice of fiscal reform. Its relative importance declined from 28.7% of total
expenditure in 1986 to 14% in 1990. The average rate of cut was 11.5% per annum.
The objective of long-term economic development strategies should be the increase of
development expenditure directed at the productive and social structure sector
(agriculture, fisheries, industry, health, education, vocational training). It is suggested
that the following approach should be followed in the allocation of development
expenditure.
• a concrete and stable concept should be developed of how to allocate the
resources available for development expenditure between the various sectors
over the coming years.
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• Construction costs should be rationalised in order to ensure that the biggest
percentage of resources is directed to the production activity of the project.
• In light of the general plan objectives, the projects should be prioritised on an
economic basis. The selection of projects to be implemented and their
implementation should be made on a scientific basis, such as the expected
increase in income, the value of investments required, production efficiency,
new employment opportunities, etc.
• Given the importance to building infrastructure (i.e. seaports, roads, schools,
hospitals electricity) in initiating development, in previous plans some regions
have received the majority of the development expenditure while others have
received a relatively smaller share (see Table 4-14). Therefore, a redistribution
of development expenditure between the less rich regions should be considered,
to meet the key objectives of the development strategy. In urban services,
public provision of roads, water and electricity is critical. In rural
infrastructure, roads, schools, irrigation, and electricity are areas in which the
public sector has been and should continue to be involved. Such reforms can
expand the access of the poor to basic services, while increasing growth and
development. The following are some areas where these are sources of waste
and inefficiency.
• White-elephant projects which are a financial burden on government
expenditure and whose public benefit is doubtful or insufficient to justify the
expense. An obvious example of this is the copper project at Sohar.
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• Luxurious buildings of some ministries and other government units. The
building of government units of this standard should be stopped. Concern must
only be for sound engineering and security.
• The bids in which government contracts have been executed were high. As
was mentioned earlier in Chapter Four some studies revealed that public
services prices in Oman are much higher than in other (3CC countries, even
though they are subsidised. Private interests and personal relations are blamed
for this.
c) Defence Expenditure
It was found earlier that defence expenditure is one of the highest in the world. On
average it has formed 40.6% of total expenditure. Between 1975 and 1980 it
constituted about 45%. It has been consuming about 54% of oil revenue and on
average has been growing by 25% per year (see Tables 4-10 and 4-11).
During the period under study it has been reduced, averaging 37% of total
expenditure, and its growth has almost stopped. Defence expenditure is important and
expresses a political decision in the first place. There are several advantages of
defence expenditure. In addition to defending the country and securing its stability,
defence expenditure contributes towards reducing unemployment. It also provides
technical training, raises per capita income and boosts economic growth. The
allocation of scarce resources inevitably puts the decision-makers in a dilemma
regarding where to put the money, because each use implies costs and benefits. Due to
lack of information regarding the structure of defence expenditure it is impossible to
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put forth particular suggestions. Nevertheless, efficiency and effectiveness should be
secured and any possible saving is essential.
d) Subsidies
This kind of expenditure has been directed to public entities and privat enterprises. It
should be rationalised in both directions. Public entities are both financial and non-
financial (see Chapter Two). They have been subsidised financially by sharing in their
capitals or by lending and they should be reformed. Public finance analysts and policy
makers have focused their attention on the central government budget as the main
determinant of fiscal policy. Analysis of SOE finances has largely been left to sectoral
experts, thus few systematic attempts have been made to monitor SOE financial
performance on aggregate, or to compile fiscal data for all levels of the public sector.
SOEs often do not follow uniform accounting standards, so their financial statistics are
difficult to consolidate with other public sector statistics. However, the failure to view
public finances comprehensively is not entirely caused by lack of data. SOEs were
often set up or enlarged precisely because they were largely exempt from fiscal control.
They have therefore, been both a cause and a symptom of weak fiscal discipline and
lack of transparency. Transparency - the ability to assess the financial implications of
public sector activity in advance, to evaluate them after the event, and to identify who
bears the costs and who receives the benefits - is necessary if decision-makers are to be
accountable for their actions. They often operate in areas of special concern to the
government: financial services, communication, transport and their investments are
seen as crucial for development. In allocating their resources, they are not subject to a
direct market test. Moreover, in financing their expenditure, they often draw on
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subsidies, loans, or guarantees from the government. Accordingly, their spending and
especially their investment, should face an evaluation as rigorous as that applied to
direct government transactions. Improving the transparency of SOE finances calls for
up-to-date data. These should include data on actual and planned spending and
revenues and on changes in assets and liabilities organised in a systematic accounting
framework. Had these amendments been made, there would have been no need for
direct government subsidies. Instead, there would have been a good source of income
for the state general budget.
Financial subsidies given to the private sector took the form of interest-free and low-
interest loans and grants. The assessment of this kind of subsidies revealed that it has
not succeeded in achieving its objectives (see Chapter Four). The present
fundamental, economy-wide structure of incentives is thus not adequately supportive
of sectoral diversification into tradable goods production (World Bank, 1994, p.51).
In many cases it has been given to big enterprises which have not been suffering from
lack of financial resources. In other cases subsidies have been given to ambitious new
projects that have been conducted by inexperienced individuals without sound
appraisal studies. Thus, this sort of government spending should be revised and
carefully controlled. Enterprises should not be subsidised unless they meet specific
criteria that can secure the effective use of scarce resources. The priority should be
give to small and medium firms that are in need of capital and conducted by skilled
Omanis. Subsidies should also be directed towards supporting new graduates from
technical colleges to encourage them to initiate their own projects.
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On the expenditure side, in general, the emphasis has to be on the careful evaluation of
government expenditure and the elimination of as much fat as possible. Every effort
should be made to increase efficiency in government spending and reduce wastefulness
and prodigality.
6.3.2. Improvin2 the Sources and Techniques of Financing
On average, 81% of government expenditure, has been financed by oil revenues (see
Table 6-5 and Chart 6.4). Non-oil revenues have financed only 9.6%. During the
focused period the average share of oil revenues fell to 68%. The participation of non-
oil revenues began to increase in 1979. However, they have also fluctuated, following
the trend of oil revenues. The overall rise of their participation from 1986 onwards
was due to the fall in government spending.
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Table (6-5) 
The Ratio of Total Government Expenditure Financed by
Oil and Non-oil Revenues 
Year Expenditure Oil
Revenue
Non-oil
Revenue
Oil Revenue/
Expenditure
%
Non-oil Revenue/
Expenditure
%
1970 20.6 44.4 1.0 215.5 4.9
1971 46.0 47.9 2.2 104.1 4.8
1972 71.6 49.6 4.9 69.2 6.8
1973 91.7 41.3 3.7 45.0 4.0
1974 362.0 291.5 11.7 80.5 3.2
1975 489.2 373.1 14.6 76.3 3.0
1976 581.0 455.0 32.0 78.3 5.5
1977 557.0 482.0 38.0 86.5 6.8
1978 586.0 458.0 35.0 78.2 6.0
1979 663.0 635.0 58.0 95.8 8.7
1980 949.8 1109.5 78.4 116.8 8.3
1981 1223.8 1144.0 118.2 93.5 9.7
1982 1411.9 1076.8 98.6 76.3 7.0
1983 1546.9 1128.5 125.4 72.9 8.1
1984 1760.3 1166.5 174.2 66.3 9.9
1985 1915.3 1343.7 216.1 70.2 11.3
1986 1854.0 932.4 254.0 50.3 13.7
1987 1576.4 1182.1 278.1 75.0 17.6
1988 1567.2 995.0 209.8 63.5 13.4
1989 1665.8 1129.5 240.6 67.8 14.4
1990 1887.4 1588.3 288.0 84.2 15.3
1991 1868.1 1289.5 280.9 69.0 15.0
1992 2258.7 1338.9 322.1 59.3 14.3
1993 2197.9 1302.9 414.1 59.3 18.8
1994 2252.9 1363.7 393.7 60.5 17.5
1995 2331.0 1433.9 418.3 61.5 17.9
Average
1986-'90
68.2 14.9
Average
1970-'95
79.8 10.2
Source: Previous Tables
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Chart (6-4) 
The Ratio of Government Expenditure Financed by
Oil and Non-oil Revenue
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Source: Table (6-5).
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The above situation of government finance implies the following facts.
i. Public expenditure is funded almost entirely by oil revenues. Oil is a depleted
commodity and it will last for no more than 17 more years. Thus another source
should be developed. Also oil prices are unpredictable, making the fiscal position
of the government and the economic atmosphere of the country highly vulnerable
to external shocks. Therefore, public finance needs a " shock absorber" to protect
it and the overall economy from external shocks.
ii. Non-oil sources of public finance, which are not external, and therefore should be
stable, are marginal and unstable. They are influenced by changes in government
expenditure which are in turn affected, by changes in oil revenues. Consequently,
the internal source of public finance should be promoted.
iii. The low level of financial resources from non-oil domestic economic activities for
public purposes makes the fiscal policy one-sided, relying on expenditure policies.
Accordingly, the diversification of sources and techniques of non-oil finance will
equip the fiscal policy with various tools to achieve the goals of income
redistribution, economic growth and stabilisation. The development of tax revenue
will also enable the tax payer to play some role of accountability in public
expenditure.
The application of these reforms can be fulfilled through two channels:
1. Maintenance of the current level of oil revenue and restoring the stability of
the State General Reserve Fund (SGRF).
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2. Developing stable sources of financing.
6.3.2.1 Maintenance of Current Level of Oil Revenue and Restoring the Firmness
of the State General Reserve Fund (SGRF).
This can be achieved by certain measures:
a) Continuing the current level of oil production namely 800,000 b/d,
b) Reducing the cost of production as far as possible. See Chapter Four for an
explanation of the high production cost.
c) The Sultanate should continue to co-operate with OPEC and non-OPEC countries
to preserve the stabilisation of the world oil market. Balancing the oil supply in
accordance with world oil demand is essential for stable prices. The Sultanate should
also maintain it's co-operation inside and outside the GCC in order to convince the
countries of the European Economic Community not to impose carbon tax on oil
consumption. These countries have suggested that the tax should be three dollars per
barrel increasing by one dollar a year to reach ten dollars per barrel. This would
increase oil prices by 10% (Al Hassan et al, 1993, p.15). The purpose of this tax is to
reduce the demand on oil through raising the final consumer price. The direct effect of
this tax would be a fall in the demand of industrial countries on oil, leading to a decline
in oil exports of producing countries. The indirect effect would be the increase of the
prices of industrial products imported by oil countries. The carbon tax, however,
would adversely affect the EEC countries in several ways.
• It would raise inflation, reduce investment and increase unemployment.
• It would weaken the competitiveness of their industries (Ibid., p. 16).
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Carbon dioxide is not only caused by oil, but also by other fossil fuels such as coal and
natural gas. Despite the fact that coal is a high pollutant emitting more carbon dioxide,
it is subsidised in European countries, whereas it is suggested that petrol, which is less
pollutant, be taxed.
d)	 The essential step to restoring the firmness of the State General Reserve Fund
is a sound management for the commodity price movements.
One commonly stated principle for managing commodity price movements is
that the revenue from temporary price increases should be saved, whereas
income from permanent increases can be spent (World Bank, 1988, p.74).
However, classifying a particular shift as permanent or temporary in an environment of
extremely volatile prices is uncertain. The policy makers therefore have to ask which
sort of mistake is more costly. The cost of assuming a temporary price increase to be
permanent is probably higher than that of assuming a permanent increase to be
temporary.
Delays in adjustment to the fall in export prices lead to further debt
accumulation. When the adjustment finally comes it is more difficult because
countries have to cope not only with lower commodity revenue, but also with
increased debt service and reduced flows of new lending (Ibid.).
Consequently, the prudent strategy is for the government to save a large portion of its
commodity revenue. This would be a practical use of Keynes' Theory of
substitutionary finance; the surplus of boom is for the deficit of recession. In this way
the technique would serve as a "buffer or shock absorber" for the budget.
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The government decision in 1980 to establish the State General Reserve Fund was
prudent and it was used as a stabiliser of government expenditure and the total output
against the collapse of oil prices. However, the successive and intensive withdrawal
from the fund was at the cost of running down the government accumulated saving.
6.3.2.2. The Development of Stable Sources of Financing
A practical policy issue in stabilisation programmes is how to plan diverse and stable
resources to mitigate the adverse affects of unstable revenues. As analysed in Chapter
Four, the two main types of non-oil revenue are tax and non-tax. The former
comprises only 3.7% of total receipt on average whereas the latter forms 7.8%.
Custom duties make up 50% of taxes. The other 50% is made up of several fees and
corporate income tax which is very tiny. Non-tax revenue consists of user charges, i.e.
payments from beneficiaries in exchange for goods and services provided by the
government. These have grown faster than taxes 57% as opposed to 28%. The
growth of both of these has been affected by the fluctuation of oil revenues, especially
tax revenue which has been retreating by 4.8% on average during the period under
study (see Tables 4-17, 4-18, 4-19).
It is normally appropriate for recurrent expenditure to be financed by tax revenues.
However, not only the tax revenues, in our case, but all non-oil revenues fall short of
financing half the recurrent expenditure. As can be seen from Table (6-6) and Chart
(6-5) non-oil revenues covered only 30% of current expenditure on average.
Throughout the period under review this ratio has increased slightly to 34%. They
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have not been sufficient to cover the wages bill of the government. Only 76% of the
wages has been covered. During the period under scrutiny the ratio rose to 86.8%. It
is obvious then, how small the non-oil revenue is in comparison with government
expenditure.
The diversification of non-oil revenue could follow three routes:
i. Improving existing taxes and introducing new ones
ii. Using the current deposits of the commercial banks
iii. Restoring traditional Islamic sources of revenue.
i. Improving Existing Taxes and Introducing New Ones 
Imposing any sort of tax has costs and benefits. A dilemma, therefore, inevitably
occurs as to whether the costs outweigh the benefits or the vice versa. The criteria
that can help in suggesting the raising of the present taxes or inventing new ones
relates to effects of taxing on saving, income redistribution, economic growth,
productivity, the competitiveness of industries, prices and the budget needs of
resources. Short term and long term effects, either positive or negative, should be
taken into consideration. Due to the urgent budget needs for stable, sustainable
sources of revenues, improving the existing taxes is necessary, and the imposing of
new taxes is indispensable. The development of a fair and effective taxation system is
also justified as far as the present wide disparities in income is considered. Improving
the currently legislated taxes necessitates revising of widely granted exemption either
from tariffs or from corporate income tax. Many companies have been exempted from
Chapter VI	 367
Table (6-61
The Ratio of Current Expenditure and 
Salaries Financed by Non-Oil Revenues
Year Current
Expend.
Non-oil
Revenue
Salaries Non-oil R/
Current
Expend.
%
Non-oil R/
Salaries
1970 6.1 1.0 5.4 16.4 18.5
1971 9.9 2.2 6.9 22.9 31.9
1972 13.8 4.9 7.3 35.5 67.1
1973 20.2 3.7 9.2 18.3 40.2
1974 65.6 11.7 14.1 17.8 83.0
1975 65.0 14.6 21.2 22.5 68.9
1976 114.1 32.0 31.6 28.0 101.3
1977 152.0 38.0 47.6 25.0 79.8
1978 173.0 35.0 53.9 20.2 64.9
1979 188.0 58.0 62.3 30.9 93.1
1980 271.2 78.4 93.2 28.9 84.1
1981 335.0 118.2 118.9 35.3 99.6
1982 443.6 98.6 152.4 22.2 64.7
1983 440.6 125.4 171.7 28.5 73.0
1984 507.2 174.2 197.7 34.3 88.0
1985 606.0 216.1 227.4 35.7 95.0
1986 648.2 254.0 221.4 39.2 114.7
1987 648.5 278.1 284.6 42.9 97.7
1988 696.0 209.8 290.1 30.1 72.3
1989 772.3 240.6 337.0 31.2 71.4
1990 847.9 288.0 370.2 34.0 77.8
1991 839.1 280.9 374.8 33.5 74.9
1992 989.5 322.1 441.5 32.6 73.0
1993 976.5 414.1 467.1 42.4 88.7
1994 1014.0 393.4 480.1 38.8 81.9
1995 1102.0 418.3 523.9 38.0 79.8
Average
1986-'90
34.3 86.8
Average
1970-'95
30.2 76.4
Source:
1. DC.SDP & THDP
2. CBO. 1985, 1990, 1995
3. SYB. 1993, 1994
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Chart (6-5) 
The Ratio of Current Expenditure and Salaries
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custom duties on imported raw materials and equipment. The exemption given for five
years has mostly been extended for another five years. New projects are also normally
exempt from income tax for five years. In many cases companies continued enjoying
these exemptions for extra periods. In some circumstances these exemptions have not
been justified objectively or on a real economic basis. All these exemptions which
were allowed of course by the law itself should be revised. The law of taxes should be
amended in the light of the above criteria and any exemptions should be made after
careful investigation. The next step towards improving the effectiveness of the current
tax system is to establish a clear complementary accounting system to facilitate the
taxing process. Finally, a well-trained taxing staff should be recruited which, bearing
in mind the cost of tax administration, should not consume large proportion of the tax
income.
As far as the goal of recruiting new resources for public services and the redistribution
of income are concerned, new types of taxes are essential. Such taxes could include:
a) Tax on luxury consumer goods, cars, expensive residential real estate, etc.
b) Tax on real estate that exceed the owner's need for accommodation. There
are many individuals and families who own buildings and other units for
residential and commercial uses. Many of them have been blessed with
large plots and financial grants therefore they have good reason to pay the
tax.
Without these measures the need for borrowing would continue. Some economists
have emphasised this fact, stating that:
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there is no escape from sacrifice and austerity, particularly for the rich, if
economic development and general well-being are to be pursued. The easy
availability of interest-based borrowing tends only to weaken the urge for
sacrifice. It only postpones the sacrifice. The procrastination continues and
the debt keeps on accumulating until debt-servicing becomes unbearable
(Chapra, 1986, p.138).
ii. Using the Current Deposits of the Commercial Banks
The commercial banks act as agents of the public for mobilising the society's idle
resources. Also the banks do not pay any return on current deposits. In addition, there
is no risk to the public from these deposits. Therefore, I agree with some economists
who suggest that:
a certain proportion of commercial bank demand deposits up to maximum of
say, 25%, should be diverted to the government to enable it to finance socially-
beneficial projects in which profit-sharing is not feasible or desirable (Ibid.,
p.196-197).
iii. Restoring Traditional Islamic Techniques of Financing
Zakat was an important source of revenue for the government in the Islamic world. It
has been also collected by the Omani governments in the past. It is imposed by Islamic
law on money, primary agriculture crops (such as wheat, dates, corn and barley) and
on animals classed as Al-Anaam (camels, cows, goats and sheep). The rate of zakat
varies according to the type of wealth. On money it is levied at 2.5% on money capital
if it is not invested. If it is invested zakat would be on the profit only after discounting
the costs. On agriculture crops it is imposed at 10% of the yield if the crop is irrigated
by rain or natural resources of water e.g. rivers, and at 5% if the crop is irrigated by
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mechanical techniques. On Al-Anaam it is levied according to particular categories. It
is paid annually on money and on the Al-Anaam whereas in crops it is paid at the end
of every harvesting season. There is a minimum level of income and minimum quantity
of crop and minimum number of each of the four kinds of animals stipulated for paying
the zakat under which zakat is not paid. On money capital it is paid in money. On
crops and animals it is paid in kind.
Zakat has many advantages that make it very useful financially, economically and
socially. Firstly, it is imposed on the total money capital, i.e. not just on the profit like
the tax unless the capital is invested. This peculiarity, on the one hand makes the
financial proceeds very large bearing in mind that zakat is the second practical
worshipping duty of Muslims after prayer thus every Muslim who meets zakat
conditions should pay it. On the other hand, it motivates the rich to invest their capital
funds so as to pay zakat only on the profit yielded from the investment, the
characteristic which maximises investment, employment and income growth. Second,
the first beneficiaries of zakat, according to Koran itself; are the needy and the poor.
Consequently, it alleviates poverty, narrows the gap between the rich and the poor,
and acts as an income re-distributor. In this way, zakat can meet all of the social
security expenditure, lightening part of the burden from the government budget.
Third, one group of beneficiaries, according to the Koran, are those employed to
collect and distribute it between its expenses. In this way zakat contributes towards
reducing unemployment directly.
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Another important source of revenue from the Islamic perspective is endowment
(w a q/) . Before they die, rich people can bestow some of their property, e.g. shops,
farms, houses, etc., for particular social or educational uses, such as the needs of the
poor, students relief, Islamic education, the upkeep of mosques, etc. Such properties
can be developed into a modern framework by establishing special authorities equipped
with Islamic and economics-educated staff to utilise these resources in well-organised
methods. The income can be used to maintain mosques, provide Koranic education,
and support for poor students, according to the will of the endower. The rich should
be enlightened and encouraged to bequeath some of their possessions to future
generations (for more detail see Quhf, 1993, p.8)
Other techniques that can be used are known as possession-based sources of financing.
They are based on the idea that the government can recruit financial resources from the
public not by taxes or borrowing but by selling them deeds or documents, called
sanadat or sokuqu as shares of the capital that will be invested. The public buy these
deeds because they will get dividends out of them and they can liquidate them if they
need cash, in stock markets. Several versions of these documents can be selected,
according to the nature of goods and services the government wants to produce. They
are based on particular Islamic bases or oquood called Mudarabah, Musharakah, and
Ejarah. For example, if the government wants to build an electricity-generating plant,
it may issue Mudarabah or Musharakah deeds, or it may combine the two kinds.
Those who buy Mudarabah deeds have no right to participation in the administration.
They will get dividends according to the profitability of the project or they may lose if
it loses. Their proportion of profits and losses is defined and agreed upon with the
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government beforehand. Those who buy Musharakah deeds can participate in the
administration. Their profits and losses are proportionate to their shares in the capital
invested.
Regarding Ejarah (renting) if, for example, the government wants to establish a tourist
project and it doesn't have the financial resources required it can sell the plot to the
public and give them Sokuqu. These documents imply that the government will rent
the project from them after completion. They buy these deeds because the project is
promising so they will get return. Otherwise they can sell them on the stock market,
i.e. they can liquidate them. Thanks to resources collected from the buyers of these
deeds, the government will be able to build the project. After completion it will be
opened to the people in exchange of fees. From the income generated by the project
itself, the government will be able to pay the rent to the owners (shareholders). The
more profitable the project, the more valuable the Ejarah deeds will be and the more
acceptable on the stock market.
Such financing techniques have many economic advantages, including:
a) Sokuqu are exchangeable on the stock market and their prices are defined by
market forces, regardless of their nominal values. This will motivate the public to
deal with these deeds. In addition to their liquidity, their market prices are linked
to the expected return, their opportunity cost and the demand on their products.
b) They do not create an indebtedness on the government. Thus, the government
doesn't need to borrow or to impose taxes in order to amortise them.
Consequently they do not issue the question of justice between present and future
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generations, which inevitably occurs in the case of borrowing when the next
generation becomes obliged to pay the debt of the present generation. In the case
of Ejarah the government is obliged to pay a fixed rent, annually or quarterly, to
the owners. It may be supposed that this rent is not higher than the interest rate
paid to the creditor. In addition, there is no need to refimd the Ejarah deeds.
Therefore the arrangement of Ejarah provides better conditions than interest-based
financing.
c) These tools represent a type of privatisation. However, this is applicable to
possession rights but not to administration, which remains under the control of the
government with the exception of Musharakah, which enables shareholders to
participate in the administration of the project. Nonetheless, the government can
keep the fundamental decisions of the project in its hands via owning the majority
of the project shares.
d) Offering these sokuqu to the public represents a kind of democracy, since if a
project is well-accepted by the public this shows that they value it highly. In other
words, buying these deeds is a kind of vote of confidence for the government.
e) In all these tools of financing, funds are linked with particular projects or assets.
The government cannot transfer the funds to other uses. In other words, these
techniques provide a complete association between the source of funding and the
purposes for which the government will use the money. Accordingly, there is less
probability of extravagance and waste (for more details see Quhf, 1993, p.25-28)
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6.3.3 Diversification of the Economy
For the development of various sources of non-oil revenues for the government budget
and reducing the exposure of the economy to external shocks, diversification of the
sources of the gross domestic product is essential. Diversification will strengthen inter-
sectoral relations and raise the domestically-generated value added. Hence, the urge
for economic diversification implying the creation of a viable modern economy
integrated with the oil sector that would sustain a relatively high income level after the
end of the oil era. This requires maintaining extremely high levels of investment
compared with production in the non-oil sector for extended periods, while at the same
time sustaining large expenditure on training and education.
The diversification goal was not absent in the development strategies adopted by the
policy makers through the DC in 1975 but the domestic economy in reality, has not
been developing as the decision makers here had hoped.
Previous investigation, particularly in Chapters One and Five, pointed out some
indicators that reveal weak inter-sectoral relations and a high degree of independence
of the economy to the external world.
About 90% of exported oil is crude oil with the locally manufactured - which is the
refinery industry- forming less than 10%. The total manpower employed in the oil
sector comprises only 1.2% of private sector employment. The non-oil sector is
dominated by the non-trade services. Agriculture and manufacturing together made up
8% of Gross Domestic Product in the ThDP. This proportion declined to 6.6% in the
FODP. The Service sector contributed to 50.9% (see Table 5-9). Non-oil exports
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form 7.8% of total exports (in 1995). Domestic uses of gross national product - which
indicate sectoral integration in general is 45%, and the foreign trade component in
GNP contributes to 55%, bearing in mind the domination of oil exports by almost 78%
of total exports (in 1995).
Agriculture and fisheries, the sector which employs 23% of all employees and 45% of
Omani employees, contributes to 3.6% of GDP, and makes up 2.7% of total exports.
The ratios express severe disparity of income distribution and low productivity where
the development strategy has attached great importance. Wholesale and retail trade
sectors are dominated by small shops run by foreign nationals whose aim is not to
recycle their profit and enlarge their projects, but to save and send their money to their
home countries. Few Omani nationals have gained experience in this sector.
The non-oil sector output is, nonetheless, highly sensitive to changes in oil output.
This is explained by the dependence of the former on government expenditure, which
is governed by oil revenue.
The domination of service sectors coupled with high rate of government consumption
fuelled by revenues derived from natural resources, and low productivity resulted in so
called "Dutch Disease" in which the picture is: high prices of services, an appreciation
of the real exchange rate, less profitability and less competitiveness of local tradable
goods.
The general picture is what is perceived by economists regarding oil-producing
countries in general, when they state that:
Chapter VI	 377
they have all been unable to find a development strategy capable of combining
industrial growth with rural development, full employment and equitable
income distribution (Amuzegar, 1983, p.20).
This picture can be changed by a package of reforming policies working
simultaneously through the key sectors: the oil sector, agriculture and fisheries,
commerce and industry.
6.3.1.1 The Oil Sector
The financial relationship between the oil sector and other sectors through the
government budget should be developed to physical-economic integration. Although
this linking began in the early eighties through the domestic utilisation of natural gas in
industry, electricity generating and household uses, through the refinery plant and
some contractual services between oil companies and the private sector, the physical-
economic relations could be strengthened.
One way to do that is via the petro-chemical industry. The advantage of such industry
is to:
move from being supplier of crude oil into high value-added petro-chemicals,
and eventually further downstream into consumer goods inputs, if not the final
products themselves (Wilson, 1995, p.143)
The output of such industry can be absorbed partially by the manufacturing sector, the
agriculture sector and the surplus could be exported. This will increase local value
added, bring technology transfer, create employment and raise export earnings.
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6.3.3.2 Agriculture and Fisheries
i. Support should be given to small producers of vegetables, livestock, eggs, etc.,
through the OBAF financially and physically. This could be done by providing
physical capital such as stores, fields, vehicles, pumping machines, modern
irrigation techniques etc. This sort of support should be given to new graduates of
agricultural colleges.
ii. Rural areas should be developed by retaining the traditional irrigation system,
promoting handicrafts and organising local markets. The traditional irrigation
system in Oman is called Al-Falaj. It can be described as
a unified irrigation system which distributes, by means of a network of canals, a
source of water to those who have established rights in it (Wilkinson, 1980,
p.124).
It is by far the cheapest and most mechanically efficient water supply system in
Oman, old and new, but only so long as it is properly maintained (Ibid., p.132).
Between 50% and 60% of cultivated land in Oman is irrigated by this system
(Oman Daily Newspaper, 21 November, 1996). The existence of this system in
Oman has created good distribution of the population of the country in thousands of
villages, many of which have expanded and become towns and cities. If this system
collapses a mass rural-urban migration will take place, exerting great pressure on
the government to provide jobs, settlements and several other services for the
people. According to Wilkinson:
Even more damaging to the country' s development is the collapse of the social
framework of village life through drawing off it's population into non-
productive occupations (Ibid, p. 135).
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The agricultural and rural craft base in Oman has been profoundly disrupted by
economic and social changes stemming from oil wealth. (Dutton, 1987, p.94) The
decline of rural craft resulted in unemployment and under-employment and migration
to urban areas, the phenomenon which has been expected by the policy makers and the
development strategy was aiming to promote regional development to keep a proper
distribution of population. The impact of oil wealth is felt throughout rural Oman by
badu, farming and fishing communities in the interior and on the coast. The speed of
change from poor to rich has given no time to adapt local produce and local
manufacturing techniques to the new demands.
They need new ranges of skills to enable them to cope with new agricultural
systems of husbandry, to produce the new foodstuffs which Oman's consumers
now demand (ibid.).
A greatly stimulated local demand coupled with the ability to pay for cheap mass-
produced imports, has tended to inhibit local production. Some of the traditional
products such as wheat have been replaced by imported equivalents.
The rural economy should be integrated with the modern one, and negative influences
of oil-based economy must be controlled. This policy can be applied in several
procedures such as:
1) Intensifying agricultural training by increasing the number of agricultural
institutes. This can be applied by reducing the general secondary education and
converting secondary schools to agricultural ones. All aspects, concepts, and
problems of rural economy should be introduced into the agricultural
educational curriculum in particular and the general education curriculum in
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general. The traditional irrigation system, Al-Falaj, how it works; it's
importance; the problems facing it, is one of the most fundamental aspects of
what should be taught in the agricultural colleges and institutes. Special
Institutes for handicraft could be established, establishing higher authority for
handicraft. These should study the problems of traditional industries and set out
the appropriate policies.
2) Organising the traditional markets (souk).
Large cities and towns in Oman usually organise traditional markets or auctions
known as souk or halaquah. Animals, agricultural products and traditional
goods such as daggers, old weapons, etc., are sold at these auctions. Many
other agricultural products are marketed in these occasional or weekly markets.
These markets play a dynamic role in rural economy in Oman because they
match suppliers and consumers around a wide variety of domestic products.
The role of the government here is to encourage these traditional markets in
several ways such as:
i. Building the ancient market places which used to be the best area for souk
or halaquah.
ii. Providing infrastnictural facilities like storage, electricity, water, car parks
etc.
iii. Extending these activities to other cities and choosing suitable times by co-
ordinating them with other cities.
iv. Revising the protection system through tariffs. Agricultural products face
fierce competition from imported equivalents, and domestic producers have
given up their traditional work because they became unprofitable. The
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protection tariffs should be amended to provide an adequate competitive
position for Omani agricultural products.
6.3.3.3 Commerce and Industry
Omani naval history was based on commercial activities, exchanging agricultural
Omani products with spices, wood, textiles from India, and coffee, cloves and other
products from Africa. From the seventh to the fifteenth centuries Oman's maritime
trade flourished. Omani ships regularly called at ports in Persia, India, and south-east
Asia. Oman has played an important mediation trading role because of its strategic
location overlooking the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Arabian Gulf with a coast line
of 1700 km. It is an important part of the Middle East which
has always been a cross-roads for commerce due to its geographical position
between the more populated regions of Europe, South Asia and East Asia.
Rather than being a barrier to trade, the deserts of the region have been like
oceans, crossed by important trade routes (Wilson, 1995, p.148).
The following steps are suggested in order to enhance commercial activities:
i. Big businessmen should be prevented from monopolising several activities. For
example, some of them trade in cars, building materials, foodstuffs and electronics.
Instead, each businessman should be involved in only one activity.
ii. Trade should be confined to Omanis. This includes supermarkets, building material
shops, clothes shops, cold stores, greengrocers and all distributors.
iii. Government officials should be prevented from practising private business. To put
this procedure into effect, all civil workers who registered commercially before
1980 should leave their work in government departments. The rationale behind
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this arbitrary criterion stems from the fact that those who have been running their
businesses since then, have already established a secure income and must
administer their business themselves instead of foreigners. At the same time they
would lighten the pressure on the government budget.
With respect to industry, the problems include foreign competition, a limited local
market, lack of opportunities, and lack of entrepreneurial and marketing skills. All
industrial firms in Oman are small and medium sized. This sector is given high priority
from the government economic policy. Five industrial estates have been established in
five regions, but the biggest and most important firms are centralised in the capital
area. Omanisation and utilisation of local raw materials must be highly emphasised.
All firms depend mostly on expatriate workers. This trend hinders the
"nationalisation" of technology in the long term, because foreigners are going to leave
the country soon or later. Industry on the other hand must benefit from cheap local
agricultural, fish, and mineral raw material. This would lower costs on the one hand,
create inter-sectoral linkage, and maximise the local value added. In this regard I
suggest the following industries:
• Tomato and fish packaging
• Lemon-juice producing
• Mango acetifying
• Using dates in manufacturing biscuits
• Maldng fishing boats
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Conclusion
The discussion in this chapter addressed the evaluation of the deficit-reducing policy
adopted by the financial authority, following which the suggested alternatives were
presented.
The prudence of public deficit depends on the level of private saving, the desired level
of private investment and the desired current account deficit. The assessment of these
three variables has found that they were not in a good position and were not
sustainable. The other criterion was the external creditworthiness that is measured by
the ratio of external debt to exports. The study has found that this ratio was rising
quickly. It peaked in 1986 at almost 84% which meant that 84% of exports had to be
assigned to serve the indebtedness balance. During the period under study this ratio
averaged 66%. Indebtedness has been growing five times faster than that of exports. In
a slowly growing economy with low financial savings and stagnant exports, the
prudent fiscal deficit is likely to be low. The assessment of these elements in the
previous chapter and in preceding pages indicated a low prudent position.
Secondly, the discussion focused on the fiscal and monetary measures taken to reduce
the deficit. Two main measures were evaluated: cutting public spending and the
devaluation of the Omani Rial against the US dollar by 10%.
Regarding the first measure, the financial authority was able to bring down the growth
rate of total expenditure from 30% during 1970-1993, to less than 1% on average over
the examined period. The sharpest cut was in development expenditure which was cut
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by 11.5% annually. Other high cuts were in the areas of education and health services.
Lessening capital formation had led to diminishing private investment, lower growth of
non-oil output, and finally almost stagnation. Efforts should be made to increase
efficiency in public spending and to reduce waste and extravagance.
The devaluation policy was directed to achieve three goals: raising government oil
revenue, improving the position of the balance of payments and reducing the demand
on foreign exchange.
The devaluation has increased oil revenues in terms of local currency by RO 582
million during the period under study, but it raised the value of the public imports —
through prices — by RO 344 million, making the final gain ample at RO 238 million.
With respect to the second aim, the devaluation did not improve the position of the
balance of payment. The positive effect has been cancelled out by negative effects on
the same account or on other accounts of the balance of payments. The third goal also
has not been achieved according to our analysis.
Thirdly, the alternative policy was discussed and presented. This alternative rests on a
more comprehensive approach to deal with the problem, taking into account all causes
of the deficit on both sides' expenditure and revenues. The suggested approach
consists of three elements: rationalising public expenditure, improving the sources and
techniques of financing, and the diversification of the economy.
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Rationalising public expenditure can be accomplished through three measures:
reprioritisation of public spending, ensuring the efficiency of public administration and
the financial control, and assuring national use of the available resources between types
of public spending.
Improving the sources and techniques of financing can be assured through two
channels: firstly by maintaining the current level of oil revenue and restoring the
stability of the State General Reserve Fund and secondly by developing stable sources
of financing through improving the existing taxes and introducing new ones, using the
current deposits of the commercial banks and restoring traditional Islamic sources of
revenues.
Finally, for the diversification of the economy a suggested strategy was discussed. It
rests on combining oil income with industrial growth, rural development, and full
employment. The oil sector should be economically, rather than financially integrated
with the other sectors. This can be done through petrochemical industries. In
agriculture and fisheries, support should be given to small producers, rural areas
should be developed and the rural economy should be integrated with the modern one.
With respect to commerce and industry, monopolistic behaviour should be eliminated,
trade should be confined to Omanis, and manufacturing should use local agricultural
and mineral raw materials and should depend on the Omani labour force.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has addressed the causes of the problem of the budget deficit in Oman
and examined its economic repercussions on the economy. The last chapter was
directed to evaluate the effectiveness of the economic policy adapted by the
financial authorities to tackle the problem.
The overview on the Omani economy in chapter one recognised the main
characteristics of the Omani economy. The Omani economy can be divided into
three main sectors: the oil sector, the non-oil commodity sector and the services
sector.
The oil sector has been playing a leading role in the economy. The production of
crude oil dominated the structure of GDP. Up to 1980 it was forming 61% but since
then its relative importance has diminished until it reached 39% in 1995. Crude oil
still dominates total exports by 87%, and oil revenues still constitute the mass of
government revenue at about 85%. Notwithstanding its predominant role in the
economy, the oil sector is an enclave activity employing only 0.8% of total
employment and its links with other sectors are macro-financial rather than micro-
economic links. It exerts its total effects through government expenditure.
The non-oil commodity sector consists of three main subsectors: agriculture and
fisheries, manufacturing, and construction. Agriculture and fisheries before 1970
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was the main sector, generating the main source of income for the population and
employing about 75% of the labour force. Although the agricultural produce had
been increasing in absolute value, the relative importance of this sector in the
economy has been diminishing. Oil-based economy has adversely influenced the
rural life and the agricultural activities. With the easy access to financial resources
derived from oil through working in the government and other linked activities, a
massive rural-urban migration has been taking place leaving the farms for farmers'
families. The availability of money has made it too easy to import items which
previously were produced domestically. Imported agricultural products have also
brought severe competition for local products, making the work in agriculture
unlucrative. Rapid social and economic change made agriculture producers unable
to adapt their production techniques to modern ones. Accordingly, the relative
contribution of this sector as a source of income has not increased during the
previous four development plans, forming about 2.7% of GDP. The growth rate of
the sector has been falling, recording 13%, 12%, 5.6% and 2.5% during the
previous development plans.
Manufacturing is a modern small sector based on light industries. It received great
consideration from the government with the aim of creating structural change and to
diversify the sources of national income. The sector consists of light industries
based on import-substitution strategy and recently it started to be partially export
oriented.
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This sector, however, encounters structural impediments such as small local
markets, lack of investment opportunities, lack of experience and entrepreneurial
and administrative skills. Its contribution in the gross domestic product rose from
0.19% in the first development plan to 4% in the fourth plan. With comparison with
other sectors, it recorded the highest growth rate of about 32% during the last four
plans on average.
The construction sector flourished during the first and second plans due to the
government public works and the increasing needs of the population for housing
units and the rising rates of rents induced by the oil boom.
Due to the above structural problems, the non-oil commodity sector was unable to
increase its participation in GDP, recording a proportion of 15%, 13%, 15% and
11.5% of GDP during the previous plans. Its growth rate averaged 16%, 18%,
0.3% and 9% respectively.
An increasing importance has been achieved by the third sector — the services sector.
Its relative importance of GDP started to take the place of the oil sector since the
end of the FODP (1991-1995). It consists of government services, wholesale and
retail trade, and financial and business services.
The characteristic of the rising services sectors and falling significance of
commodity sectors is one major structural change in Oman as a rentier state. This
characteristic has been caused by the so called "Dutch Disease". It takes place with a
Conclusion	 389
high rate of increase of domestic spending as a consequence of the large-scale
development of natural resources. Dutch Disease drives up the prices of domestic
services relative to those of domestic tradable goods motivating the investors to
spend their money in service activities at the expense of agricultural and industrial
goods.
Large foreign exchange from oil channelled into successive public spending also
resulted in an overvalued exchange rate which discouraged industrial exports and
encouraged imports and locally produced services.
Consequently, the relative importance of the service sectors in total GDP has been
rising frequently. It recorded 24%, 35%, 39% and 50% throughout the previous
development plans respectively. The sector's growth rate averaged 33%, 17.5%,
2.8% and 7% during these development plans respectively. Its absorption of
employment has been rising until it reached 39% of total employment in 1993.
The next salient characteristic of the Omani economy is that the state increasingly
assumed a major role in the economy. Intensive and urgent intervention of the
government in the economy was economically, socially and politically justified. The
Omani economy in 1970 was stagnant and operating at subsistent levels, lacking the
basic infrastructure and basic health, educational and communication services. The
government role was essential to construct these basic pillars in order to put the
economy on the starting point. The elementary status of the market forces and the
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weakness of the private sector, the government has to assure an optimal social
distribution of oil resources.
In order to take this huge task the government started to build up its administration
apparatus and to set the organisational foundations. From 1976 onwards, four
systematic development plans have been executed so as to create the required
economic and social structural change. In 1975, a development strategy has been set
up. The strategy aimed to achieve some fundamental long-term objectives.
According to the strategy, the Omani economy must be based on economic
freedom, the private sector assuming the leading role. All opportunities must be
equally be open to all Omanis. The strategy places a high emphasis on the
importance of the agriculture, fisheries, industry and commerce, as a diversification
policy for the source of income. The strategy also concentrated on the importance of
just regional distribution of the capital formation in order to maintain the existent
distribution of the population.
Therefore, the government raised its share in the Petroleum Development Oman
(PDO), which dominates oil production, producing almost 95% of the crude oil, to
60%. The government also gradually increased its ownership in several activities
extending from complete control on electricity generating stations, oil refinery
plants, the general telecommunications organisation, the financial institutions, to
partial ownership of several projects scattered in transport, manufacturing, tourism
and civil aviation.
Conclusion	 391
The state control over the oil sector provided it with massive financial resources
which enable it to pursue its social, economic and political objectives. Oil revenues
have been channelled into four types of public expenditure: recurrent, development,
defence and national security, and subsidies. Current expenditure has been directed
to operate the public administration which has been stretching increasingly.
Government civil employees rose to 94 thousand, forming 14% of total
employment. Development expenditure was injected in the economy in building
schools, hospitals, roads, dams, airports, in several regions. Defence and national
security expenditure provided a well prepared and equipped army and police force
which secured the country's social and political stability and profound security.
Subsidies have been appropriated to support the private sector and it varied from
pure grants to low interest loans and long-term interest free loans.
Consequently, public expenditure reached one of the highest levels in the world,
forming 53% of GDP on average. Public capital formation constituted 70% of total
capital formation, and public consumption formed 50% of total consumption.
Government-produced services contributed to 12% of GDP during the first
development plan. By the end of the fourth development plan they were
contributing by 26%. In 1993 total government employment, both civil and
military, formed 24% of total employment.
Unfortunately, this intensive role of the government has inhibited the achievement
of some of the long term objectives of the development strategy. The private sector
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has failed to play the leading role. Private investment has been decreasing.
Businessmen have been mainly interested in quick-return-yielding activities such as
real estate, commerce, and contracting with the government.
The lack of profitable opportunities open to the private sector was one result of the
government's dominating role. With the obstacles encountered in the development
of the non-oil commodity sector in agriculture and industry, the objective of
economic diversification has not been accomplished.
If oil provided the opportunity for growth and proved to be a blessing for the state
and the economy, it was also a curse, because it imposed limits on the economy
which revenue alone could not remove. The inability of the state to diversify the
economy led to the increasing dependence on the government and the oil revenues.
Oman's population, due to remarkable progress in education and health services and
good living standards, has been increasing at a high rate of growth (3.4%). One
demographic peculiarity of Oman is the large proportion of teenagers. Those who
are 15 years or less constitute 51% of the total population. This characteristic has
led to shortage of labour force triggered by the inadequate vocational training
programme - despite the quantitative performance - to meet the labour market needs
for technicians, skilled and semi-skilled manpower. Accordingly, all private and
economic activities both in the commodity sector and services sector are
predominantly occupied by expatriate labourers. They occupy 82% of work
opportunities in the commodity sector and 75% in the services sector.
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The incremental reliance of the economy on the government and accordingly
excessive public spending accompanied by intensive dependence on oil revenues
which have been exposed to unpredictable trends of oil prices, has resulted in a
semi-chronic budget deficit.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 were devoted to measuring the deficit, to analysing its causes
and examining its impacts on the economy. To facilitate the study of these three
major aspects, chapter 2 focused on the government as a link between the oil sector
and other sectors and examined the objectives of the fiscal policy.
Due to the high capital intensive and enclave nature of the oil sector, there are few
significant forward or backward linkages. The most effective means of transmitting
the oil sector's growth to the rest of the economy is through the budget. Therefore
government purchases of total output averaged 50% and government wage bill
averaged 52% of the total wage bill of the economy and 16% of GDP. The
objectives of the fiscal policy are derived from the long-term objectives of the
development strategies: improving the quality of human resources through
education, health service and vocational training, the diversification of the economy
by developing the income generating projects, and equitable distribution of income
through sectoral and regional distribution of oil resources. Theoretically, these
objectives fall in the three main functions of the budget defined by Musgrave: an
allocation function, the distribution function, and the stabilisation function.
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Oman budgetary policy is aimed at affecting both sides of the economy: supply and
demand. On the supply side, the government tried to raise the country's growth
potential by channelling growth investment in the proper direction. It was also using
the budget to support the private sector to play its role in the economy. On the
demand side, the government expenditure both current and development aimed to
modify the inequality of income distribution. However, Oman is still characterised
by many features of underdeveloped countries such as insufficient infrastructure,
lopsided nature of economic growth, maldistribution of income, limited availability
of skilled labour, wages that rose beyond labour productivity, and decline of
traditional exports.
The financial control is still not efficient, lacking autonomy and skilled specialists
and the availability of database.
The budget is classified according to the line-item technique. This has a number of
advantages, but one disadvantage is that it does not facilitate the economic analysis
of individual transactions within the government's financial activities. It does not
provide useful information for the purposes of planning. The functional
classification permits trends in government expenditure on a special function to be
examined over time. Through this type of classification, the state fiscal activity can
be analysed, changes and developments can be followed up. Unfortunately, this
classification is not applied properly in Oman. Some government units are difficult
to classify into a particular group because their spending programmes serve many
purposes, e.g. the Diwan of Royal Court. In contrast, there are some activities
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served by several units and yet they are not collected into one section, e.g.
education. There are several kinds of education: agricultural, industrial, commercial
etc., all of which are practised by different ministries. However, the functional
classification does not include these several types in the education sector.
With respect to the measurement of the deficit which was discussed in chapter 3, the
conclusion that can be drawn is that the measurement of the fiscal deficit provides
the policy makers with analytical instruments to assess the net effects of government
budgetary transactions on different aspects of the national economy such as the
aggregate demand, the money supply, and the balance of payments. The deficit
measure which is adopted by this study is the conventional concept of deficit, which
is also known as the public debt concept of deficit because it measures the Public
Sector Borrowing Requirements (PSBR). There are other special purposes measures
of deficit, the most important of which for Oman are the current account concept of
deficit and the cyclical adjusted deficit. The former indicates the saving capacity of
the current budget to use it to finance the development budget. The latter is used to
remove the business cycle effects on the budget. By using this concept we found
that between 40%-60% of actual deficit in Oman is cyclical effect induced by
swinging oil prices.
The investigation of the causes of the deficit was conducted in chapter 4. The deficit
resulted from a gap between government expenditure and government revenues.
Government expenditure has been mostly higher than government revenues and it
was rising faster than government revenues. Accordingly the deficit consists of two
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parts. One relates to the expenditure side of the budget and the other relates to the
revenue side. There were two kinds of causes behind rising expenditure: general
causes and special causes. The general causes are population growth, administration
setbacks, monetary variables e.g. inflation and exchange rate depreciation, and
psychological causes relating to climate of confidence during the oil boom with ease
of access to financial resources.
The special causes refer to each one of the four types of government expenditure.
For example, current expenditure has been increasing because of increasing wages
and salaries as the main reason. Defence expenditure has been rising due to massive
spending on military and security purposes. All of the four types implied
unnecessary spending, i.e. misallocation of resources, and waste, i.e. inefficient
spending. In current expenditure the misallocation is represented in excessive
purchase of equipment, e.g. computer systems. Inefficient spending is represented
in purchasing at higher prices because of private interests.
Government revenues were impeded by their structure, oil prices, the cost of oil
production, and the depreciation of the dollar.
Regarding the structure of revenue, the small proportion of domestically collected
revenues, i.e. taxes and fees, to total revenue (12%) and the large contribution of
oil revenues (88%) made the public finance highly vulnerable to the external shocks
of the unstable world market of oil. The negative movement of oil prices adversely
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affected government revenues. For example, when oil prices declined to $13/b in
1986, oil revenue declined by 31%.
The high cost of Oman's oil production increases the government participation in
PDO capital expenditure and reduces the government's oil revenues. The
depreciation of the dollar has weakened the purchasing power of Oman's oil
through increasing import price index and reducing export price index.
The macroeconomic impacts of the budget deficit were traced first on the
indebtedness balance and foreign reserves, then on three macroeconomic variables:
money supply, aggregate demand and the balance of payments. The deficit effects
on these variables have been working through the way in which the deficit was
financed. One direct negative effect of the deficit has been the increasing public
debt which rose, by 1995, to RO 1500m. Its percentage of GDP averaged 30%
during the period under study which meant that one third of the country's income is
engaged by foreign debt.
The second direct negative effect was the rapid exhaustion of the foreign reserves.
Regarding money supply, the budget deficit has an expansionary influence on the
financial markets. Money supply is measured by the currency with the public and
demand deposits, and has had a positive responsiveness to the movements of
domestic budget balance. The influence was working through the inflow of oil
resources, and foreign borrowing. Therefore, commercial banks have been in
surplus, i.e. their total deposits have been larger than their total credit.
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Concerning the aggregate demand, total investment (private and public) was
decreasing during the period of budget deficit. Private investment has been hindered
by structural obstacles, as indicated earlier. It was not crowded out by public
investment, because, as mentioned above, the banking system was not short of
resources. In fact, the deficit has hindered both private and public investment
through the erosion of public saving. Due to massive public consumption and
deficit, the public saving was diminishing. Accordingly, the government reduced
public investment at sharp rates. This reduction has adversely affected the private
saving and investment because the private sector activity is almost contingent upon
the continuation of a high level of public expenditure.
The slow-down of both private and public consumption during the period under
study was caused by the decline of oil income and consequently non-oil income.
The balance of payments has been adversely affected, both directly and indirectly.
The direct impact of deficit on the balance of payments happened through the debt
service which has been reducing the foreign exchange gained by the trade balance.
The deficit has also been eroding the government's foreign reserves when the
overall balance of the balance of payments has been in deficit. The indirect impact
of the deficit on the balance of payment was working through the exchange rate
mechanism. The appreciation of the real exchange rate made the prices of the
Omani non-oil exports uncompetitive. It also made import prices cheaper than local
products, which has been minimising the trade balance surplus.
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The final chapter (chapter 6) evaluated the fiscal policy directed to cope with the
deficit problem. Finally it presented the alternative reforms.
The fiscal policy was evaluated through the assessment of the management of the
deficit and through the examination of the measures adopted to reduce the deficit.
The extent to which the deficit was prudent was judged via criteria such as domestic
private saving and investment, the creditworthiness concept, the current account
balance and the ratio of foreign reserves to imports. The result found was that the
level of the deficit was unacceptable because all these criteria were in unsatisfactory
positions. Private investment was falling, private saving was unstable, the current
account balance of the balance of payments has been falling since 1981. In 1986 it
saw a deficit of 14% of GDP. It recovered in 1987 and 1990 and recorded surplus
of 10% and 12% of GDP but since then it has been deteriorating. The
creditworthiness is measured by the debt/export ratio. This ratio was rising. In 1986
it peaked at 84% which meant that 84% of exports were engrossed in debt. The
usual objective in managing foreign reserves is to maintain an adequate ratio of
reserves to imports of goods and services. Foreign reserves covered 46% of imports
on average. However, this position has improved during the period under study to
57.6% due to the decline of imports.
Two main measures were adopted to reduce the deficit in addition to raising the
volume of oil production. The first one was the reduction of public spending.
Development expenditure was sacrificed. It was cut by 11.5% per annum during the
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period under study. The growth rate of education expenditure was reduced from
26% to 6.8%, and that of health services from 13% to 1%. Other reductions may
be acceptable such as that of military expenditure. However the sharp reduction of
development expenditure was harmful to the economy. The country's network of
highways, schools, hospitals, roads, etc. all represent the future wealth of the
country. The emphasis has to be on careful assessment of public spending and to
eliminate as much fat as possible. Every effort should be made to increase
efficiency in public spending and stop waste and extravagance.
The second measure to minimise the deficit was devaluation of the Omani Rial by
10.2% against the US dollar. Three goals were intended to be achieved through this
devaluation: raising government oil revenues in local currency, improving the
position of the balance of payments, and reducing the demand on foreign exchange.
In so far as these three goals has been achieved, the devaluation policy would be
successful. However, with the exception of the first one to some extent, the
collective result was not helpful.
Our suggested approach to deal with the problem, and even to avoid such problems,
is a more comprehensive one. It takes into consideration all the causes of the deficit,
as has been investigated above and articulated in chapter 4.
This approach has three main dimensions: rationalising public spending, improving
the source and techniques of financing and the diversification of the economy.
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The rationalisation of public spending requires a review of spending priorities, a
reform of public administration, and a rational use of the available resources.
Plausible criteria for ranking the areas of government involvement are promoting
efficiency, boosting economic growth, alleviating poverty and securing social and
macroeconomic stabilisation. These elements represent the country's national
economic and social goals and the government is responsible for their achievement.
Social, physical and information infrastructure: education, health, transport network
and public utilities are at the second level of government responsibility after
defence, justice and macroeconomic management. They meet the basic needs of the
population and the private sector is unqualified to produce them and distribute their
benefits equitably.
The second requirement to rationalise public spending is efficient public
administration and strict financial control. This can be achieved through reducing
bureaucratic trends in the government sector, organising training programmes for
civil officers, and strengthening the regulations and mechanisms of financial
control.
The third requirement to rationalise public spending is ensuring efficient use of
available resources. Resources should be allocated carefully between the main types
of spending. Careful assessment of each type of public expenditure must be
conducted to find the most cost-effective means to achieve the targeted objectives.
Current expenditures can be trimmed in areas of inefficient spending such as
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furniture, rents, cars and equipment. In development spending, white elephant
projects and luxurious building should be avoided.
The second dimension of the suggested approach is improving the sources and
techniques of financing. The financial situation of the government is characterised
by its dependence on depleted sources of revenue and high vulnerability to external
shocks. This is due to the fact that 80% of government expenditure is financed by
oil revenue. To immunise public finance against this vulnerability and to protect the
whole economy from external shocks, the internal source of financing (i.e. non-oil
revenue) must be developed. This will equip the government with fiscal tools that
can help obtain the goals of income redistribution, economic growth and
macroeconomic stabilisation. Therefore, the current level of oil revenue must be
maintained and stable sources of financing must be developed. The first goal can be
achieved through the reduction of production costs, continuing the current scale of
production, and effective co-ordination with other oil producing countries to
maintain a stable demand for oil in the world oil market. This policy must be
complemented by restoring the firmness of the SGRF.
To attain the second goal, the following measures are required: improving existing
taxes and introducing new ones, using the current deposits of the commercial banks
and restoring traditional Islamic sources of financing.
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The third dimension of our approach is the diversification of the economy. The
diversification policy is vital in seeking sustainable development as it would obtain
the following four objectives:
1. It would increase employment and create various sources of GDP.
2. It would strengthen the inter-sectoral relations and raise the domestic value
added.
3. It would immunise the economy against external shocks.
The diversification policy needs a development strategy that combines industrial
growth with agricultural development, full employment and equitable distribution of
national income. The oil sector needs to become more integrated with other sectors
through backwards and forwards real economic linkages. The petrochemical
industry is the most appropriate option for this. Financial resources generated in the
oil sector and transferred through the government budget can be used wisely to
develop the agricultural and rural economy. This can be achieved through
agricultural training, irrigation projects, roads, providing physical capital such as
stores, fields for the new graduates of agricultural colleges and developing the
traditional markets. In this way, the agricultural economy will become more
integrated within the modern economy based on oil income. Another requirement is
the revision of the protection system through tariffs, since agricultural producers
face strong competition from imports.
Commerce needs the elimination of monopolistic trends that prevail with some large
businessmen, who control trading in several activities. The economic surplus of this
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sector has not been recycled and projects have not been enlarged because the sector
is dominated by foreign nationals who transfer most of their profit to their home
countries. Therefore, commercial activities should be confined to Omanis.
The manufacturing sector should use local agricultural and mineral raw materials. It
should also increase the employment of Omanis. By adopting such measures, the
industrial sector would lower costs, create sectoral integration, increase local value
added and nationalise technology.
To round up this thesis, a general conclusion that can be reached from this study is
that drawing up theories and policies for development are one thing, but the right
application of these theories and policies is quite another. Each society is a special
case, and careful analysis of the real economic and social fabric of each society is
necessary to formulate realistic targets and policies for the country's development.
Clear vision for the future is required, in which sufficient and reliable databases,
especially on demographic realities, are of prime importance. Decision-maldng, on
the other hand, must take place through taking into consideration all the points of
view of concerned enlightened members of the society and not just through closed
meetings between one particular group of people all the time. A country may be
blessed with sufficient resources but the question is how to use these resources
carefully.
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Schedule No. (2/2)
Estimates of Other Current Revenues
ltemwise for the Financial Year 1995
(Thousands of Rial Omani)
Account Number
- PARTICULARS
Revenue
EstimatesHead Class Item
A) Taxes and Fees Revenue :
1 101 21 Income Tax on Companies and Establishments 35,000
•1 103 11 Pay Roll Tax (Company participation in
. Technical Training Project) 43,077
1 104 11 Municipality Fees on Rents 3,838
1 104 41 Fees on Real Estate Transactions 4,036
1 105 51 Business Licences 0,656
1 105 52 Transportation Licences 8,500
1 105 53 Fees from Hotels and Entertainments 2,011
1 105 54 Taxes on concessionary use 2,001
1 105 55 Domestic Miscellaneous Licences 2,938
1 106 11 Custom Duties 42,000
r r
Total of Taxes and Fees Revenue 144,057
B) Non Tax Revenue : 	 •
1 108 11 Revenue from Sale of Electricity 91,544
1 108 12 Other Electricity Revenue 2,420
1 108 13 Revenue from Sale of Water 21,377
1 108 14 Other Water Revenue 0,394
1 108 15 Postal Revenue 4,507
1 108 16 Airport Revenue 12,158
1 108 17 Ports Revenue 0,958
1 108 21 Surplus from Public Authorities 45,000
1 108 31 Rent from Government Real Estate 2,429
1 108 41 Income from Geveenment Investments 33,054
1 108 42 Interest on Bank Deposits and Lending 4,402
1 109 11 Passport and Immigration Fees 4,100
1 109 12 Miscellaneous Administrative fees and Charges 10,028
1 110 11 Compensation Fines and Forfeits 5,392
1 112 11 Mining Revenue 0,898
1 112 21 Sale of Food Stuff 0,092
1 112 22 • Miscellaneous Agricultural Revenue 0,190
1 112 23 Fisheries Revenue 1,007
1 112 24 Medical Revenue 4,524
1 112 25 Sale of Goods at reduced prices 1,144
1 112 26 Miscellaneous Revenue 8,855
1 100 12 Other Revenue 1,470
,
Total of Non Tax Revenue 255,943
Total	 Estimates of Other Current
Revenue ltemwise (A + 8) 400,000
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Schedule No. (4)
Estimates of Current and Capital Expenditure
for Civil Ministries for the Financial Year 1995
(Thousands of Rial Omani)
Bud get
Number
,
MINISTRY / DEPARTMENT
Current
Expendi-
lure
Capital
Expendi-
lure
Total
Expendi-
lure
10100 Diwan of Royal Court 91,989 1,858 93,847
10200 General Secretariat of the Cabinet 0,619 0,030 0,649
10300 Office of HM's Personal Representative 0,512 0,009 0,521
15300 Cabinet to the	 Deputy	 Prime	 Minister for
Council of Ministers 0,404 0,010 0414
10400 Ministry of Legal Affairs 0,974 0,008 0,982
10500 Ministry of Finance & Economy 5,960 0,127 6,087
10600 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 18,212 0,090 18,302
10700 Ministry of Interior 13,496 0,165 13,661
10800 Ministry of Information 14,473 0,318 14,791
10900 Ministry of Commerce & Industry 5,437 0,031 5,468
11000 Ministry of Petroleum & Minerals 4,961 0,025 4,986
11100 Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries 16,684 0,092 16,776
11200 Ministry of Justice Awqaf & Islamic Affairs 10,695 0,247 10,942
11300 Ministry of Health 302,574 4,526 107,100
11400 Ministry of Education• 150,324 1,443 151,767
11500 Ministry of Social Affairs & Labour 30,022 0,219 30,241
11600 Ministry of National Heritage & Culture 2,950 0,037 2,987
11700 Ministry of Housing 7,777 0,133 7,910
11800 Ministry of Communication 21,068 0,282 21,350
11900 Ministry of Electricity & Water 123,079 0,544 123,623
12000 Ministry of Post, Telegraph & Telephones 4,755 0,019 4,774
12100 Ministry of Regional Municipalities &
Environment 21,844 0,281 22,125
12200 High Committee for National Day 0,215 0,003 0,218
12300 Office of Minister of State & Governor Dhofar 22,293 0,553 22,846
12400 Governorate of Muscat 1,395 0,012 1,407
12500 Secretariat General of Development Council 0,125 0.006 0,131
12600 Office of Special Advisor to His Majesty the
Sultan 0,200 0,003 0,203
12700 Office of Advisor to His Majesty the Sultan for
Development Planning Affairs 0,701 0,008 0,709
12800 Office of Advisor to His Majesty the Sultan for
Economic Planning Affairs 0,230 0,010 0,240
12900 Office of Advisor to His Majesty the Sultan for
External Liaison 0,213 0,006 0,219
13000 Secretariat General of Consultative Council 1,775 0,105 1,880
13100 Ministry of Civil Service 19,236 0,023 19,259
13200 Secretariat General of Civil Service Council 0,244 0,004 0,248
13300 Secretariat of Supreme Committee for Town
Planning 0,292 0,004 0,296
15
r-.
Schedule No. (2/1)
Estimates of Other Current Revenues Functionwise for Ministries and
Public Authorities for the Financial Year 1995
(Thousands of Mal Omani)
Budget
Number MINISTRY / DEPARTMENT
—
Revenue
Estimates
(1)	 General Public Services Sector :
10400 Ministry of Legal Affairs 0,072
10500 Ministry of Finance and Economy 35,508
10600 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1,986
12200 High Committee for National , Day 0,014
12700 Office of the Advisor to H.M. the Sultan for Development Planning Affairs 0,201
12900 Office of Advison to His Majesty the Sultan for External
Liaison 0,003
13000 Secretariat General of Consultative Council 0,018
14000 Ministry of Finance and Economy
(Ministers and Under Secretaries Appropriation) 0,008
Total of General Public Services Sector 37,810
(3)	 Public order and Safety Sector
10700 Ministry of Interior 0,037
11201 Ministry of Justice, Awqaf and Islamic Affairs (Justice Affairs) 0,048
&
11202
12400 Governorate of Muscat 0,004
13600 Magistrate Court 0,011
13900 Authority for Settlement of Commercial Disputes 0,507
20400 Ministry of Defence 1,000
20600 Royal Oman Police 61,897
Total of Public Order and Safety Sector 63,504
(4)	 Education Sector :
11400 Ministry of Education 0,620
13700 Sultan Oaboos University & Educational Hospital 0,163
15100 Vocational Training Authority 0,037
15200 Institute of Public Administration 0,040
11204 Ministry of Justice, Awqafand Islamic Affairs (Institute of
Juries prudence) 0,001
Total of Education Sector- 0,861
(5)	 Health Sector :
11300 Ministry of Health 4,881
Total of Health Sector 4,881
(6)	 Social Security and Welfare Sector :
11500 Ministry of Social Affairs & Labour 46,599
Total of Social Security and Welfare Sector 46,599
(7)	 Housing Sector :
10100 Diwan of Royal Court (Municipality of Muscat and Sohar
Development Office) 8,550
11700 Ministry of Housing 4,796
10
Axneaule no. 011)Estimates of Current and Capital Expenditure Functionwise
for Civil Ministries for the Financial Year 1995
(Thousands of Mai Omani)
Budget
Number MINISTRY / DEPARTMENT
Current
Expendi-
ture
Capital
Expendi-
ture
Total
Expendi-
lure
(1)	 General Public Services Sector
10100 Diwan of Royal Court 76,764 1,607 78,371
10200 Cabinet Secretariat 0,619 0,030 0,649
10300 Office of HM's Personal Representative 0,512 0,009 0,521
15300 Cabinet to the Deputy Prime Minister for
Council of Ministers 0,404 0,010 0,414
10400 Ministry of Legal Affairs 0,974 0,008 0,982
10500 Ministry of Finance & Economy 5,960 0,127 6,087
10600 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 18,212 0,090 18,302
12200 High Committee For National Day 0,215 0,003 0,218
12600 Office of Special Advisor to His Majesty the Sultan 0,200 0,003 0,203
12700 Office of Advisor to His Majesty the Sultan
for Development Planning Affairs 0,701 0,008 0,709
12900 Office of Advisor to His Majesty the Sultan
for External Liaison 0,213 0,006 0,219
13000 Secretariat General of Consultative Council 1,775 0,105 1,880
14000 Ministers & Under Seaetaries Appropriation 4,776 0,183 4,959
14100 Secretariat	 General	 for	 Supreme
Committee for Conferences 0,267 0,001 0,268
Total of General Public Services Sector 111,592 2,190 113,782
(3)	 Public Order and Safety Sector
10109 Diwan of Royal Court 1,506 - 1,506
(Appropriation for Ministers and Sheikhs)
10700 Ministry of Interior 13,496 0,165 13,661
11201
& -
11202 Ministry of Justice Awqaf, and Islamic
Affairs (Justice Affairs)	 . 5,005 0,108 5,113
12400 Office of State Minister & Govemorate of
Muscat 1,395 0,012 1,407
13600 Magistrate Court 1,269 0,022 1,291
13900 Authority	 for	 the	 Settlement	 of .
Commercial Disputes 0,720 0,009 0,729
Total of Public Order & Safety Sector 23,391 0,316 23,707
(4)	 Education Sector
•
11204 Ministry of Justice, Awqaf, and Islamic
Affairs 0,871 0,009 0,880
11400 Ministry of Education 150,324 1,443 151,767
13700 Sultan Qaboos University • 46,725 0,603 47,328
14600 Supreme	 Committee	 for	 Vocational
Training & Labour 0,186 0,014 0,200
15100 Vocational Training Authority 10,528 0,285 10,813
15200 Institute of Public Administration 0,910 0,018 0,928
15500 Ministry of Higher Education 4,859 0,023 4,882
Total of Education Sector 214,403 2,395 216,798
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Schedule No. (3/1)
Estimates of Capital Revenues and
Repayments itemwise for the Financial Year 1995
(Thousands of Mal Omani)
Account Number
PARTICULARS
Estimates
of Revenue
Repay-mentsHead Class Item
Capital Revenue : 	
.
1	 • 213 11 Revenue from Sales of Social Houses
& Govt. Buildings 1,486
1 215 11 Revenue from Sale of Government
Land 5,014
Total Estimates of Capital Revenue 6,500
Capital Repayments :
Repayment of Loan Installments :
1 430 11 Repayment	 of	 Loans	 by	 Public
Authorities Establishments and Others 13,138
Sale of Investments :
1 431 11 Sale	 of	 Investments	 in	 Public	 and
Private Authorities and Establishments 10,000
Total	 of	 Estimates	 of	 Capital
Repayments (Ifemwise) 23,138
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Schedule No. (4/1)
Estimates of Current and Capital Expenditure Functionwise
for Civil Ministries for the Financial Year 1995
(Thousands of Mal Omani)
Bud get
Number MINISTRY / DEPARTMENT
Current
Expendi-
lure
Capital
Expendi-
lure
Total
Expendi-
ture
(5)	 Health Sector
11300 Ministry of Health 102,574 4,526 107,100
Total of Health Sector 102,574 4,526 107,100
(6)	 Social Security & Welfare Sector
11500 Ministry of Social Affairs & Labour 30,022 0,219 30,241
13100 Council and Ministry of Civil Service 19,236 0,023 19,259
13200 Secretariat	 General	 of	 Civil	 Service
Council 0,244 0,004 0,248
14214 Subsidies	 to ' Household	 and	 Other
Establishments 1,045 - 1,045
Total of Social Security and Welfare Sector 	 ' 50,547 0,246 50,793
-(7)	 Housing Sector
Diwan of Royal Court Comprising of :
•
10103 -	 Municipality of Muscat 11,603 0,236 11,839
10105 -	 Advisor for Environment 0,245 - 0,245
10107 . -	 Sohar Development Office 1,684 0,015 1,699
10111 - Office of the Advisor to H.M. the Sultan
for Environmental Affairs 0,187 - 0,187
11700 Ministry of Housing 7,777 0,133 7,910
11903 •
&
11908 Ministry of Electricity and Water (Water
Sector) 9,207 0,094 9,301
12100 Ministry	 of	 Regional	 Municipalities	 &
Environment 21,844 0,281 22,125
12300 Office of Minister of State & Governor of
Dhofar 22,293 0,553 22,846
13300 Secretariat of Supreme Committee for
Town Planning 0,292 0,004 0,296
14900 Ministry of Water Resources 10,470 0,666 11,136
Total of Housing Sector 85,602 1,982 87,584
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Estimates of current Expenditure for Civil Ministries
for the Financial Year 1988 (item wise)
(Amount in Thousands of Mai Omani)
Account Number
Particulars Estimates
of Expenditure
Head
'
Sub
Head
Item Sub
Item
2 101 00 00 Expenditure on Goods and Services
2 101 10 00 Wages and Salaries
2 101 11 00 Wages
2 101 11 01 Basic Salary 191.652
2 101 11 02 Wages of Temporary Employees 0.353
Total Salaries and Wages 192.005
2 101 12 00 Allowances
2 101 12 01 Housing 20.426
2 101 12 02 Electricity 4.317
2 101 12 03 Water 1.635
2 101 12 04 Telephone 0.337
2 101 12 05 Nature of Work 2.669
2 101 12 06 Expatriation 0.370
2 101 12 07 Transport 2.299
,	 2 101 12 08 Others 32.621
Total Allowances 64.674
2 101 13 00 Other Remunerations
.	 2 101 13 01 Travel Tickets 10.648
2 101 13 02 Travel Expenses_ 1.084
2 101 13 03 Bonus 4.306
2 101 13 04 Leave Encashment 0.116
2 101 13 05 . Overtime 2.661
2 101 13 06 End of Service Benefits 5.090
2 101 13 07 Rents for Staff Accommodation 10.580
2 101 13 08 Cost of Special Employment Contracts 22.434
Total Other Remuneration 56.919
Total Wages Salaries Allowances and Others 313.598
2 101 30 00 Other Purchase of Goods and Services
2 101 31 00 1) Goods
2 101 31 01 Medical Supplies 7.481
2 101 31 02 Agricultural Supplies 1.943
2 101 31 03 Chemical and Insecticides Supplies 0.021
2 101 31 04 Education Supplies 5.964
2 101 31 05 Food Supplies 6.165
2 101 31 06 Office Supplies and Printed Materials 2.622
2 101 31 07 Building and Roads Supplies 0.737
2 101 31 08 Broadcasting and TV Supplies 1.930
2 101 31 09 Computer Supplies 0.025
2 101 31 10 Machinery Fuel 0.955
2 101 31 12 Machinery Spare Parts 63.447
2 101 31 13 Fuel for Vehicle and other Transportation 2.329
2 101 31 14 Spare Parts of Vehicles and Other Transporations 0.611
2 101 31 15 Other Supplies of Goods 3.091
_
Total Supplies of Goods 97.321
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Estimates of current Expenditure for Civil Ministries
for the Financial Year 1988 (Item wise)
(Amount In Thousands of Rial Omani)
Account Number
Particulars Estimates,
of ExpenditureHead Sub
Head
Item Sub
Item
2 101 32 00 2) Purchase of Goods for Resale at Subsidised Prices
2 101 32 01 Oates 0.165
2 101 32 02 Meat 0. 891
Total Purchase of Goods for Resale at Subsidised Pdces 1.056
2 101 33 00 3) Services
2 101 33 02 Cleaning Contracts 2.193
2 101 33 03 Building Maintenance 5.321
2 101 33 04 Office Furniture and Equipment Maintenance 0.714
2 101 33 05 House Furniture and Equipment Maintenance 0.071
2 101 33 06 Maintenance of Vehicles and Other Transport 4.181
2 101 33 07 Machinery Maintenance 0.085
2 101 33 08 Computer Machinery Maintenance 0.189
2 101 33 09 Other Maintenance 1.450
2 101 33 10 Rents of Real Estates 3.793
2 101 33 11 Insurance of Vehicles 1.298
2 101 33 12 Insurance of Govt. Properties & Treasuries 0.603
2 101 33 13 Travel on Duty Expenditure 2.216
2 101 33 14 Subscription for Newspaper & Periodicals 0.977
2 101 33 15 Advertisement and Exhibition 0.240
2 101 33 16 Training and Scholarship 13.804
2 101 33 17 Medical Treatment Abroad Expenditure 1.900
2 101 33 18 Cost of Other Services 3.893
2 101 33 19 National Day-Celebration Cost 0.690
2 101 33 20 Hire & Vehicles 4.502
2 101 33 21 Cost of Electric Connection Outside Capital Area 0.439
2 101 33 23 Contracts of Consulting Services 1.474
2 101 33 24 Contracts of Operating Service 0.614
2 101 33 25 Contracts for Other Services 0.937
2 101 33 29 Unclassified Expenses 17.755
Total Services Supplies 69.339
2 101 34 00 4) Government Services Expenses
2 101 34 01 Posts. Telegraph and Telephones Services 3.362
2 101 34 02 Cost of Electricity Consumption 6.414
2 101 34 03 Cost of Water Consumption 0 641
Total Government Services Expenses 10.617
Total Expenditure on Goods & Serrices(1 + 2 +3 +4) 178.333
2 103 00 00 Subsidies and other Current Transfers
2 103 10 00 1) Subsidies	 .
2 103 11 00 Subsidies for Non Financial Authorities and
Establishments
2 103 11 01 Subsidies for Public Authorities 5.002
Schedule No. (413)
Total Subsidies 5.002
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Estimates of current Expenditure for Civil Ministries
for the Financial Year 1988 (Item wise)
(Amt in Thousands of Rial Omani)
Account Number
r
Particulars
Estimates
of ExpenditureHead Sub
Head
Item Sub
item
2 103 30 00 2) Transfers to Non Financial Authorities and
Establishments
2 103 31 01 Transfers to Clubs and Sports Unions 2.115
2 103 31 02 Transfers to other Authorities and Establishment 0.068
Total Transfers to Non Financial Authorities and
Establishments 2.183
2 103 40 00 3) Grants and Compensation to National
Households
2 103 41 00 Aids to National Household
2 103 41 01 Grants for Social Purposes 11.711
2 103 41 02 Sheiks and Tribes Allotment 0.219
2 103 41 03 Emergency Grants 0.921
2 103 41 04 Students Cost of Living Allotment 1.549
2 103 41 05 Miscellaneous Aids	
.. -
4.282
Total Grants and Compensation to National
Households 18.682
2 103 42 00 4) Subsidies to National Household
2 103 42 04 Allocation for Rural Development 0.100
-
Total Subsidies to National Household 0.100
2 103 61 00 5) Foreign Grants
•
2 103 61 01 Foreign Grants 0.200
Total Foreign Grants 0.200
2 103 62 00 6) Contribution to Non Financial Organisation
2 103 62 01 Gulf Council Organisations 1.869
2 103 62 02 Arab Organisations 0.748
2 103 62 03 International Organisations 1.079
Total Contribution to Non Financial Organisations 3.696
Total Subsidies and Other Current Transfers
(1+2+3+4+5+6) 29.863
Current Budget Reserve 11.206
Total Current Budget Reserve 11.206
Total Estimates of Current Expenditures
for Civil Ministries (Item wise)
533.000
18
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Financial Year 1988 
(Amount in Million of Rid l Omani)
PARTICULARS BUDGET ESTIMATES
First:
	 Revenue:
1) Net Oil Revenue
2) Natural Gas Revenue
3) Other Current Revenue (Schedule No.2)
4) Capital Revenue (Schedule No. 3)
5) Capital Repayments (Schedule No. 3)
1065.3
43.0
202.7
3.9
35.4
6) Total Revenue (1+2+3+4+5)
•
1350.3
Second:Expenditure, and Lending & Participation:
Current Expenditures:
7) Defence & National Security
8) Civil Ministries (Schedule No. 4)
9) Interest on Loans
10) Government Share in PDO's Current Expenditure
532.6
533.0
84.0
70.0
11) Total Current Expenditures (7+8+9+10) 1219.6
Capital Expenditures:
12) Project Expenditure for Civil Ministries (Schedule No. 4)
13) Exploration of Natural Gas 	 ..
14) Government Share in PDO's 'capital Expenditure
15) Non Project Capital Expenditure for Civil Ministries (Schedule No.4)
245.0
6.3
74.0
12.0
16) Total Capital Expenditure (12+13+14+15) 337.3
Lending & Participation:
17) industrial Sector
18) Oman Housing Bank
19) Oman Development Bank
20) Oman Bank for Agriculture & Fisheries
21) International Regional and Domestic Establishments
.
8.0
7.0
2.0
5.0
23.4
22) Total Lending and Participation (17+18+19+20+21) 45.4
23) Total Expenditures, and Lending & Participation
(11 +16+ 22) 1602.3
24) Net Surplusi(Deficit) (6-23) (252.0)
Third:	 Financing:
25) Net Borrowing
Loans Receivable
Loans Repayable
26) Net Grants
178.0
123.0 55.0
3.0
Total Financing (25+26) 58.0
Balance Deficit (24-27) (194.0)
5
(4Estimates of Non Project Capital Expenditurefor Civil Ministries for the Financial Year 1988
(item wise)
(Amount in Thousands of Rid Omani)
Account Number
Particulars Estimates
of ExpenditureHead Sub
Head
Item Sub
Item
-
2 204 00 00 Acquisition of Fixed Capital Assets
2 204 30 00 Non Project Expenditures
2 204 30 00 Furniture and Equipment
2 204 31 01 Office Furniture and Equipment 1.198
2 204 31 02 House Furniture and Equipment 2.842
Total Furniture and Equipment 4.040
2 204 32 00 Means of Transport
2 204 32 01 Vehicles 5.151
Total means of Transport
2 204 33 00 Machinery and Equipment
2 204 33 01 Machinery 1.672
2 204 33 02 Eqiprnent 0.319
Total Machinery and Equipment 1.991
2 204 34 00 Miscellaneous Fixed Assets - —
2 204 34 01 Other fixed Assets 0.806
Total Miscellaneous fixed Assets 0.806
Total Estimates of Non Project Capital Expenditure
(itermvise) '	 11.988
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Schedule No. (5 / 1)
Sectoral Distribution of Development
Budget for 1995
(Thousands of Rial Omani)
Cost of Cost of
on-going New
Projects Projects In Total
Sectors from Third the Fourth
Five Year Ave Year Allocations
Plan Plan
A. Commodity Sector
- Oil 0,014 0,167 0,181
- Natural Gas 8,374 29,992 38,366
- Minerals and Quarries 0,427 6,579 7,006
- Agriculture 0,443 12,212 12,655
- Fisheries 1,051 35,691 36,742
- Manufacture 0,070 35,017 35,087
Total Commodity Sector 10,379 119,658 130,037
B.	 Services Sector
- Housing 0,416 29,161 29,577
- Trade 0,839 5,354 6,193
- Electricity 1,041 67,135 68,176
- Water 4,986 76,704 81,690
- Posts, Telegraph & Telephones 0,895 2,623 3,518
- Transport 0,118 0,118
- Tourism 0,75-7 7,125 7,882
Total Services Sector 8,934 188,220 197,154
C.	 Social Services Sector
- Education 1,149 71,227 72,376
- Vocational Training 0,345 11,113 11,458
'	 - Health	 . 4,079 53,232 ' 57,311
- Information, Culture & Islamic Affairs 0,209 18,788 18,997
- Community Centres 0,762 2,919 3,681
- Youth Centres• 0,143 6,760 6,903
Total Social Structures Sector 6,687 164,039 170,726
D.	 Infrastructure Sector
- Roads 2,603 47,010 49,613
- Airports 0,316 11,526 11,842
- Ports 0,015 4,526 4,541
- Irrigation & Water Resources 3,867 39,512 43,379
- Town Planning & Municipal Services 6,653 38,080 44,733
- Government Administration 6,087 59,607 65,694
• Environment & Pollution Control 0,021 4,605 4,626
Total Infrastructure Sector 19,562 204,866 224,428
Total (A+B+C+D) 45,562 676,783 722,345
Estimate of Actual Expenditure for 1995 250,000
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Schedule No. (5)
Total Development Budget Allocations
for the Financial year 1995
(Thousands of Rial Omani)
Sector / Ministry and Subsector
Balance on
going Projects
from third Five
Year Plan
Cost of Pro-
jacts Included
, e , he wee
for years
1991 -1995
Total
Allocations
A)	 Commodity Production Sector
Ministry of Petroleum & Minerals : Oil 0,024 1,713 1,737
Ministry of Petroleum & Minerals : Gas 8,374 34,732 43,106
Ministry of Petroleum & Minerals : Minerals 0,427 6,579 7,006
Ministry of Commerce & Industry : Industry 0,061 2,928 2,989
Public Establishment for Industrial Estates 0,009 17,093 17,102
Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries : Agriculture 0,735 13,636 14,371
Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries : Fisheries 1,051 35,691 36,742
Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries Irrigation &
Water resources 2,460 6,845 9,305
Support for Industrial Development Programme - 15,500 15,500
Subtotal 13,141 134,717 147,858
B)	 Service Producing Sector
Ministry of Commerce and Industry : Trade 0,508 6,263 6,771
Ministry of Commerce and Industry : Tourism 0,931 7,125 8,056
Ministry of Housing 1,898 23,321 25,219
Ministry of Electricity & Water : Electricity 0,975 67,297 68,272
Ministry of Electricity & Water : Water 3,215 70,907 74,122
Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones 0,895 2,623 3,518
Authority for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes - 0,054 0,054
Public Authority for Stores & Food Reserves 0,316 0,753 1,069
Public	 Authority	 for	 Marketing .	Agricultural .
Products 0,015 0,026 0,041
Muscat Securities Market - 1,556 1,556
Subtotal 8,753 179,925 188,678
C)	 Social Service Sector
0,187 11,035 11,222'-'	 Ministry of Information
Ministry of Justice, Awqaf & Islamic Affairs 0,164 2,607 2,771
Ministry of Health	 . 3,653 53,506 57,159
Ministry of Education 0,522 37,256 37,778
General	 Organization	 for	 Youth	 Sports	 and
Cultural Activities 0,143 .	 6,788 6,931
: Ministry of Social Affairs & Labour 0,975 3,847 4,822
Ministry of National Heritage & Culture 0,055 6,614 6,669
Ministry of Civil Service 0,001 17,239 17,240
Institute of Public Administration - 0,340 0,340
Magistrate Court - 0,448 0,448
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